Metaphysical Project Research Articles

Kant and his Critique of Leibniz

According to one line of interpretation, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant argues that Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz conflated two kinds of cognitive capacities and their respective types of mental representations: (1) sensibility and sensible or spatiotemporal representations and (2) the understanding and intellectual or conceptual representations. According to this interpretation, Leibniz held that sensibility is not distinct from the understanding, and sensible representations are confused and reducible to distinct intellectual representations. However, this interpretation fails against the more charitable thesis that Leibniz believed the two cognitive capacities and their representations are distinct, yet all sensible representations are necessarily confused. Instead, I argue that Kant’s criticism concerns a different distinction: general logic, the rules of thought in general, and transcendental logic, the rules governing thought of sensible representations. Additionally, I argue for a second part of Kant’s criticism: the Copernican Revolution. By providing an account of mathematics that depends on objects of possible knowledge conforming to our cognitive capacities, Kant eliminates the possibility of a Leibnizian metaphysical project that allegedly aims beyond such objects. A Leibnizian would have to provide an account of the success of mathematics solely in terms of general logic or deny it altogether.

The Theory of Projection

Abstract Whitehead’s process philosophy offers a wide range of speculatively generalized concepts that allow for an application in transdisciplinary research. The notion of projection is an often-overlooked detail of his philosophy that not only appears in his far-reaching theory of perception, but also constitutes an integral part of his theory of extension as the formal foundation of his metaphysical project. His perceptive theory relies on the idea of projection as the fundamental ontological relationship that lifts the past into the present. Projections of sensa describe one side of the ‘double-barreled’ theory of perception and the spatial relations of the contemporary world. The microscopic projection is just as fundamental for perception and for the integrity of a relational theory of becoming, as the perceptual projection is necessary ingredient for symbolic modes of experience. The simple projection in the mode of presentational immediacy is the basis of temporary stability of events and of any perceptual situation in the biological realm. Whitehead was aware of the possible misconceptions that this term might lead to. Discussing his remarks on the hierarchical variety of different modes of projection can resolve those misconceptions and throw a new light on the importance of projection for interdisciplinary inquiries.

The Perception of Socrates' Ethics in F. Nietzsche's Moral Philosophy: Overcoming Metaphysics and its "Eternal Recurrence"

The subject of the study is to consider the perception of Socrates' ethics in Nietzsche's philosophy as a theoretical basis for the formation of the key provisions of Nietzsche's philosophy of morality, in particular, possible elements of metaphysical thinking in these provisions. Nietzsche's critical argumentation in relation to the philosophical views of Socrates was considered as the basis for the key provisions of Nietzsche's moral philosophy, particularly in the aspect of its connection with the question of metaphysics. The focus of the author's research is the analysis of the perception of Socratic ideas in the context of criticism of Nietzsche's project of metaphysics through the prism of morality: the idea of self-overcoming and the increasing will to power turn out to be the basis for understanding Nietzsche's new project in moral philosophy. The research methodology includes theoretical methods, historical-philosophical and ethical-philosophical analysis of the consideration of Socrates’ ethics by Nietzsche, and the influence of this consideration on the ethical position of the latter. As a research basis, the article uses the approaches of J. Deleuze, L. Klages, A.F. Losev, L. Shestova, V.M. Bakuseva. The novelty of the article lies in tracing the influence of Socratic ethics on Friedrich Nietzsche's formulation of the moral problem, especially in the aspect of the question of metaphysics in Nietzsche's ethical thought (both criticism of metaphysics and the continuation of some lines of the metaphysical tradition). The first line of Nietzsche's criticism of Socratic philosophy was to identify the influence of Socrates on the emergence of European nihilism. Nietzsche's second thought, in relation to Socrates, concerned the "theoretical man".The third idea, which can be designated as one of the most important features of Nietzsche's moral philosophy, was the idea of self-overcoming.

Two approaches to metaphysical explanation

AbstractExplanatory metaphysics aspires to explain the less fundamental in terms of the more fundamental. But we should recognize two importantly different approaches to this task. According to the generation approach, more basic features of reality generate (or give rise to) less basic features. According to the reduction approach, less perspicuous ways of representing reality reduce to (or collapse into) more perspicuous ways of representing reality. The main goals of this paper are to present the core differences between the two approaches (§2), to demonstrate the distinction's significance (§3), to provide some resources for adjudicating between the approaches (§4), and to argue that the project of explanatory metaphysics needs both (§5).

Idol Or Icon? Francisco Suárez And The Concept Of Being

Abstract: This essay addresses dominant critiques of Francisco Suárez’s metaphysical project raised by many contemporary philosophers of religion. Those critiques often center upon two main claims. (1) God and creature are both comprehended under the concept of being such that God amounts to just one more being among others. As such, a univocal community of being results wherein God’s divine transcendence and irreducibility to creation are destroyed. (2) Since Suárez employs a univocal concept of being when conducting his metaphysical speculations about God, he has (unwittingly) abandoned the God of Christian revelation in favor of a conceptual idol. The author argues that both critiques harbor a severe misunderstanding of Suárezian metaphysics, and that it is precisely in turning to the concept of being that Suárez defends both God’s irreducible transcendence and his incomprehensibility. Paradoxically, to think of God in terms of being is just to leave God unthought.

In the flow of sociems

The article reveals the creative spirit of modern sociality, transforming it into a flow of sociemsas the contin-uous formation of social singularities. Modernist worldview guidelines with faith in holistic, metaphysical ideals are being persistently replaced by fundamentally new cognitive attitudes that represent the latest civili-zational challenges. The current course of social development has changed the usual rational social schemes, opposing, destroying, and deconstructing them. In social processes, increasing factors of pan-mythologization of all areas of social activity, the relativity of spiritual values, subjectivism, irrationalism, randomness, unpre-dictability, and uncertainty have been revealed. The image of contemporary society is one of flows of inde-pendent processes and human manifestations of will, fracturing, splitting, multifarious, varied, ludicrous, and individualistic. Modern cognitive thinking and a radically new epistemology are needed since the social envi-ronment has changed. Post-classical socio-philosophical discourse is a result of the metaphysical project's cri-ses of conventionalsystematicity, reductionist scientific explanation of reality, and classical spiritual pre-cepts. Instead of contemplating the clash between social paradigms, we must consider their coexistence poly-paradigmality, and how they mutually complement each otherin examining different facets of social reality and addressing specific problematics across different scales.

Anne Conway on memory

ABSTRACT Anne Conway’s understanding of the faculty of memory in The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy crucially intersects with her larger psychological and metaphysical projects. However, it has thus far been largely overlooked in the secondary literature. It is the purpose of this article to rectify this omission and emphasize the greater role which this faculty has to play in Conway’s philosophy by systematically examining her account of memory. I do this by first elucidating the objects of memory as well as the key features of the faculty itself before turning to develop what I believe to be a hitherto unnoticed but significant concern, which arises out of one of the key conditions required for memory to occur and which seriously threatens to undermine Conway’s theological and soteriological positions. After considering and rejecting several possibilities for alleviating this worry, I posit an interpretation which I argue is capable of resolving the concern, restoring coherence to Conway’s theological and soteriological projects, and more fully revealing Conway’s understanding of the faculty of memory itself.

A Flexible, Sloppy Blob?

Abstract Ladyman and Ross argue that analytic metaphysics is a misguided enterprise that should give way to a naturalized metaphysics that aims to reconcile everyday and special-scientific ontologies with fundamental physics as the authoritative source of knowledge on the general structure of the universe. Le Bihan and Barton (argue, as against this, that analytic metaphysics remains useful as a basis for the body of work in AI known as “applied ontology.” They stop short of claiming, however, that analytic metaphysics is useful as metaphysics. I consider a basis for making the stronger claim: Smith's project for building what he claims to be metaphysical foundations for applied ontology (and for AI generally). Ultimately, the stronger claim is rejected; but in the course of this dialectic new aspects of the naturalistic metaphysical project come to light, including relationships between it and the traditional metaphysical project of providing foundations for philosophical semantics of truth and reference.

Introduction

Introduction

Номологический реализм Дэвида Армстронга

The article discusses the position of the Australian philosopher David Armstrong on the problem of the ontological status of the laws of nature. Through a clarification of Armstrong’s understanding of naturalism, physicalism, and factualism, the general essence of his metaphysical project is summarized. Then article presents his theory of the laws of nature, which is a kind of nomological realism: his version of the nomolog­ical argument is examined; his general grounds for rejecting the regularity theories, which is classical for the naturalistic approach, are clarified; and the role of abduction in Arm­strong’s theory is demonstrated. The relation of nomic necessity, which is the key concept of his theory, is discussed in detail: its status as a second-order universal is explained; the terms of this relation, namely the types of states of affairs that constitute some special kind of universals, are distinguished; the essence of the nomic connection assumed by this relation is clarified through Armstrong’s theory of causality. Armstrong’s critique of regularity theories of laws of nature and the advantages of his nomological realism over them are discussed: cases where regularity is not law are considered; cases where there are laws that are not related to regularities, and cases where law and regularity seem to coincide, but there is reason to believe that they are different, these are the cases that appear to be most important. Finally, drawing on his own argumentation, the advan­tages of Armstrong’s theory over the best systems approach are justified: the problem of subjectivism and the threat of anti-realism inherent in coherentist approaches are ex­amined; the highly counterintuitive dependence of the existence of some laws on the ex­istence of others is pointed out; and the danger of actual contradictions within our ontol­ogy is demonstrated.

Имяславские споры в формировании русской метафизики: В.Ф. Эрн и А.Ф. Лосев

The article is devoted to the influence exerted by the imyaslav disputes on the formation of Russian religious metaphysics. The declared theme is considered on the example of philosophical projects of two authors: V.F. Ern and A.F. Losev. The attitude of these thinkers to the controversy around the Name of God is placed in the context of the development of their philosophical views. Parallels are traced between the metaphysical projects of Ern and Losev, considered as a part of a long process of development of Russian religious thought. The ques­tion of the deep kinship of the key aspect of the imyaslav disputes with the main problems of Russian philosophy is touched upon, which, according to the au­thor’s hypothesis, made this initially purely theological controversy such an im­portant event for the intellectual biography of a number of Russian thinkers. We are talking about the problem of the possibility of experiential knowledge of God, which has traditionally occupied an important place in Russian ontol­ogy and epistemology and has become the subject of theological discussion in the context of imyaslav movement. Ern and Losev develop their projects in this traditional way, inheriting the Slavophiles (primarily I.V. Kireevsky), Vl.S. Solovyov and S.N. Trubetskoy. At the same time, they accepted the prob­lematics of imyaslav movement, in which they saw the embodiment of “ecclesi­astical Platonism”, opposed to “ecclesiastical Kantianism”, thus including it in the discussion of key philosophical issues. The article touches upon the prob­lem of numerous parallels between the works of Ern and Losev and the possible influence of the first on the second one. Based on Losev’s early works, the au­thor seeks to trace his way to the formation of a large-scale metaphysical synthe­sis in later works.

Putting races on the ontological map: a close look at Spencer’s ‘new biologism’ of race

In a large and impressive body of published work, Quayshawn Spencer has meticulously articulated and defended a metaphysical project aimed at resuscitating a biological conception of race—one free from many of the pitfalls of biological essentialism. If successful, such a project would be highly rewarding, since it would provide a compelling response to philosophers who have denied the genuine existence of race while avoiding the very dangers that they sought to avoid. The aim of this paper is to subject those moves to careful scrutiny and thereby appraise the prospects for a new biologism about race.

Современный социум в свете социальной гетерологии

The article highlights the idea of the need to move to a heterological paradigm of social research, relevant to the picture of modern society, which is fundamentally different from the classical one and even opposes it. New ideological guidelines, the key postulates of which are based on modern civilizational challenges, are inexorably replacing modernist worldview guidelines with a belief in the rationality of the social order in the ontological and axiological senses, holistic ideals under the sign of metaphysics. The course of social development has changed the usual social schemes, opposing and destroying, deconstructing them. Increasing factors of dehumanization, pan-mythologization, relativity, subjectivism, irrationalism, chance and uncertainty were revealed in social development. The picture of modern society is scattered, torn, many-sided, diverse, individualized by streams of autonomous processes and human wills. The social world has become different, requiring the latest cognitive thinking, a fundamentally new epistemology. The post-non-classical sociophilosophical discourse is caused by a crisis of traditional systemicity, classical spiritual guidelines, reductionist scientization of reality in a metaphysical project. However, this is not about opposing social paradigms, but about supplementing them in the study of various sections of social reality, solving certain types of tasks and scales. If the task is to trace the general, global trend of social development, one can rightfully apply the classical paradigm. Human-dimensional tactics of social cognition are needed to understand the singular aspects of human life, the “living tissue” of social processes, which is necessary in the conditions of the rapid, intense flows of modernity fraught with social cataclysms.

Vulnerabilities in Kantian Constructivism: Why they Matter for Objective Normativity

Abstract In section 1 we present moral constructivism as a metaphysical project which grounds moral norms in the attitude of valuing by rational agents. In section 2 we establish that Kantian Constructivism – opposed to Humean Constructivism – seeks objective and universal moral norms through a process of rational construction and ratification of norms that does not draw on any kind of subjective attitude of valuing. In section 3 we explore whether Kant is a moral constructivist or moral realist, arguing that he might be read as a proto-moral constructivist whose formulas impose standards of correctness upon our moral judgments, from which we formulate moral norms as necessary facts of reason. In section 4 we argue that: 1) vulnerabilities have moral relevance which adds merit to the project of finding objective moral norms, and 2) the inclusion of vulnerabilities as empirical contingencies is compatible with Kantian Constructivism. We do so by considering vulnerabilities a constitutive aspect of finite rational agents which must, therefore, be implied and considered in the process of moral construction.

On Metaphysical Necessity: Essays on God, the World, Morality, and Democracy

On Metaphysical Necessity: Essays on God, the World, Morality, and Democracy

Reform or Euthanasia of Metaphysics?

Although the philosophical ideas of the English philosopher Robin George Collingwood on history and art have often been compared with those of the German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey, an in-depth comparison between their concepts of metaphysics was never made. Therefore, the focus in this article is on both authors’ concepts of metaphysics. It is shown that, despite the undeniable affinity, their views of the status of metaphysics differ substantially. Both Dilthey and Collingwood focus on an inherent antinomy in the project of metaphysics. On the one hand, there is the inescapable relativity of all time-bound ways of thinking and their results; on the other, there is the metaphysical search for objective and generally accepted knowledge of reality as a whole. For Dilthey, the awareness of its historical character reveals the impossibility for metaphysics to provide a foundation for natural and human sciences alike. Collingwood’s aim, by contrast, is to safeguard the possibility of metaphysics as a historical science to supply an enduring foundation of natural and human sciences. To clarify this radical difference with regard to the role of metaphysics, I make three steps. First, I situate Dilthey’s critique of metaphysics within the context of his work in order to present his ‘solution’ of the metaphysical antinomy. Second, I focus on the role of Collingwood’s reform of metaphysics and his ‘solution’ of the metaphysical antinomy. Finally, I relate the different status of their views of metaphysics to their divergent interpretations of human finitude.

Counterparts and Counterpossibles: Impossibility without Impossible Worlds

Standard accounts of counterfactuals with metaphysically impossible antecedents take them to by trivially true. But recent work shows that nontrivial countermetaphysicals are frequently appealed to in scientific modeling and are indispensable for a number of metaphysical projects. I focus on three recent discussions of counterpossible counterfactuals, which apply counterpossibles in both scientific and metaphysical modeling. I show that a sufficiently developed modal counterpart theory can provide a semantics for a wide range of counterpossibles without any inconsistent possibilities or other forms of impossible worlds. But such a view faces problems: in order for the metaphysical views I discuss to bear weight, there must be a significant difference between the metaphysical possibilities and impossibilities. I will show how the counterpart-theoretic view delineates the possible from impossible, while still making room for the impossible.

The natural, the fundamental, and the perfectly similar: Unraveling a metaphysical braid

AbstractSome of our most prominent metaphysicians have argued for a notion of naturalness that combines the roles of joint‐carving, fundamentality, and perfect similarity. This paper argues that it is a mistake to think that there are select properties fulfilling all these roles. Toward this end, epistemologically tractable diagnostic markers for naturalness are presented. From these it follows that there can be perfect naturalness and similarity at nonfundamental levels; and the fundamental need not be perfectly natural or yield perfect similarities. Metaphysicians of naturalness are encouraged to attend to insights from metaphysical property theory and the interdisciplinary study of patterns and complexity, both of which support these conclusions. Distinct metaphysical projects are distinguished.

Postmetaphysical Conundrums: The Problematic Return to Metaphysics in Horkheimer’s Critique of Instrumental Reason

Postmetaphysical Conundrums: The Problematic Return to Metaphysics in Horkheimer’s Critique of Instrumental Reason

Being a ‘not-quite-Buddhist theist’

AbstractBuddhism is a tradition that set itself decidedly against theism, with the development of complex arguments against the existence of God. I propose that the metaphysical conclusions reached by some schools in the Mahayana tradition present a vision of reality that, with some apparently small modification, would ground an argument for the existence of God. This argument involves explanation in terms of natures rather than causal agency. Yet I conclude not only that the Buddhist becomes a theist in embracing such explanations as legitimate, but alsoipso factoabandons their metaphysical project and ceases to be a Buddhist.