Being a ‘not-quite-Buddhist theist’

James Dominic Rooney

doi:10.1017/s0034412521000391

Abstract

AbstractBuddhism is a tradition that set itself decidedly against theism, with the development of complex arguments against the existence of God. I propose that the metaphysical conclusions reached by some schools in the Mahayana tradition present a vision of reality that, with some apparently small modification, would ground an argument for the existence of God. This argument involves explanation in terms of natures rather than causal agency. Yet I conclude not only that the Buddhist becomes a theist in embracing such explanations as legitimate, but alsoipso factoabandons their metaphysical project and ceases to be a Buddhist.

Highlights

Buddhism is a tradition that set itself decidedly against theism, with the development of complex arguments against the existence of God
As Paul Williams has noted: ‘Some consider that while traditions of Buddhism originating earlier like Theravada may be unsympathetic to the existence of God, this is different with Mahayana Buddhism
Even if Buddhist texts that engage in explicit attempts to refute the existence of a creator God were ignored or bracketed, the Buddhist metaphysical analysis of causality involves or entails the position that there necessarily does not exist anything that enters into causal relations which is not causally dependent (Williams (1989), Williams and Tribe (2000))

Summary

Introduction

Buddhism is a tradition that set itself decidedly against theism, with the development of complex arguments against the existence of God. We can provisionally grant that relations like efficient causation explain the nature of things in terms of the agents that cause them; yet, at least at this point, efficient causal relations are not the right kind of formal dependence that the Huayan Buddhist is willing to concede.

Results

Conclusion