Missile Program Research Articles

The Development of the US National Missile Defense and its Impact on the International Security

The article reflects the US officials' point of view on the development of its national missile defense. The major threat to international security is the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. The United States and the former Soviet Union made huge efforts to reduce and limit offensive arms. However, presently the proliferation of ballistic missiles spreads all over the world, especially in the Middle East, because of the ballistic missile technology falling into the hands of hostile non-state groups. Missile defenses can provide a permanent presence in a region and discourage adversaries from believing they can use ballistic missiles to coerce or intimidate the U.S. or its allies. With the possible attack regional missile defense systems will be promptly mobilized to enhance an effective deterrent. The ultimate goal of such large-scale missile defense deployment is to convince the adversaries that the use of ballistic missiles is useless in military terms and that any attack on the United States and its allies is doomed to failure. The United States has missile defense cooperative programs with a number of allies, including United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, Israel, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Czech Republic, Poland, Italy and many others. The Missile Defense Agency also actively participates in NATO activities to maximize opportunities to develop an integrated NATO ballistic missile defense capability. The initiative of the development of US BMD naturally belongs to the United States. That country has enormous technological, financial, economic, military and institutional capabilities, exceeding by far those of the other NATO members combined.

India's Pursuit Of Ballistic Missile Defense

This article analyzes India's efforts to deploy a Ballistic Missile Program (BMD). The article has three objectives. First, it argues that scientific-bureaucratic factors and India's incapacity to deter Pakistan's use of terrorist proxies have driven its quest for BMD. Second, the article also evaluates the current state of India's two-tiered missile defense shield. In spite of various claims on the part of India's defense science establishment, the paper estimates that India still lacks a deployable BMD system and is still far from developing an effective strategy of deterrence-through-denial. Third, the article analyzes the implications of the development of India's BMD system for nuclear stability in South Asia. The article shows how India's BMD capacities, however limited, have indirectly exacerbated the security concerns of India's regional rival, Pakistan.

The Design Research of Millimeter-Wave Homing Empty - Empty Ammunition Ballistics

The millimeter-wave terminal guidance ammunition monitoring scanning field is small. The modified design is in order to improve the search section trajectory guidance. This study established seeker search area to capture the target model, which leads to the missile engine unpowered glide distance formula after flameout. At the millimeter-wave terminal on the missiles contraction section ballistic. Each missile is designed for the flat road, the swash decline ballistic programs. Flat missile road program scans and does not shrink. Its flight speed falls and declines rapidly, has different gliding distance and terminal velocity. After the missile engine is flameout, its start-gliding speed is great. Ramp fell ballistic program enhances the air-air (or air-ground) guided missile’s gliding ability, helping to improve range. But shortcomings are that target tracking scanning domain contracts. Using the seeker optical axis in the pitch direction can achieve accurate positioning with the height precession. Two ballistic designs can both meet the target seeker’s scanning, thus effectively improve the striking precision.

Las Relaciones entre Corea del Norte y Pakistán y el tráfico de tecnología

North Korea may well constitute a threat for international peace and security not only for its nuclear weapons and missile programs but also due to the transfer of such know-how. In this regard, the relation between the North Korean State and Pakistan deserves special attention. Thus, the article will analyze the nuclear and missile exchanges between Pakistan and North Korea and the short, medium term implications of the North Korean transfers.

Battlefield weapons and missile defense: Worrisome developments in nuclear South Asia

Two recent developments in South Asia have increased the risk of an accelerated arms race between India and Pakistan. One development is Pakistan’s introduction of the Nasr missile, a very-short-range, “tactical” nuclear weapon that threatens India’s conventional forces and could also tempt other countries to develop battlefield-usable nuclear weapons. The other development is India’s announcement that it plans to use its nascent ballistic missile defense program to protect the civilian populations of Delhi and Mumbai, which would weaken Pakistan’s strategy of deterrence by threatening civilian casualties. Although these two developments occurred in response to other perceived threats and are not directly connected, both have introduced new and more dangerous dimensions to the South Asian nuclear scene.

STIFLED GROWTH AND ADDED SUFFERING

The United States rhetorically promotes a nuclear-free North Korea with an open economic system, eager for the country to become an integrated member of the global community. Sanctions Washington has imposed on Pyongyang since the outbreak of the Korean War, however, have failed to advance this objective. Indeed, sanctions have proven to be counterproductive. While having a negligible effect on North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, sanctions also restrict the inflow of foreign investment, thereby stymieing North Korea's efforts to recalibrate its economic system. The dearth of foreign investment further limits the establishment of market-based exchanges that would facilitate economic liberalization, a process that could improve economic security in North Korea. It is the North Korean people, moreover, not the governing elite, who bear the ultimate costs and suffer under these sanctions, creating undeniable tension when considering the causal relationship between economic sanctions and human rights. Despite assurances offered by U.S. administrations that sanctions policies exclusively target the government, this article argues that economic restrictions play a significant role in the country's economic woes, inhibiting Pyongyang from improving the standard of living for the North Korean people and failing to promote an improvement in basic economic rights.

Non-Traditional Security Issues in North Korea ed. by Kyung-Ae Park

Reviewed by: Non-Traditional Security Issues in North Korea ed. by Kyung-Ae Park Jerôme de Wit Non-Traditional Security Issues in North Korea edited by Kyung-Ae Park . Honolulu : University of Hawai’i Press , 2013 . 265 pp. When the international media discusses North Korea, the most common topic that is paid attention to is its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and its missile program. This is usually paired with reports on North Korea’s belligerent rhetoric and a reminder of its million men army that are a threat to Northeast Asian security, Seoul in particular. Scholars and policy makers with a focus on North Korea are also keen to focus almost exclusively on these topics and one can find many analytical papers on the North’s military, defense budget, fighting capability, the state of its weapons systems, military exercises, etc. These studies all focus on national security concerns and belong to the realm of traditional security. This edited volume of works by North Korea experts is an attempt to shift the focus away from these traditional concerns. The book’s argument is that the theories and notions of national security have failed to offer an adequate explanation of the national security threats posed by North Korea. The contributors believe that the North’s national security concerns are to a high degree informed by human security and non-traditional security (NTS) issues, and, once the causes of the North’s national insecurity are known, we are better able to handle the threats posed by the North to our (inter-)national security. The first chapter introduces the concept of NTS and examines in the context of North Korea how NTS and traditional security form complex and multifaceted connections. It describes how the indeterminate relationship between national and human security can be conceptualized by focusing on NTS issues. By using examples of the North’s insecurity issues in regards to food and energy security, this chapter explains how NTS issues can serve as an important variable in determining whether a state and its society can be deemed secure or unsafe. The next chapters all deal with a specific non-traditional security issue. Chapter two gives a brief history of North Korea’s energy problems and discusses the impact the lack of energy security has on the North’s economy and society. The authors of this chapter regard energy shortages as one of the reasons why North Korea uses the threat of military action to try to induce the international community to meet its demands. Addressing these concerns will in their opinion help the overall security of the Northeast Asian region and they suggest several assistance approaches. Chapter three examines the NTS issue of economic security in connection with women in North Korea. The author shows that the North Korean economic crisis has had different impacts on men and women in that it changed [End Page 147] the pattern of women’s economic participation, dragging women away from the formal labor market into the informal private economic sector. This has also forced a number of women to cross the North Korean border in their attempt to provide for both their own and their families’ livelihoods. On the one hand it seems that the new economic roles that women have assumed has given them a stronger voice in family decision-making matters and allowed them to develop, to some degree, a sense of self-consciousness and awareness of their own rights. On the other hand women’s economic insecurity has negatively affected other sectors of their NTS and human security resulting in new threats such as an increase in workloads, sex trafficking and sexual violence, and the stress of family breakdowns. Chapter four deals with political bias in labeling North Korea a criminal state. By giving an overview of how transnational crime is securitized, the author shows that issues surrounding North Korea’s criminal behavior are more fiction than fact, and that even in cases where North Korea does indulge in such activities, their scope is small in comparison to other players in this arena. Issues related to North Korea’s food insecurity are the focus of chapters five and six. The...

Межкорейские отношения и политика региональных держав

Missile launches and nuclear tests by DPRK in 2013 undermined inter-Korean cooperation and regional stability. The primary purpose of these activities was to strengthen legitimacy of Kim Jong Un’s administration. South Korean president Park Geun-Hye’s trustpolitik policy focused on improving mutual understanding and developing step-by-step inter-Korean cooperation. Regional powers jointly opposed North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs, but failed to elaborate common understanding on policies to promote security in the Korean peninsula as well as on prospects for the unification of Korea.

Research on Guide and Control Method of Air Launched Ballistic Missile

In order to further improve the performance of the air launched ballistic missile, a full range of air launched method had been given. For the full range launch program faced initial roll angle and initial lateral speed problem, researched the initial roll angle control mode processing technology in the virtual body coordinates and correct the lateral initial velocity method used angle of sideslip flight procedures. Given the ballistic flight simulation Using the proposed method and technology, and verified the feasibility of the ballistic missile program of all-round air launched.

India's Nuclear Limbo and the Fatalism of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime, 1974–1983

India's relationship with the nuclear non-proliferation regime deteriorated sharply after its 1974 underground nuclear test which, according to India, was a peaceful nuclear explosion, but which was not accepted as such by the regime. That it did not follow up with immediate weaponisation challenged the core logic of the non-proliferation regime which operates on a Murphy's Law of ‘nuclear fatalism’, i.e. if a country has the know-how to produce nuclear weapons, it will certainly produce them. This article argues that at least until the beginning of its integrated guided missile development programme in 1983, India's nuclear inaction posed a normative challenge to this logic.

Targeted: A case study in Iranian illicit missile procurement

While diplomatic efforts to halt Iran’s nuclear ambitions continue, it is clear that the private sector can and does play a role in slowing sanctioned programs in Iran. This is certainly the case with the country’s ballistic missile program, which is highly dependent upon imports of high-specification materials and components from the international marketplace. Activities relating to Iran’s ballistic missile program have been prohibited under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929 since June 2010. However, Iran has continued to undertake research and testing activities focused on the development of liquid-fueled missiles. Iran’s illicit efforts to obtain missile-grade oscillators—components used in guidance systems—have targeted Rakon UK, the British arm of a New Zealand-owned company. The company has made significant efforts to prevent its products from ending up in programs of concern. Undertaking activities that go beyond basic compliance practices has allowed Rakon UK to mitigate risks more holistically. The insights gained from Rakon UK’s experience, in conjunction with information from a number of other sources, can help shed light on the methods that proliferators use—and, more generally, on the role that the private sector can play in combating proliferation.

Illicit Nuclear & Missile Procurement Activities

This essay provides an overview and analysis of Iran’s nuclear and missile procurement activities and the efforts of the United States and its allies to detect, deter, and disrupt those activities. It also derives lessons learned and makes recommendations for how the U.S. and its allies can more effectively counter those Iranian activities. Iran’s nuclear and missile programs remain heavily dependent on foreign suppliers. Since Iranian procurement of key nuclear and missile technology is prohibited by legally binding resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, Iran must procure this material illicitly. Over the past three decades, Iran has acquired more and more experience bypassing export regulations, hiding end users, and otherwise evading detection of its illicit trafficking activities. Iran’s nuclear program is rapidly approaching a point of “critical capability” at which Iran could dash for a bomb before the IAEA or Western intelligence could detect such a step. To disrupt Iran’s illicit networks, the U.S. and its allies have worked together with increasing frequency to share intelligence, extradite and prosecute complicit individuals, and ultimately shut down Iranian trafficking rings. Although such collaborations have resulted in a number of successful prosecutions, efforts to combat Iran’s procurement network are too often slow and ineffective. The weak strategic trade controls of several key countries continue to be a particularly significant obstacle. With governments and firms worldwide on the lookout for illicit Iranian government procurement efforts, Iran has increasingly turned to middlemen to serve as key links in its nuclear and missile procurement networks. These middlemen smuggle dual-use materials via front companies located in countries including China, Turkey, Malaysia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore. Although many schemes involving middlemen have been very complex, comprising multilayered networks of individuals and trading companies, several other successful procurements have been remarkably simple. Through a variety of tactics, these middlemen have filled a critical void in Iran’s nuclear procurement activities, for which traditional methods such as direct state purchase and indigenous production are no longer possible or efficient. This report’s Section Two details and analyzes Iran’s procurement activities. It includes a discussion of Iran’s nuclear and missile program (focusing on items that the regime seeks to procure), the middlemen involved in the schemes, the key countries through which transshipment occurs, and the tactics utilized. Section Three discusses the response to Iran’s nuclear program by the United States, the European Union, and several key countries of diversion concern, with a particular focus on responses to Iran’s use of middlemen. Section Four provides both lessons learned and several recommendations for more effectively combating Iran’s procurement networks.

India's Foreign Policy Transformation

A ssessing India’s evolution since 1980 is a compelling idea that has been executed with much competence by Sumit Ganguly and Rahul Mukherji in India Since 1980. The volume is part of a broader series of studies on a number of countries since 1980, but any study of India since 1980 offers special rewards. Many features of contemporary India find their origins in that decade. The first considerations of economic reform, the rumbling of the two great tectonic plates of caste and religion, outreach to the United States and China, the perception of India as a regional power, and India’s launch of nuclear weapon and missile programs can all be traced back to the 1980s. In the three decades since then, India’s views of itself and the world, as well as the world’s image of India, have undergone profound changes. The core concepts that defined India’s political and economic development before this period—economic self-reliance, socialism, secularism, nonalignment, and third worldism—would be recast or come under great stress in the years that followed. Ganguly and Mukherji divide the story of India since 1980 into four different domains: the changing nature of its engagement with the world, the restructuring of India’s economy, the new patterns of domestic political mobilization, and the challenges to the idea of secularism amid the rise of Hindu nationalism. In a volume of fewer than 200 pages, Ganguly and Mukherji deftly guide us through the labyrinth of India’s dramatic transformation. On the revolutionary changes in India’s foreign policy, Ganguly and Mukherji rightly avoid the temptation to offer a comprehensive account. Their focus instead is on India’s relations with two major powers (the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia), India’s principal adversaries (Pakistan and China), and New Delhi’s successful engagement with Southeast Asia as part of its mid-1990s initiative on “Looking East.” The chapter on foreign policy also briefly touches on the nuclear question that consumed so much diplomatic and military energy during the last three decades. Ganguly and Mukherjee delineate with ease the main lines of New Delhi’s diplomatic activity in the three decades that followed 1980:

Tough Challenges, Hard Choices: Dealing with North Korea after the Collapse of the Leap Day Agreement

North Korea's threat to the United States and our regional allies is increasing after the latest failure of diplomacy to halt Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs. These programs can now grow w...

Rebalancing U.S. Security Posture in Asia

Rebalancing U.S. Security Posture in Asia Wallace "Chip" Gregson (bio) The Chinese naval vessel Zheng He recently made port calls in South Korea and Japan. These visits were an appropriate reminder of Chinese power, past and potential. The ship honors the admiral responsible for China's greatest expansion of political influence and commercial activity, a soft-power effort backed by unmistakable superiority. Between 1405 and 1433, China deployed the greatest naval fleet in history, overwhelmingly superior in size and nautical technology. Larger than Spain's future armada a century and a half away, it sailed a wide arc through China's seaward frontiers, the Indian Ocean, Africa's coast, and the Arabian Gulf. The admiral brought gifts, extolled the virtues of the emperor, and conveyed foreign envoys back to the Imperial City. There was no need to fight. Admiral Zheng He's obvious and overwhelming superiority made it unwise. Clear and congenial intentions made it unnecessary. But imperial edict ended this strategy in 1433. Preoccupied by landward threats and unable to resist the seaborne Western presence, China began a long period of inward focus and decline. This era would last more than four centuries. Although history shows that Asia can endure centuries of strife, maintaining today's success is another challenge. This is not only an issue for Asia; it is a critical issue for all. China's rise as a productive member of the international system is important to the United States, Asia, and the world. But challenges remain. Asia spans two oceans that are increasingly linked by shipping, energy, trade, and strategy. The region is home to three maritime straits—the Malacca, the Sunda, and the Lombok—that permit the easy passage of well over 1,100 fully laden supertankers per year, most passing into the South China Sea and the East China Sea. The epicenter of China's growth and wealth lies along these shores, creating opportunities and vulnerabilities. Many nations compete over claims to the South China Sea's fishing grounds, seabed resources, exclusive economic zones, and freedom of navigation. Half of the world's seaborne commercial tonnage and one-third of its trade value traverse this sea. Nowhere else do the important interests [End Page 45] of so many states compete. The South China Sea may hold great seabed energy resources, which are accompanied by access disputes. The search for affordable energy invites upstream countries to build hydroelectric dams on rivers descending from their mountains. This can devastate downstream nations dependent on these rivers. Every freshwater system on the East, Southeast, and South Asian littoral is under heavy pressure. Ocean and freshwater fish suffer from illegal fishing, and some sort of resource management agreement is needed. Demographic trends also create pressures. The world will add nearly 60 million people per year, reaching over 8 billion by the 2030s. The United States, alone among the developed countries, is expected to add 50 million people, while Europe, Japan, Russia, and South Korea will join those in absolute population decline. China will add some 170 million, but the population will be aging and predominantly male. India, in contrast, will add 320 million people and become the world's most populous nation before 2030. India's growth risks tensions between rich and poor, and among Hindus, Muslims, and Buddhists. The Maoists in much of eastern India are the country's most important security challenge. Incredible communications and transportation technologies make business a truly global affair. Manufacturing depends on global supply chains, and global dependencies require a global approach. One such dependency is the need for free and secure access to cyberspace. Knowledgeable estimates show that the United States loses billions of dollars and millions of jobs every year due to cybercrime. Additionally, an old threat, piracy, has returned to the high seas, adding cost and risk to legitimate business. Natural disasters, as we have recently seen in Japan and Thailand, destroy supply chains. Asia, the Pacific, and the world also confront one significant legacy threat. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea continues to threaten the Republic of Korea and defies all predictions of imminent collapse. North Korea's continuing nuclear and missile programs threaten every nation. Pyongyang...

Ballistic Missiles and Space Launch Vehicles in Regional Powers

International security concerns about ballistic missile proliferation have frequently highlighted the links between ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. This article examines the extent of these links through a comprehensive survey of ballistic missile and space rocket programs in regional powers. It notes that missiles were derived from existing space launchers in just a small fraction of these cases. In a slightly greater fraction, space launchers were drawn from existing missile programs. This analysis suggests that though security concerns about space launchers being used as ballistic missiles are valid, the reverse trend, that of ballistic missiles being used as space launch vehicles, cannot be ignored. At the same time, as long as regional powers are limited to short-range and medium-range systems, their missile and space projects would only raise limited missile proliferation and space security concerns.

The elephant in the room: US ballistic missile defence under Barack Obama

Conventional wisdom seems to hold that under Barack Obama, the US ballistic missile defence programme has been pushed aside to allow for a refreshed domestic and international agenda. Proponents point to Obama's campaign thinking and rhetoric, the ballistic missile defence (BMD) budget cuts, the decision to end the Third Site in Europe, and the reset relations with Russia through the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) as evidence that the programme has undergone a significant period of change, retraction and rationalisation. This article argues instead that BMD has not fallen from prominence and that there is a change in focus rather than retraction of its strategic goal. Consequently, BMD continues to grow in importance as a component of US national security strategy.

Can – Should – Must We Negotiate with Evil?*

How should the USA and its allies deal with regimes that abuse their own people and threaten world order? Are some regimes so evil that it is wrong and unwise to engage with them – even on matters of shared concern? The answer depends not only on the “facts of the case” but also on priorities and frames of reference. Thus, two Soviet citizens, each a Nobel Prize winner, disagreed on whether Western governments should treat the Kremlin as a viable partner in negotiations to control the arms race. Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn said “no,” because a regime that oppressed its own people could not be trusted. But Andrei D. Sakharov answered “yes,” because the stakes for humanity were so high. Solzhenitsyn put human rights first; Sakharov, the survival of humanity.Today a similar choice confronts Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo as they face leaders in Pyongyang moving to expand their nuclear and missile capabilities. President George W. Bush placed North Korea on an “axis of evil.” He loathed a leader who permitted more than a million of his subjects to starve. But even if this repugnance was justified, did it serve US and allied interests to end the dialogues that, in the Clinton years, offered hope of limiting and perhaps terminating the North's nuclear weapons and missile programs?“We are good and they are bad” is dangerous as an approach to foreign affairs. But it is also wrong and reckless to assume that all actors are equally flawed. Still, if a cruel dictatorship is willing to negotiate security arrangements likely to limit arms competition and make war less likely, democratic governments should engage and seek verifiable arrangements.

The North Korean Missile Program -Origins, Capabilities and Future Trajectories-

탄도미사일은 북한의 비대칭 전력의 핵심 요소이다. 탄도미사일의 개발과 실전 배치에 기저를 이루는 정밀한 전략과 북한의 탄도미사일에 의한 위협의 성격은 아직 명확히 밝혀지지 않았다. 본 논문은 북한의 탄도미사일 프로그램 대해 어떤 것들이 분석되어 왔는지, 다음과 같은 주요 쟁점에 대해서 다루고자 한다. 첫째, 탄도미사일 개발과 관련한 북한의 기술적 역량을 어떻게 평가할 수 있는가? 이 질문은 북한이 30년 넘게 소련의 기술을 바탕으로 하여 다양한 종류와 다량의 탄도미사일을 개발해 온 것에 대한 관찰 결과로부터 시작되었다. 가장 최근, 노동-2와 무수단이 북한의 미사일 전력을 과시하기 위한 군사 퍼레이드에 등장하였다. 그러나 북한이 미사일 개발을 위해 대규모의 외부 원조에 의존하고 있다는 것이 점차 명확해지고 있다. 본 논문에서는, 북한이 미사일의 생산자이기 보다는 거래자이고, 더 발전된 로켓 추진체를 발전시키기에는 그 역량이 부족하다는 것을 주장하고자 한다. 둘째, 북한의 탄도미사일로 인한 위협은 무엇인가? 본 논문에서는 그 정확도와 신뢰성의 부족으로 북한의 중·장거리 미사일은 지역 내 남한과 다른 나라들에게 제한된 위협만을 가할 수 있다는 것을 주장한다. 만약 미사일이 핵탄두 공격을 가하는 용도로 사용된다면 이러한 상황은 바뀔 수도 있으나, 북한은 핵탄두의 개발에 엄청난 시간을 투자해야할 것이다. 결론적으로, 북한의 미사일이 대륙 간 탄도 미사일로 발전되기 위해서는 기술적 진보를 필요로 하나, 지금 당장 실현 가능성이 보이지는 않는다. 북한의 기술에 있어 파키스탄과 이란의 의존성을 고려해볼 때, 이는 전반적인 탄도미사일 확산에 더 큰 함의를 암시한다.

India, China, and the United States in Space: Partners, Competitors, Combatants? A Perspective From the United States

India's space program used to fall solely under the civil category, but recently it appears to be expanding its use of space for national security efforts and developing capabilities that could give it an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon capacity. This shift by India could have long-term consequences for its relationship with China and Asia's overall regional stability; it also may provide new opportunities for the United States and India to enhance their relations. This article will first explain how the author views the US government's attitudes toward space and cooperation. Next, it will look at India's missile defense program and study the connection between the program and an ASAT capability, as well as its link to China's ASAT tests. Then, it will discuss ways in which India and the United States can use their shared interests in continuing to utilize space to possibly cooperate. Finally, it will contrast how India and China are viewed within the US policy community.