Abstract
The long-enduring problem of assessing psychoanalysis as a science is still under debate and perhaps this is because the focus has been more on questions of demarcation than an evaluation of the qualities proper to this psychological approach. Here we outline this discussion and attempt to clarify Freud’s conceptions of natural science and naturalism. We show that Freud commits himself to a nonreductionist view of the mind that is consistent with his phenomenon-oriented attitude. Drawing on a difference between ontological and methodological naturalism, we argue that Freud understood psychic phenomena as a process, and this is key to comprehending the qualities and scope of his metapsychological theory.
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