Freedom and Miracles

Abstract

There is a in the air.' One argument in the family of new arguments for incompatibilism might be called the argument for incompatibilism. I have presented a version of the modal argument (following Carl Ginet), and Peter Van Inwagen has recently presented basically the same sort of argument.2 ( I shall also refer to the modal argument for incompatibilism as the Ginet/Van Inwagen argument.) Elsewhere, I argued that the Ginet/ Van Inwagen argument is importantly incomplete; there is no single interpretation of the premises of the argument on which it is uncontroversially sound.3 Both Ginet and Van Inwagen have defended the modal argument against the sort of criticism which I developed.4 In this paper, I propose to look again at the modal argument for incompatibilism. I shall present a simplified version of the argument, and I intend to show that the compatibilist can explain the examples adduced by Ginet and Van Inwagen in defense of their argument by narrower principles than those used in the argument, principles which don't support incompatibilism. Thus, I shall defend a version of my original claim that the incompatibilist's argument is incomplete. I do not here purport to defend compatibilism; rather, my project is to make clear where the gaps are in the modal argument for incompatibilism. Further, I shall point out that, whereas the incompatibilist's argument is not entirely convincing, it has an important virtue it exposes a commitment of certain compatibilists which appears to stand in need of some explanation and justification. In the course of this discussion, I hope to shed light on the relationship between human freedom and the laws of nature. I shall argue that the compatibilist has a distinctive and not obviously false view about this relationship.