Metaphysical Nature Research Articles

Is Any Alleged Truthmaker for Negatives Explanatorily Deficient?

Some truthmaker theorists posit a distinctive kind of entity to solve the problem of providing ontological grounding for negative truths. Recently, A. M. Griffith has raised a general objection against these alleged truthmakers based on an explanatory constraint on truthmaking and the existence condition of these entities. This paper counters the objection by placing it on the horns of a dilemma: the argument must either specify that the existence condition in question is a conceptual matter or insist that the condition is of properly metaphysical substance. I first argue that the former horn cannot be pursued because it makes the objection irrelevant to the alleged claims of truthmaking. I then argue that the latter horn is also highly problematic because simply insisting on the claim begs the question; appreciating this point leads proponents and opponents of the alleged truthmakers to a substantial debate about the metaphysical nature of these entities and the overall theoretical benefit of their postulation. The discussion shows that Griffith’s argument fails to establish its conclusion and reveals what is actually required to argue for/against a particular proposal to provide ontological grounding for negative truths.

Secular Buddhism and the Quest for a Lived Ethics

Secular Buddhism and the Quest for a Lived Ethics

A Numerus Clausus Principle for Intellectual Property

Real property can only be held and conveyed in a small number of forms, such as fee simple, life estate, and lease. This principle is known as numerus clausus, meaning “the number is closed.” For centuries, the principle has been central to the common-law system of property rights. Scholars have justified it as a mechanism for facilitating effective property alienation, maintaining low transaction costs in the buying and selling of property, and keeping the scope of property owners’ rights clear. In contrast, the numerus clausus principle is essentially nonexistent in intellectual property law. In the context of patents and copyrights, “the number is open.” There is nearly no limit to the ways in which intellectual objects can be licensed and sold. This Article will argue that the numerus clausus principle should extend to intellectual property. The justifications for the numerus clausus principle in real property law are even more persuasive in the intellectual property context because the scope of intellectual property rights is more difficult to delineate than the scope of real property rights. The metaphysical nature of intellectual property prevents protected objects from being clearly identifiable, particularly in a patent context, where inventions can be independently created by multiple parties. As a result, investigating the sale and licensing history of a work or invention — and whether a work or invention is protected at all — is difficult, costly, and sometimes impossible. This difficulty is compounded by the absence of numerus clausus, which permits inscrutable licensing and sale agreements and allows single works to be carved into several parts and burdened by complicated usage rules. By considering examples of digital content licensing and fragmentation of particular copyrights, this Article will identify how a numerus clausus principle for intellectual property would facilitate the use and conveyance of intellectual property. This principle would benefit intellectual property owners, licensees, and the general public by lowering transaction costs and preventing accidental overuse and underuse of intellectual works.

An Examination of the Criticism of J. Dewey's Naturalistic Metaphysics

An Examination of the Criticism of J. Dewey's Naturalistic Metaphysics

Standing by the Ruins: Elegiac Humanism in Wartime and Postwar Lebanon

Standing by the Ruins: Elegiac Humanism in Wartime and Postwar Lebanon

La "Introducción" a la Crítica de la Razón Pura y el Comentario al De Trinitate de Boecio de Santo Tomás de Aquino

La “Introducción” de Kant a la Crítica de la Razón Pura y las cuestiones 5 y 6 del Comentario al De Trinitate de Boecio de Santo Tomás, representan un preludio a la naturaleza de la ciencia y la metafísica. No obstante, Aquino no concibe una metafísica racionalista, correctamente criticada por Kant, sino un conocimiento que continúa el pensamiento físico, que no el matemático. Este modus sciendi diferentede la metafísica y la matemática muestra el alcance limitado de la crítica metafísica kantiana a la philosophia perennis.

Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T. M. Scanlon, edited by R. Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar, and Samuel Freeman.

T. M. Scanlon is undoubtedly one of the greatest moral and political philosophers of our time. This volume brings together fifteen first-class critical essays on different aspects of his work, written by both early career and more established authors. The book consists of four thematically unified parts. The first part is a tour de force through Scanlon’s views on the nature of reasons and value. Essays in the second part engage with Scanlon’s moral theory, in particular contractualism and promissory obligations. The third part is reserved for Scanlon’s political philosophy. There we find a wide range of topics, from social and global justice to free speech and political neutrality. In the fourth part, several authors critically discuss Scanlon’s account of blame. Given the constraints of space, I will address the central arguments only of some of the essays I find important. The volume opens with Christine Korsgaard’s ‘The Activity of Reason’, in which she argues against the realist understanding of normative reasons Scanlon advances in What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998, hereafter WWOTEO). Realism about reasons is the view that reasons are mind-independent considerations that count in favour of or against some action, belief, or attitude. Most debates about realism revolve around specifying the metaphysical nature and epistemic access to such reasons. Korsgaard takes a different argumentative route. She claims that realists cannot explain why reasons exist and have claims on us. The problem as she sees it lies in the fact that realists ascribe a receptive role to reason, identifying it with the recognition of and response to substantive reasons (p. 4). Korsgaard argues that reason’s function should rather be conceived as active — in the sense of employing rational principles (hypothetical and categorical imperatives) — to pick out the reasons (pp. 4–6). Reasons then exist and have their normative force only because we, as rational beings who engage with the world in a certain way, exist (p. 12).

The epistemic force of perceptual experience

What is the metaphysical nature of perceptual experience? What evidence does experience provide us with? These questions are typically addressed in isolation. In order to make progress in answering both questions, perceptual experience needs to be studied in an integrated manner. I develop a unified account of the phenomenological and epistemological role of perceptual experience, by arguing that sensory states provide perceptual evidence due to their metaphysical structure. More specifically, I argue that sensory states are individuated by the perceptual capacities employed and that there is an asymmetric dependence between their employment in perception and their employment in hallucination and illusion. Due to this asymmetric dependence, sensory states provide us with evidence.

There are Intentionalia of Which it is True that Such Objects Do Not Exist

According to Crane’s schematicity thesis (ST) about intentional objects, intentionalia have no particular metaphysical nature qua thought-of entities; moreover, the real metaphysical nature of intentionalia is various, insofar as it is settled independently of the fact that intentionalia are targets of one’s thought. As I will point out, ST has the ontological consequence that the intentionalia that really belong to the general inventory of what there is, the overall domain, are those that fall under a good metaphysical kind, i.e., a kind such that its members figure (for independent reasons) in such an inventory. Negatively put, if there are no things of a certain metaphysical kind, thoughts about things of that kind are not really committed to such things. Pace Crane, however, this does not mean that the intentionalia that are really there are only those that exist. For existence, qua first-order property, is no metaphysical kind. Thus, there may really be intentionalia that do not exist, provided that they belong to good metaphysical kinds.

OF MIRACLES AND METAPHYSICS: A PENTECOSTAL‐CHARISMATIC AND PROCESS‐RELATIONAL DIALOGUE

AbstractThis article is comprised of a dialogue between Pentecostal‐Charismatic and Process‐Relational theologies on the perennial issue of miracles. The language of supernaturalism, widely employed by Pentecostal‐Charismatic theologians, is contrasted with the metaphysical naturalism of Process‐Relational theology; it is proposed that a philosophically and scientifically sensitive theology of miracles is possible through a synthesis of both traditions. Themes such as nonmaterialism over materialism, spiritual experience, and prayer for healing miracles are explored. A theology of miracles, mutually informed by both Pentecostal‐Charismatic and Process‐Relational theologies, may focus less on whether or not miracles are possible, but instead focus more on what kind of miracles human beings might value most. By mutually engaging a theology of nonsupernatural, metaphysically grounded miracles, Pentecostal‐Charismatic and Process‐Relational theologians may collaborate to establish the groundwork for creative scientific enterprises, especially in the non‐Western world where Pentecostalism continues to experience its most rapid growth, Such perspectives may eventually lead to cutting‐edge discoveries about the fundamental nature of, and God's interaction with, reality itself. Implications for future research are proposed.

Philosophical and cultural dimensions of the transcendental

Solving complex spiritual problems of modern life leads us to rethinking its higher meanings, absolute values, essences. Philosophical and cultural worldview, as the supreme form of knowledge and comprehension of the existence of the world and man, now directs the study of the root causes, the essential foundations of the world order, the disclosure of the deep meaning of what is happening to the world, society, culture and man, focuses on the creation of universal explanatory models of things, its individual components. Philosophical and cultural reflection as analytical means of cognition involves the ability to go beyond the real spheres of being and deduces the general cultural categories of the world of thought, such as being and non-being, God and soul, time and eternity, spirit and matter, death and immortality, etc. It is in the sense of reflexive activity of philosophical and cultural consciousness that it is possible to consider any phenomenon of being not in itself, but through the prism of the space of deep cultural meanings, which testifies to the metaphysical nature of culture, which is connected with the world of higher, absolute meanings and entities. In cultural studies, there is a tremendous experience with genesis and historical development of socio-cultural life, in particular, religious and philosophical culture.

Articulating Everyday Catastrophes: Reflections on the Research Literacies of Lorri Neilsen

Articulating Everyday Catastrophes: Reflections on the Research Literacies of Lorri Neilsen

“Theism, Naturalism, and Meta‐Ethics”

AbstractThe relationship between God and morality has been a topic of philosophical discussion since Socrates engaged Euthyphro in the agora. In recent years, it has received a lot of attention, as theistic philosophers have attempted to show that divine command theory and other theistic meta‐ethical accounts are defensible. Whether metaphysical naturalism is compatible with moral realism is a related (and equally controversial) topic. This essay surveys the main issues in these debates.

Is science compatible with religion but not with naturalism?

In Where the Conflict Really Lies, Alvin Plantinga (distinguished epistemologist, committed Calvinist, and Professor at the University of Notre Dame) provides a long, multifaceted, carefully argued rebuttal of the claim that theistic religion and science are incompatible, followed by a short provocative argument that there is a ‘deep conflict’, but one between naturalism (not religion) and science. Theistic religion is incompatible with naturalism, all versions of which share the claim that there is no such being as God or other ‘supernatural’ beings and that all phenomena are explicable without appeal to supernatural action in the world (ix, 122, 169). Moreover, it is often thought that naturalism (in contemporary formulations of which the theory of evolution plays a pivotal role) is the scientific worldview and inextricably linked with commitment to science, so that incompatibility with naturalism implies incompatibility with science. Plantinga challenges this point of view. Scientific results, he maintains, neither presuppose naturalism (Dennett and Plantinga 2011, 48) nor provide confirmatory support for it (122, 308). He recognizes that scientific research deploys ‘methodological naturalism’—it does not entertain the possibility of supernatural phenomena or causes—but that need not rest on commitment to metaphysical naturalism; where it is deployed, evidence that would be inconvenient for metaphysical naturalism (if there were any) could not be obtained. The greater part of the book is devoted to rebutting that there is deep conflict between science and religion (he focuses almost exclusively on Christianity). While a wide range of well-trodden topics are covered, for example, the possibility of miracles and the nature of possible divine intervention in the world, most attention

The Fundamentals of Constructing a Hermeneutical Model for Poetry Translation

Poetry translation involves certain complexities that cannot be easily tackled through the methods developed by linguistics. Such problems as authorial intention, the aesthetical and rhetorical value of translated works, bicultural ideological conflicts, the affective role of literary criticism, and the metaphysical nature of the final textual product require a more systematic and valid approach. To evaluate the difficulties and propose certain possible solutions, first the general points of convergence between hermeneutics and translation are discussed. Then, it is argued that the existing translation theories are not flexible enough to process poetry. This study sheds a new light on the process of poetry translation through proposing a model sensitive to hermeneutical conceptions. Specifically, the discussions show that there is a strong inevitable relationship between hermeneutics and poetry translation. Generally, the study proposes certain implications for developing a postmodern approach to literary translation.

As Duas Fontes dos Ensinamentos de Delsarte: observações e metafísica

RESUMO Este texto apresenta o trabalho expressivo de Delsarte e suas duas fontes principais: um sistema empírico de observações e um quadro teórico de ordem metafísica. Apresenta-se o sistema empírico de observações de Delsarte que tem suas origens nos primeiros anos de sua vida, passando por uma mudança decisiva nos seus estudos no Conservatório de Paris. Descreve-se o modo como Delsarte, a partir de suas observações, de um lado, consegue escapar de um sistema escravizante de aprendizado baseado na imitação dos professores, e, de outro, reeducar sua voz cantada arruinada pelo ensino oficial de canto. Esse sistema empírico de observação é articulado, em seguida, à teoria delsarteana, de ordem metafísica, cuja origem se situa na conversão de Delsarte ao catolicismo, segundo o qual o corpo humano ocupa uma posição central. Com efeito, observações e metafísica se encontram em Delsarte para alimentar toda sua pedagogia e definem a dinâmica geral do seu trabalho: a espiritualização do ser humano através da arte.

IS THERE A DISTINCTIVE HUMAN NATURE? APPROACHING THE QUESTION FROM A CHRISTIAN EPISTEMIC BASE

Abstract Interpretations of human nature driven by scientific analyses of the origin and development of the human species often assume metaphysical naturalism. This generates restrictive and distortive accounts of key facets of human life and ethics. It fails to make sense of human altruism, and it operates within a wider philosophical framework that lacks explanatory power. The accounts of theistic evolution that seek to redress this, however, too easily fail to take sufficient account of the unique contribution of interpretations from a specifically Christian epistemic base. The latter involve a Christological and, hence, eschatological approach which is intrinsic to the interpretation of human nature in light of the purpose and intentionality of the Creator. Phenomenological approaches to the nature of humanity lack the categories to distinguish between human nature as the object of divine intentionality and its present dysfunctional and, ultimately, subhuman state.

Properties in a Contingentist's Domain

AbstractThis article attempts to make sense of property contingentism, the view that the metaphysical nature of properties is contingent. That is, it is contingent whether properties are universals or tropes or some other kind of entity. The article argues that even if one thinks that necessities are exhausted by conceptual truths and a posteriori necessities, the sort of methodology that can lead one to endorse contingentism in various domains in metaphysics does not give us good grounds to suppose that the nature of properties is contingent.

Looking at forensic intelligence from the metaphysical perspective: citing illicit heroin profiling as an example

As far as illicit drugs are concerned, drug profiling utilizing various analytical methods to trace the origin, manufacturing process and distribution chain is a key element in forensic intelligence. Setting aside the practical use of drug profiles, forensic laboratory findings with close reference to that of illicit heroin could also provide metaphyiscal insights about the nature of such intelligence work. The metaphysical nature, if appreciated, provides grounds for further scientific hypotheses that can be validated by logic and observation. Thus, both forensic science and metaphysics adopt an important role in forensic drug intelligence. Hence, it is worth examining the underlying metaphysical nature that governs the intelligence work through forensic science in the effort to counteract drug trafficking. Metaphysical explanations relating to the scientific evidence of drug profiling are integrated in this review, which focuses on the basic notion, law of identity, causality, necessity and holarchy, all of which essentially constitute philosophical bases for forensic intelligence and drug profiling. By expounding on these five aspects, much of the published work pertaining to illicit heroin profiling is used to reify the core concepts for better comprehension.

What is Analytic Metaphysics For?

We divide analytic metaphysics into naturalistic and non-naturalistic metaphysics. The latter we define as any philosophical theory that makes some ontological (as opposed to conceptual) claim, where that ontological claim has no observable consequences. We discuss further features of non-naturalistic metaphysics, including its methodology of appealing to intuition, and we explain the way in which we take it to be discontinuous with science. We outline and criticize Ladyman and Ross's 2007 epistemic argument against non-naturalistic metaphysics. We then present our own argument against it. We set out various ways in which intellectual endeavours can be of value, and we argue that, in so far as it claims to be an ontological enterprise, non-naturalistic metaphysics cannot be justified according to the same standards as science or naturalistic metaphysics. The lack of observable consequences explains why non-naturalistic metaphysics has, in general, failed to make progress, beyond increasing the standards of clarity and precision in expressing its theories. We end with a series of objections and replies.