NATO Membership Research Articles

The problems of functioning of the existent management system of defense resources of the security and defense of Ukraine sector

In the conditions of military aggression, resource limitation, actual transition to weapons, military equipment and standards of NATO member countries, the issue of centralization of the existing defense resource management system of the security and defense sector of Ukraine is becoming more and more urgent. A constellation of scientists was engaged in researching the issue of defense resource management, but new challenges are not taken into account in the construction of the existing defense resource management mechanism, which determines the relevance of this study. The paper is devoted to the analysis of the legal framework for the regulation of the defense resource management system. The paper highlights the problems of legislative regulation of the existing defense resource management system of the security and defense sector of Ukraine in the context of resource limitations and full-scale military aggression of the Russian Federation. The purpose of the paper is to identify and study the actual problems of the functioning of the existing defense resource management system of the security and defense sector of Ukraine. Identified inconsistencies and problems in the regulatory support of the defense resource management system. There is a well-founded need to establish a system of obtaining weapons, military equipment, and military materials with the international assistance of Lend-Lease partner countries, automating planning and provisioning processes at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, bringing the resource provision system closer to the principles and standards of NATO member states. The domestic legislation does not sufficiently fully and effectively ensure the functioning of the existing defense resources management system of the security and defense sector of Ukraine. This requires a clear distribution of powers between the management bodies for each separate area of defense resource management, coordination of priorities, ways and measures for providing defense resources and taking into account the experience of advanced NATO countries for its implementation in the domestic system.

US and NATO strategy in Ukraine: scenarios for relations with Russia

This article examines scenarios for the development of relations between certain members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Russia. The author attempts to assess the bloc’s internal cohesion in terms of relations with Russia and to identify what timelines key NATO member states have defined as to their foreign policy planning in the current crisis.

Military Spending Among European NATO Members. The Importance of Strategic Factors After 2014

The Russian Federation, with its plans to regain influence over former Soviet bloc countries, currently constitutes the main military danger for the EU and NATO. Because the war is so close to the EU’s borders, European allies have every reason to increase army financing instead of fuelling a transatlantic disagreement about burden sharing. This article deals with the question of whether the high strategic threat posed by Russia has increased military spending among European allies and decreased free-riding practices after 2014. To analyse this problem, we applied Spearman’s Rank Correlation test and then made a comparative analysis of 21 countries that are both EU and NATO members. Our results confirmed that European allies did not react in the same way to the Russian threat. We proved that strategic factors played a key role in the majority of Eastern European members of NATO, but not across Western European allies.

Would the Russian - Ukraine War Spark World War 3?

Diplomatic attempts by international leaders to settle the situation have showed no signs of success, and the surprise conflict between Ukraine and Russia has taken the globe by storm in terms of politics, peace, economics, and global market systems. After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Ukraine declared its independence. After having been a part of the Russian empire, it became the Soviet Republic and severed relations with Russia in order to become more Westernized. The nation has been struggling with corruption and internal strife since it gained independence. Some parts of the nation, particularly in the west, seek closer ties to the West, while others, particularly in the east, want closer ties to Russia. Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych sparked the crisis by rejecting an EU association deal in favour of tighter relations with Moscow. In what has become known as the "Revolution of Dignity," protestors toppled him. Russia's response was to invade the Crimean Peninsula and support a separatist uprising in eastern Ukraine. Donbas, the country's industrial core, was invaded shortly afterwards (Siddiqui, 2022). There were more than 14,000 fatalities in the fighting between Ukrainian troops and rebels supported by Russia. Russia has refuted accusations made by Ukraine and the West that it has sent soldiers to the region and supplied weaponry to the rebels. Russia, meanwhile, has been critical of the United States and NATO for its support to Ukraine in the form of arms and joint military training. Even though Ukraine is not a member of NATO, President Putin is nonetheless concerned about certain NATO states establishing military training camps in Ukraine. The information used in this study was gathered from secondary sources. Two primary conclusions may be drawn from this study. Two major factors contributed to the tragic loss of life and damage of property on both sides of the war: first, Russia does not completely recognise Ukraine's independence as a sovereign nation, and second, superpower nations are playing politics with the situation. According to the study's findings and recommendations, Ukraine's neighbours must acknowledge the country's status as an independent state, and the world's superpowers and other global communities must express concern for and make a significant commitment to ending the war between the nations (Jibrin Ubale Yahaya, 2022).

Russia v The World: Was That Inevitable?

Two exceptional new books add powerful insight into Russia’s worldview and the challenges surmounting the West in forging an actionable collective security agreement for Europe and the US. Chatham House’s John Lough has weighed in with a critical analysis in Germany’s Russia Problem that examines the complex relationship between Germany and Russia. Johns Hopkins Cold War historian Mary Sarotte has provided her brilliant Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of the Post-Cold War Stalemate, an intricately researched and splendidly written, detailed history of engagements among US administrations, former Warsaw Pact nations that now hold NATO membership, and Russian leadership. Lough has written a long book, over 500 pages, and so rich in detail that, despite the fluid writing, reading and digesting it requires focused attention.

It Is About Protection. Defence in Finland’s Steps to NATO

After Russia invaded Ukraine, Finland quickly applied for NATO membership. This step is not necessarily that drastic should Finland’s security policy development in the long term be examined with one’s focus set on a gradually-developed defence policy. It represents an important continuity in security policy, but also played a central role in advancing Finland’s steps to becoming NATO members. On the basis of different studies and accounts, the following points seem to be critical in constructing a preliminary narrative about Finland’s road to the Alliance. After the Second World War, Finland’s western relations became dependent on its bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. Finland was aware that it could not expect any support from the West as regards its security. Despite a security policy based on recognising facts, and the FCMA Treaty with the Soviet Union, the eastern neighbour was seen as the main, and, later on, the only military threat on the basis of history and Finland’s vulnerable geopolitical position. The threat, however, was concealed by so-called “doubletalk” in security policy discourse until the 2010s. In this context, state defence was developed to be an independent and modern territorial defence, ultimately there to defend against a large-scale invasion. Finland’s defence enjoyed high legitimacy and confi dence in society, especially from the 1970s. Security policy was raised above normal politics to be a kind of super-politics with a strong political consensus. When the Cold War ended and Finland joined the European Union, defence policy and the defence establishment got a leading role in working an approaching NATO. Finland’s opportunities to conduct stabilisation policy in its close neighbourhood were seen as being limited, especially after Russia adopted a self-asserting foreign and security policy towards theWest after 2007. At the same time, the subsequently increased cooperation, networking, and integration stimulated perceptions about western defence dependence. This increased emphasis on defence actually turned people’s attention to the extra security that NATO membership might provide. Applying for NATO, however, required the shock of a Russian invasion of Ukraine before the Finnish public was ready to see the risks of NATO membership as being less than that of its benefits.

A Convincing Finnish Move: Implications for State Identity of Persuading Sweden to Jointly Bid for NATO Membership

This article examines the consequences for Sweden’s state identity by the decision of Finland and Sweden to apply for membership in NATO. Taking its starting point in Sweden’s shattering loss of its easternmost provinces in the 1809 Treaty of Fredrikshamn, it explores Sweden’s initial formulations of a policy of neutrality and its evolution until the end of the Cold War. The article then directs attention to how Social Democratic leaders managed to institutionalise a Swedish “active foreign policy”, exerting a lasting, formative infl uence on Sweden’s state identity. It also addresses the rapprochement of Finland and Sweden after the end of the Cold War and the consequences of the bilateral dynamics that characterised their EU-membership applications. The article critically discusses how Sweden reformulated its concept of neutrality into a nebulous concept of nonalignment and adopted a security policy rooted in a cooperative security approach. Based on key findings drawn from this historical account, this article addresses the processes that lead to Finland and Sweden unexpectedly deciding on jointly applying for NATO membership. It concludes with a forward-looking assessment of how a Swedish NATO membership will ultimately stabilise Sweden’s adaptable state identity and its implications for the Nordic countries’ regional military strategy.

In the Shadow of the Eastern Neighbour. Finland in the Security Policy of Russia and the Soviet Union from Peter the Great to Contemporary Times

Throughout its history, Finland’s relations with Russia have generally been determined by Russian attempts to secure control over the eastern part of the Baltic Sea region. In medieval times, it was mainly about the control of trade routes, especially between Novgorod, and Western Europe and Byzantium. After the founding of the new city of St. Petersburg by Peter the Great in 1703, the rulers of Russia were faced with the problem of ensuring security to that city. From a Russian point of view, it became vitally important to gain control over lands on the eastern side of the Baltic Sea. When Finland became a Russian province in 1809, it seemed that the Baltic security dilemmas of Russia had fi nally been resolved. However, the collapse of Tsarist Russia in 1917 changed that particular situation. Finland became independent, and Russia’s border moved east to the outskirts of St. Petersburg (renamed Petrograd during World War I). For the leaders of the Soviet Union, which had replaced the Romanov Empire, World War II provided an opportunity to try to regain lost Finnish territories. Although the Red Army did not manage to conquer Finland, during two wars (occurring between 1939–1940 and 1941–1944), the post war settlement saw the Soviet-Finnish border shift back westwards. Finland also had to reckon with the requirements of the USSR’s security policy and make it a priority of its own foreign policyAfter the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Finland modified its policy of neutrality and adopted a doctrine of non-alignment that has remained in place to this day. However, the increase of tensions in international relations in recent years, due to Russia’s aggressive foreign policy threatening its neighbours, has forced Finnish statesmen to rethink their country’s security policy. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Finland, together with Sweden, decided to apply for NATO membership. The ratification procedure is ongoing. The aim of this paper is to analyse, in a longer historical perspective, what Finland’s place was as regards the Russian and Soviet security policy, from Peter the Great to our times. The methodological approach refl ects the chronology of events which have occurred in the eastern part of the Baltic Sea region in the last 300 years. They are described to provide readers with necessary facts, and create the background for conclusions on the reasons for the Russian/Soviet policy towards Finland and, in a broader sense, the northern coasts of the Gulf of Finland.

Constructing a Crisis: Putin, the West and War in Ukraine

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was met with condemnation from the European Union and the United States as an "unprovoked and unjustified military aggression" that undermines the liberal international order. However, some international relations scholars, such as John Mearsheimer, argue that Russia had genuine security concerns with regard to Ukraine and that the invasion was a response to the threat of NATO membership for Ukraine. Both liberal and realist perspectives on the invasion rely on the assumption of rational, cost-benefit calculations by actors, but cultural factors and irreconcilable non-material interests may also be at play in shaping the actions and motivations of states. Understanding the cultural and national identity factors at play in the invasion of Ukraine is complex and difficult, but they cannot be ignored in attempting to understand and address the conflict.

Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie w polityce Lecha Kaczyńskiego

The policy of the president Lech Kaczyński towards Ukraine was inscribed in the broader context of his Eastern Policy. Its assumptions were based on the belief that Eastern European countries should establish closely cooperating political alliance for realization of shared interests. Ukraine’s participation, the largest eastern neighbor of Poland, was crucial to the success of this conception. Therefore Lech Kaczyński was actively involved in resolving political crises in this country. He initiated actions for Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation not to make a problem in the shared initiatives from tragic past events from the history of two nations. For the President of Poland Ukraine was also a strategic partner in enterprises aimed to make Eastern European countries independent from Russian fuels supplies. The most prominent investment in the energy policy was realization of the Odessa-Brody-Gdańsk pipeline. It would not be possible without the Ukrainian side. At the same time Lech Kaczyński lobbied internationally for Ukrainian membership in NATO and the European Union to permanently integrate Ukraine with institutional structures of the West.

Shifting attitudes towards identity, borders and geopolitical choices: The case of Moldova

AbstractThe ongoing war at the immediate borders of the European Union (EU) poses the greatest security risk Europe has known since the end of the Second World War. Although the entire continent is on high alert, the proximity to the conflict is definitely an important factor to consider when assessing security risks. In this regard, not only is Moldova at Ukraine’s border, but its recent history (especially the frozen conflict in Transnistria) and the complicated relations with Russia, add to enhancing people’s fears and uncertainty. Moreover, the closed cultural, historical and ethnic ties that Moldova shares with Romania – a NATO and EU member – often fuel Russia’s threat perceptions to its Transistrian proxy. Within this context, this paper aims to assess the attitudes that Moldovans – a population that is traditionally divided between West and East, between EU (respectively Romania) and Russia – display towards their own identity and the path that their country should embrace in this difficult geopolitical design through mixed methods research. The main findings indicate a clear shift in Moldovans’ attitudes towards a stronger alignment with European integration that is also reflected in the preference regarding their country’s future geopolitical path.

A new alliance in Europe: the September 2021 defence agreement between Greece and France as a case of embedded alliance formation

ABSTRACT In September 2021, Greece and France announced the conclusion of a landmark defence agreement, which included not only the sale of modern French frigates to the Hellenic Navy but also the signing of a new “strategic partnership for defence and security cooperation”. The cornerstone of this strategic partnership – which formalises Paris’ and Athens’ geopolitical rapprochement, accelerated after the tensions with Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean in 2020 – lies in a mutual defence clause that commits France and Greece to defend each other in case of an armed attack against their respective territory. The new bilateral alliance thus forged between Athens and Paris, coming on top of similar NATO and EU security guarantees, is of political as well as scholarly interest. Politically, the question is how such an arrangement, which ostensibly aims to protect Greece from fellow NATO member Turkey, squares with the broader European security architecture. From a scholarly perspective, the Franco-Greek defence agreement is remarkable in that, unlike almost all bilateral or minilateral defence cooperation arrangements that have been concluded in recent years between NATO and EU countries, this one touches on the key question of collective defence, thus constituting an intriguing case of “embedded alliance formation”.

The Eurasianist Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy after the Coup Attempt: An Evaluation in the Context of the SCO

In the aftermath of the coup attempt, there have been debates about a Eurasianist axis shift in Turkish Foreign Policy. The development of relations with Russia and China in parallel with the tension in relations with Western actors has given rise to these debates. The fact that the links established with these two countries do not depend on a conditional cooperation and criticism from the West on the basis of authoritarianism, together with the background of political alliances formed after the change of government system, keeps the Eurasianist discourse at the forefront. Statements on rapprochement with the SCO and even membership are integrated into pragmatism in the context of tensions with the West, regional security risks and expectations, and economic/commercial needs. The government’s continued emphasis on NATO membership, the public’s view of the EU accession, and the continued dependence on trade and investments show that the Eurasianist outlook is a pragmatism linked to conjunctural needs.

A Geopolitical War in Europe: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine and its Implications

The security-insecurity paradox in a geopolitical struggle between Russia and its ex-territory; Ukraine along with the politics of the influences between great powers has made the Russian invasion a reality. Russian intervention in its periphery in February 2022 has sent shockwaves to the European Union and NATO members, and posed various challenges to the Eurasian states. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine is a protracted one, but this new phase is more complex and multi-layered. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol in 2014, and support to the militant separatists in Donbas, undermined Ukrainian sovereignty. A series of border skirmishes occurred during 2014-2021, which led to thousands of people dead and injured.[1] The tension converted into a humanitarian crisis with millions of refugees and collateral damages after the 2022 war. This recent situation can be termed as a geopolitical warfare, which is based on the politics of security to assert political advantages in the desired geopolitical sphere of influence. In this paper, an effort has been made to examine the structural, bilateral, and regional issues that have led Russia to engage in a risky war. It hypothesise that this war cannot be recognized only as a bilateral war between Russia and Ukraine based on the old issues, rather it is the result of new developments in the shape of Ukraine’s pursuit for a new identity and affinity with West, its bid for NATO membership and as a client of US and EU against Russia in the great power rivalry. The theoretical lens of Neo-Realism and the security dilemma best explains the causes of the war between the two. Finally, this study also endeavours to trace some important implications for the Eurasian Region. [1] Conflict-Related Civilian Casualties in Ukraine. United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, 2022.

ЭВОЛЮЦИЯ ВОЕННО-ПРОМЫШЛЕННОГО КОМПЛЕКСА ТУРЦИИ

The article considers a brief history of the development of the Turkish military-industrial sector. Attention is paid to its current state, defined as a major technological breakthrough in the development and creation of complex systems of various types of weapons on the territory of Turkey. The security issues faced by Ankara in the period following the “Arab Spring”, the increased attacks by terrorist organizations, the geopolitical uncertainty caused by the withdrawal of Americans from Iraq and Afghanistan, forced the Turkish authorities to reconsider their approaches to the internal security of the state, shifting the emphasis from threats emanating from Turkey itself to the challenges posed by its origin is outside the Turkish territory. Such a rapid shift in the focus of potential and real threats to Turkey from national borders to adjacent (and remote) territories of neighboring states required the application of efforts and resources significantly exceeding the previous ones. That became a reason for the rapid development of the Turkish militaryindustrial complex, in which Turkey’s membership in NATO played a major role, providing Ankara with the necessary technological solutions, without which the further modernization of national “defense” would not be so successful. Having gone beyond providing its armed forces with the modern logistical means, Ankara is gradually turning into one of the major exporters of military products whereas commercial arms exports are becoming one of Turkey’s foreign policy priorities.

Еволюція військового співробітництва України та Польщі

The article investigates the evolution of interstate relations between Ukraine and Poland in the military sphere. The military cooperation between the countries began with the signing of the Agreement between the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Poland and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine in February 1993. The relations between the states reached the level of strategic partnership in 1996, after the signing of a joint declaration by the Presidents of Ukraine and the Republic of Poland. The joint Ukrainian-Polish military unit for participation in international peacekeeping and humanitarian operations under the auspices of international organizations was created in 1997. The military cooperation between the countries increased with Poland’s joining NATO and the EU. The joint military exercises conducted by Ukraine and Poland contributed to the practical assimilation of Western operational standards, modern practices and approaches implemented in the Ukrainian army. It has been found that there were regular bilateral meetings between Ukraine and Poland at the level of the leadership of the defense departments. A number of agreements on military-technical cooperation were signed, and annual internships and training were held in higher educational institutions of the Republic of Poland and Ukraine. It has been found out that over the past 30 years, Polish-Ukrainian cooperation has been built on mutually beneficial terms in the military sphere, and relations have deepened every year. With the beginning of the full-scale war of Russia against Ukraine, military cooperation between the countries reached the highest level of development during the years of independence. Poland, as a member of NATO and the EU, contributes to the establishment of military cooperation between Ukraine and European structures. This cooperation is an example for other countries in the conditions of Ukraine’s war with the Russian Federation.

Defending the nation, securing the economy

Literature on the effects of military expenses and GDP is mixed, although a significant body of research supports the hypothesis that military expenses positively impact GDP. To contribute to the literature, this article analyses whether military expenditures influenced GDP in 27 European Union member countries from 1998 to 2021 by studying two clusters specific to the analysed countries: NATO and non-NATO countries. The way in which military expenditures affect GDP has been analysed using both the classic static models for panel data (pooled OLS, fixed effects, random effects, feasible generalized least squares, panel corrected standard errors, Poisson pseudomaximum likelihood regression) as well as by applying dynamic panel model system GMM, reverse causality, and half-panel jackknife regression models, with unemployment and inflation selected as control variables. The findings indicate that the current values of military expenditures positively influence GDP in both clusters, while past values of military expenditures positively influence GDP in the NATO EU countries and negatively affect GDP in the non-NATO EU countries. There are several key differences between NATO EU members and non-NATO EU members, particularly in regard to their security commitments and defence spending. NATO members are part of a mutual defence pact, agreeing to the principle of collective defence, which also impacts public defence policies and public budgets. This paper offers practical value to policymakers, stakeholders, and academicians. In addition, it has two significant political implications. First, it highlights the role of military expenditures as a catalyst for economic growth but does not underestimate the dangers of using military spending as a pretext to stimulate employment. Second, it establishes the optimal proportion of military expenditures required to fulfil two essential targets of national and European policies – security and welfare.

Countering Geopolitical Competition in the Western Balkans: the EU, Russia, and China

While the European Union (EU) has long considered the Western Balkans its sphere of influence, the growing geopolitical competition from Russia and China has created harmful countercurrents in the region. In order to adequately challenge these, the EU needs to overcome its credibility crisis in the Western Balkans, produced by years of national vetoes and enlargement fatigue in the EU, paired with slow reforms or even democratic backsliding in the region. This situation could be remedied by focusing on Montenegro, which has long been considered the region’s frontrunner in the EU accession process and is already a NATO member. By actively working towards full EU membership for the smallest country in the Western Balkans, the EU would not only be able to fortify its geopolitical role in the region, it could simultaneously create positive momentum, proving that there is indeed a believable path towards EU membership, which remains the most reliable tool to combat destructive influence from Russia and China.

Uma análise da resposta do ocidente à invasão russa da Ucrânia sob o prisma da trindade da Guerra de Clausewitz

The invasion of Ukraine by Russian troops in late February 2022 brought the world to the danger of a new polarity: Russia vs. Western countries led by the NATO bloc (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). Historical factors and the geographical importance of Ukraine to Russia as opposed to the sense of danger that Western nations see its territorial expansion towards Eastern Europe makes the solution to the conflict increasingly complex. Faced with this complex situantion, the western nations has been adopting solutions to try to stop the Russian advance without the use of NATO’s troops in support of the Ukrainian Army. This article seeks to observe the strategies adopted by Western countries, focusing on NATO members, through the analysis of the modern Cluasewitzian trinity.

The Grand Strategy of President Ilham Aliyev as the Foreign Policy Foundation of Azerbaijan’s Victory in the Second Karabakh War

The growing geopolitical dynamics in the South Caucasus and the Caspian Black Sea basin region and the role of Azerbaijan as an undisputed regional leader in this space appear to be an urgent trend in international relations. Azerbaijan is not a member of either NATO or the CSTO, fighting for leadership in this region. But at the same time, Azerbaijan is successfully developing bilateral and multilateral relations with the participating states of these military-political alliances. Armenia, as a member of the CSTO, and Georgia, which has officially included the goal of joining NATO in the Basic Laws of their country, to a certain extent, can produce a degree of inter-bloc competition to solve their own problems. Azerbaijan can objectively reduce the risks of geopolitical tension in the region by promoting a peaceful cooperation agenda through inter-block communication. Under the leadership of the President of Azerbaijan, Supreme Commander-in-Chief Ilham Aliyev, Azerbaijan was the first in the post-Soviet space to resolve an interstate conflict within the framework of international law. Systemic and structural-functional methods are used in the geopolitical, geostrategic and geo-economic analysis of the role of Azerbaijan in the studied region, the development and implementation of the Grand Strategy of President Ilham Aliyev and the main directions of national geoengineering at the present stage of development of Azerbaijan. The comparative method is used to analyse the main trends in international relations based on the study of international, international legal, and foreign documents and materials.