Metaphysical Nature Research Articles

Nietzsches Musikästhetik der Affekte

Nietzsches Musikästhetik der Affekte

Grist to the Mill of Anti-evolutionism: The Failed Strategy of Ruling the Supernatural Out of Science by Philosophical Fiat

According to a widespread philosophical opinion, science is strictly limited to investigating natural causes and putting forth natural explanations. Lacking the tools to evaluate supernatural claims, science must remain studiously neutral on questions of metaphysics. This (self-imposed) stricture, which goes under the name of ‘methodological naturalism’, allows science to be divorced from metaphysical naturalism or atheism, which many people tend to associate with it. However, ruling the supernatural out of science by fiat is not only philosophically untenable, it actually provides grist to the mill of anti-evolutionism. The philosophical flaws in this conception of methodological naturalism have been gratefully exploited by advocates of intelligent design creationism to bolster their false accusations of naturalistic bias and dogmatism on the part of modern science. We argue that it promotes a misleading view of the scientific endeavor and is at odds with the foremost arguments for evolution by natural selection. Reconciling science and religion on the basis of such methodological strictures is therefore misguided.

Self Systems in Altered Ego and Consciousness States and Sustainable Leadership Psychology

Some argue that the ontology of the mental is a metaphysical and irreducible one, in spite of the emerging physicalism in scientific basis for models of mind and self, based on materialistic reductionism. However a model of a physical mind localized in brain based consciousness can still accommodate the non-local or rather metaphysical and disembodied aspects, as a study of the findings of neural correlates and brain biology related to altered ego and consciousness states would suggest, as argued in this paper. There is a need to synergize the bottom up approaches with top down perspectives on consciousness and mind in a theoretic model of mind encompassing the reductionist and holistic paradigms and scientific and philosophical frameworks. This is possible in the light of the current literature related to altered ego states of pathological conditions and altered consciousness states of meditation and its brain based mechanisms and processes. A perspective on a model of mind is possible by integrating its physicalism with its rather metaphysical nature intrinsic to its being and objective reality in specific altered states of consciousness that implies a disappearance of the subject-object differentiation that is normally associated with self systems.This has possible implications for management of self systems,with its import for sustainable leadership.

ATVIROJO KLAUSIMO ARGUMENTAS IR REDUKTYVIZMO GALIMYBĖ

Šiame straipsnyje nagrinėjama, kokių reduktyvizmo formų galimybę blokuoja vadinamasis atvirojo klausimo argumentas (AKA) – tiek savo istoriniu, tiek šiandieniais pavidalais – ir kokiu pagrindu. Išskirtos keturios svarbiausios AKA interpretacijos ir išanalizuotas jų poveikis vertinamųjų savybių reduktyvistinių teorijų galimybei. Teigiu, jog AKA kelia didelę grėsmę semantiniam etiniam natūralizmui, tačiau ne metafiziniam etiniam natūralizmui (nors ir pasmerkia jį tam tikrai „šizofrenijai“).

Metaphilosophical Reflections on the Idea of Metaphysics

One constant in Wittgenstein’s thought, early and late, is his denial not only of metaphysical naturalism, but of methodologically monistic scientism, a broadly epistemological view that is often taken to be a consequence of such a metaphysical view. This is the claim, roughly, that scientific knowledge is the form of knowledge, and scientific understanding is the only kind of understanding that deserves the name. “Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences,” he says in the Tractatus, and this view seems to be part of what lies behind the theoretical quietism of the later work. In fact, I think Wittgenstein thinks that if systematic philosophical theorizing were possible, it would mean that philosophy is an empirical science. Since it is not, philosophers must eschew theorizing, restricting themselves instead to light, local descriptions of discursive practices, where such descriptions might provide helpful reminders in freeing ourselves from the sort of misunderstandings and puzzlements that arise precisely from the theories implicit in inherited pictures of what is going on when we think and talk. Whether or not Wittgenstein himself reasoned in this way, I Philosophia (2012) 40:13–26 DOI 10.1007/s11406-011-9332-7

The Role of Metaphysical Naturalism in Science

This paper defends the view that metaphysical naturalism is a constitutive ontological principle of science in that the general empirical methods of science, such as observation, measurement and experiment, and thus the very production of empirical evidence, presuppose a no-supernature principle. It examines the consequences of metaphysical naturalism for the testability of supernatural claims, and it argues that explanations involving supernatural entities are pseudo-explanatory due to the many semantic and ontological problems of supernatural concepts. The paper also addresses the controversy about metaphysical versus methodological naturalism.

A review on Traditional Veterinary Medical Practices in Sri Lanka with special reference to Cattle Diseases

Sri Lanka has well developed systems of traditional veterinary medicine. Unfortunately most of our people today, are unaware of these practices and they generally seek western modern veterinary medicinal assistance due to this unawareness and also for convenience in their busy lives. Hence, this study was undertaken to collect and preserve the old knowledge and practices. Data were gathered from traditional veterinary physicians in Central and Sabaragamuwa provinces, Olla leaves and text books. These physicians have a knowledge in identifying and treating diseases, preparation of medicines, mode of drug administration, burning of vital points (moxibustion), branding, and blood letting. Specific applications of metaphysical nature such as mystical diagrams and charms, ‘Yanthra’ or ‘Kem’ are also used. The striking feature of this treatment regimen is the incorporation of both physical (visible) and metaphysical (invisible) methods to treat diseases as preventive and therapeutic measures. The medicinal preparations consist of herbs, metals, minerals and animal products including milk products, eggs, bones, meat, spider web, anthill mud and human urine. It is also observed that the traditional veterinary medicinal practices; especially in treatment of cattle, are very diverse. Key words: Cattle diseases; Traditional veterinary remedies; Sri Lanka DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4038/tare.v13i3.3139 Tropical Agricultural Research and Extension 13(3) 2010 pp.55-62

Why metrical properties are not powers

What has the dispositional analysis of properties and laws (e.g. Molnar, Powers,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2003;Mumford,Lawsinnature,Routledge, London,2004; Bird, Nature's metaphysics, Clarendon Press, Oxford,2007)toofferto thescientificunderstandingofphysicalproperties?—Thearticleprovidesananswerto this question for the case of spacetime points and their metrical properties in General Relativity. The analysis shows that metrical properties are not 'powers', i.e. they can- not be understood as producing the effects of spacetime on matter with metaphysical necessity. Instead they possess categorical characteristics which, in connection with specific laws, explain those effects. Thus, the properties of spacetime do not favor the metaphysics of powers with respect to properties and laws.

The Divine Transcendence and Relation to Evil in Hartshorne’s Dipolar Theism

the title above identifies two issues in Charles Hartshorne’s panentheistic understanding of God that, in my judgment, have not been sufficiently clarified. The purpose of this paper is to provide additional clarification, that the adequacy of this type of theism may be more carefully judged by its admirers and by its detractors from their respective perspectives. The first part will identify central elements of Hartshorne’s reasoning about God’s relation to the world. The second part examines how Hartshorne speaks of a divine “transcendence” in a naturalistic metaphysics that is thoroughly empirical. The third part will examine the ways that God is related to the world’s evil and whether God is in some way responsible for this evil in a way that makes God morally culpable. The discussion will uncover significant differences from the way process theists, traditional theists, and non-theists have usually thought about creation, eternity, and everlastingness. Of course, in a naturalistic metaphysics, transcendence will have to be constructed in a way that differs from that in the metaphysics that undergirds classical (or traditional) theism. Hartshorne proposes that all worldly relations are internal or external relations sustained by their relation internal to God. All worldly relations and their terms can be said to be related within this relation internal to God in which God is related to the world by a relation external to the world. I interpret this external relation to have the practical effect that we can have no perception or prehension of God as God while we perceive worldly events that, Hartshorne says, comprise the strict identity of God. There is a complexity here that may be said to be “paradoxical” in its own way that is more “dialectical” than contradictory. In any case, no worldly individual or entity enjoys absolute independence. This is also true of God in virtue of the world’s relation internal to God. Everything is related and dependent. Nothing enjoys aseity, unless it is reality as a whole, the universe,

In defense of naturalism

History and the modern sciences are characterized by what is sometimes called a “methodological naturalism” that disregards talk of divine agency. Some religious thinkers argue that this reflects a dogmatic materialism: a non-negotiable and a priori commitment to a materialist metaphysics. In response to this charge, I make a sharp distinction between procedural requirements and metaphysical commitments. The procedural requirement of history and the sciences—that proposed explanations appeal to publicly-accessible bodies of evidence—is non-negotiable, but has no metaphysical implications. The metaphysical commitment is naturalistic, but is both a posteriori and provisional, arising from the fact that for more than 400 years no proposed theistic explanation has been shown capable of meeting the procedural requirement. I argue that there is nothing to prevent religious thinkers from seeking to overturn this metaphysically naturalistic stance. But in order to do so they would need to show that their proposed theistic explanations are the best available explanations of a range of phenomena. Until this has been done, the metaphysical naturalism of history and the sciences remains defensible.

Editor's Note

Editor's Note David Granger The Continuing Relevance of Dewey Welcome, readers, to the latest edition of Education and Culture. We have in this issue a set of articles that nicely highlights the ongoing relevance of Dewey’s thinking for addressing barriers we continue to face today in fostering democratic forms of life. Moreover, we are reminded that an increasing number of writers are offering new insights by creatively putting this thinking to work in encounters with different cultural times and places. For example, in our lead article, Charles Dorn and Doris A. Santoro’s “Political Goals and Social Ideals: Dewey, Democracy, and the Emergence of the Turkish Republic,” the authors probe beyond historians’ typically piecemeal commentaries on Dewey’s 1924 Report and Recommendation Upon Turkish Education. Importantly, their more thorough study brings to light “the conceptual slippage between Dewey’s understanding of democratic localism, as essential to an educational system in a vibrant democracy, and Turkish officials’ view of centralized, formal education as a means to promulgate a homogeneous, modern, secular and democratic identity for their new nation-state.” As a result, Dorn and Santoro effectively enhance our understanding of Dewey’s conceptions of democratic localism and pluralism, as well as his vision of democracy as a social ideal. Following this, Roudy Hildreth’s “What Good is Growth? Reconsidering Dewey on the Ends of Education” reexamines Dewey’s routinely criticized claim that “growth itself is the only moral ‘end’” and asserts that, when interpreted in a way that empowers “‘ordinary’ educational actors (students, parents, teachers, administrators)” this “understanding of ends provides critical resources to help us both understand and respond to the increasingly narrow and technical focus of education practice and policy.” Next, in “Dewey’s Naturalistic Metaphysics: Expostulations and Replies,” Randy Friedman utilizes several popular misreadings by Dewey’s critics to develop a functionalist definition of his metaphysics, one that seeks to reveal “the value and significance of his naturalistic metaphysics in terms of his philosophy of education.” Finally, we revisit another popular point of contention [End Page 1] (and at times outright dismissal) in Dewey’s philosophy through Bradley Baurain’s “Common Ground With A Common Faith: Dewey’s Idea of the ‘Religious.’” In this provocative piece, Baurain identifies and then explores a number of strong conceptual connections and discontinuities between “Dewey’s idea of the ‘religious’ and modern descriptions of the ‘spiritual’ in education.” He then uses this finely nuanced discussion to urge educators to redress “the relative absence of Deweyan ‘religious’ or ‘spiritual’ priorities from current mainstream discourse on education.” Enjoy and be well! [End Page 2] David Granger State University of New York at Geneseo Copyright © 2011 John Dewey Society

“The Divine Transcendence and Relation to Evil in Hartshorne’s Dipolar Theism”

the title above identifies two issues in Charles Hartshorne’s panentheistic understanding of God that, in my judgment, have not been sufficiently clarified. The purpose of this paper is to provide additional clarification, that the adequacy of this type of theism may be more carefully judged by its admirers and by its detractors from their respective perspectives. The first part will identify central elements of Hartshorne’s reasoning about God’s relation to the world. The second part examines how Hartshorne speaks of a divine “transcendence” in a naturalistic metaphysics that is thoroughly empirical. The third part will examine the ways that God is related to the world’s evil and whether God is in some way responsible for this evil in a way that makes God morally culpable. The discussion will uncover significant differences from the way process theists, traditional theists, and non-theists have usually thought about creation, eternity, and everlastingness. Of course, in a naturalistic metaphysics, transcendence will have to be constructed in a way that differs from that in the metaphysics that undergirds classical (or traditional) theism. Hartshorne proposes that all worldly relations are internal or external relations sustained by their relation internal to God. All worldly relations and their terms can be said to be related within this relation internal to God in which God is related to the world by a relation external to the world. I interpret this external relation to have the practical effect that we can have no perception or prehension of God as God while we perceive worldly events that, Hartshorne says, comprise the strict identity of God. There is a complexity here that may be said to be “paradoxical” in its own way that is more “dialectical” than contradictory. In any case, no worldly individual or entity enjoys absolute independence. This is also true of God in virtue of the world’s relation internal to God. Everything is related and dependent. Nothing enjoys aseity, unless it is reality as a whole, the universe,

Dewey’s Naturalistic Metaphysics: Expostulations and Replies

Critics of Dewey’s metaphysics point to his dismissal of any philosophy which locates ideals in a realm beyond experience. However, Dewey’s sustained critique of dualistic philosophies is but a first step in his reconstruction and recovery of the function of the metaphysical. Detaching the discussion of values from inquiry, whether scientific, philosophical, or educational, produces the same end as relegating values to a transcendent realm that is beyond ordinary human discourse. Dewey’s naturalistic metaphysics supports his progressive educational philosophy. The duty of education is grounded in its service to democracy; it must help students develop the ability to express, discuss, and develop their moral reasoning through experiential and experimental learning.

Metaphysical Naturalism and Some Moral Realisms

Metaphysical Naturalism and Some Moral Realisms

Finkish Dispositions and Contextualism

Martin's famous examples of dispositional finks have been at the centre of philosophical discussions regarding the semantical and metaphysical nature of dispositions for decades. Thanks to the works by many philosophers like David Lewis, we have learned numerous insights about dispositions from Martin's examples. I take it, though, that there are more morals yet to be learned from Martin's examples. In this paper, I will draw from them one important moral about the contextual contribution to the semantic values of dispositional ascriptions. I will first articulate what I mean by the context-sensitivity of dispo sitional ascriptions. It is old news that it is possible that two people disagree about whether or not x has disposition D but they both are intuitively correct. A homemaker truly asserts that a television set is not fragile, whilst a building worker truly asserts that the same television set is fragile. There thus seem to be two true dispositional ascriptions that appear to be mutually in compatible. The most common and compelling account of this phenomenon is to invoke the idea that the semantic value of a dispositional ascription at least in part depends on the context in which the ascription is made. In this regard, Hawthorne and Manley's distinction between envi ronment-dependence and ascriber-dependence is illuminating. The idea of environment-dependence is that the semantic value of a dispositional as cription to x is partly determined by x's current environment. Suppose, for instance, that at home a soft blow is common and at a construction site a very hard blow is common. Then when something is currently at home, what we mean by saying simply that it is fragile is that it is fragile for a soft blow. Meanwhile, when something is currently at a construction site, by saying simply that it is fragile we mean that it is fragile for a very hard blow. In this sense, the truth-value of 'x is fragile' depends on x's current environment.

A DISJUNCTIVE THEORY OF INTROSPECTION: A REFLECTION ON ZOMBIES AND ANTON'S SYNDROME

Reflection on skeptical scenarios in the philosophy of perception, made vivid in the arguments from illusion and hallucination, have led to the formulation of theories of the metaphysical and epistemological nature of perceptual experience. In recent times, the locus of the debate concerning the nature of perceptual experience has been the dispute between disjunctivists and common-kind theorists. Disjunctivists have held that there are substantial dissimilarities (either metaphysical or epistemological or both) between veridical perceptual experiences occurring when one perceives and perceptual experiences involved in hallucination. Common-kind theorists have denied

Sprigge's Ontology of Consciousness

AbstractTimothy Sprigge advanced an original synthesis of panpsychism and absolute idealism. He argued that consciousness is an irreducible, subjective reality that is only grasped by an introspective, phenomenological approach and constructed his ontology from what is revealed in the phenomenology. In defending the unique place of metaphysics in the pursuit of truth, he claimed that scientific investigation can never discover the essence of consciousness since it can only provide descriptions of structure and function in what we normally think of as physical existence. In this paper I present a critical evaluation of Sprigge's view focusing in particular on his conception of the nature of scientific inquiry vis-à-vis the ambitious project of his metaphysics. I argue that a naturalistic metaphysics provides a more adequate approach to the relation between science and metaphysics.

The Controversy over the Existence of Ordinary Objects

The basic philosophical controversy regarding ordinary objects is: Do tables and chairs, sticks and stones, exist? This paper aims to do two things: first, to explain why how this can be a controversy at all, and second, to explain why this controversy has arisen so late in the history of philosophy. Section 1 begins by discussing why the ‘obvious’ sensory evidence in favor of ordinary objects is not taken to be decisive. It goes on to review the standard arguments against the existence of ordinary objects – including those based on problems with causal redundancy, parsimony, co-location, sorites arguments, and the special composition question. Section 2 goes on to address what it is about the contemporary approach to metaphysics that invites and sustains this kind of controversy, and helps make evident why debates about ordinary objects lead so readily to debates in metametaphysics about the nature of metaphysics itself.

Essere un soggetto è un fenomeno naturale?

As I define it, metaphysical naturalism (in the philosophy of mind) is the thesis according to which mental facts supervene in strong sense on neurophysiological states, i.e., the former can be deduced from the latter. In this paper I discuss this thesis by taking into consideration two different kinds of mental states: I shall argue that, while metaphysical naturalism is false for standard propositional attitudes (beliefs and desires), it can be defended in the case of low-level phenomenal states, or raw feelings. As a consequence, since the instantiation of high-order mental states requires those neurophysiological mechanisms that constitute raw feelings, the notion of self has a biological basis, and to this extent we can regard subjectivity as a natural phenomenon.

Intelligent Design: It's Just Too Good to be True

Leading Intelligent Design (ID) proponent William Dembski argues that ID is a three-pronged research agenda: 1) it is a potentially fecund scientific research program; 2) it is a critique of metaphysical naturalism; 3) it can conceptualize divine action. ID's principal assertion is that its scientific program can function without identifying the designer behind ID. I contend, however, that ID does presuppose certain characteristics about the identity of the designer and, in this article, I make these implicit presuppositions about the designer explicit. Furthermore, I explore the considerable theological problems of associating the designer with the God of Jesus Christ.