Soldiers and Politics: Exposing Some Myths

Abstract

Americans today could not imagine the nation's senior military officer running for high political office while still in uniform. They would think it absurd for that officer campaign for the presidency, lose, and then quietly resume his position in the Pentagon while continuing serve for another decade, receiving not only a promotion but also wide respect and acclaim from Congress, the people, the news media, and even the President. And yet, this is what occurred in the mid-nineteenth century. Major General Winfield Scott, the general-in-chief of the US Army and hero of the War of 1812 and the Mexican War, contested with the incumbent President, Millard Fillmore, win the Whig Party's presidential nomination. Scott then ran against his erstwhile subordinate, former Brigadier General Franklin Pierce. Scott did not resign his commission. He lost the election of 1852, but continued as the Army's top general for another decade. In 1856, a grateful Congress promoted him lieutenant general, the first officer hold that rank since George Washington. (1) The campaign of 1852 was not Scott's first foray into politics. In 1848, he had lobbied for the Whig presidential nomination, but the party chose another general, Zachary Taylor, as its standard bearer. Taylor, also a Mexican War hero, was then-commander of the Army's Western Division. He remained in uniform throughout the campaign. In fact, the election was held on 7 November, but General Taylor did not submit his resignation from the Army until 21 December, take effect the following 28 February, four days before his inauguration. (2) These were not isolated incidents. Throughout most of our nation's history this type of conduct was part of the American military tradition. It is a myth argue that the military has been divorced from political affairs. On the contrary, military leaders have been deeply involved in politics. Yet, one of the foremost observers of civil-military relations, Richard H. Kohn, argues in his seminal essay on the subject that a crisis is now unfolding because the military is becoming politicized. It was not always so, says Kohn: Historically, one of the chief bulwarks of civilian control has been the American military establishment itself. Its small size in peacetime, the professionalism of the officers, their political neutrality, their willing subordination, and their acceptance of a set of unwritten but largely understood rules of behavior in the civil-military relationship--all had made civilian control succeed, messy as it sometimes was and situational as it must always be. (3) The record is clear: The US military was anything but politically neutral throughout much of its history; its leaders were not always willingly subordinate civilian authority; and they did not often agree an unwritten standard of behavior. Rather, there was in essence a permeable membrane between the military and political spheres that allowed men pass back and forth between the two as it suited their purpose--and the purpose of the political parties and even the nation. Politics and the Military America's founding fathers were fearful of a standing army. The Declaration of Independence railed against King George III because he kept among us, in times of peace, standing armies without the consent of our legislature; he imposed an occupying force that affected render the military independent of and superior the civil power; and he brought in mercenaries to complete the works of death, desolation, and tyranny. It was therefore no surprise that the issue of an army was highly contentious in the newly independent United States. Debates at the Constitutional Convention in 1787 were heated. When the Constitution was finally agreed upon, it included several provisions specifically designed regulate and define the powers and limitations of an army. The President was be the commander-in-chief of the military and would appoint officers, but Congress would control the purse strings and have the power declare war. …