Midwest Studies In Philosophy Research Articles

Midwest Studies in Philosophy: Published Volumes

Midwest Studies in Philosophy: Published Volumes

Midwest Studies in Philosophy: Published Volumes

Midwest Studies in Philosophy: Published Volumes

Models for Hylomorphism

In a series of papers (Fine et al., 1982; Fine, Noûs28(2), 137–158; 1994, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 23, 61–74, 1999) Fine develops his hylomorphic theory of embodiments. In this article, we supply a formal semantics for this theory that is adequate to the principles laid down for it in (Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 23, 61–74, 1999). In Section 1, we lay out the theory of embodiments as Fine presents it. In Section 2, we argue on Cantorian grounds that the theory needs to be stabilized, and sketch some ways forward, discussing various choice points in modeling the view. In Section 3, we develop a formal semantics for the theory of embodiments by constructing embodiments in stages and restricting the domain of the second-order quantifiers. In Section 4 we give a few illustrative examples to show how the models deliver Finean hylomorphic consequences. In Section 5, we prove that Fine’s principles are sound with respect to this semantics. In Section 6 we present some inexpressibility results concerning Fine’s various notions of parthood and show that in our formal semantics these notions are all expressible using a single mereological primitive. In Section 7, we prove several mereological results stemming from the model theory, showing that the mereology is surprisingly robust. In Section 8, we draw some philosophical lessons from the formal semantics, and in particular respond to Koslicki’s (2008) main objection to Fine’s theory. In the appendix we present proofs of the inexpressibility results of Section 6.

The Epistemic Value of Speculative Fiction

In Daniel F. Galouye’s novel Simulacron-3 (1964), a team of computer scientists employs an elaborate computer simulation to reduce the need for marketing research in the actual world. The agents in the simulation are conscious and do not realize they live in a simulated world. When Morton Lynch, one of the scientists, mysteriously disappears, his colleague Douglas Hall attempts to find out what happened to him, only to realize that nobody else even remembers the vanished man. Gradually, it transpires that the world Hall inhabits is also a simulation, and thus that their creation is a simulation within a simulation. The fact that Hall remembers Lynch is a computer glitch. The novel explores several philosophical topics: If the creator of a simulated world turns out to be a malicious sadist (as is the case in the novel), can he be considered a god to his creation? Do simulated beings have souls? If there is an afterlife, will only “real” people go there, or also simulated beings? Can you fall in love with a simulated being? How do people from the level above know they are living in the real physical world, or do they perhaps also inhabit a simulation? Schwitzgebel and Bakker (2013) explore similar issues in their short story Reinstalling Eden, focusing on the moral responsibilities of creators of simulations to their simulated entities. Nick Bostrom (2003), in his philosophical paper “Are We Living in a Computer Simulation?,” uses a weak indifference principle and probability calculus to argue that it is either highly likely that we are living in a computer simulation, or that future generations will never run any simulations (for instance, because they bs_bs_banner MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY

Mathematics and Reality, by Mary Leng.

The popularity of anti-realism in the philosophy of mathematics has been steadily increasing over the past several decades. This book is a valuable addition to the anti-realist cause. Beginning from a naturalistic standpoint familiar to any Quinean, Leng ends with the very non-Quinean view that the standards of justification operative in our best science do not ultimately give us reason to believe that there are mathematical objects, not even those low-level objects — in terms of set-theoretic rank — that she accepts as (very likely) indispensable to our best science (Sect. 3.3). Leng’s overarching strategy — namely, undermining the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument — is not new. Hartry Field is well known for taking this approach in arguing for nominalism (Science Without Numbers, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). Neither is her primary strategy for accomplishing this — namely, undermining confirmation holism — entirely novel. For example, Penelope Maddy (‘Indispensability and Practice’, Journal of Philosophy, 89 (1992), pp. 275–89; Naturalism in Mathematics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, Sects II.6 and II.7), Elliot Sober (‘Mathematics and Indispensability’, Philosophical Review, 102 (1993), pp. 35–7), and Susan Vineberg (‘Confirmation and the Indispensability of Mathematics to Science’, Philosophy of Science, 63 (1996), pp. S256–S263) have all called confirmation holism into question. Even Leng’s insightful application of Kendall Walton’s theory of fiction (Mimesis as Make-Believe, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990) was prefigured by Stephen Yablo (‘Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 72 (1998), pp. 229–61; ‘Go Figure: A Path Through Fictionalism’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25 (2001), pp. 72–102; ‘The Myth of the Seven’, in Fictionalism in Metaphysics, ed. Mark Eli Kalderon, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 88–115). That said, the care and detail with which she develops her fiction-based arguments against confirmation holism and explores the dialectic between responses and counter responses to these arguments make this book worthwhile for anyone seriously interested in the philosophy of mathematics.

The Timing Objection to the Frankfurt Cases

According to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. Pereboom (Living without free will, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29:228–247, 2005) has developed an influential version of a Frankfurt case, known as “Tax Evasion,” which he believes is a counterexample to PAP. Ginet (Journal of Ethics 6:305–309, 2002) raises a key objection against Pereboom’s case, known as “the timing objection.” The main claim of the timing objection is that we need to pay close attention to the precise time at which people act in order to determine what they can, and cannot, be morally responsible for. Recently, Pereboom (The philosophy of free will, Oxford University Press, New York, 2012) has defended his position against this objection by developing a new Frankfurt case called “Tax Cut.” In this paper, I assess this new development. I argue that Tax Cut is just as vulnerable to the timing objection as Pereboom’s original case, Tax Evasion. Thus, Pereboom’s response to the timing objection fails, leaving PAP intact from the threat of both of his Frankfurt cases. Along the way, I further motivate and develop the timing objection, and explore the distinction between derivative and non-derivative responsibility.

Philosophy and Poetry: Midwest Studies in Philosophy edited by french, peter a., howard k. wettstein, and ernie lepore

Philosophy and Poetry: Midwest Studies in Philosophy edited by french, peter a., howard k. wettstein, and ernie lepore

Teaching & Learning Guide for: Vagueness: Supervaluationism

Teaching & Learning Guide for: Vagueness: Supervaluationism

Teaching & Learning Guide for: Contemporary Virtue Ethics

Teaching & Learning Guide for: Contemporary Virtue Ethics

Pereboom on the Frankfurt cases

According to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. In what follows, I want to defend this principle against an apparent counterexample offered recently by Derk Pereboom (Living without free will, 2001; Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 29:228–247, 2005). Pereboom’s case, a variant of what are known as ‘Frankfurt cases,’ is important for it attempts to overcome a dilemma posed for earlier alleged counterexamples to PAP. However, I will argue that by paying closer attention to the details of Pereboom’s example, we see that his example fails to show a way between the horns of the dilemma posed for the earlier Frankfurt examples.

Two Varieties of Literary Imagination: Metaphor, Fiction, and Thought Experiments

Recently, philosophers have discovered that they have a lot to learn from, or at least to ponder about, fiction. Many metaphysicians are attracted to fiction as a model for our talk about purported objects and properties, such as numbers, morality, and possible worlds, without embracing a robust Platonist ontology. In addition, a growing group of philosophers of mind are interested in the implications of our engagement with fiction for our understanding of the mind and emotions: If I don’t believe that Anna Karenina exists, can I really pity her, or hope or desire that she extricate herself from her tragic situation? And why is there no “morality fiction,” analogous to science fiction? I suspect that philosophers have been especially comfortable thinking about fiction because it seems, at least prima facie, to employ the imagination in a way that conforms to a standard model of the mind. Specifically, contemporary philosophers tend to think of imagination as a form of mental pretense. Mental pretense can take two main forms: a cognitive attitude of supposing a set of propositions to be true (make-believe) or else an experiential state of imaging a scenario as if it were before one (imaging). Much of our pretense intertwines the cognitive and experiential modalities, of course. But both share a crucial common feature: all of one’s imaginative effort is invested in pretending that certain contents obtain. In this sense, we can understand imagination as the “offline” simulation of actual beliefs and perceptions (and perhaps other attitudes as well), where we analyze these in the normal way, as states individuated by their attitude and representational content. While I share the burgeoning interest in fiction, I want to suggest that we also have a lot to learn from poetry, and in particular from poetic metaphor. I will argue Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XXXIII (2009)

Teaching & Learning Guide for: The Paradox of Confirmation

. Hempel’s theory of confirmationwas based on a few very simple (and seemingly plausible) assumptions about (instantial)‘inductive-logical support’. However, as Hempel himself was keenly aware, even suchsimple and seemingly plausible assumptions give rise to various puzzles and paradoxes.The two most famous paradoxes of confirmation were discovered by Hempel andGoodman. This article discusses Hempel’s paradox (which is known as ‘the’ paradoxof confirmation, since it was discovered first). However, many of the historicaldevelopments surrounding Hempel’s paradox (also known as the ‘raven paradox’)are also crucial for understanding Goodman’s later (‘grue’) paradox.

The Two Faces of Evidentialism

In this paper I hope to demonstrate two different (and seemingly independent) ways of interpreting the tenets of evidentialism and show why it is important to distinguish between them. These two ways correspond to those proposed by Feldman (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60, 667–695, 2000, Evidentialism: Essays in epistemology, Oxford University Press, 2004) and Adler (Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 23, 267–285, 1999, Beliefs own ethics, MIT Press, 2002). Feldman’s way of interpreting evidentialism makes evidentialism a principle about epistemic justification, about what we ought to believe. Adler’s, on the other hand, makes evidentialism a principle about how we come to believe, what it is, broadly speaking, rational for us to believe. Having identified this difference, I consider two complaints levied against evidentialism, namely what I call the threshold problem and what I call the availability problem, and hope to show that: (a) only an independent, bracketed justification principle of evidentialism can deal with those problems; (b) the rationality principle of evidentialism is not in fact independent from the justification principle; (c) the rationality principle is hard to motivate; and that (d) in the final analysis the argument for the justification principle depends on the rationality principle. I thus conclude that although it may be convenient for evidentialists to treat these two principles as independent, such an independence cannot be maintained.

Responsibility Incorporated

Responsibility Incorporated

Teleonomic functions and intrinsic intentionality: Dretske’s theory as a test case

Fred Dretske’s theory of indicatory functions [Dretske, F. (1988). Explaining behavior: reasons in a world of causes. Cambridge, MA: MIT/Bradford; Dretske, F. (1994). A recipe for thought. Originally published as “If You Can’t Make One, You Don’t Know How It Works.” In P. French, T. Uehling, & H. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest studies in philosophy: Vol. 19. Reprinted in D. J. Chalmers (2002) (pp. 468–482).] is undoubtedly one of the more ambitious attempts to articulate a sound naturalistic foundation for an adequate theory of intentional content. In what follows I argue that, contrary to Dretske’s explicit intentions, his theory fails a crucial adequacy test – that of accounting for mental content as a system-intrinsic property. Once examined in light of the first-person perspective of an embodied psychological agent, I argue, it becomes clear that neither ‘indication’, nor ‘function’, as used by Dretske, can be consistently applied. Dretske’s theory of indicatory functions is, thus, doubly incoherent. It is then argued that the problems identified here stretch far beyond Dretske’s specific theory – covering the better part of contemporary attempts to naturalize content. I conclude by suggesting that these general problems of representation, exemplified so vividly in Dretske’s theory, also testify to the inadequacy of the quest to reduce teleological phenomena (function and purpose) to predominantly mechanistic variables.

Intention, intentional action and moral considerations

Adams, F. 1986. Intention and intentional action: the simple view. Mind and Language 1: 281–301. Adams, F. 1997. Cognitive trying. In Contemporary Action Theory, vol. 1, ed. G. Holmstron-Hintikka and R. Tuomela, 287–314. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Bratman, M. 1987. Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Cosmides, L. and J. Tooby. 1994. The Adapted Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Grice, H. P. 1989. Studies in the Ways of Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Harman, G. 1976. Practical reasoning. Review of Metaphysics 29: 431–63. Knobe, J. 2003a. Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language. Analysis 63: 190–94. Knobe, J. 2003b. Intentional action in folk psychology: an experimental investigation. Philosophical Psychology 16: 309–24. Malle, B. and J. Knobe. 1997. The folk concept of intentionality. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 33: 101–21. Malle, B., L. Moses and D. Baldwin, eds. 2001. Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT/Bradford. McCann, H. 1986. Rationality and the range of intention. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10: 191–211. Mele, A. 1992. Springs of Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mele, A. 2001. Acting intentionally: probing folk notions. In Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition, ed. B. Malle, L. Moses and D. Baldwin, 27–43. Cambridge, MA: MIT/Bradford. Mele, A. and S. Sverdlik. 1996. Intention, intentional action, and moral responsibility. Philosophical Studies 82: 265–87.

Introduction

Introduction FELICIA ACKERMAN What is a philosophical approach to Malory? Philosophy deals with conceptual issues that may seem hopelessly abstract and lofty ('What is truth?' 'What is the good society?' 'What is the meaning oflife?'), hopelessly trivial ('IfI blink while snapping my fingers, is that one event or two?'), hopelessly arcane ('Do properties have a mode ofexistence that is independent of being exemplified?'), or just plain hopeless ('How can I know that the earth was not created five minutes ago, complete with false memories and false historical records?'). Malory can hardly be expected to tell us much about whether properties have a mode of existence that is independent of being exemplified. But he presents a rich and engrossing world where ideals interact with the daily lives of men of action. As the first two articles in this issue of Arthuriana illustrate, LeMorte Darthurthus helps bring some ofphilosophy's 'hopelessly abstract and lofty' issues down to earth in a society whose differences from ours enlarge our outlook. Beverly Kennedy treats the loftiest subject imaginable—the concept of Providence—in relation to the vivid events of Malory's world. Marc Ricciardi deals with the nature of the Round Table fellowship, as well with the perennici philosophical question ofthe relation between being a good occupant ofa particular social role (in this case, being a good knight) and being a good person. The remaining four articles 'officially' deal with emotions in the Morte. Some, however, have philosophical implications as well. In discussing emotion and characterization in Malory, Felicia Ackerman considers the philosophical issue of what it is for a fictional character to be a coherent individual. Peter R. Schroeder's discussion of the reader's role in filling in gaps in Malory's depiction ofemotions draws upon ideas ofthe twentieth-century philosopher H.P. Grice. Karen Cherewatuk deals not only with Lancelot's emotions, but also with fatherhood and with the contrast between the sexual ethic of Camelot and that ofthe Grail world. Kevin T. Grimm explores the emotional, irrational nature ofMalorian loyalty, as well as the interplay oflove and envy in the character of Palomides. ARTHURIANA 11.2 (2OO1) ARTHURIANA Except for Beverly Kennedy's, these papers (or their immediate ancestors) were presented at two special sessions at the Thirty-Fifth International Congress on Medieval Studies, May 2000, whan every lusty harte begynnyth to blossom and to burgyne. BROWN UNIVERSITY Felicia Ackerman (Felicia_Ackerman@Brown.edu) is Professor of Philosophy at Brown University. Her philosophical essays on Malory are published or forthcoming in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 22, 23, and 26, as well as in Shannon French, Code ofthe Warrior. One of her short stories with a Malorian theme has appeared in the anthology Clones and Clones: Facts and Fantasies about Human Cloning. Another is forthcoming in Witness magazine. ...

The Termination Thesis

The Termination Thesis (or “TT”) is the view that people go out of existence when they die. Lots of philosophers seem to believe it. Epicurus, for example, apparently makes use of TT in his efforts to show that it is irrational to fear death. He says, “as long as we exist, death is not with us; but when death comes, then we do not exist.” Lucretius says pretty much the same thing, but in many more words and more poetically: “Death therefore to us is nothing, concerns us not a jot, since the nature of the mind is proved to be mortal; . . . when we shall be no more, when there shall have been a separation of body and soul, out of both of which we are each formed into a single being, to us, you may be sure, who then shall be no more, nothing whatever can happen to excite sensation.” A considerably clearer and more economical statement of TT can be found in L. W. Sumner’s “A Matter of Life and Death.” Sumner says, “The death of a person is the end of that person; before death he is and after death he is not. To die is therefore to cease to exist.” In John Martin Fischer’s recent anthology of papers on the metaphysics of death, there are many passages in which philosophers seem to endorse TT. The philosophers in question appeal to it for a variety of purposes and often do not agree about its significance. One fairly good example is Thomas Nagel, who puts it in the antecedent of a conditional in the first sentence of his essay, though I think he provisionally endorses it elsewhere: “If death is the unequivocal and permanent end of our existence, then the question arises whether it is a bad thing to die.” Other “terminators” in the Fischer anthology include Harry Silverstein, Stephen Rosenbaum, Palle Yourgrau, Steven Luper-Foy, and Joel Feinberg. In his book Thinking Clearly about Death, Jay Rosenberg presents a vigorous endorsement of TT. This comes out in a preliminary way in his discussion of Aunt Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XXIV (2000)

Definite descriptions, A reader, edited by Gary Ostertag, Bradford books, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1998, xii + 411 pp. - Gary Ostertag, Introduction, Pp. 1–34. - Bertrand Russell, On denoting, A reprint of 1119. Pp. 35–49. - A. N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, From Principia mathematica, A reprint of pp. 30–32, 66–71, 173–175 of 1941. Pp. 51–65.

Definite descriptions, A reader, edited by Gary Ostertag, Bradford books, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1998, xii + 411 pp. - Gary Ostertag, Introduction, Pp. 1–34. - Bertrand Russell, On denoting, A reprint of 111<i><b>9</b></i>. Pp. 35–49. - A. N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, From Principia mathematica, A reprint of pp. 30–32, 66–71, 173–175 of 194<i><b>1</b></i>. Pp. 51–65.

Unity without Identity: A New Look at Material Constitution

It is time to rethink age-old questions about material constitution. What is the relation between, say, a lump of clay and a statue that it makes up, or between a red and white piece of metal and a stop sign, or between a person and her body? Assuming that there is a single relation between members of each of these pairs, is the relation “strict” identity, “contingent” identity or something else? Although this question has generated substantial controversy recently, I believe that there is philosophical gain to be had from thinking through the issues from scratch. Many of the charges and countercharges are based on the following dichotomy: For any x and y that are related as the lump of clay is to the statue that it makes up, either x is identical to y, or x and y are separate entities, independent of each other. By giving up this dichotomy, we will be able to begin to make sense, I hope, of an intermediate unity relation that holds promise for solving a raft of philosophical problems, including the problem of how persons are related to their bodies. And if I am correct, then this relation—constitution without identity—is ubiquitous and interesting in its own right, apart from the light that it sheds on human persons. My overall aim here is constructive: I want to set out and defend an explicit account of what it is for an object x to constitute an object y at time t. According to my account, if x constitutes y (at any time), then x ≠ y. (Thus, I reject the first half of the dichotomy above.) Although I join the ranks of those who deny that the relation between the members of any of the pairs is identity in any sense, I depart from those ranks by also denying a central aspect of what has been called “the standard account.” Suppose that “Copper” is a name for the piece of copper that makes up a copper statue, “Statue.” According to “the standard account,” Copper is not (predicatively) a statue. I believe that “the standard account” construes Copper and Statue as too separate. On my view, by contrast, the relation between Copper and Statue is Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XXIII (1999)