Responsibility Incorporated

Integrity

Previous articleNext article No AccessDiscussionThe Responsibility of "Random Collections"Stanley BatesStanley Bates Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 81, Number 4Jul., 1971 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/291823 Views: 8Total views on this site Citations: 16Citations are reported from Crossref PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Alberto Giubilini, Neil Levy What in the World Is Collective Responsibility?, Dialectica 72, no.22 (Aug 2018): 191–217.https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12228Hans Bernhard Schmid Collective Responsibilities of Random Collections: Plural Self-Awareness among Strangers, Journal of Social Philosophy 49, no.11 (Apr 2018): 91–105.https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12229Amy J. Sepinwall Corporate Moral Responsibility, Philosophy Compass 11, no.11 (Jan 2016): 3–13.https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12293J.A. Corlett Collective Responsibility, (Jan 2015): 1–5.https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118785317.weom020007Jesse Tomalty The force of the claimability objection to the human right to subsistence, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44, no.11 (Jan 2020): 1–17.https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2014.900211Paul Kirby Refusing to be a Man?, Men and Masculinities 16, no.11 (Jan 2013): 93–114.https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184X12468100Björn Petersson Collective Omissions and Responsibility, Philosophical Papers 37, no.22 (Jul 2008): 243–261.https://doi.org/10.1080/05568640809485221Brook J. Sadler Collective Responsibility, Universalizability, and Social Practices, Journal of Social Philosophy 38, no.33 (Sep 2007): 486–503.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9833.2007.00393.xBROOK JENKINS SADLER Shared Intentions and Shared Responsibility, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30, no.11 (Sep 2006): 115–144.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.2006.00131.xGregory Mellema Collective responsibility and contributing to an outcome, Criminal Justice Ethics 25, no.22 (Jun 2006): 17–22.https://doi.org/10.1080/0731129X.2006.9992199Manuel Velasquez Debunking Corporate Moral Responsibility, Business Ethics Quarterly 13, no.44 (Jan 2015): 531–562.https://doi.org/10.5840/beq200313436George G. Brenkert Marketing to Inner-City Blacks: PowerMaster and Moral Responsibility, Business Ethics Quarterly 8, no.0101 (Jan 2015): 1–18.https://doi.org/10.1017/S1052150X00003675George G. Brenkert Marketing to Inner-City Blacks: PowerMaster and Moral Responsibility, Business Ethics Quarterly 8, no.11 (Jan 2015): 1–18.https://doi.org/10.2307/3857519J. Moreh The authority of moral rules, Theory and Decision 27, no.33 (Nov 1989): 257–273.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00135099 Kristin Shrader-Frechette Parfit and Mistakes in Moral Mathematics, Ethics 98, no.11 (Oct 2015): 50–60.https://doi.org/10.1086/292915Iemasa NAKAMURA, Shouhei INOUE, Tomomichi ONO, Yoshihiro MAEKAWA, Takahisa SATO, Hiroshi KUWAHARA, Yoshimitsu ISHII Chronic Arsenical Poisoning Near an Abandoned Mine at Toroku, Miyazaki Prefecture, Kyushu, Japan, Nishi Nihon Hifuka 38, no.44 (Jan 1976): 554–571.https://doi.org/10.2336/nishinihonhifu.38.554

Moral Perception and Particularity

Of late philosophers have begun to write about the implications of research in social and personality psychology for the study of ethics. The spirit of this movement is that ethics should be founded on a realistic conception of human nature and that social and personality psychology have important things to say about these matters. Examples of philosophers involved in this movement are, inter alia, and most prominently, Doris, Flanagan, Harman, and Vranas. On the psychologists’ side, Ross and Nisbett are the most prominent examples of those attempting to insure that the findings of psychology find their way into our conception of human nature. We want to sign up for this movement too. But we are afraid that these philosophers and psychologists have drawn wrong conclusions from psychological results. We believe the lesson to be learned is substantially narrower than the movement seems to believe.

Nowadays it often appears that liberals have been outflanked on the issue of diversity. Political activists and theorists increasingly insist that greater weight be given to what distinguishes particular groups from others. Those who clamor for a "politics of difference" are as likely to be attacking as seeking to extend liberal values and practices. Iris Marion Young, for example, wants a politics that "attends to rather than represses difference," in which no group "is stereotyped, silenced, or marginalized."' She dismisses the ideal of impartiality and such notions as moral universality, human nature, essentialism, and various other pre-postmodern sins and vices, because all deny the basic significance of group-based differences: "Groups cannot be socially equal unless their specific experience, culture, and social contributions are publicly affirmed and recognized."2 Young rejects "melting pot ideals of assimilation and unity," not surprisingly, arguing that the "desire for political unity will suppress difference, and tend to exclude some voices and perspectives from the public."3 She advocates "bilingual-

The popular and professional press is filled with discussions of major changes on the organizational landscape, including organizational design experiments at entrepreneurial firms as well as at major corporations, the slashing of corporate staffs, the downsizing, delayering and revitalization of firms, the emerging electronic organization, mergers and acquisitions, failures of high reliability organizations, and time-based competition. Each of these issues has been associated with the redesign of organizations, yet these redesigns seem far removed from academic research, and they do not typically utilize the academic body of knowledge. Although the field has progressed enormously in new methods and insights during a century of research, it seems to us that organization studies have been a source of recurrent disappointment for practitioners and academics alike (Bedian 1989; Cummings 1983; Luthans 1986; Slocum 1984). For example, Miner (1984) analyzed 32 established organizational science theories and concluded that with the exception of theories of motivation there is no relationship between usefulness and validity. Is the field of organization studies irrelevant? Organizations have become the dominant institution on the social landscape. Yet the body of knowledge published in academic journals has practically no audience in business or government. Unlike a field such as economics, research on organizations has not typically focused on problems relevant to business and government organizations, and the real world of organizations has not drawn on the work undertaken by organizational scientists. From colleagues within our field and in allied disciplines, we hear complaints that manuscripts espousing radical ideas, or topics outside the mainstream, are difficult to publish. Reviewers for established journals seem to value papers whose theses are anchored in established theories or that use "legitimate" methods, thus implicitly creating a publication barrier for research that falls outside mainstream topics or methods. Moreover, we observe that scholars with interests in organizations span many disciplines and fields of inquiry such as anthropology, economics, history, information science, communication theory, artificial intelligence, systems theory, psychology, sociology, political science, policy sciences, as well as organization behavior, strategic management and organization theory. We sense that a new discipline of organization science is evolving and we envision that a new journal can become a forum for a discipline defined more broadly. The purpose of this essay is to discuss these issues and the need for reorienting research away from incremental, footnote-on-footnote research as the norm for the field. Although current research approches have made solid contributions, they do not

The question of whether those who think of themselves as egalitarians really do, or should, value equality has received considerable attention in recent years. Alternative principles have been offered as better capturing those distributive intuitions formerly known as ‘egalitarian’. Some endorse sufficiency—comparisons do not matter; what is important is that all have enough. Others favor giving priority to the worse off. The

Examinant les approches cognitive et non-cognitive de la confiance dans le domaine de la theorie politique contemporaine, l'A. souligne la pertinence de la seconde pour le gouvernement, ainsi que l'importance d'un sens de la securite concernant la bienveillance, le caractere consciencieux et la reciprocite des acteurs politiques dans la vie publique moderne

Analytic moral philosophers have been taking a renewed interest in friendship in recent years. They have been especially liable to consider friendship in connection with debates over partiality and impartiality in ethics. Many important styles of ethical theory hold up impartiality and equal treatment—under one or another interpretation—as central moral concepts and ideals. Yet friendship and other close relations between persons seem to involve partiality and differential treatment. We care more about what befalls our friends than about what happens to strangers, and we are more motivated to advance our friends’ interests than those of strangers. We seem even to have special responsibilities toward our friends which we don’t have toward strangers. If friendship necessarily involves such partiality, then there is a tension, at least, between the constitutive elements and dispositions of friendship and those of morality: they seem to pull in opposite directions. Contemporary moral theorists have responded to this tension in a variety of ways. Some have sought to bring the apparent partiality of friendship under the wing of a more fundamental impartiality, thus reconciling friendship and the moral. Others have insisted on the primacy of friendship, and partiality, over impartial moral conceptions—

The Law of Peoples

Agreements and kindred phenomena are ubiquitous in human life.' They are a central source of obligation. Obligation is a forceful species of reason for action. It is therefore important to be clear about the nature of agreements and the obligations of agreement. These matters have not as yet been well understood. Or so a number of common pronouncements suggest. Among these are some prevalent claims about the impact of coercion on agreements. Philosophers standardly claim that coerced agreements do not impose obligations to fulfill the agreement: they are not binding.2 Many assert that

Previous articleNext article No AccessSymposium on David Gauthier's Morals by AgreementSocial Contract Theory's Fanciest FlightDavid BraybrookeDavid Braybrooke Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 97, Number 4Jul., 1987 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/292887 Views: 11Total views on this site Citations: 11Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1987 The University of Chicago PressPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Oleksii Konashevych General Concept of Real Estate Tokenization on Blockchain, European Property Law Journal 9, no.11 (Sep 2020): 21–66.https://doi.org/10.1515/eplj-2020-0003Peter Timmerman Introduction, (Mar 2014): 1–20.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04262-6_1Peter Timmerman Contract Theory and Perspective-Taking, (Mar 2014): 23–43.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04262-6_2John R. Welch Securing Our Moral Ends, (Sep 2014): 133–168.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08013-0_5Edwin Etieyibo Bargaining and agreement in Gauthier's moral contractarianism, South African Journal of Philosophy 32, no.33 (Sep 2013): 221–233.https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2013.837652Elisabeth EllisElisabeth Ellis is assistant professor of political science, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX 77843. Citizenship and Property Rights: A New Look at Social Contract Theory, The Journal of Politics 68, no.33 (Jul 2015): 544–555.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00444.x Erratum, Business Ethics Quarterly 8, no.33 (Jan 2015): 613–615.https://doi.org/10.2307/3857442Joe Mintoff On a problem for contractarianism, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74, no.11 (Mar 1996): 98–116.https://doi.org/10.1080/00048409612347091Gerald F. Gaus Public justification and democratic adjudication, Constitutional Political Economy 2, no.33 (Sep 1991): 251–281.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02393132Richard P. Nielsen Dialogic leadership as ethics action (praxis) method, Journal of Business Ethics 9, no.1010 (Oct 1990): 765–783.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00383275Richard P. Nielsen Negotiating as an ethics action (praxis) strategy, Journal of Business Ethics 8, no.55 (May 1989): 383–390.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00381730

Corporate/collective moral responsibility is a thorny topic in business ethics and this paper argues that this is due a number of unacknowledged and connected epistemic issues. Firstly, CSR, Corporate Citizenship and many other research streams that are based on the assumption of collective and/or corporate moral responsibility are not compatible with Kantian ethics, consequentialism, or virtue ethics because corporate/collective responsibility violates the axioms and central hypotheses of these research programmes. Secondly, in the absence of a sound theoretical moral philosophical foundation, business ethicists have based their ideas on legal and political epistemologies, yet still claim to be ethics-based. Thirdly, research is often driven by an intention to prove that a specific social goal is right, not by open and critical inquiry. Finally, today, corporate/collective moral responsibility is widely accepted as the Truth as most researchers are unaware of any issues because they are untrained in philosophy. The paper identifies the confusion about the epistemic basis as a major impediment for delivering a thick concept of the role of corporations as moral agents. Thus, the paper does not argue against corporate or collective agency as such, but points out an obvious but forgotten paradox: corporate and collective personhood cannot, at the moment at least, be epistemologically grounded in the field in which business ethics claims to operate: moral philosophy.

Previous articleNext article No AccessCan Libertarianism Sustain a Fraud Standard?James W. ChildJames W. Child Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 104, Number 4Jul., 1994 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/293652 Views: 7Total views on this site Citations: 16Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1994 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Sana Ben Cheikh, Nadia Loukil Political connections, related party transactions and firm performance: evidence from Tunisian context, Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies 41 (Mar 2022).https://doi.org/10.1108/JAEE-10-2020-0287Sanju Ahuja, Jyoti Kumar The Influence of Business Incentives and Attitudes on Ethics Discourse in the Information Technology Industry, Philosophy & Technology 34, no.44 (Mar 2021): 941–966.https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-021-00443-wDamian Bäumlisberger A Nozickian Case for Compulsory Employment Injury Insurance: The Example of Sweatshops, Journal of Business Ethics 173, no.11 (Jun 2020): 13–27.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-020-04535-zPavel Slutskiy Fraudulent Communication in Advertising and Business Promotion, (Aug 2021): 261–274.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-6664-0_17Hillel Steiner Asymmetric information, libertarianism, and fraud, Review of Social Economy 77, no.22 (May 2019): 94–107.https://doi.org/10.1080/00346764.2019.1602280Benjamin Ferguson CAN LIBERTARIANS GET AWAY WITH FRAUD?, Economics and Philosophy 34, no.22 (Jan 2018): 165–184.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267117000311Carl David Mildenberger , Philosophical Studies 175, no.99 ( 2018): 2105.https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0950-1Matt Zwolinski THE LIBERTARIAN NONAGGRESSION PRINCIPLE, Social Philosophy and Policy 32, no.22 (Apr 2016): 62–90.https://doi.org/10.1017/S026505251600011XThomas L. Carson Free Exchange for Mutual Benefit: Sweatshops and Maitland’s “Classical Liberal Standard”, Journal of Business Ethics 112, no.11 (Feb 2012): 127–135.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-012-1236-3William Kline Do No Harm: A Defense of Markets in Healthcare, HEC Forum 22, no.33 (Aug 2010): 241–251.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10730-010-9140-7Jeffrey Moriarty How Much Compensation Can CEOs Permissibly Accept?, Business Ethics Quarterly 19, no.22 (Jan 2015): 235–250.https://doi.org/10.5840/beq200919212Richard Sturn Volenti Non Fit Iniuria? Contract Freedom and Labor Market Institutions, Analyse & Kritik 31, no.11 (Jan 2009).https://doi.org/10.1515/auk-2009-0104J. S. Taylor Market Incentives and Health Care Reform, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 33, no.55 (Oct 2008): 498–514.https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/jhn027Serena Olsaretti Liberty, Desert and the Market, 48 (Sep 2009).https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511487422Raphael Chijioke Njoku Deconstructing Abacha: Demilitarization and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria after the Abacha Era, Government and Opposition 36, no.11 (Mar 2014): 71–96.https://doi.org/10.1111/1477-7053.00054James W. Child Profit: The Concept and Its Moral Features, Social Philosophy and Policy 15, no.22 (Jan 2009): 243–282.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500002004

This special issue of the Journal of Personnel Psychology concerns a relatively new and empirically unexplored terrain of leadership, that is, ethical leadership. Contemporary organizations express a strong need for leaders who behave in an ethicalmanner and encourage employees to adopt this behavior in their daily work. It is surprising to see that, despite this urgent call, ethical transgressions are very much commonplace, as such emphasizing the need to increase our insight into the workings of ethical leadership. In this issue, we bring together research on the antecedents, processes, and consequences of ethical as well as unethical leadership and, to start off with, we describe the emerging field of ethical leadership and identify future directions in this introductory editorial.