Mexican War Research Articles

“Retribution Will Be Their Reward”: New Mexico's Las Gorras Blancas and the Fight for the Las Vegas Land Grant Commons

This essay traces the struggle for the commons on New Mexico's Las Vegas Land Grant, a community property claim in New Mexico. Following the U.S.–Mexican War, waves of enclosures undermined communal property relations throughout the region. The Las Vegas grant was particularly appealing to land speculators and commercial cattle operators for its vast grasslands, timber, and rail connections. In the late 1880s a clandestine movement, known as Las Gorras Blancas, responded to the property enclosures and new wage labor relations on the grant with night-riding tactics that included cutting the barbed wire fences that enclosed common property and destroying the rail infrastructure that served the new class of speculators and commercial cattle operators. This essay examines the specific patterns of land speculation in Las Vegas amid the wider capitalist transformation of New Mexico as a means to understand the development and political economy of the Las Gorras Blancas protest.

Slaughter at Goliad: The Mexican Massacre of 400 Texas Volunteers , and: Texas Devils: Rangers & Regulars on the Lower Rio Grande, 1846–1861 , and: War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.–Mexican War , and: A Gallant Little Army: The Mexico City Campaign (review)

Reviewed by: Slaughter at Goliad: The Mexican Massacre of 400 Texas Volunteers, and: Texas Devils: Rangers & Regulars on the Lower Rio Grande, 1846–1861, and: War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.–Mexican War, and: A Gallant Little Army: The Mexico City Campaign Joseph F. Stoltz III (bio) Slaughter at Goliad: The Mexican Massacre of 400 Texas Volunteers. By Jay A. Stout. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008. Pp. 272. Cloth, $29.95.) Texas Devils: Rangers & Regulars on the Lower Rio Grande, 1846–1861. By Michael L. Collins. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008. Pp. 316. Cloth, $26.95.) War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.–Mexican War. By Brian DeLay. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008. Pp. 496. Cloth, $35.00.) A Gallant Little Army: The Mexico City Campaign. By Timothy D. Johnson. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007. Pp. 384. Cloth, $39.95.) Historians today are far more aware of issues of race relations than previous generations, and recently a number of new works have contributed substantially to the historiography of the topic as it relates to the antebellum Southwest. While some of these works do not explore the issue of race directly, they all present significant advances furthering our understanding of race relations between peoples of Anglo, Mexican, and Native American descent. Political instability within the region exacerbated existing racial attitudes among the various populations, resulting in considerable violence throughout the period. The Texas Revolution represented one of the earliest manifestations of this violence. In fact, this event contributed substantially to the near constant bloodshed in the southwestern United States and northern Mexico during the mid nineteenth century. Jay A. Stout’s Slaughter at Goliad explores the events culminating in the March 27, 1836, Mexican execution of more than four hundred Texas volunteers during the Texas Revolution. Stout argues that the mass execution of these soldiers resulted from poor leadership and negative racial attitudes on both sides. Through an examination of army records, government reports, and survivor accounts, Stout explores the individuals who played key roles in the executions and how the Mexican army put hundreds of American citizens to death with no resulting action [End Page 497] by the United States government. The captured soldiers came largely from the southern United States and did not hold Texas citizenship. They had enlisted in the army of Texas in support of their Anglo–American brethren, who had reportedly suffered under a corrupt and inept Mexican government. Conversely, Mexicans believed that Anglo Americans abused the good will of the Mexican people and sought to rob Mexico of its territory and resources. The situation in the region ultimately resulted in increasingly negative racial attitudes that fostered little quarter to be given by either side. Slaughter at Goliad relies heavily on Internet-based sources, and the work is a testament to the usefulness of archival digitization for both researching a topic and evaluating the product of the research. The ability to find and quickly review the source an author used is extremely useful. Yet if the reader has the ability to access a primary source on a topic, it becomes all the more noticeable when there is no citation, as occurs in Stout’s book on occasion. A more specialized reader may at times find Slaughter at Goliad frustrating because of its cursory style. Stout crafts his chapter on the effectiveness of shoulder-fired weapons during the mid nineteenth century well, but serious scholars of the Texas Revolution will find that Stout offers little, if anything, new on the topic. Additionally, in an effort to provide context for the massacre at Goliad, Stout belabors Texas history prior to March 1836. General readers will undoubtedly find these opening chapters helpful, but specialists can skip over these sections with ease. Overall, Stout’s Slaughter at Goliad sheds light on a partially forgotten event in U.S. and Mexican history in a format accessible to a general audience. Moreover, the work provides an interesting guide for scholars to the plethora of materials now available in digital archives. While greater citation and a more streamlined construction would aid the work, Slaughter at Goliad certainly has enough...

War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.–Mexican War (review)

War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.–Mexican War (review)

At the Edge of the Precipice: Henry Clay and the Compromise that Saved the Union (review)

Reviewed by: At the Edge of the Precipice: Henry Clay and the Compromise that Saved the Union Larry Menna (bio) At the Edge of the Precipice: Henry Clay and the Compromise that Saved the Union. By Robert V. Remini. (New York: Basic Books, 2010. Pp. xiii, 184. $24.00 cloth) Beginning in grade school, we are taught that compromise is the hallmark and strength of the American political system. In his new book, At the Edge of the Precipice, Robert Remini uses the sectional crisis precipitated by the acquisition of territory from the Mexican War as a primer to examine the craft and process of political compromise. His lively account of the Compromise of 1850 skillfully and concisely analyzes the leadership role of Henry Clay in guiding the nation through the swirling and dangerous political waters of the time and in averting the dissolution of the Union. The strength of Remini's work is his dissection of the political wrangling, partisan interests, individual frailties, and sectional differences that eventually culminated in the passage of the Compromise, ironically with Stephen Douglas at the helm. Clay, the Great Compromiser, had exited the capital after the defeat of his "omnibus" bill that had grouped the various components of the Compromise into one legislative proposal, a tactical mistake that Douglas had understood from the start and later corrected through the passage of its components through separate bills. Remini, the author of a highly respected biography of Clay, captures the complexities and contradictions of the Kentuckian's views on slavery, the lack of discipline in his personal life and legislative career, and the generosity and intemperance of his congressional maneuverings. In addition, he emphasizes the role [End Page 255] of national leadership in preserving the Union in 1850, particularly that of the Great Triumvirate—Clay, Calhoun, and Webster—and argues that their concern for the Union and their skillful leadership prevailed over the forces of disunion. Standard accounts of the Compromise of 1850 situate it as one of the crucial national events that polarized the sections politically over the issue of slavery and that progressively broke down the second political party system, thus allowing the voices of extremism to prevail in both sections. Remini, however, offers a new insight in his book: because the Union averted disunion in 1850, the North gained another ten years during which it grew in industrial, financial, technological, and military strength while the South, despite the expansion of cotton production, failed to diversify its economic system and declined relative to northern economic and political power. He also asserts that the 1850s bought more time for another strong leader in the national tradition to emerge—Abraham Lincoln—who could meet the challenges to the Union posed by secession and civil war. But Remini's insight also exposes the weakness of the book. For the most part, his work is too tightly focused on the congressional process of the Compromise without much of an examination of the larger political, economic, and social factors that shaped the forces of union and disunion during the period. In short, much of his recounting of the Compromise seems to occur within a legislative political vacuum. In addition, his book provides little support for his key assertion about growing northern power—an odd omission since plenty of economic and demographic evidence could have been marshaled behind it. In this sense, Remini's book is more suggestive than anything else. Moreover, by asserting the centrality of statesmanship in the passage of the Compromise of 1850 and its absence several years later in the descent into Civil War, Remini's interpretation of the Compromise harkens back to elements of the blundering-politician school of Civil War causation advocated by Avery Craven and James G. Randall. Yet Remini's narrative of enlightened statesmanship is often belied by the pettiness, partisanship, and machinations that [End Page 256] characterized the legislative process, including those by the Great Triumvirate that came close to derailing the Compromise altogether before moderate elements prevailed. Lastly, compromise is certainly an important political skill, but Remini's account elevates it to a highly valued principle. Before we forget, compromises of the antebellum era occurred at the expense of...

Brian DeLay . War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.‐Mexican War . (The Lamar Series in Western History.) New Haven : Yale University Press , in association with the William P. Clements Center for Southwest Studies, Southern Methodist University. 2008 . Pp. xxi, 473. $35.00.

Brian DeLay . War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.‐Mexican War . (The Lamar Series in Western History.) New Haven : Yale University Press , in association with the William P. Clements Center for Southwest Studies, Southern Methodist University. 2008 . Pp. xxi, 473. $35.00.

Trailing Clouds of Glory: Zachary Taylor's Mexican War Campaign and His Emerging Civil Leaders

Trailing Clouds of Glory: Zachary Taylor's Mexican War Campaign and His Emerging Civil Leaders

Soldiers and Politics: Exposing Some Myths

Americans today could not imagine the nation's senior military officer running for high political office while still in uniform. They would think it absurd for that officer campaign for the presidency, lose, and then quietly resume his position in the Pentagon while continuing serve for another decade, receiving not only a promotion but also wide respect and acclaim from Congress, the people, the news media, and even the President. And yet, this is what occurred in the mid-nineteenth century. Major General Winfield Scott, the general-in-chief of the US Army and hero of the War of 1812 and the Mexican War, contested with the incumbent President, Millard Fillmore, win the Whig Party's presidential nomination. Scott then ran against his erstwhile subordinate, former Brigadier General Franklin Pierce. Scott did not resign his commission. He lost the election of 1852, but continued as the Army's top general for another decade. In 1856, a grateful Congress promoted him lieutenant general, the first officer hold that rank since George Washington. (1) The campaign of 1852 was not Scott's first foray into politics. In 1848, he had lobbied for the Whig presidential nomination, but the party chose another general, Zachary Taylor, as its standard bearer. Taylor, also a Mexican War hero, was then-commander of the Army's Western Division. He remained in uniform throughout the campaign. In fact, the election was held on 7 November, but General Taylor did not submit his resignation from the Army until 21 December, take effect the following 28 February, four days before his inauguration. (2) These were not isolated incidents. Throughout most of our nation's history this type of conduct was part of the American military tradition. It is a myth argue that the military has been divorced from political affairs. On the contrary, military leaders have been deeply involved in politics. Yet, one of the foremost observers of civil-military relations, Richard H. Kohn, argues in his seminal essay on the subject that a crisis is now unfolding because the military is becoming politicized. It was not always so, says Kohn: Historically, one of the chief bulwarks of civilian control has been the American military establishment itself. Its small size in peacetime, the professionalism of the officers, their political neutrality, their willing subordination, and their acceptance of a set of unwritten but largely understood rules of behavior in the civil-military relationship--all had made civilian control succeed, messy as it sometimes was and situational as it must always be. (3) The record is clear: The US military was anything but politically neutral throughout much of its history; its leaders were not always willingly subordinate civilian authority; and they did not often agree an unwritten standard of behavior. Rather, there was in essence a permeable membrane between the military and political spheres that allowed men pass back and forth between the two as it suited their purpose--and the purpose of the political parties and even the nation. Politics and the Military America's founding fathers were fearful of a standing army. The Declaration of Independence railed against King George III because he kept among us, in times of peace, standing armies without the consent of our legislature; he imposed an occupying force that affected render the military independent of and superior the civil power; and he brought in mercenaries to complete the works of death, desolation, and tyranny. It was therefore no surprise that the issue of an army was highly contentious in the newly independent United States. Debates at the Constitutional Convention in 1787 were heated. When the Constitution was finally agreed upon, it included several provisions specifically designed regulate and define the powers and limitations of an army. The President was be the commander-in-chief of the military and would appoint officers, but Congress would control the purse strings and have the power declare war. …

American Anabasis: Xenophon and the Idea of America from the Mexican War to Iraq (review)

American Anabasis: Xenophon and the Idea of America from the Mexican War to Iraq (review)

“An Ugly and Sickening Business,” or, the Bush “Legacy” and the Decimation of Iraq

Interweaving five meditations on imperial power, this article appraises the consequences of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. By including excerpts of poetry from the U.S./Mexican War, the Vietnam War, Plato, the Iraq War, and ancient Buddhist texts, the article raises larger questions about the ethics of resistance, the dilemmas of complicity, and the possibility of hope.

Texas Devils: Rangers and Regulars on the Lower Rio Grande, 1846-1861 (review)

20ogBook Reviews265 service would boost the fortunes of their region and pave the way for a southern transcontinental railroad. Elsewhere, in his discussion of Henry Skillman's mail operations in Texas during the early 1850s, Sells says that "Negro soldiers" provided protection for Skillman's mail line (131-132). Buffalo soldiers were not detailed to the Texas frontier until after the Civil War. The above arejust a few of die many errors that diminish diis overview's odierwise commendable assets. Sells, a Colorado native now retired from the financial services industry, clearly has a strong affinity for his subject matter. Readers will find much of the book informative and many of the stories engaging. This work provides an illustrative example, however, of why copyeditors at every publishing house are wordi their weight in gold. Texas Christian UniversityGlen Sample Ely Texas Devils: Rangen and Regulars on tL· Lower Rio Grande, 1846—1861. By Michael L. Collins. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008. Pp. 328. Illustrations , notes, bibliography, index. ISBN 9780806139395, $26.95 cloth.) Anyone wanting to know more about the history of the Texas Rangers and the United States Army and the role they played in the history of the Lower Rio Grande will thoroughly enjoy this refreshing and tantalizing book. In a grand sweeping narrative, Collins ably demonstrates that the Mexican War was only die beginning of a series of tumultuous events on the border. As many as five thousand Texas Mounted Volunteersjoined Gen. Zachary Taylor 's army on die Rio Grande in 1 846. Although Taylor viewed the Rangers as brave and gallant, he saw them as lawless and uncontrollable. Rangers such as Ben McCulloch,John Salmon "Rip" Ford, Walter P. Lane,John Coffee "Jack" Hays, and Samuel Hamilton Walker all became legendary during the war. A veteran of the Mier Expedition and the "black bean" incident, Walker came to be known as the ¦ "Thunderbolt of die Texas Rangers." Killed at the Batde of Humanda at the end of the war, he is best remembered today for the Colt Walker revolver, the largest and most powerful black powder repeating handgun ever made. As an adjutant in the Rangers, Ford came to be known as "R. I .P." after writing "Rest in Peace" at die end of letters of condolence. One of the most interesting Texas volunteers, however, is John Joel Glanton who is referred to as a half-savage Indian fighter with a penchant for scalping die enemy, and who was certain to have been courtmartialed as a war criminal had he not escaped back to Texas. After a murderous, scalp hunting career murdering Indians in northern Mexico, Glanton arrived at the Yuma Crossing on die Colorado River where he seized control of the ferry from the Yuma Indians. In response, the Yumas caught Glanton and his men in a drunken stupor, killed and scalped most of them, and then cremated their bodies in a big bonfire. Largely men of myth with a barbaric code of conduct and notorious for their excessive violence and biting racism, "Los Diablos Téjanos" left deep and lasting scars on die history of the border that remain to this day. In the 1 850s, the lower Rio Grande was also plagued by filibusters lusting for conquest, many of them Knights of the Golden Circle. Some dreamed of creat- 266Southwestern Historical QuarterlyOctober ing a Republic of the Sierra Madre as an independent buffer state in northern Mexico. Probably die best known filibuster wasJosé María de Jesús Carvajal who rallied several hundred Texas mercenaries into a mob called the "Liberating Army of Northern Mexico." In what was known as the "Merchant's War," Carvajal and his rabble captured Camargo and attacking Matamoros, only to be defeated by a superior force of the Mexican army in street-to-street, house-to-house fighting. Certainly the most serious uprising on the Rio Grande, one that would send hundreds of Texas Rangers and the United States Army scurrying for the Rio Grande, was the Cortina War of 1859-1860. Although Collins did not have available a recent biography of Cortina that corrects many of the errors of previous writings on die subject, his treatment of this...

Confederate Colonels: A Biographical Register (review)

Book Reviews Confederate Colonels: A Biographical Register. By Bruce S. Allardice. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2008. x, 436 pp. $49.95. ISBN 978-0-8262-1809-4. Civil War studies are replete with reference works of varying quality, some redundant and repetitive, some hyperspecialized and consequently of interest to only a few. Others are gems that deliver unexpected insights , revealing facts, and enticing details. Bruce Allardice has written a biographical register of Confederate colonels that fortunately has more of the latter virtues than the former vices. Allardice’s register includes a highly informative introduction that explains the process by which an individual became a colonel in the Confederate army. The Confederate government accepted volunteer regiments organized according to state law that generally provided for the election of officers, including colonels—a practice much criticized then and later. Colonels could also be appointed by governors, if state law permitted it, or by the president of the Confederacy. If a colonel was killed or otherwise incapacitated, strict seniority dictated his replacement , a policy that was later modified with the creation of boards of examination that scrutinized officers to determine if they were really capable of taking command of a full regiment. Some were appointed by dubious or questionable authorities, and Allardice has helpfully provided separate appendixes to deal with such anomalies. The profile that emerges of the men who led Confederate regiments in the vicious fighting that typified the war belies at least one longstanding assumption regarding officers. Allardice found that about 1,900 men reached the rank of colonel in the Confederate army. They tended to be young (the average age about thirty-two) and, remarkably for the era, they had some education at the college level. Before the war, men who later served as colonels were farmers, lawyers, and politicians, or some mix of those professions; the majority of them lived in older southern states. Casualties among colonels were heavy, with 252, or 16 percent, killed or mortally wounded in action. Most interestingly, Allardice argues that it is a myth that Confederate regiments were led by inexperienced military amateurs prone to blunders . His review of the extensive biographical material suggests that in fact many of the colonels had some previous military experience, and T H E A L A B A M A R E V I E W 298 regiments led by colonels without military training often had subordinate officers with military know-how. The specific nature of that experience varied a great deal: more attended private military academies other than West Point; state militia and Mexican War veterans outnumbered those with regular army experience; and a number of colonels had been naval officers who transferred to the army. Allardice also found colonels who had attended West Point and not graduated, which nonetheless gave them a degree of familiarity with military tactics and manners. The biographical entries are pithy yet informative, replete with the usual birth and death dates as well as important events in the lives of the colonels before, during, and after the war. For example, the postwar accomplishments of William C. Oates, commander of the Fifteenth Alabama and later a congressman and governor, are noted in his biography . Fascinating details emerge on the life of John F. Marshall, before the war chairman of the Texas Democratic Party, who may have used his friendship with Jefferson Davis to secure his appointment as colonel of the Fourth Texas regiment. The hardscrabble men of the Fourth resented the appointment and tried to force Marshall out. Perhaps in an effort to win their loyalty and affection, Marshall led from the front and was killed leading a charge at Gaines’ Mill, Virginia. The entries lack source citations, which would have been immensely helpful to scholars, but space restrictions most likely prevented Allardice from including that material. Bruce Allardice has written a reference work that is useful, informative, and challenges at least one misconception regarding southern officers in the war. DAN MONROE Millikin University Booker T. Washington and the Art of Self-Representation. By Michael Bieze. New York: Peter Lang, 2008. viii, 285 pp. $32.95. ISBN 978-1-4331-0010...

Party over section: the rough and ready presidential election of 1848

The presidential campaign of 1848 saw the first strong electoral challenge to the expansion of slavery in the United States; most historians consider the appearance of the Free Soil Party in that election a major turning point of the nineteenth century. The three-way race capped a decade of political turmoil that had raised the issue of slavery to unprecedented prominence on the national stage and brought about critical splits in the two major parties. In the first book in four decades devoted to the 1848 election, Joel Silbey clarifies our understanding of a pivotal moment in American history. The election of Whig Zachary Taylor, hero of the Mexican War, over Democrat Lewis Cass and Free Soiler Martin Van Buren followed a particularly bitter contest, a fierce political storm in an already tumultuous year marked by the first significant attempt by antislavery advocates to win the presidency. Silbey describes what occurred during that election and why it turned out as it did, offering a nuanced look at the interaction of the forces shaping the direction of politics in mid-nineteenth century America. He explains how the Free Soilers went about their reform movement and why they failed as they ran up against the tenacious grip that the existing two-party structure had on the political system and the behavior of the nation's voters. For Whigs and Democrats it was politics as usual as they stressed economic, cultural, and ideological issues that had divided the country for the previous twenty years. Silbey describes the new confrontation between the force of tradition and a new and different way of thinking about the political world. He shows that ultimately, when America went to the polls, northerners and southerners alike had more on their minds than slavery. Nevertheless, while Van Buren managed to attract only 10 percent of the vote, his party's presence foreshadowed a more successful challenge in the future. Emphasizing both persistent party commitments and the reformers' lack of political muscle, Silbey expertly delineates the central issues of an election framed by intense partisanship and increasing sectional anger. If 1848 did not yet mark the death rattle of traditional politics, this insightful book shows us its importance as a harbinger of change.

Civil War to the Bloody End: The Life and Times of Major General Samuel P. Heintzelman (review)

Reviewed by: Civil War to the Bloody End: The Life and Times of Major General Samuel P. Heintzelman Ethan S. Rafuse Civil War to the Bloody End: The Life and Times of Major General Samuel P. Heintzelman. By Jerry Thompson. (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2006. Pp. xv, 443. Cloth, $35.00). Although he never achieved the fame of a Winfield Scott Hancock or Dan Sickles, Samuel P. Heintzelman is a familiar name to students of the Civil War, for in addition to his having been one of the Army of the Potomac’s original corps commanders and played a significant role in two major campaigns in Virginia in 1862, his journals have long been valuable sources of information for researchers. Unfortunately, as is the case with nearly all of the Army of the Potomac’s original corps commanders, for over 140 years no historian deemed Heintzelman worthy of study in his own right. Jerry Thompson’s thorough and impressive Civil War to the Bloody End not only effectively fills this void in Civil War military history but offers much of value to students of the antebellum army and Reconstruction as well. Of course, it was the Civil War that made Heintzelman a subject worthy of a major biography. After a solid performance as a division commander at First Manassas, Heintzelman found himself subordinate to George McClellan, who had not even been born when Heintzelman graduated from West Point, and outside the clique of officers the “Young Napoleon” relied on as he built the Army of the Potomac and formulated strategy. That Heintzelman resented this is understandable. Not only was he senior to McClellan in the antebellum army, but, as Thompson ably documents, he [End Page 427] had compiled a fairly impressive record of service prior to 1861. Although he missed the major campaigns of the Mexican War, Heintzelman performed important duties in southern California afterward and provided notable leadership to U.S. operations during the Cortina War of 1859–60. Utilizing the general’s journals, as well as an impressive range of other primary and secondary sources, Thompson effectively chronicles these activities, as well as Heintzelman’s ambition for an independent command and his resentment of McClellan during the Civil War, the ways Radical Republicans tried to use him in their efforts to undermine “Little Mac,” and the emergence of divisions within the Army of the Potomac that would plague its history. After being imposed on McClellan as commander of the Third Corps, Heintzelman led that unit through the Peninsula campaign, turning in solid performances at Yorktown, Williamsburg, Fair Oaks, and in the Seven Days Battles while doing little to hinder the emergence of his corps as a bastion of anti-McClellan sentiment within the Army of the Potomac. After his corps took a severe beating during the Second Manassas campaign, it was retained within the Washington defenses during the Maryland campaign, at which point Heintzelman faded from center stage. As he does with Heintzelman’s active military career, Thompson provides exceptionally informative accounts of the general’s activities after he was kicked upstairs to command the Department of Washington and of his later service as commander of the Northern Department, where his duties mainly consisted of keeping watch over prison camps and monitoring Copperhead activity in the Midwest. Thompson then follows Heintzelman through his postwar military career, in which his most notable service came in Texas, where he had the opportunity to see and deal firsthand with the problems of Reconstruction. Given the range and importance of his experiences before, during, and after the Civil War, and the fact that his journals provide plenty of material to work with, it is a bit surprising that it has taken so long for Heintzelman to be the subject of a full-scale biography. Thompson, however, has made it worth the wait. His research is thorough and careful, his arguments are persuasive, his prose is clear and compelling, and the text is effectively supplemented with maps, photos, and other images that are clear and useful. The past decade has been an enjoyable one for anyone with an interest in the officer corps of the Army of the Potomac. Long...

Historical Atlas of Texas Methodism (review)

20ogBook Reviews113 from the perspective of the livestock industry, manufacturing and mining, agricultural irrigation, energy needs, per capita use, and municipal demands. Their predictions, while cautionary, are not wholly pessimistic. Mapping can reveal small differences that are far harder to explain in words. For example, the regional disparities indicate concerns that may be magnified or reduced according to whether the location is a heavily or sparsely populated area. Coastal problems differ from those in the High Plains, Houston and El Paso share some issues, others are wholly dissimilar. Although this may be obvious to anyone who gives such matters a thought, it is sobering to see the reality on an illustrated page. Lawrence Estaville and Richard Earl are geography professors at Texas State University, and Estaville served as the department's chairman for several years. The clarity of the maps owes a measure to advances in cartographic technology, but it is their consummate skill and experience that enables us to recognize the complexities of this precious and irreplaceable resource. The atlas's approach and organization take it beyond the classification of a reference book. Austin, TexasJane Manaster Historical Atlas of Texas Methodism. By William C. and John Wesley Hardt. (Garland, Tex.: CrossHouse Publishing, 2008. Pp. 248. Maps, figures, references , index. ISBN 9781934749074, $ 34.95 cloth.) The Methodist people, long influential in the history of the frontier and the United States, have a proud and storied chronicle of struggle and achievement. The Texas portion of this struggle has been well documented by William and John Hardt. William, the younger of die two, is retired from a career in public schools and as a writer of educational materials, and the elder Hardt, John Wesley, is a retired bishop and currently serves as Bishop Emeritus at the Perkins School of Theology in Dallas. The Hardts' roots in Methodism run deep, almost from the beginning of the Methodist presence in Texas, and it is obvious that this work for both historians is a labor of love. Covering the entire history of the denomination in Texas from its beginnings in Austin's colony through the present time, the authors use a short and tight chronology in an effort to give a concise historical account of Texas Methodism. As a reference book it is not strong on narrative; rather, it is quite the opposite. Nevertheless, readers can sense throughout the authors' love of their subject, but those same readers, due to the terse writing, may not share that love and have difficulty perusing these pages. There are, however, some anecdotal and humorous quotes in the text, which give relief from the litany of facts. An example is when William Stephenson, a presiding elder and missionary, sought to establish a Methodist mission in Austin's colony, to which Austin remarked that "one Methodist preacher would do more mischief that a dozen horse thieves" (19). After Austin's imprisonment in Mexico, the Methodists proceeded to begin their "mischief" in Austin's colony. It is disappointing that the writers do not delve more deeply into the work of 114Southwestern Historical QuarterlyJuly the Methodists in the establishment of die Texas Republic and their role in the Mexican War. The same could be said for another exciting chapter in the history, "The War Between the States," and the impact die conflict had on American religion , especially the dominant evangelical denomination of the period— Methodism. The authors submit no more than two pages about Methodism on the eve of the war, and nothing at all on the war itself. Surely, something could have been written about the Methodists who served as Confederate chaplains, in denominational humanitarian ministries, colportage work, or those who entered the ministry after the war. The adas is particularly strong in its coverage of African Americans, Spanishspeaking groups, Germans, Swedes, Bohemians, and Italian Methodists in the periods after the war, and in its chronicle of the holiness movements that sprang from Methodism such as the Church of the Nazarene and the Wesleyan Church. The authors also included over forty maps, more than two-dozen charts, and an index with over two thousand entries. The work is useful for those interested in American, southern, southwestern, or Texas Methodism. Readers of...

“More Fatal than Powder and Shot”: Dysentery in the U.S. Army During the Mexican War, 1846–48

In terms of deaths due to disease, the Mexican War (1846-48) was the deadliest of all American wars. Nearly 13% of the entire U.S. force perished from disease. Of the total 12,535 war deaths, 10,986 (88%) were due to infectious diseases (overwhelmingly dysentery, both bacterial and amoebic); seven men died from disease for every man killed by Mexican musket balls. Camp pollution was the greatest error committed by U.S. troops in the Mexican War. The indifference of line officers and recruits to the need for proper sanitation and military hygiene fueled the dysentery outbreaks, and the poor conditions in military hospitals contributed further to the spread of disease. This defect in military culture undermined the health of the army and led to medical disaster. Disease caused an enormous drain on the U.S. Army's resources, eroded troop morale, and influenced strategy and tactics. As we enter the 21st century, dysentery is still a major public health threat, killing hundreds of thousands of people annually-primarily children in developing countries where personal hygiene is poor and disposal of human and animal wastes is indiscriminate.

Civil War Leadership and Mexican War Experience by Kevin Dougherty (review)

Civil War Leadership and Mexican War Experience. By Kevin Dougherty. (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2007. Pp. 222. Illustrations, diagrams, appendices , works cited, index. ISBN 978-1-57806-968-2. $50.00, cloth.) Kevin Dougherty tackles the relationship between the Mexican War experience of American officers and soldiers and their Civil War leadership. Perhaps the greatest weakness of the book is that the author tried to do too much. In covering the experiences of twenty-six men, Dougherty limits himself to a few pages for each. Surely Henry Hunt, Jefferson C. Davis, John Slidell (a diplomat), Philip Kearny, John Winder, and William T. Sherman (who played no role in the war) might have been eliminated, so as to provide more space for essays on Robert E. Lee, U. S. Grant, and Stonewall Jackson. Likewise, the space available is not wisely used. The author dedicates four pages to Jackson, four and a half pages to Lee, six pages to Grant, seven to Gideon Pillow, seven to Samuel Du Pont, and twelve to John Pope. Furthermore, the author sometimes relies on outdated secondary sources while ignoring modern scholarship. In his essay on Jefferson Davis, Dougherty refers to Cass Canfield as Davis’s biographer, citing the short book, The Iron Will of Jefferson Davis (1978), while ignoring more recent and scholarly biographies by William C. Davis and William J. Cooper Jr. Most disappointing, the editors at the University of Mississippi Press did not remind the author of Joseph E. Chance’s excellent, Jefferson Davis’s Mexican War Regiment, which they published in 1991. The same problem is apparent in the essay on Gideon Pillow, in which the author does not cite the definitive The Life and Wars of Gideon J. Pillow (1993) by Nathaniel Cheairs Hughes Jr. and Roy P. Stonesifer Jr. Likewise, Dougherty sometimes demonstrates a simple lack of knowledge of the Mexican War and its historiography. Checking the bibliography, this reviewer noticed that Richard Bruce Winders’s Mr. Polk’s Army: The American Military Experience in the Mexican War and James McCaffrey’s Army of Manifest Destiny: The American Soldier in the Mexican War—starting points for any study of the American army in Mexico—are not cited. Likewise, his statement, “Geographic enthusiasm for the war was generally confined to the South”, (p. 15) is just wrong. In 1846, President Polk asked Indiana to provide three regiments and enough men volunteered to fill nearly six. That said, this reviewer did find some of the essays interesting and enlightening , particularly those on George McClellan and George Gordon Meade. This could have been a much better book, however, if the editors at the University of Mississippi Press had sent it out to readers with more knowledge of the Mexican War. Texas State University–San Marcos Jeffrey G. Mauck 328 Southwestern Historical Quarterly January *jan 09 11/26/08 12:00 PM Page 328 ...

America’s Coming of Age: Daniel Walker Howe’s What Hath God Wrought

America’s Coming of AgeDaniel Walker Howe’s What Hath God Wrought Merritt Roe Smith (bio) According to Daniel Walker Howe, the three decades between the end of the War of 1812 and the end of the Mexican War (1848) witnessed “the transformation of America.”1 Of what did this transformation consist? What drove it? What were its larger implications? These questions lie at the very center of historical writing about the early and middle decades of nineteenth- century America. Howe’s monumental effort goes far in answering them. In the process, he upends several well-known interpretations of the so-called Jacksonian period. Howe knits together a complex tapestry of seemingly unrelated historical events with keen insight and wonderfully lucid prose. His intermittent snapshots of American society between 1815 and 1848 are well done, as are his depictions of American science and literature. Of greater significance, however, are the connections he establishes between evangelical religion, social reform, sectional politics, and economic development as key elements in America’s transformation. His discussion of the Second Great Awakening, with its focus on revival-oriented Protestant preachers like Charles Grandison Finney and Lyman Beecher (the father of Harriet Beecher Stowe, author of Uncle Tom’s Cabin) is extremely well done. Owing to the efforts of Finney, Beecher, and other “New Light” evangelists, the Second Great Awakening became a major force that not only ignited widespread millennial fervor in America but also spawned numerous voluntary associations calling for the reformation of society in preparation for the second coming of the Christ. Among these associations numbered temperance, missionary, Bible distribution, and pacifist groups as well as the most important of all, the abolitionist movement aimed at ridding the country of slavery. What is [End Page 187] more, white middle-class women joined these movements and, through their experiences, came to the realization that their rights needed to be legally recognized. Some of Howe’s best writing centers on the rise of the women’s rights movement and its association with abolitionism. Equally interesting is his discussion of how evangelical revival methods influenced politics, resulting most notably in the “political revivalism” that characterized William Henry Harrison’s successful campaign for the presidency in 1840 (p. 573). Howe’s chapters on Andrew Jackson, the Democratic Party, and the socalled “second party system” that emerged during the 1830s are particularly telling. Howe is no admirer of Jackson. Rather than applauding him as a national hero and “man of the people,” he portrays “Old Hickory” as a selfabsorbed white supremacist with “profoundly authoritarian instincts”—definitely “not a man to be crossed” (p. 328). Particularly noteworthy are Howe’s observations on Indian removal, a brutal process that he describes as a form of ethnic cleansing (pp. 423, 810). “The fundamental impulse behind Jacksonian Democracy,” he emphasizes, “was about the extension of white supremacy across the North American continent,” adding that “Indian policy, not banking or the tariff, was the number one issue . . . during the early years of Jackson’s presidency” (pp. 356–57). Jacksonian America was many things, but it was not essentially democratic. To be sure, the franchise expanded during the period, but only for white men. Indians, free blacks, undesirable immigrants, and women were systematically excluded from citizenship, to say nothing of the terrible plight of slaves. An unswerving commitment to America’s “Manifest Destiny” and the protection of slavery accordingly became central tenets of Jacksonian Democracy (p. 524). Contrasted with his critical view of Andrew Jackson and the Democratic Party, Howe portrays the Whig Party as a force for innovation and change in antebellum America. If Andrew Jackson and his successors Martin Van Buren and James K. Polk are the villains of his story, John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay are its heroes. Indeed, Howe dedicates What Hath God Wrought “to the memory of John Quincy Adams ”! While neither Adams nor Clay succeeded in garnering the degree of public adulation and support that Jackson did, their visionary ideas about American advancement provided a blueprint for transforming rural America into a modern urban-industrial nation. In Howe’s view, Adams and Clay were “improvers” who resisted Jackson’s expansionist policies, including the expansion of slavery. They...

Civil War Leadership and Mexican War Experience

Civil War Leadership and Mexican War Experience

Civil War Leadership and Mexican War Experience (review)

Reviewed by Timothy D. Johnson Lipscomb University Nashville, Tennessee Civil War Leadership and Mexican War Experience. By Kevin Dougherty. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2007. ISBN 978-1-57806-968-2. Photographs. Illustrations. Appendixes. Works cited. Index. Pp. xi, 207. $50.00. With over three hundred Mexican War veterans going on to become Civil War generals, a link between the two conflicts seems a foregone conclusion. One might assume that experience in the former would demonstrably influence leadership in the latter. However, the connections, as Kevin Dougherty explains in the preface to his book, are not so obvious. He begins his study by pointing out what the reviewer discovered years ago while writing on this topic, which is that historians can make few concrete and provable links between the two wars. That is not to say that the earlier conflict did not influence the latter one, but that drawing a direct line showing how previous experiences influenced later actions is often difficult and sometimes hypothetical. Acknowledging this, Dougherty tells the reader that in "many cases there is insufficient evidence" to conclusively demonstrate a Mexican War influence on the Civil War. He further contends that even though "not all [of his conclusions] would necessarily 'stand up in court,'" they are "certainly plausible" (pp. viii-ix). The most obvious missing link is a lack of personal statements by Civil War generals, who rarely referred back to the earlier conflict. Few of them are as blatant as Gen. George McClellan in 1861 when, in a letter to Gen. Winfield Scott, his former commander in Mexico, he wrote that he had "learned my first lessons in War" from the older general. And later, while preparing to move against Confederate forces in western Virginia, McClellan informed Scott of his tactical plan: "If possible I will repeat the manoeuvre of Cerro Gordo." With a dearth of such straightforward testimonials, the historian must use conjecture and inference, which can be convincing if supported with adequate primary research. Unfortunately, this study lists less than a dozen primary sources in the bibliography. After an introductory chapter on weaponry, tactics, and leadership, Dougherty offers the reader twenty-six chapters; each being a case study of a Civil War leader. There is no attempt at a cover-to-cover narrative, rather each chapter is a short, individual vignette that stands alone. The author chose to evaluate thirteen Federals and thirteen Confederates, and his evaluation of each is largely a synthesis of selected secondary sources. While many of his comparisons are not new, they are thought provoking as they remind the reader of a myriad of possible Mexican War influences that must have helped shape later generalship. Among the comparisons that Dougherty makes on the Union side are George McClellan, whose 1862 Peninsula Campaign was merely an attempt to replicate Scott's 1847 Mexico City Campaign. The author also asserts that McClellan learned contempt for civil authority from his observations of Scott's relationship with President James K. Polk. Ulysses S. Grant's bold decision to abandon his [End Page 573] supply line during the Vicksburg Campaign in 1863 was, according to Dougherty, a lesson learned from Scott who did likewise in 1847. Other comparisons: George G. Meade developed into a careful and competent commander due in part to his tutelage as a staff officer under Zachary Taylor; Joseph Hooker became known for his organizational skills in the Civil War largely because in Mexico he served as staff officer to superiors like Gideon Pillow whose limited knowledge required that they rely heavily on him; Samuel DuPont learned lessons in Mexico about coastal blockading that would serve him well during the Civil War. On the Confederate side Dougherty not surprisingly asserts that Robert E. Lee learned the value of reconnaissance, flank attacks, and battlefield audacity from Scott in Mexico. It was the latter quality, audacity, that differentiated Scott from Taylor and later differentiated Lee from Meade, and thus it was the key ingredient that separated...

Recent Journal Articles

Recent Journal Articles Wendy A. Swik U.S. Military Academy Library The bibliography is compiled by the systematic search of approximately four hundred periodicals, a check of several general journal bibliographies, and the welcomed contribution of interested subscribers. Many times older citations will be included simply because the compiler had not come across them earlier or, more frequently, because the periodicals are behind publication schedule. Those wishing to be assured of having their articles listed in this section are urged to notify the compiler. References should include the following: author(s), full title (including subtitle), name of periodical, volume number, issue date, and pagination. Address all contributions to Wendy Swik, Military Affairs Librarian, U.S.M.A. Library, West Point, NY 10996–1799. General Military Affairs Meilinger, Phillip S. "Busting the icon: restoring balance to the influence of Clausewitz." Strategic Studies Quarterly 1 (Fall 2007): 116-145. Reid, Richard J. "Revisiting primitive war: perceptions of violence and race in history." War & Society 26 (October 2007): 1-25. Stone, John. "Clausewitz's trinity and contemporary conflict." Civil Wars 9 (September 2007): 282-296. Ancient and Medieval Warfare Hanson, Victor Davis. "New light on ancient battles." MHQ: Quarterly Journal of Military History 20 (Winter 2008): 28-35. Maddicott, J. R. "Responses to the threat of invasion, 1085." English Historical Review 122 (September 2007): 986-997. 1500-1815 Military Affairs Aaslestad, Katherine. "Republican traditions: patriotism, gender, and war in Hamburg, 1770-1815." European History Quarterly 37 (October 2007): 582-602. Aaslestad, Katherine and others. "Introduction: Gender, war and the nation in the period of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars – European perspectives." European History Quarterly 37 (October 2007): 501-506. [End Page 641] Cormack, Andrew. "Observations on the later life of Lieutenant-General the Honorable Robert Monckton and the lives of his children." Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research 85 (2007): 275-285. Hagemann, Karen. "`Heroic virgins' and `bellicose amazons': armed women, the gender order and the German public during and after the anti-Napoleonic wars." European History Quarterly 37 (October 2007): 507-527. Hopkin, David. "Sieges, seduction and sacrifices in Revolutionary War: the `Virgins of Verdun', 1792." European History Quarterly 37 (October 2007): 528-547. Randall, Willard Sterne. "The first American victory." MHQ: Quarterly Journal of Military History 20 (Winter 2008): 64-73. Showalter, Dennis. "European power projection." MHQ: Quarterly Journal of Military History 20 (Winter 2008): 46-55. Tone, John Lawrence. "A dangerous Amazon: Augustine Zaragoza and the Spanish Revolutionary War, 1808-1814." European History Quarterly 37 (October 2007): 548-561. 1816-1869 Military Affairs Crowther, C. P. "Was the Anaconda Plan the blueprint for Union victory in the American Civil War?" British Army Review (Autumn 2007): 70-76. Dawson, Joseph G. III. "Leaders for manifest destiny: American volunteer colonels serving in the U.S. – Mexican War." American Nineteenth Century History 7 (June 2006): 253-279. Legan, Marshall Scott. "Hang by the neck until dead': the trial and hanging of a member of the 22nd Texas Cavalry." Military History of the West 37 (2007): 55-68. Logue, Larry M. and Peter Blanck. "`Benefit of the doubt': African-American Civil War veterans and pensions." Journal of Interdisciplinary History 38 (Winter 2008): 377-399. Sears, Stephen W. "Building the Army of the Potomac." MHQ: Quarterly Journal of Military History 20 (Winter 2008): 74-83. Skelton, William B. "The commanding generals and the question of civil control in the antebellum U.S. Army." American Nineteenth Century History 7 (June 2006): 153-172. Sodergren, Steven E. "Exercising restraint: military responses to Southern sentiment in California during the Civil War." Military History of the West 37 (2007): 1-27. Watson, Samuel J. "How the Army became accepted: West Point socialization, military accountability, and the nation-state during the Jacksonian era." American Nineteenth Century History 7 (June 2006): 219-251. Wells, David S. "Fact versus fiction: examples from the Indian Mutiny." Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research 85 (2007): 292-299. Wettemann, Robert P., Jr. "A part or apart: the alleged...