Minsk Group Research Articles

The Evolving Dilemma of the Status Quo in Nagorno-Karabakh

The 4-day war in Nagorno-Karabakh in April 2016 has shown that a shift in the political and military balance of power between the conflicting parties is not enough to reverse the status quo by military means. The use of force and the threat of war aggravate the conflict’s security dilemma, further consolidating the status quo. As the osce Minsk Group’s mediation efforts remain hostage to the geopolitics behind the conflict, it is the political will of the conflicting parties and their adherence to fair play and mutual compromise that can shift the logic of the conflict’s dynamics into a more constructive course.

Silencing the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict and Challenges of the Four-Day War

The Four-Day War of 2016 once again exposed the danger that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict poses in the Caucasus. However, despite its military scale and human losses, Russia has raised only general statements from other co-chairs of the osce (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) Minsk Group, from the United States and France, and from other international actors such as the United Nations Security Council. In an attempt to stimulate debate about this lack of engagement, this paper claims that the external actors involved aim to cast silence over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict beyond the region. While this approach may serve to remove the political impact of the conflict from the international arena, it unwittingly also enhances the aggressiveness of both Armenia and Azerbaijan in the regional arena. The main aim of this paper is, then, to explain why the conflict is being silenced, how this is made possible and what the regional effects of this approach are. By drawing on the Four-Day War of 2016, the paper intends to show how the recent violence has challenged the silencing of external actors.

ILKHAM ALIYEV HEADED TO SUMMIT IN THE U.S.

(By Sokhbet Mamedov. Nezavisimaya gazeta, March 29, 2016, p. 6. Condensed text:) Azerbaijani President Ilkham Aliyev will participate in the fourth Nuclear Security Summit, which will take place in Washington [March 31-April 1]. US President Barack Obama sent an invitation to the head of Azerbaijan back in December 2015.. . . ... Baku attaches special importance to Ilkham Aliyev’s Washington visit. According to Novruz Mamedov, deputy head of the Azerbaijani presidential administration in charge of the foreign relations department, this visit is important for several reasons. the head of state will talk at the summit about Azerbaijan’s progress on nuclear security, as well as outline challenges that lie ahead. Second, various meetings, contacts and discussions will take place during the summit. is during such meetings that important steps are made in developing bilateral relations, Novruz Mamedov said in an interview with the ANS television channel. ... Commenting on Azerbaijan’s participation in the upcoming Washington summit, political analyst Rasim Musabekov told local publications that the US wants very much to ward off any potential attempts to illicitly transfer nuclear materials to Iran via Azerbaijan. nuclear security issue has become even more relevant since sanctions against Iran were lifted [following an agreement reached in July 2015; see Current Digest, Vol. 67, No. 29, pp. 7 - 9 - Trans.]. And I think the US will keep an even closer eye on any Iranian attempts to gain access to nuclear materials and technology in the future. It is important that Azerbaijan meet all of the requirements imposed on countries participating in the Agreement on the International Atomic Energy Agency, Musabekov said. According to the expert, in this light, Azerbaijan must take all measures to ensure strict oversight over the trafficking of nuclear materials and technologies. ... In his comments, the political analyst also touched on Armenia’s participation in the Washington Nuclear Security Summit. In his view, this was expected. First, Armenia, like Azerbaijan, borders Iran. Second, there is the Armenian nuclear power plant, where irradiated fuel is stored, including plutonium, which is widely used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. The US does not want nuclear materials from Russia to go to Armenia and then on to Iran, the expert said. As for reports of a possible meeting between the heads of Azerbaijan and Armenia during the summit, Musabekov says that this meeting will largely depend on who moderates it. ... If this initiative comes from the cochairs of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Minsk Group, I think the results will be just as fruitless as the last meeting in Bern, Switzerland. It is another matter if a bilateral meeting in a summit format is organized by the US presidential administration, or at least Secretary of State John Kerry, Musabekov told 1news.az.. . .

The Upper Karabakh Predicament from the UN Resolutions to the Mediated Negotiations: Resolution or Hibernation?

Despite the third party efforts of the significant international and regional organizations, such as the UN and the OSCE, the Upper Karabakh problem remains unresolved for over 20 years. Neither the four resolutions related to Armenia’s invasion of Azerbaijani lands adopted by the UN SC in the early 1990s have worked, nor the formal negotiations over this conflict that have taken place under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group for more than 20 years have reached any tangible results. These facts give rise to questions about effectiveness of the role of this institution in reaching a resolution to the conflict. The ceasefire regime is in effect since May 1994 without changing the situation, in which Armenia still keeps about 20 percent of Azerbaijani lands under invasion and is effectively involved in building a new state over the invaded lands. This paper analyzes the effectiveness of UN resolutions in liberating Azerbaijan’s invaded regions, both within and outside of Upper Karabakh, as well as the OSCE mediation efforts to resolve this conflict. It also discusses effectiveness of the negotiation process, and raises a question about impartiality of the mediators and usefulness of the mediation institution of the OSCE in general. It argues that the OSCE Minsk Group has failed to successfully establish and lead the process of negotiations, thus expecting a fruitful yield is not realistic.

The Upper Karabakh Predicament from the UN Resolutions to the Mediated Negotiations: Resolution or Hibernation?

Despite the third party efforts of the significant international and regional organizations, such as the UN and the OSCE, the Upper Karabakh problem remains unresolved for over 20 years. Neither the four resolutions related to Armenia’s invasion of Azerbaijani lands adopted by the UN SC in the early 1990s have worked, nor the formal negotiations over this conflict that have taken place under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group for more than 20 years have reached any tangible results. These facts give rise to questions about effectiveness of the role of this institution in reaching a resolution to the conflict. The ceasefire regime is in effect since May 1994 without changing the situation, in which Armenia still keeps about 20 percent of Azerbaijani lands under invasion and is effectively involved in building a new state over the invaded lands. This paper analyzes the effectiveness of UN resolutions in liberating Azerbaijan’s invaded regions, both within and outside of Upper Karabakh, as well as the OSCE mediation efforts to resolve this conflict. It also discusses effectiveness of the negotiation process, and raises a question about impartiality of the mediators and usefulness of the mediation institution of the OSCE in general. It argues that the OSCE Minsk Group has failed to successfully establish and lead the process of negotiations, thus expecting a fruitful yield is not realistic.

Return to Babel: The Race to Integration in the Southern Caucasus

When talking or writing about the (Southern) Caucasus, I usually like to start by illustrating the diversity of its three countries when it comes to their cultural, linguistic, historical, economic and religious composition. This is due to the heavy migration in the region and the century-long influence of surrounding regional powers and to the fact that it is located in a strategic triangle between Iran, Russia and Turkey, with additional geopolitical interest coming from the European Union and the United States. There is a significant background of existing conflicts to take into account. For those who know the region this may seem redundant; however, for "newcomers" it is a good start in describing the (Southern) Caucasian Babel.I will begin by explaining the most significant features that lead me to believe that the Southern Caucasus is a modern-day Babel. With new developments in the context of the European Union (EU) I will demonstrate that these features are present in and inherent to the region.Original features of Babel:* Nations: Three states with different titular nations and minorities* Languages'. From Indo-Germanic (e.g. Armenian, Ossetian) to different Caucasian ones (e.g. Georgian, Abkhaz), Turkic (e.g. Azerbaijani) and Russian as a long-time lingua franca* Scripts'. From Latin (e.g. Azerbaijani variant) to Armenian, Georgian and Cyrillic (e.g. Ossetian variant)* Religions: Armenian apostolic, Georgian Orthodox, Islam (Shia, Sunni), Russian Orthodox, etc.* Boundaries'. After the collapse of the Soviet Union there were three independent states, three autonomous republics and two autonomous regions. Autonomous units were often disconnected from the "motherland" (e.g. Nagomyi-Karabakh, Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic) and nationalities were divided along borders (e.g. South and North Ossetia) - which were arbitrary Soviet border drawings.This "Babylonian spirit" is reflected to an even higher degree in the Northern Caucasus (comprising seven autonomous republics: Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, North-Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia and Adygea). These are populated by different ethnicities (approximately 30), which are primarily but not exclusively Muslim and have different points of view concerning their relationship with the central Russian government. This was perhaps also one of the reasons for the demise of the Soviet Union, among others: the conflict of nationality in the Southern Caucasus (NagomyiKarabakh), followed by others (e.g. Abkhazia, South Ossetia), reinforced the split in the region.Today's Babel:Since the aforementioned "original features of Babel" were not confronted and changed, the development of the region continued in dissonance after the collapse of the Soviet Union.1. Foreign presence. Russian troops are still present in Armenia (Gyumri), Abkhazia and South Ossetia.2. International peace ejforts/presence. The OSCE, stationed in Armenia and Azerbaijan, had to stop work in South Ossetia (Georgia) after the 2008 Georgian-Russian War. The OSCE Minsk Group was established for the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The UN peacekeeping presence in Abkhazia (Georgia) had to cease after the 2008 Georgian-Russian War. The European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) has been present along the border with Abkhazia and South Ossetia since the Georgian-Russian War in 2008. The Geneva Peace Talks try to solve the Abkhaz and South Ossetian question (Participants are Abkhazia, EU, Georgia, OSCE, Russia, South Ossetia, UN, USA).3. Economy. Azerbaijan is the clear winner here. Due to its substantial gas and oil reserves, Azerbaijan has developed into the richest country in the region, investing in huge infrastructure projects and the military, among other things. However, huge parts of the population m rural areas remain very vulnerable and poor, thus contributing to an ever-growmg income gap. Due to its wealth of natural resources, Azerbaijan plays a significant role in energy supply, also for the European Umon. …

Twenty years after the Nagorny Karabakh ceasefire: an opportunity to move towards more inclusive conflict resolution

Twenty years ago this May the ceasefire that put an end to active fighting between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces for control over Nagorny Karabakh was signed. It was supposed to be the first step in a process to end the conflict. But the expected pull back of forces, deployment of peacekeepers and return of displaced persons never occurred. Instead in recent years the line of contact between the sides has become increasingly tense as some thirty persons are killed every year. Negotiations facilitated by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) over a set of basic principles to guide a comprehensive settlement have become bogged down in details. Nevertheless a whole range of Armenian and Azerbaijani civil groups have over the years had opportunities to develop a third narrative, and think through concrete technical solutions to bridge fundamental differences. This article, bringing lessons from practice to bear for policy on this conflict, argues that the best push that could be made this year to strengthen the ceasefire would be to broaden the Minsk Group process, taking advantage of the civil society expertise, inter-communal trust and know-how of technical and local political elites who are currently outside the process, in order to move beyond the discussion on basic principles towards a comprehensive peace agreement.

SOME CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT KARABAKH CONFLICT SETTLEMENT IN THE FORMAT OF THE MINSK GROUP

?he separated monitoring of the Nagorno–Karabakh conflict and the intended policy for peaceful regulation are very important in the system of providing national security of the Republic of Armenia in more acceptable format of the Minsk Group. During the regional visits of the Minsk group co–chairs are being realized regular controlling and monitoring the contact line of the conflicting forces. Tryaing to satisfy the conflicting parties, the Minsk Group offers a compromise according to the international norms, in which are some obvious discrepancies (The right of nations to self–determination and The territorial integrity). Recently, the regulation process of the Nagorno–Karabakh conflict remains in the active level, which, however, does not lead to substantial progress in the peace process. The Armenian part keeps giving priority of the intermediary activity to the OSCE Minsk group. Because of the negative position of the Azerbaijan part all intermediary initiatives are not leading to serious practical results. The freedom has the main place in the European value system, which can be the key for the regulation of the Nagorno–Karabakh conflict.

Twenty years after the Nagorny Karabakh ceasefire: an opportunity to move towards more inclusive conflict resolution

Twenty years ago this May the ceasefire that put an end to active fighting between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces for control over Nagorny Karabakh was signed. It was supposed to be the first step in a process to end the conflict. But the expected pull back of forces, deployment of peacekeepers and return of displaced persons never occurred. Instead in recent years the line of contact between the sides has become increasingly tense as some thirty persons are killed every year. Negotiations facilitated by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) over a set of basic principles to guide a comprehensive settlement have become bogged down in details. Nevertheless a whole range of Armenian and Azerbaijani civil groups have over the years had opportunities to develop a third narrative, and think through concrete technical solutions to bridge fundamental differences. This article, bringing lessons from practice to bear for policy on this conflict, argues that the best push that could be made this year to strengthen the ceasefire would be to broaden the Minsk Group process, taking advantage of the civil society expertise, inter-communal trust and know-how of technical and local political elites who are currently outside the process, in order to move beyond the discussion on basic principles towards a comprehensive peace agreement.

Referendum to Determine Nagorno Karabakh's Final Status: A Critical Appraisal

With the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh having reached a stalemate some time ago, the Co-Chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group have been forced to introduce new proposals to the sides involved in an attempt to move the diplomatic process forward. The Madrid Principles, as they have since become known, require mutual compromises between Azerbaijan and Armenia, including a return of territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control and an interim status for Karabakh, until the eventual determination of its legal status, probably via a referendum can be reached. This paper considers the practical difficulties of organizing a referendum: such as, who would be entitled to vote? What would be the question asked? And how the result would be determined? The author is of the opinion that if a referendum is to be held to determine the (final) status of Nagorno-Karabakh, it should be conducted immediately, without further delay, otherwise, the Minsk Group's proposals are likely to fail.

Recent Trends in Security and Stability in the South Caucasus

After twenty years of independence, the three counties of the South Caucasus—Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia—continue to struggle with a daunting set of challenges. In light of several unresolved conflicts and profound deficiencies in efforts directed at democratic and economic reform, the South Caucasus continues to be a “region at risk.” As if this rather bleak landscape was not enough, three more recent trends have emerged to further threaten the region’s security and stability. The first trend, and one that is likely to have the most profound effects over the long term, is evident in a subtle shift in the already delicate balance of power in the region, driven largely by a steady surge in Azerbaijani defense spending and exacerbated by a lack of progress in the mediation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Since the 1994 ceasefire that resulted in the suspension of hostilities over Nagorno-Karabakh (but that did not definitively end them), this unresolved or “frozen” conflict has been subject to an international mediation effort conducted by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) so-called Minsk Group. This tripartite body co-chaired by France, Russia, and the United States seeks to engage and prod the parties to the conflict toward a negotiated resolution of the conflict. Over the past two years, however, tension has mounted significantly, clashes and attacks have escalated, and violations of the ceasefire have culminated in a renewed threat of war. In response, the primary focus of diplomatic engagement has been modified to a more “back to basics” approach, moving from outright conflict resolution to a more basic mission of conflict prevention. But the outlook for diplomacy remains rather bleak, especially as Azerbaijan sees no real progress from the peace process and has instead reverted to a policy of threatening hostilities, warning of a military option to force a resolution to the conflict. This has also led to a new danger that the NagornoKarabakh conflict may rapidly transform from a simmering (but manageable) “frozen” conflict into a new “hot” conflict. And although the warning signs of possible renewed hostilities over Nagorno-Karabakh have been clear for some time—marked by an escalation of clashes along the line of contact separating Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan—there has been far too little appreciation of the danger outside of the region.

In the light of bilateral relations of OSCE Minsk group member countries

This paper analyses confrontation that occurred between Armenia and Azerbaijan concerning Nagorno Karabakh territory, as well as the many attempts to finally get this conflict resolved. The war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the territory of Nagorno Karabakh ended with the ceasefire agreement under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group, which is empowered for final resolvment of this issue. This process has been going on for years, but a solution is yet to come. The European Union in recent years is trying to reduce dependence on Russian natural gas and orients to new suppliers, primarily in the southern Caucasus region. Western countries are interested in resolving conflicts in South Caucasus due to its economic and political interests in the region and the fact that these conflicts pose a risk to investment. The authors of the paper will bring forth the views of all stakeholders in addressing the problem of Nagorno Karabakh and analyze their interests in an attempt to predict the possible final solution to the conflict.

The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Moving from Power Brokerage to Relationship Restructuring

AbstractThe conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh represents the failure of mediation efforts in the context of a prolonged and successful ceasefire which has created disincentives for compromise. Today’s difficult negotiation atmosphere originates from perceiving the conflict as primarily an ethnic problem couched in the rhetoric of a territorial dispute. Further, a prolonged and successful ceasefire has entrenched powerful economic and political interests on both sides which stand to gain from continued limbo. With this in mind, the Minsk Group should shift its focus to the implementation of confidence-building measures between the authorities on both sides as well as the three societies involved. Secondly, the Minsk Group co-chairs can no longer just serve as peace brokers, but must be co-signers to the negotiated agreement, emphasizing their role as guarantors of a long-term peace between Armenians and Azeris. Finally, any long-term agreement will have to include aspects of mutual economic development, cross-cultural exchange, and socio-political understanding.

The Nagorno-Karabakh Settlement Revisited: Is Peace Achievable?

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which mars relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan and impedes the political stability and economic development of the South Caucasus, has a long history and deep roots. Its main political cause lies in the contradiction between the aspirations for national self-determination of the predominantly Armenian-populated enclave and Azerbaijan's claim of territorial integrity to its Soviet-defined boundaries. Although the Bolsheviks granted sovereignty over the overwhelmingly Armenian-populated oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan in 1921, the people of Nagorno-Karabakh have since questioned this decision. In 1988, the Soviet of the Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous oblast requested secession from Azerbaijan, an event beginning the present phase of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The response was the massacre of Armenians in the Azerbaijani industrial city of Sumgait. Rising ethnic tensions and the ensuing violence gradually degenerated into a full-scale war between Azerbaijan and the local Armenian self-defense forces in and around Nagorno-Karabakh and then, following the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, the devastating military confrontation along the borders of newly independent Armenia and Azerbaijan.On May 12, 1994, a cease-fire agreement, brokered by Russia and signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh1 put an end to the years of bitter armed fighting in the battle about the of Nagorno-Karabakh. Because of the conflict, 6,500 Armenians and 20,000-25,000 Azerbaijanis were killed; 412,000 Armenians were expelled from Azerbaijan; and 186,000 Azeris fled from Armenia.2 Nagorno-Karabakh forces established military control over most of Karabakh, as well as seven districts of Azerbaijan, from where some five hundred thousand Azeris were displaced. Since the cease-fire, various international mediation efforts between the conflicting parties have been consolidated into negotiations under the auspices of the Organization for security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), led by the so-called Minsk Group, cochaired since 1997 by France, Russia, and the United States. The negotiations, which so far have produced few results, have focused on two possible methods for the settlement of the conflict. One approach is the package deal and the other is a step-by-step (or phased) solution.The package solution requires an agreement on the final of Nagorno-Karabakh to open a road for the elimination of the armed conflict's consequences. On the other hand, the step-by-step approach postpones an agreement on the final of Nagorno-Karabakh to the indefinite future, focusing instead on a agreement addressing all other issues. These include provisions for reliable international security guarantees for Nagorno-Karabakh, the withdrawal of Nagorno-Karabakh forces from the occupied territories, the return of displaced persons to their prewar homes, and the normalization of the relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, including the reopening of trade and communication links.The choice between a step-by-step and a package methodology for the conflict's settlement has become a bitter point of contention in Armenian political discourse. The administration of the first president, Levon Ter-Petrossian, favored the step-by-step approach as a way to avoid the irreconcilable contradictions of the conflicting parties' maximalist positions, promoting the land for peace formula. His opponents in the government, who forced him to resign over differences on the settlement, declared the policies defeatist.The current Armenian president, Robert Kocharian, has been a long-time advocate for the package solution based on the land for status formula. Besides, the former Karabakhi leader's rise to power in 1998 eventually brought a change to the negotiations' format. Whereas the 1994 Budapest Summit of the OSCE recognized Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh as parties to the conflict, the negotiators' perception of Kocharian as representing both Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh eventually led to the replacement of the negotiations' trilateral format by bilateral Armenian-Azerbaijani talks. …

Scheduling theory and practice: Minsk group results

The paper surveys scheduling theory results obtained mainly at the Institute of Engineering Cybernetics of the Academy of Sciences of Belarus, and published on the whole in Russian. The survey deals with the job-shop, flow-shop and open-shop scheduling problems, and with sequencing jobs on one machine and on a set of parallel machines. The more complicated problems and applied aspects of scheduling theory are also observed. Some trends of further research in scheduling and sequencing are outlined.