Missile Program Research Articles

The Contemporary Status of Iran's Nuclear Missile Programme and Russo-Iranian Relations

The Contemporary Status of Iran's Nuclear Missile Programme and Russo-Iranian Relations

I. International Law and Nuclear Weapons in Scottish Courts

Britain's Trident nuclear missile programme has long been politically controversial. In 1999, the controversy entered the judicial arena in Scotland, in two cases involving ‘direct action’ against Trident installations by anti-nuclear activists. In both cases, the actions were intended not as protests against Britain's nuclear-weapons policy, but rather as actual operations to disable the weapons themselves. The acts were, in other words, in the nature of acts of sabotage. Both incidents led to criminal prosecutions. In both cases, the accused parties sought to use international law as a defence. In both cases, the Appeal Court of the High Court of Justiciary—the highest court for criminal cases in Scotland—rejected the defence. In the process, however, the Appeal Court had occasion to expound upon some controversial points regarding nuclear weapons. Each of these cases will be discussed in turn.

Security, nationalism and the pursuit of nuclear weapons and missiles: The South Korean case, 1970–82

South Korea decided to develop nuclear weapons and surface‐to‐surface missiles in the early 1970s. The Park Chung‐hee administration made the decision because of its concern about a complete withdrawal of US forces from Korea following the Nixon Doctrine. Simultaneously, increasing nationalism within the administration, caused by its tumultuous relations with the United States, further strengthened such pursuits. Later, when faced with the US threat to withdraw security and economic assistance, the administration slowed down active development of nuclear weapons in 1976, but it continued missile development. However, the Chun Doo‐hwan administration, inaugurated in 1980 after military coup and massacre, froze all weapons‐related nuclear research and the missile programme. The Chun regime made such a change because it needed the support of the US to make up for its weakness in legitimacy and because the Reagan administration provided a solid defence commitment to South Korea.

India's Rise After Pokhran II: Chinese Analyses and Assessments

Research Article| December 01 2001 India's Rise After Pokhran II: Chinese Analyses and Assessments Jing-Dong Yuan Jing-Dong Yuan Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Asian Survey (2001) 41 (6): 978–1001. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2001.41.6.978 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Jing-Dong Yuan; India's Rise After Pokhran II: Chinese Analyses and Assessments. Asian Survey 1 December 2001; 41 (6): 978–1001. doi: https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2001.41.6.978 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAsian Survey Search This content is only available via PDF. © Regents of the University of California Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Iran's missile programme

Iran's missile programme

Goodwill and Proactive Exchange Policy: How Taipei manages the cross-strait relations

Dynamic developments within both Mainland China and Taiwan have compounded the uncertainties looming across the Taiwan Strait. Since mid-2000, the cross-strait relationship has evolved into a mixture of four elements: lingering, though less confrontational, political stalemate; growing and even accelerating economic exchanges; rapidly expanding social interactions; and heightened military competition. Since July 1999, four distinct periods have marked Beijing's tactical operations toward Taiwan: military intimidations and verbal threats (9 July‐21 September 1999); verbal threats (21 September 1999‐18 March 2000); passive observation (18 March‐20 June 2000); and the two-pronged campaign (20 June‐present). Beijing's two-pronged campaign is well-coordinated and full-scaled. One soft prong aims at winning 'the hearts of Taiwanese people'. The soft prong includes the following elements: softening of rhetoric without concrete change of behavior; escalated efforts to invite opinion leaders in Taiwan; mentioning preferential treatments for Taiwanese investors on the Mainland; and allowing a dramatically increased number of Mainland visitors to Taiwan since July 2000. On the other hand, the hard prong seeks to put 'appropriate pressure' on Taipei to accept Beijing's precondition of resumption of cross-strait talks, and eventually Beijing's terms on unification. The hard prong includes the following elements: continuing to conduct military exercises with no reduction in frequency and scale; continuing strangulation of Taipei's international living-space with a new twist of diplomatic war in Africa; mobilizing Chinese overseas globally to oppose Taiwanese independence; escalating Beijing's pressure on Washington not to include Taiwan in the theater missile defense program, and not to transfer arms to Taiwan. The new Taiwan government has adopted much continuity in its cross-strait policy from the previous one. The new administration seeks a structured and constructive cross-strait relationship, holds no precondition for the resumption of cross-strait talks, continues to express maximum goodwill, exercises absolute restraint to avoid being seen as provocative, and takes a proactive approach on promoting socio-economic exchanges across the Taiwan Strait.

Titan II: a history of a Cold War missile program

Titan II: a history of a Cold War missile program

2.2.3 Simplifying Risky Business: An Improved Risk Management Approach

AbstractThe Risk Management process used on the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Missile Program is discussed. Approaches for integrating risk management activities based upon a simple risk sources checklist questionnaire, standardized assessment templates, and easy‐to‐use tracking templates are presented. The human aspects of implementation, the real keys to success, are discussed. Specific recommendations for achieving success are provided.

India's Nuclear Security. Edited by Raju G. C. Thomas and Amit Gupta. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000. 325 pp. $59.95.

Why did India go nuclear?, S.P. Cohen India's pathway to Pokharan II - the prospects and sources of New Delhi's nuclear weapons programme, S. Ganguly India's strategic doctrine and practice - the impact of nuclear testing, D. Ollapally India's nuclear and missile programmes - power, intentions, capabilities, outcomes, R.G.C. Thomas India's nuclear decision - implications for Indian-US relations, M. Ayoob what after pokharan II? - the China factor, G Deshingkar the nuclear aspect of Pakistan's India policy, F. Zarah South Asia's ballistic ambitions, B. Sheppard technology for defence and development - India's space programme, D. Mistry the Indian economy after Pokharan II, P.S. Jha lest we forget - the dangers and irrelevance of nuclear weapons, S.R. Valluri is an otherwise sensible agreement with India and Pakistan precluded because it would reward nuclear testing?, C.E. Singer a nuclear arms control agenda for India, A. Gupta.

North Korean missiles: strategic implications and policy responses

Analysts remain sharply divided on the underlying motivations behind North Korea's ballistic missile program, more than two years after Pyongyang startled the world by test firing its Taepodong-1 missile in August 1998. In the aftermath of the historic South-North summit meeting in June and US Secretary of State Madeline Albright's path-breaking trip to Pyongyang in October, proponents of the engagement school argue that with a mixture of patience and inducements, North Korea will ultimately negotiate away its missiles. They point to the 1994 Agreed Framework as a key reminder that North Korea uses its weapons of mass destruction capability as a bargaining chip. Conversely, countervailing arguments point out that North Korea's ballistic missile program serves multiple purposes such as shifting the correlation of forces to its favor, supporting the military's modernization goals, and as the primary symbol of military prowess and that, as a result, a negotiated settlement is unlikely. This paper assesses North Korea's potential reasons for pursuing a robust ballistic missile program over the past two decades and the broader strategic consequences of North Korea's missile arsenal, particularly if it succeeds in developing intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities. In addition, it also analyzes South Korea's political and military responses to North Korea's accelerated ballistic missile program including South Korea's own ballistic missile modernization goals. The paper also reviews the problems associated with trilateral policy coordination between South Korea, the United States, and Japan. Finally, policy options are analyzed but none appear to be able to satisfy the seemingly contradictory objectives of the key players in the ongoing North Korean missile saga.

North Korean missiles: strategic implications and policy responses

Analysts remain sharply divided on the underlying motivations behind North Korea's ballistic missile program, more than two years after Pyongyang startled the world by test firing its Taepodong-1 missile in August 1998. In the aftermath of the historic South-North summit meeting in June and US Secretary of State Madeline Albright's path-breaking trip to Pyongyang in October, proponents of the engagement school argue that with a mixture of patience and inducements, North Korea will ultimately negotiate away its missiles. They point to the 1994 Agreed Framework as a key reminder that North Korea uses its weapons of mass destruction capability as a bargaining chip. Conversely, countervailing arguments point out that North Korea's ballistic missile program serves multiple purposes such as shifting the correlation of forces to its favor, supporting the military's modernization goals, and as the primary symbol of military prowess and that, as a result, a negotiated settlement is unlikely. This paper assesses North Korea's potential reasons for pursuing a robust ballistic missile program over the past two decades and the broader strategic consequences of North Korea's missile arsenal, particularly if it succeeds in developing intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities. In addition, it also analyzes South Korea's political and military responses to North Korea's accelerated ballistic missile program including South Korea's own ballistic missile modernization goals. The paper also reviews the problems associated with trilateral policy coordination between South Korea, the United States, and Japan. Finally, policy options are analyzed but none appear to be able to satisfy the seemingly contradictory objectives of the key players in the ongoing North Korean missile saga.

North Korea's missile programme: A matter of concern

North Korea's missile programme: A matter of concern

Pyongyang's pressure

North Korea is unlikely to change its missile development program. The timing of U.S. deployment, however, could affect fragile negotiations.

The North Korean Missiles: A Military Threat or a Survival Kit?

Abstract North Korea has acquired weapons of mass destruction and missiles to deliver them, but has not been able to modernize its armed forces and its conventional warfare capability has deteriorated. Not simply a scheme to gain international aid and hard cash, the missile program has thus come to assume a strategic position for Pyongyang. This article outlines the history of the missile program, takes a look at missile capabilities, and discusses implications such as the threat perceived by Japan and the United States, sales to the Middle East and South Ask, and their value as a shield against outside pressure. Above all, they help ensure the survival of the Pyongyang regime. The article goes on to detail American policy responses including TMD, conventional deterrence including preemptive strikes (not appropriate for the Korean situation), the MTCR, and the negotiation track. For South Korea, the author suggests a combination of deterrence through enhanced missile capability of its own and continued engagement policy. North Korea is consistent with its pattern of flexing military muscle then demanding a price. So long as this keeps working, Pyongyang is unlikely to dismantle its missile program. The only possible trade-off might be the combination of US forces withdrawal and South Korea's gradual political submission—too high a price. North Korea thus will not relinquish its leverage—barring a major change domestically that could possibly call for a broader peace dividend, but that may not be possible without a genuine reconciliation based on peaceful coexistence.

The role of ‘transatlantic cooperation’ in air-to-air missile programmes

At a time when important decisions are about to be made regarding the choice of air-to-air weapons procurements to meet future military needs, this paper reviews the experience of previous transatlantic cooperative programmes in the same field and poses some questions having relevance to those decisions.

High technology product development: technical and management review system

In a high technology product development environment, due to large uncertainty and complexity, decision-making becomes very difficult. A review system provides a means for systematically dealing with this uncertainty and complexity. This paper intends to bring out a typical review system for high technology product development projects, based on the experiences of the Indian Guided Missile Programme. In order to gain a deeper understanding of the review system, the high technology product development environment has been modelled and the review system has been characterised for use in similar projects. The need for integration of decision making at various levels, integrated implication analysis of technical and managerial issues, special tools for decision collation and conflict resolution in a multi-project environment have been highlighted. The Indian experience shows that as we move from a traditional project environment towards a high technology environment, the review system attains greater significance and becomes vital for the success of the project.

America's space sentinels: DSP satellites and national security

During much of the Cold War, America's first line of defence was in outer space: a network of secret satellites that could provide instant warning of an enemy missile launch. The presence of these infrared sensors orbiting 22,000 miles above the earth discouraged a Soviet first strike and stabilized international relations between the superpowers, and they now play a crucial role in monitoring the missile programs of China, India, and other emerging nuclear powers. Jeffrey Richelson has written a comprehensive history of this programme, tracing its evolution from the late 1950s to the beginning of the 21st century. He puts Defense Support Program operations in the context of world events-from Russian missile programs to the Gulf War- and explains how DSP's infrared sensors are used to detect meteorites, monitor forest fires, and even gather industrial intelligence by seeing the lights of steel mills. These satellites, reveals Richelson, detected Iran's test firing of a new missile in 1998 and even provided clues to the cause of the TWA 800 disaster. Drawing on many previously classified documents and on interviews with key participants, Richelson provides a wealth of information: the use of DSP for detecting intermediate-range missiles, false alarms generated following the attempted assassination of President Reagan, the controversial U.S.-Australian DSP partnership, and the role of DSP in Desert Storm. He describes the Slow Walker and Fast Walker programs used to detect aircraft for the U.S. Navy and spacecraft for the Air Force Space Command. And he offers insights into the controversy over what kind of system will eventually replace DSP.

Solid Rocket Motor Development for Land-Based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

Solid rocket motor development in the U.S. Air Force land-based intercontinental ballistic missile programs is briee y described. The new, radical approach to program management adopted by Bernard Schriever and the U.S. AirForceWesternDevelopmentDivisionin1954ispresentedasoneofthemajorreasonsfortheoutstandingsuccess of Minuteman I, II, and III; Peacekeeper; and Small Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Program. A broad technical discussion is included of solid rocket motor technical challenges and growth in performance and capability for Minuteman through Peacekeeper and the small intercontinental ballistic missile. Particularly signie cant are the service life characteristics of the three-stage solid rocket boosters. Data and future predictions are also provided. Finally, current and future challenges in the development of solid rocket motors to sustain the U.S. Air Force deployed intercontinental ballistic missile weapon systems are briee y discussed.

US–North Korean détente

On 12 September 1999, US and North Korean negotiators reached what may be a historic compromise in Berlin. In return for a North promise to suspend its programme of long-range missile development, the US lifted most economic sanctions against the isolated communist state. In the short term, the effects of this are likely to be limited, as the North Korean economy offers few opportunities for successful investment. In the longer term, however, there is some hope that relations may thaw further. In particular, Pyongyang's cooperation over missile suggests that the North Korean leadership may now recognise that using missile and nuclear programmes as a means of pressure is largely futile. So far this has only other states in resistance, and reduced the communist regime's room for diplomatic manoeuvre.

Tech forecasting an empirical perspective

Introduction In inviting these perspectives, Hal Linstone wrote that technology forecasting (TF) seems to have peaked around 1970 with a decline in methodological advance thereafter. That stimulated me to conduct a bibliometric analysis of TF activity over the past dozen years. Results support Hal’s contention, but also point toward “next wave” possibilities. Before digging into the data, it is worth considering what is different today from the earlier “heydey” periods for TF. In the 1950s and 1960s, TF was driven by military competition with the Soviet Union. TF was initiated primarily as a tool to help anticipate military technology needs and to help plan and prioritize R&D and systems development. Many of these technologies had long development times (for example, anti-ballistic missile program, new fighter planes). Today, military technology development has been supplanted by commercial technological competition as the primary motivator for TF. Competitive technological intelligence—a remarkable growth area of the 1990s—conjures images of companies, more than intelligence agencies, most actively trying to find out “who’s doing what.” This interest in tracking and forecasting others’ technology development has been heightened by tendencies to constrain corporate R&D to more immediate and more applied targets. In addition, both industry and government (even in the United States) evidence interest in trying to plan, prioritize, and evaluate their R&D programs, placing a premium on information about relative prospects and performance metrics. National technology foresight initiatives and industry or product technology road maps are important emerging forms of TF [30]. The defining characteristic of today’s technology is that we are in the Information Age. While cases could be made for various emerging technologies (for example, advanced materials, biotech) as flowering, it is clearly IT—information technology—that defines our era. That poses a challenge for TF in that typical IT life cycles are much shorter than military systems technology life cycles of 40 years ago. In addition to targeting rather different technological targets these days, TF draws on different resources. The availability of electronic information in several forms pro-