Recent Trends in Security and Stability in the South Caucasus

Abstract

After twenty years of independence, the three counties of the South Caucasus—Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia—continue to struggle with a daunting set of challenges. In light of several unresolved conflicts and profound deficiencies in efforts directed at democratic and economic reform, the South Caucasus continues to be a “region at risk.” As if this rather bleak landscape was not enough, three more recent trends have emerged to further threaten the region’s security and stability. The first trend, and one that is likely to have the most profound effects over the long term, is evident in a subtle shift in the already delicate balance of power in the region, driven largely by a steady surge in Azerbaijani defense spending and exacerbated by a lack of progress in the mediation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Since the 1994 ceasefire that resulted in the suspension of hostilities over Nagorno-Karabakh (but that did not definitively end them), this unresolved or “frozen” conflict has been subject to an international mediation effort conducted by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) so-called Minsk Group. This tripartite body co-chaired by France, Russia, and the United States seeks to engage and prod the parties to the conflict toward a negotiated resolution of the conflict. Over the past two years, however, tension has mounted significantly, clashes and attacks have escalated, and violations of the ceasefire have culminated in a renewed threat of war. In response, the primary focus of diplomatic engagement has been modified to a more “back to basics” approach, moving from outright conflict resolution to a more basic mission of conflict prevention. But the outlook for diplomacy remains rather bleak, especially as Azerbaijan sees no real progress from the peace process and has instead reverted to a policy of threatening hostilities, warning of a military option to force a resolution to the conflict. This has also led to a new danger that the NagornoKarabakh conflict may rapidly transform from a simmering (but manageable) “frozen” conflict into a new “hot” conflict. And although the warning signs of possible renewed hostilities over Nagorno-Karabakh have been clear for some time—marked by an escalation of clashes along the line of contact separating Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan—there has been far too little appreciation of the danger outside of the region.