Methodological Naturalism Research Articles

The problem of naturalism and causal explanation in the interpretations of Nietzsche’s philosophy

In this paper we are going to discuss the two forms of naturalism that are attributed to Nietzsche, that are shown to be the most important in the recent interpretations of his philosophy: the methodological naturalism in Brian Leiter?s formulation and the naturalism in the broad sense in the interpretation of Christopher Janaway. This paper suggests an interpretation of Nietzsche?s genealogy that leans toward the naturalism in the broad sense, and attempts to show that the result of genealogical research should be the causal explanation which uses the everyday-concept of causality and the organicistic conception of part-whole relation. The suggested interpretation of Nietzsche?s genealogy will result with the explanation of his concept of life according to which that concept refers to any whole, natural or social, as a specific causal domain of will to power.

What’s Good for the Goose is Good for the Gander

A central question raised in a 2011 issue of the jshj is how can evangelical scholars productively contribute to historical Jesus research which seems to presuppose tenets at variance with their faith. The impetus for the issue was the 2009 book Key Events in the Life of the Historical Jesus which was the product of several evangelical scholars who had been working together for a decade. The goal of this paper will be to identify and assess three significant historiographical concerns raised in the 2011 issue – worldviews, presuppositions, and biases as both positives and negatives; criteria for authenticity and negative historical judgements; and lastly methodological naturalism – in order to demonstrate that these are issues all historians pursuing historical Jesus research must equally confront.

SHOULD A CHRISTIAN ADOPT METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM?

AbstractIt has become standard practice for scientists to avoid the possibility of references to God by adopting methodological naturalism (MN), a method that assumes that the reality of the universe, as it can be accessed by empirical enquiry, is to be explained solely with recourse to natural phenomena. In this essay, I critique the Christian practice of this method, arguing that a Christian's practices should always reflect her belief that the universe is created and sustained by the triune God. This leads me to contend that the Christian should adopt a theologically humble approach to the sciences (instead of MN), with which she humbly acknowledges that special divine action is not discernible by empirical science. To further my critique, I consider three ways in which the practice of MN can be particularly problematic for Christianity.

Problémy introspekce

This study discusses the first chapter of Filip Tvrdý’s book, Nesnaze introspekce (“The Trouble with Introspection”, 2015). In his book, Filip Tvrdý presents critical arguments against introspection, that serve him in his implicit defence of methodological naturalism. The aim of this study is to show that the problems of introspection are deeper-rooted than Tvrdý assumes in his book and that his implicit defence of methodological naturalism contains many weak points.

Nietzsche's Naturalism and Nineteenth-Century Biology

Abstract Christian Emden's recent book sheds fascinating light on Nietzsche's readings in the nineteenth-century life sciences and his relationship to Darwinism, though it is less successful in showing how particular readings influenced Nietzsche's claims. Emden largely follows my distinction between substantive and methodological naturalism in Nietzsche, but argues—unpersuasively, I argue—that the latter must collapse into the former, and that the latter requires “uniform” scientific methods, though I explicitly deny that and no plausible form of naturalism requires it. I also discuss Emden's treatment of the Kant-Nietzsche relationship, and raise doubts about whether what Emden sometimes calls “the problem of normativity” is really a Nietzschean problem.

Methodological naturalism and its misconceptions

Methodological naturalism has been defended on both intrinsic and pragmatic grounds. Both of these defenses agree that methodological naturalism is a principle of science according to which the scientist ought to eschew talk of causally efficacious disembodied minds. I argue that this is the wrong interpretation of methodological naturalism. Methodological naturalism does not constrain the theories that scientists may conjecture, but how those theories may be justified. On this view, methodological naturalism is a principle of science according to which supernatural methods of justification, such as faith, are eschewed.

Thought Experiments in Philosophy: A Neo-Kantian and Experimentalist Point of View

The paper addresses the question of the nature and limits of philosophical thought experiments. On the one hand, experimental philosophers are right to claim that we need much more laboratory work in order to have more reliable thought experiments, but on the other hand a naturalism that is too radical is incapable of clarifying the peculiarity of thought experiments in philosophy. Starting from a historico-critical reconstruction of Kant’s concept of the “experiments of pure reason”, this paper outlines an account of thought experiments in philosophy that tries to reconcile the thesis of a principled difference between scientific and philosophical TEs with the position of a methodological naturalism that does not admit any difference in kind between the methods of science and of philosophy.

Naturalizing Perspectives. On the Epistemology of Nietzsche’s Experimental Naturalizations

Abstract This paper argues that Nietzsche indeed pursues a philosophical project of naturalization. But that neither implies the uncritical adoption of naturalistic doctrines nor that he employs ontological or methodological naturalism in a strict sense of the word. To this end I not only dwell upon the extensive terminological difficulties for any non-empty definition of ‘naturalism’ but also on Nietzsche’s well justified reservations against clear defined doctrines. His naturalizing philosophical experiments cannot be understood without an appreciation of his critical epistemic attitude towards the sciences. A contextual reading of the naturalizing and the critical epistemological aphorisms in the first book of Beyond Good and Evil rather reveals that Nietzsche experimentally adopts naturalizing perspectives for abductive reasons without ascribing a privileged position to the natural sciences above philosophy. Nietzsche’s project of naturalization is perspectival.

Merleau-Ponty’s Gordian knot: Transcendental phenomenology, science, and naturalism

In this paper I explore a series of fertile ambiguities that Merleau-Ponty’s work is premised upon. These ambiguities concern some of the central methodological commitments of his work, in particular his commitment (or otherwise) to transcendental phenomenology and how he transforms that tradition, and his relationship to science and philosophical naturalism and what they suggest about his philosophical methodology. Many engagements with Merleau-Ponty’s work that are more ‘analytic’ in orientation either deflate it of its transcendental heritage, or offer a “modest” rendering of its transcendental dimensions. This is also true, albeit perhaps to a lesser extent, of the work of the more empirically-minded phenomenological philosophers who engage very seriously with Merleau-Ponty—e.g. Hubert Dreyfus, Shaun Gallagher, Evan Thompson, Alva Noe, and others. At the same time, many other scholars contest these proto-scientific and more naturalistic uses of Merleau-Ponty’s work on hermeneutical and exegetical grounds, and they likewise criticise the deflated reading of his transcendental phenomenology that tends to support them. By working through some of the key passages and ideas, this paper establishes that the former view captures something pivotal to Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. I also extend these interpretations by arguing that, at least around the time of Phenomenology of Perception, his philosophy might be reasonably regarded as a form of minimal methodological naturalism.

On Extreme versus Moderate Methodological Naturalism

In a recent debate, Rosenberg claims that only the methods of natural science can deliver genuine knowledge, while Williamson rejects Rosenberg’s extreme methodological naturalism and insists that we have genuine philosophical and humanistic knowledge not achievable by hard-scientific methods alone. This paper responds to the debate. I will argue that physicalism, together with contemporary neurocognitive and evolutionary knowledge, implies that some of our intuitions and mental simulations used in the humanities and philosophy are justified methods for achieving knowledge but are practically irreplaceable with hard-scientific methods. That is, extreme methodological naturalism is in conflict with physicalism. The argument also shows that some moderate version of methodological naturalism can be consistent with physicalism. Physicalism is the strong version of ontological naturalism and is supposed to be accepted by strongly committed naturalists like Rosenberg. Therefore, to be self-consistent, these naturalists should adopt physicalism (as ontological naturalism) plus a moderate version of methodological naturalism, rather than Rosenberg’s extreme version.

Methodological naturalism and the truth seeking objection

Methodological naturalism, the exclusion of the supernatural from the natural sciences, has drawn critique from both proponents of Intelligent Design and some philosophical naturalists who argue that the methods of science can also be used to evaluate supernatural claims. One principal objection to methodological naturalism has been what I call the truth seeking objection. In this article I develop an understanding of methodological naturalism capable of answering the truth seeking objection. I further also argue that methodological naturalism as a convention of science can be best defended by abandoning scientism. In this way methodological naturalism can be reconnected to the original theistic context in which it was first developed.

Deleuze and Naturalism

Against the tendency to regard Deleuze as a materialist and a naturalistic thinker, I argue that his core philosophical writings involve commitments that are incompatible with contemporary scientific naturalism. He defends different versions of a distinction between philosophy and natural science that is inconsistent with methodological naturalism and with the scientific image of the world as a single causally interconnected system. He defends the existence of a virtual realm of entities that is irreconcilable with ontological naturalism. The difficulty of reconciling Deleuze’s philosophy with ontological naturalism is especially apparent in his recurrent conception of pure events that are irreducible to their incarnation in bodies and states of affairs. In the last section of this essay, I canvass some of the ways in which Deleuze’s thought might be reconciled with a more liberal, pluralist and ethical naturalism that he identified in an early essay on Lucretius.

Phenomenology and naturalism: a hybrid and heretical proposal

In this paper I aim to develop a largely non-empirical case for the compatibility of phenomenology and naturalism. To do so, I will criticise what I take to be the standard construal of the relationship between transcendental phenomenology and naturalism, and defend a ‘minimal’ version of phenomenology that is compatible with liberal naturalism in the ontological register (but incompatible with scientific naturalism) and with weak forms of methodological naturalism, the latter of which is understood as advocating ‘results continuity’, over the long haul, with the relevant empirical sciences. Far from such a trajectory amounting to a Faustian pact in which phenomenology sacrifices its soul, I contend that insofar as phenomenologists care about reigning in the excesses of reductive versions of naturalism, the only viable way for this to be done is via the impure and hybrid account of phenomenology I outline here.

Why Engaging in the Practices of Science Is Not Enough to Achieve Scientific Literacy

The National Research Council's Framework for K–12 Science Education and the resulting Next Generation Science Standards call for engaging students in the practices of science to develop scientific literacy. While these documents make the connections between scientific knowledge and practices explicit, very little attention is given to the shared values and commitments of the scientific community that underlie these practices and give them meaning. I argue that effective science education should engage students in the practices of science while also reflecting on the values, commitments, and habits of mind that have led to the practices of modern science and that give them meaning. The concept of methodological naturalism demonstrates the connection between the values and commitments of the culture of science and its practices and provides a useful lens for understanding the benefits and limitations of scientific knowledge.

Prescription, Description, and Hume's Experimental Method

There seems a potential tension between Hume's naturalistic project and his normative ambitions. Hume adopts what I call a methodological naturalism: that is, the methodology of providing explanations for various phenomena based on natural properties and causes. This methodology takes the form of introducing ‘the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects’, as stated in the subtitle of the Treatise; this ‘experimental method’ seems a paradigmatically descriptive one, and it remains unclear how Hume derives genuinely normative prescriptions from this methodology. In resolving this problem, I will argue that Hume's naturalistic methodology – that is, his ‘experimental philosophy’ (THN Intro 7), or what has come to be known as his experimental method – consists of the systematization of phenomena pertaining to human nature. In applying his experimental method to normative subjects, Hume systematizes our normative judgements, deriving general principles of normative justification; he then reflexively applies these principles to the pre-philosophical judgements from which they derive, dismissing and/or correcting those that do not accord with his systematized account.

Disenchantment or Conflict? Egil Asprem and ‘Science and Religion’ Discourses

In his The Problem of Disenchantment, Egil Asprem offers an interesting view of discourses on science and religion. Despite the dominance of ‘conflicts’ in public perception, the ‘independence’ approach might be more deeply rooted in modern culture. Asprem studies ‘scientific’ movements that oppose disenchantment. In this paper i raise the question of why quantum physics was successful, whereas other revisions of ‘science’ were not. Of the natural theologies discussed, this paper offers some comments on ‘emergence’ and on ‘quantum mysticism’. Asprem presents himself as a methodological naturalist; a position that is in principle open to the study of parapsychology and other ‘spiritual’ claims. He considers theism to be incompatible with such a methodological naturalism, whereas I suggest that an epistemically agnostic theism is also appropriate, combining methodological naturalism and disenchantment.

ISLAM AND SCIENCE: THE NEXT PHASE OF DEBATES

AbstractThis article reviews the new developments that have occurred in the past ten to fifteen years in the field of Islam and science: (1) the emergence of a “new generation” of thinkers, Muslim scientists who accept modern science's fundamental methodology, theories, and results, and try to find ways to “harmonize” it with Islam; and (2) the exponential increase in the popularity of the I‘jaz ‘Ilmiy “theory,” the “miraculous scientific content of the Qur'an” (and, some say, the Hadith) as well as the continuation of the traditionalist school (Iqbal and others, following Nasr) among a section of the Muslim intelligentsia. The author then focuses on the next phase of issues, that is the “challenges” that this “new generation” must address, including the integration of methodological naturalism and evolution (biological and human) in the Islamic worldview, and positions to adopt regarding divine action and miracles. The author also mentions “educational and social issues” where Islam and science interface, and concludes with “the way forward.”

AFTER FIFTY FULL YEARS, IT'S NICE NOT TO KNOW

AFTER FIFTY FULL YEARS, IT'S NICE NOT TO KNOW

Spór o możliwość wykrywania projektu w naukach przyrodniczych

Controversy over the possibility of detecting design in natural sciences According to intelligent design theory, certain biological and cosmic phenomena are designed by an intelligent being and this design is scientifically detectable. However, critics refuse to regard this theory as scientific, thereby suggesting that it does not deserve serious discussion in scientific circles. The article presents main methodological objections to intelligent design theory, indicating its unscientific or pseudoscientific character and impossibility of scientific design detection (at least in specific research areas). Critics try to show that this theory: 1) violates the principle of methodological naturalism (and thus that it is a supernatural, creationist, religious concept); 2) is empirically untestable; 3) it does not invoke natural laws, says nothing about the designer and the designing mechanism; 4) it does not offer predictions; 5) it is an argument from ignorance, and 6) it does not lead to fruitful research program and hence is not useful for science. These objections will be analyzed from the perspective of methodological thesis of design theorists that the sufficient condition of design inference are the characteristic effects (signs, traces) leaved by the activity of the designer, which indicate the final cause, although they do not have to be the basis for determining the designer’s identity. If this thesis is sound, then the objections that intelligent design theory is not scientific are rebutted or weakened. Moreover, it turns out that, basically, detecting design of supernatural beings does not differ from detecting design of natural beings. For that reason, there is no qualitative difference between these two procedures and both can be regarded as scientific.

“What is the cocoon but a dark cabinet?”

This study examines how Boston editor and publisher Benjamin O. Flower used print culture to circulate and legitimise fringe science in the 1890s. Using evolutionary theory as a template for progress, he considered hypnotism and spiritualism – what he called “psychical research” ‒ as the natural extension of environmental meliorism from the visible to the invisible. This article examines the transatlantic dimension of the idea of a “science of mind” and how it led Flower to formulate a spiritual and materialist conception of the influence of print. It describes the rhetorical strategies, the scientific procedures and institutionalisation policies he adopted in his quest to naturalise the invisible and subject it to the purview of methodological naturalism. Finally, it explores the epistemological foundations of Flower’s redefinition of the boundaries of legitimate science.