Abstract
Šiame straipsnyje nagrinėjama, kokių reduktyvizmo formų galimybę blokuoja vadinamasis atvirojo klausimo argumentas (AKA) – tiek savo istoriniu, tiek šiandieniais pavidalais – ir kokiu pagrindu. Išskirtos keturios svarbiausios AKA interpretacijos ir išanalizuotas jų poveikis vertinamųjų savybių reduktyvistinių teorijų galimybei. Teigiu, jog AKA kelia didelę grėsmę semantiniam etiniam natūralizmui, tačiau ne metafiziniam etiniam natūralizmui (nors ir pasmerkia jį tam tikrai „šizofrenijai“).
Highlights
The so-called father of metaethics, George Edward Moore, at the beginning of last century has formulated an Open Question (OQ from here on; and OQA to stand for the Open Question Argument) which to this day requires metaethicists to find their relation to it, if not to answer it
As noted, I will be more interested in the possibility of those theories which are striving to preserve the descriptive character of the moral judgements after Moore’s OQA, so let us turn to them
Looking just at this reconstruction of Moore’s argument, at its negative part, we see OQA being directed against the Analytic semantic naturalism (ASN), analytic semantic naturalism, the outdated semantic position2
Summary
In this paper I am interested in which reductionist positions are blocked, and on what grounds, by the Open Question Argument (OQA) both historically and by its contemporary guises. As noted, I will be more interested in the possibility of those theories which are striving to preserve the descriptive character of the moral judgements ( some kind of moral reality they describe) after Moore’s OQA, so let us turn to them Looking just at this reconstruction of Moore’s argument, at its negative part (what it rejects, not what conclusion about “good” Moore makes), we see OQA being directed against the ASN, analytic semantic naturalism, the outdated semantic position. This at any rate is clearly the sort of theory that Moore himself, and others who have endorsed his argument, have intended to refute with OQ” (Ball 1988: 198) Under this interpretation of OQA in its original form, there is no tension between the negative part of the Moorean enterprise and what contemporary naturalist theorists, primarily the so-called synthetic naturalists, are up to. The link between the analytic semantic naturalism and the metaphysical naturalism – synonymy criterion of property identity – being cut, metaphysical ethical naturalism is safe from the original OQA as well
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