Methodological Naturalism Research Articles

Science and Religion: An Alternative View of an Ancient Rivalry

Religion is presented as a family of religions, identified by a cluster of religion-making features, most but not all of which must be present, involving beliefs and practices which are diverse and often in conflict. Because of differences in scope, application of scientific method, and vocabulary, science can also be regarded as a family—this time a family of sciences. The universality of the physical sciences contrasts with the more restricted scope of the earth sciences and the human sciences. Their relationship can be shown by a three-tiered pyramid, with the physical sciences at the base, the human sciences at the top, and the earth sciences in the middle. Despite three notable differences between science and religion, science and religion are not, as popularly believed, in conflict. The contrary view, espoused by the “new atheists,” is shown to be based on oversimplified views of religion and science. There are nontheistic religions and science is committed, not to metaphysical naturalism (“scientism”), but only to methodological naturalism. Stephen Jay Gould escapes the conflict view by proposing that science and religion are independent “magisteria”, science being occupied with facts and religion with values. In divorcing the realm of facts from the realm of values, he too distorts their complex nature, for science is not devoid of values and religion makes claims about the facts. As Hume long ago suggested, facts and values are interconnected. While a fact is not the same as a value, a fact cannot support a value without presupposing another value in turn. Interaction between facts and values is here to stay.

Methodological naturalism, saturation, and Psychology's failure to save the phenomena

AbstractMany scientists and philosophers of science have argued that metaphysical naturalism and methodological naturalism represent distinct and separable philosophical commitments. This claim is true in the sense that metaphysics and epistemology reflect different philosophical projects. The major question of interest to psychologists, however, is whether at the pragmatic level of research designed to discover the psychological sphere in which we live our lives, the metaphysical and the methodological realms are so tightly interwoven that some important aspects of our humanity cannot be faithfully revealed without distortion, or even missed altogether. This paper argues that, in light of its intellectual origins, methodological naturalism is informed by metaphysical naturalism at the level of its formulation, and, thereby, is by its nature more apt to reveal phenomena of certain ontological types and less apt to faithfully reveal phenomena of other ontological types. In this sense, metaphysical naturalism cannot help but subtly shape psychological investigation and thus insert itself to some degree into our understanding of many important psychological phenomena. The work of the French phenomenologist Jean‐Luc Marion, particularly his concept of “saturated phenomena,” is briefly discussed by way of a call for greater methodological openness in psychological research – an openness that will permit psychological scientists to better “save the phenomena” in their accounts of human experience.

Neutralism, Naturalism and Emergence: A Critical Examination of Cumpa’s Theory of Instantiation

AbstractIn his “Are Properties, Particular, Universal, or Neither?” Javier Cumpa argues that science not metaphysics explains how properties are instantiated. I accept this conclusion provided physics can be stated using rather few primitive predicates. In addition, he uses his scientific theory of instantiation to argue for Neutralism, his thesis that the “tie” between properties and their instances implies neither that properties are particular nor that they are universals. Neutralism, I claim, is a thesis that realist about universals have independent reason to accept and their opponents have reason to reject. So, neutralism is not neutral on the topic of whether properties are universals. Nor is Cumpa’s Theory of Instantiation as naturalistic as he claims. I argue that although compatible with Ontological Naturalism, his theory provides a precedent for the non-naturalistic emergence of mental properties. Finally, I argue that because his theory requires a simple physics it presupposes a more rationalist epistemology than that of Methodological Naturalism.

Methodological naturalism in the sciences

Creationists have long argued that evolutionary science is committed to a dogmatic metaphysics of naturalism and materialism, which is based on faith or ideology rather than evidence. The standard response to this has been to insist that science is not committed to any such metaphysical doctrine, but only to a methodological version of naturalism, according to which science may only appeal to natural entities and processes. But this whole debate presupposes that there is a clear distinction between the natural and the supernatural, and thus that naturalism is a meaningful doctrine. I argue that this assumption is false. The concepts of the natural and the supernatural are in fact hopelessly obscure, such that the claim that science is committed to methodological naturalism cannot be made good. This is no victory for anti-naturalists however; explicitly supernaturalist theories, such as Creationism, can be ruled out of scientific consideration as a priori incoherent, given that they presuppose for their intelligibility that there is a meaningful natural-supernatural distinction. This is not the case for standard scientific theories however, as they are not explicitly naturalistic theories; they do not postulate natural or physical entities or processes as such.

Should Methodological Naturalists Commit to Metaphysical Naturalism?

It is widely supposed that methodological naturalism, understood as a thesis about the methodology of science, is metaphysically neutral, and that this in turn guarantees the value-neutrality of science. In this paper we argue that methodological naturalism is underpinned by certain ontological and epistemological assumptions including evidentialism and the causal closure of the physical, adoption of which necessitates commitment to metaphysical naturalism.

How Do Theist (Muslim) Pre-Service Science Teachers Reconcile Their Individual Ontologies with Premises of Modern Science

The purpose of this study was to investigate how theist (Muslim) pre-service science teachers’ reconcile their individual ontologies, which stem from their worldviews, with premises of modern science. 23 pre-service science teachers (10 males and 13 females, ages ranged from 19 to 23) were selected by purposeful sampling. Data sources included open-ended questions and semi-structured follow-up interviews. The qualitative analysis of data revealed that theist participants believing in a created Nature which is being lawful and understandable but also open to supernatural intervention diverged in their perspectives about the ontological premises that scientists must have and presupposed theism, theism/naturalism or just naturalism for doing science. They all asserted the physical universe as the boundary for science and evaluated the possibility of the scientific investigation of miracles and jinn within that boundary with the criterion of being able to obtain empirical data. They did not perceive any incompatibility between science and Islam and proposed methodological naturalism for scientific practice in order to overcome potential conflicts.

Disaggregating the Creationist Challenge to Liberal Neutrality

In the US and elsewhere, creationist groups have challenged the mandatory science curriculum because it introduces the theory of evolution as the true story of biodiversity. This paper disaggregates this challenge in two distinctive levels. On the substantive level, creationists claim that Darwinian evolution is not value-neutral, as most scientists portray it, but it works as a philosophically-loaded theory that amounts to naturalism, which is a comprehensive doctrine that undermines traditional theism. Creationists then contend that its exclusive teaching violates the liberal promise of religious neutrality. To restore metaphysical fairness, they propose to include non-naturalistic theories into the official curriculum as a way of balance. On the epistemic level, creationists criticise liberal institutions—from courts of justice to educational boards and executive officials—that demarcate science in a way in which supernatural hypotheses can never compete for the best factual explanation. Under the guise of a purely methodological naturalism, they argue, liberals are opting for a cognitive filter that is biased against the belief that God intervenes in cosmic history. To restore epistemological fairness, they propose that theories that suggest supernatural agency should be rehabilitated and eventually included in the science curriculum. In these two distinct levels, the creationist claim is advanced as a logical implication of political liberalism's purported commitment to religious impartiality.

Pragmatismo y evolución: ¿es racional ser teísta y naturalista?

Este artículo tiene como objetivo mostrar que 1) la teoría de la evolución es ontológicamente neutral en el debate entre naturalismo metafísico y teísmo y 2) que es consistente sostener en conjunto el naturalismo metodológico y el teísmo. Para ello, examinaré en primer lugar el argumento de Plantinga que intenta mostrar que hay consistencia entre teísmo y evolución y que, por el contrario, hay inconsistencia entre la teoría de la evolución y el naturalismo (tanto metodológico como metafísico). Me interesa aceptar la primera parte del argumento de Plantinga, pero rechazar la segunda. Defiendo que el argumento de Plantinga es válido si y sólo si se supone una teoría de la verdad por correspondencia. A continuación, argumento que si se reemplaza dicha noción por la concepción pragmatista de la verdad de James, es posible concluir 1 y 2.

Grammatical Constraints on the Borrowing of Nouns and Verbs in Urdu and English

The present study aims at establishing grammatical constraints on the borrowing of nouns (Ns) and verbs (Vs) in Urdu and English by adopting Noam Chomsky’s Methodological Naturalism within the fiel...

Thought Experiments as a Tool for Undermining Methodological Naturalism

There is a substantial literature on the question of whether methodological naturalism (MN) is and/or should be among the principles operative in the natural and social sciences; moreover the status of MN has been one of the battle grounds in prominent debates regarding the demarcation lines between science and theology (e.g., the debate over whether intelligent design hypotheses can ever count as genuinely scientific). I review some concrete examples of the use of thought experiments in this context, and argue that there are realistic thought experiments showing how metaphysical naturalism (MTN) could be subjected to empirical falsification; that in turn implies that MN should not be employed universally as an operative principle in the sciences. I conclude by discussing some recent actual experimental work concerning near-death experiences (NDEs), work which may point towards the likelihood of just such empirical falsification taking place in the relatively near future.

The Many Inadequate Justifications of Methodological Naturalism

The Many Inadequate Justifications of Methodological Naturalism

Mobile Phone Visual Ethnography (MpVE): Bridging Transformative Photography and Mobile Phone Ethnography

Mobile phone proliferation in developing economies has arguably affected the everyday lives of subsistence consumers and entrepreneurs like no other technology in recent times. This impact is evidenced by mobile phones’ embeddedness in everyday consumption and business practices. Surprisingly, mobile phones have only minimally been incorporated into bottom-up research approaches in subsistence marketplaces and/or ethnographic transformative research methodologies and methods. To begin addressing this important gap, the authors conducted a systematic review of the literature on mobile phones and ethnography and then gained practical experience with a new bottom-up methodology called mobile phone visual ethnography (MpVE). Using research experiences as data, the authors share micro-level details about African microentrepreneurial everyday life and highlight important methodological issues associated with conducting MpVE in subsistence marketplaces. They find that MpVE affords methodological naturalism, unpacks informant perspectives of everyday life, captures human mobility within marketplaces, and begins to democratize the research process. In doing so, this article offers a new way of giving voice to subsistence marketplace populations through more active and visible participation in research.

POLITOLOGIA O RELIGII W PERSPEKTYWIE UMIARKOWANEGO NATURALIZMU METODOLOGICZNEGO

POLITOLOGIA O RELIGII W PERSPEKTYWIE UMIARKOWANEGO NATURALIZMU METODOLOGICZNEGO

Czy zmartwychwstanie Jezusa Chrystusa jest faktem naukowym?

Zmartwychwstanie Jezusa Chrystusa jest jednym z fundamentalnych dogmatów wiary chrześcijańskiej. Czy to wydarzenie może zostać uznane za fakt naukowy? Celem artykułu jest próba odpowiedzi na to pytanie. W pracy tej zostanie przedstawiona apologia popularna Josha McDowella, która stwierdza możliwość udowodnienia tego faktu. Zdanie odmienne zostanie ukazane w poglądach Hellera, który mówi o działaniu Boga w świecie bez naruszania naturalizmu metodologicznego w nauce.

MAGNETS, MAGIC, AND OTHER ANOMALIES: IN DEFENSE OF METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM

AbstractRecent critiques of methodological naturalism (MN) claim that it fails by conflicting with Christian belief and being insufficiently humble. We defend MN by tracing the real history of the debate, contending that the story as it is usually told is mythic. We show how MN works in practice, including among real scientists. The debate is a red herring. It only appears problematic because of confusion among its opponents about how scientists respond to experimental anomalies. We conclude by introducing our preferred approach, Science‐Engaged Theology.

THE POSSIBILITY OF A THEOLOGY‐ENGAGED SCIENCE: A RESPONSE TO PERRY AND RITCHIE

AbstractThis article provides a response to John Perry and Sarah Lane Ritchie's article, “Magnets Magic, and Other Anomalies: In Defense of Methodological Naturalism.” In so doing, it provides a defense of some of the arguments I made in my article, “Should a Christian Adopt Methodological Naturalism?” I begin by addressing some of the confusion about my position. However, it is not simply my intention to address confusions. There remain some fundamental differences between my position and Perry and Ritchie's. It is on these differences that I wish to focus––differences that enable me to maintain my critique of methodological naturalism without falling prey to the problems they raise. Constructively, I advance the argument that the Christian scientist should be open to the possibility of theology‐engaged science, as well as the science‐engaged theology that Perry and Ritchie advocate.

THE AMBIVALENCE OF SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM: A RESPONSE TO MARK HARRIS

AbstractResponding to Mark Harris, I reflect on his tantalizing question whether the provision of naturalistic explanations for biblical miracles renders the narratives more, or less, credible. I address his “reversal,” in which professional scientists now feature among defenders of a literalistic reading, while professional biblical scholars are often skeptical. I suggest this underlines the ambivalence of scientific naturalism from the standpoint of Christian theology. Historical examples are adduced to show that, until the mid‐nineteenth century, naturalistic and theistic explanations were commonly regarded as complementary. Accordingly, the primacy often accorded to scientific progress in accounts of secularization is questionable. Two concluding questions are raised. If a methodological naturalism inheres in biblical scholarship, as in the sciences, how do biblical scholars decide whether the historical trajectories they construct for the composition of biblical texts are destructive or affirmative of faith? Second, when the miracle is the Resurrection of the dead Christ, does not the scientific impossibility of this foundational event remain sacrosanct?

Naturalism and the success of science

AbstractMethodological naturalism is usually regarded as compatible with a range of religious commitments on the part of scientific practitioners and it is typically assumed that methodological naturalism does not imply metaphysical naturalism. Against this, it has been argued that the cumulative success of the sciences, conducted in conformity with the principle of methodological naturalism, actually provides compelling evidence for the truth of metaphysical naturalism. In this article I assess the argument for naturalism from the history of science and suggest that it is deficient in a number of ways. There may be reasons for adopting naturalism, but the history of science is not the place to look for them.

EPISTEMOLOGÍA CRAIGUIANA Y EL ROL DE LAS INTUICIONES EN EL TEORIZAR EPISTEMOLÓGICO*

RESUMEN El uso de las intuiciones como evidencia es ubicuo en la epistemología, pero no poco controvertido. Por más de una década y media, algunos epistemólogos experimentales han cuestionado esta apelación a las intuiciones epistémicas. Estos filósofos explotan los métodos de la psicología experimental, en particular métodos de encuestas, para poner a prueba cuán ampliamente compartidas son algunas intuiciones. Dado su compromiso con la relevancia de la investigación empírica a la construcción de teorías filosóficas, estos filósofos califican como naturalistas metodológicos. Pero algunos naturalistas metodológicos que también recomiendan renunciar a esa apelación de la intuición como evidencia no basan su caso en encuestas. En este artículo considero dos desafíos fundamentales a la práctica estándar de apelar a las intuiciones que estos filósofos naturalistas plantean y argumento que un proyecto epistemológico inspirado en el trabajo de Edward Craig le permite, en principio, al epistemólogo que comparte ese naturalismo metodológico lidiar con ellos. De todas formas concluyo que, independientemente del éxito del enfoque Craiguiano, las intuiciones tienen un rol que jugar en el teorizar epistemológico en relación a la adjudicación entre enfoques.

Indispensability, causation and explanation

When considering mathematical realism, some scientific realists reject it, and express sympathy for the opposite view, mathematical nominalism; moreover, many justify this option by invoking the causal inertness of mathematical objects. The main aim of this note is to show that the scientific realists’ endorsement of this causal mathematical nominalism is in tension with another position some (many?) of them also accept, the doctrine of methodological naturalism. By highlighting this conflict, I intend to tip the balance in favor of a rival of mathematical nominalism, the mathematical realist position supported by the ‘Indispensability Argument’ – but I do this indirectly, by showing that the road toward it is not blocked by considerations from causation.