Methodological Naturalism Research Articles

From Methodological Naturalism to Interpretive Exclusivism About Religious Psychopathology

From Methodological Naturalism to Interpretive Exclusivism About Religious Psychopathology

THE ROLE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR: PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS

The publication examines the problems of the philosophical foundations of elections, the concept of physicalism, where consciousness-body is studied, which in the philosophy of consciousness has a decisive fact. In modern philosophy of elections, the philosophical aspect is considered - consciousness and the monistic-ontological thesis - physicalism, which allows us to explain the fact that everything that exists is physical or appeared as a derivative of the physical. The concept of physicalism is a position in the philosophy of mind. Consciousness in physicalism exists without an independent ontological status, then it is derivative and connected with the human brain and is also connected with methodological naturalism. The social psychological theory of voter behavior and the theory of rational political choice attempt to explain voting behavior. It can be assumed that such a concept of synthesis of the experience of studying the immature practice of elections and already established theoretical thoughts about them could be a model of behavior of voters and candidates. This could be the dialectic of freedom and necessity of the philosophy of the rational communication model.The philosophy of the rational communication approach considers the following sequential images: a communicative person, a logical person, a rhetorical and dialogical, dialectical person. There are also three levels of development of the electoral process - logical, rhetorical (subject-object) and dialogical (subject-subject). The philosophical approach views rationality as a dynamic system consisting of logical, rhetorical and dialogical levels. In studies of the politics of legal philosophy, the problem of electoral behavior occupies an important place. These studies examine the consciousness and behavior of the electorate, which are important to the electoral process of electoral philosophy.

Correction: Methodological Naturalism, Analyzed

Correction: Methodological Naturalism, Analyzed

Methodological Naturalism, Analyzed

AbstractI present and evaluate three interpretations of methodological naturalism (MN), the principle that scientific explanations may only appeal to natural phenomena: as an essential feature of science, as a provisional guideline grounded in the historical failure of supernatural hypotheses, and as a synthesis of these two approaches. In doing so, I provide both a synoptic overview of current scholarship on MN, as well a contribution to that discussion by arguing in favor of a restricted version of MN, placing it on a firmer theoretical foundation than that supplied by previous studies, and replying to recent objections.

Freudian naturalism and the assessment of psychoanalysis as a natural science: Psychic phenomenon as process

The long-enduring problem of assessing psychoanalysis as a science is still under debate and perhaps this is because the focus has been more on questions of demarcation than an evaluation of the qualities proper to this psychological approach. Here we outline this discussion and attempt to clarify Freud’s conceptions of natural science and naturalism. We show that Freud commits himself to a nonreductionist view of the mind that is consistent with his phenomenon-oriented attitude. Drawing on a difference between ontological and methodological naturalism, we argue that Freud understood psychic phenomena as a process, and this is key to comprehending the qualities and scope of his metapsychological theory.

The 'Natural' in Methodological Naturalism

The 'Natural' in Methodological Naturalism

The Energy of Non-Simple Stories: Humanities in the Form of Pedagogy and Educational Research

In the article, I put forward the thesis that research based on scientistic assumptions (in the sense of the tendency to make the humanities and social sciences similar to natural sciences, that is: based on ontological and methodological naturalism) is marginal and only auxiliary importance in the exploration of human practices (I consider it on the example of pedagogy as the science of a subjective and communicational undertaking called education). I argue that when the scientistic model of research becomes dominant – as it is nowadays – it obscures the basic subject of pedagogical research: education. As a result, the public image of education is reduced and distorted.

Readings on Evolution and the Nature of Science: One Christian’s Perspective

Readings on Evolution and the Nature of Science: One Christian’s Perspective

H. Blumer's methodological naturalism: on the notion of “sensitizing concepts” in Communication research

H. Blumer's methodological naturalism: on the notion of “sensitizing concepts” in Communication research

Theopsych: A Psychological Science Primer for Theologians

Theopsych: A Psychological Science Primer for Theologians

Christianity Cultivated Science with and without Methodological Naturalism

Many people assume ceaseless conflict between natural science and Christianity, but the real conflict has been between scientism and Christianity. Scientism is the view that only the sciences (especially not theology) generate knowledge or rational belief. I show how Christianity generated rational beliefs that contributed to the rise of science. This science-fostering rational belief included rationales for when to practice methodological naturalism, and when to study nature without that restriction. Both practices cultivated science, though in different ways. This historical difference is of enduring value for recent debates about metaphysical naturalism (atheism), creationism, theistic evolution, and intelligent design.

Does analytic theology belong in the public university?

AbstractAn overarching question in William Wood'sAnalytic Theology and the Academic Study of Religionconcerns the conditions under which theology belongs in the public university. On this question, many or most academics today are methodological naturalists, and they would not accept explanations that appeal to supernatural entities. Wood devotes a chapter to arguing against that position. Nevertheless, Wood is not a ‘sectarian’ who argues that Christian theology should only answer to its own, tradition-specific norms, and so it is important to see how close his proposal and methodological naturalism (MN) actually are. In this response, I seek to clarify both MN and Wood's proposal regarding the proper norms for academic inquiry. Key to my argument is a distinction between a MN based on strict or scientific naturalism and a MN based on liberal or expansive naturalism. Analytic theologians and expansive naturalists can agree both that a theology that operates according to proper norms for academic inquiry belongs in the public university and that strict naturalism is not the norm that we want.

Aquinas on Faith, Reason, and Charity by Roberto Di Ceglie

Reviewed by: Aquinas on Faith, Reason, and Charity by Roberto Di Ceglie Gregory Stacey DI CEGLIE, Roberto. Aquinas on Faith, Reason, and Charity. New York: Routledge, 2022. x + 196 pp. Cloth, $160.00 Suppose one wishes to argue that Christian faith (that is, supernatural belief in propositions insofar as they are divinely revealed) is compatible with the proper exercise of reason (that is, forming beliefs through natural cognitive processes). Two strategies suggest themselves. First, one could argue that faith is itself a natural cognitive process or else meets criteria by which natural beliefs are considered rational or appropriate. Alternatively, one might contend that faith can meet its own, independent criteria for rationality or propriety. Thomas Aquinas, whose natural theology and discussion of public evidence that God has revealed himself in Christ are famously robust, may appear to be an exponent of the former strategy. Yet in this volume, Roberto Di Ceglie advances a reading of Thomas that illustrates how faith can support rational enquiry, while remaining independent of it. On this view, faith is "caused mainly by God" and is therefore "at least partly unresponsive to rational criteria." Part 1 begins Di Ceglie's case obliquely, by criticizing both efforts to argue (following Gilson and Maritain) that philosophy can be influenced by Christian faith and recent attempts to explain Aquinas's account of faith and reason. Reviewing the work of commentators including Anthony Kenny, Richard Swinburne, and Eleonore Stump, the author objects that many philosophers hold that for Thomas, faith is primarily a form of propositional belief that should be evaluated for propriety in the same way as natural beliefs. He alleges that this understanding of faith is inherited from Locke, who endorsed "methodological naturalism": the view that appropriate "religious belief can only be taken as the outcome, if any, of a rational exploration of our experience." While this material usefully outlines views which Di Ceglie means to oppose, readers unfamiliar with scholarship on Aquinas and Locke may find these initial chapters difficult to follow. The argument becomes easier to follow in part 2, which provides Di Ceglie's own interpretation of Aquinas. The key third chapter explores Aquinas's definition of faith as "an act of the intellect assenting to the Divine Truth at the command of the will moved by the grace of God" (ST II-II, q. 2, a. 9). It demonstrates that while for Aquinas faith involves firm propositional belief, its certitude derives not from believers' assessment of signs that God has revealed the articles of faith but from their free choice—itself a gift of grace—to embrace those articles. More precisely, in cases of "formed" faith, this choice is motivated by supernatural love for God (charity). Charity's role in Aquinas's religious epistemology is [End Page 547] highlighted in two subsequent chapters. Inter alia, Di Ceglie charges that faith is meritorious principally due to its grounds in charity rather than because the articles of faith are not evidently true. He further claims that Aquinas understood "unformed" faith as merely "faith commonly so called"—that is, natural belief in propositions because one judges that they are testified to by a competent authority. Accordingly, unformed faith lacks perfect confidence because it is merely based on probabilistic evidence that God has revealed the articles of faith, rather than on a strong, loving will to trust God. More generally, the certitude of one's faith is proportionate to the perfection of one's charity. Having developed a reading of Aquinas's religious epistemology that stresses the distinction between faith and reason, in part 3 Di Ceglie considers their positive relationship. First, he attempts to reconcile the apparently opposing views that Aquinas's philosophy is purely an exercise of natural reason, and that his philosophical work was influenced by his Christian faith. Broadly, the charity that grounds formed faith also inspires and enhances rational investigation, although philosophical arguments cannot presume faith's truth. Believers with formed faith, however, should reject positions that contradict faith and seek to revise their philosophical reasoning accordingly. The final chapter argues that Christian faith affords a better position from which to engage in rational reflection than atheism or agnosticism. Among other advantages, faith...

Methodological Naturalists Need Not Commit to Metaphysical Naturalism

In their paper “Should Methodological Naturalists Commit to Metaphysical Naturalism?” Zargar et al. try to show that the correct answer to the question that the title of their paper poses is positive. They argue that methodological naturalism has a metaphysical presupposition, namely causal closure, and an epistemological consequence, namely evidentialism. Causal closure and evidentialism imply metaphysical naturalism. Thus, they conclude, one who believes in methodological naturalism should also endorse causal closure, evidentialism, and metaphysical naturalism as a result. In this paper, I criticize their argument and argue that it is deficient in (at least) two different ways. First, what they consider to be methodological naturalism is in fact a strawman: that is another – more radical – thesis that may be called methodological anti-supernaturalism. Second, and most importantly, even methodological anti-supernaturalism does not in essence need causal closure for its justification. Then, methodological naturalists are not required to adhere to causal closure or metaphysical naturalism.

NATURALISM AND THE CATEGORIES “SCIENCE” AND “RELIGION”: A RESPONSE TO JOSH REEVES

AbstractThis article is a response to Josh Reeve's “A Defense of Science and Religion.” I begin with the disclaimer that this was not solely my project but a joint enterprise. A common commitment of participants was to make the disciplines of history and theology central to the discussion and explore what new possibilities follows for the field of science and religion. I then address Reeves's two central concerns: first that I am too dismissive of the categories “science” and “religion.” In fact I have not advocated dispensing with these categories, but have insisted than we employ them critically and with a sense of their history. The second concern is that my position on naturalism seems to place me perilously close to advocates of ID or scientific creationism. I deny this, but point out that more work needs to be done, beyond simply invoking methodological naturalism, to clarify the differences between naturalistic and theological approaches to the world.

Introduction

Introduction

Methodological Naturalism Undercuts Ontological Naturalism

Abstract Naturalism, as I understand it, includes cosmological naturalism, ontological naturalism and methodological naturalism. After clarifying these three theses I argue that the combination of ontological with methodological naturalism is untenable. I do so by providing a pro tanto case against ontological naturalism and show that it can be resisted, but only by abandoning methodological naturalism. The pro tanto case is that ontological naturalism requires a version of what I call Redundancy Nominalism, but methodological naturalists should either reject it or at very least treat it, and hence ontological naturalism, as a speculation.

Why Naturalism cannot (Merely) be an Attitude

Varying forms of ontological and methodological naturalism are among the most popular theses in contemporary philosophy. However, each of these theses faces a different dilemma: ontological naturalism is famously challenged by Hempel’s dilemma, while methodological naturalism faces issues regarding its coherence. Some prominent naturalists (Elpidorou and Dove 2018, Ney 2009, Rea 2002) have suggested to circumvent these respective dilemmas by reconceiving naturalism as an attitude (rather than a thesis). This paper argues that such attitude accounts are unsuccessful: naturalism as an attitude either collapses into a thesis again or is rationally unjustifiable. This paper closes by suggesting two options a naturalist has remaining. Either a naturalist can reasonably choose to revert to defending naturalism as a thesis; given that naturalism receives substantial support, it is not unlikely that a solution to the problems encountered by naturalism qua thesis is forthcoming. Or a naturalist might simply want to embrace an a-rational form of naturalism as a worldview, as suggested by Kim (2003) and Stoljar (2010) (and earlier by thinkers like Dilthey 1960 and Jaspers1925).

Down with This Sort of Thing: Seth Heringer and the End of the Historical-Critical Method

Down with This Sort of Thing: Seth Heringer and the End of the Historical-Critical Method

Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God

Abstract In this article, I seek to assess the extent to which Theism, the claim that there is a God, can provide a true fundamental explanation for the existence of the infinite plurality of concrete and abstract possible worlds, posited by David K. Lewis and Alvin Plantinga. This assessment will be carried out within the (modified) explanatory framework of Richard Swinburne, which will lead to the conclusion that the existence of God provides a true fundamental explanation for these specific entities. And thus, given the truth of this type of explanation, we have another good abductive argument for God’s existence and grounds for affirming a weaker form of the principle of methodological naturalism in our metaphysical theorising.