The objective of this scholarly article is to undertake a comparative analysis of three distinct medieval translations of the introduction to Maimonides’ “Guide of the Perplexed.” Specifically, we will examine the translations provided by Shmuel ibn Tibbon and Yehuda Al-Harizi, as well as the Latin translation. The focus of our analysis will be on two particular passages that play a crucial role in comprehending Maimonides’ intended approach to reading his work. Within the scope of this article, we will demonstrate that Ibn-Tibbon’s translation successfully preserves the essence of the original Judeo-Arabic text, thereby allowing for the interpretation of Maimonides as a radical (naturalist) philosopher. In contrast, Al-Harizi’s translation negates this potential interpretation, thereby excluding the possibility of viewing Maimonides in such a light. Notably, the medieval Latin translation aligns itself with Al-Harizi’s position and translation choices. By critically examining these translations and their respective implications, we aim to shed light on the significant impact that translation choices can have on the interpretation and understanding of philosophical texts. Ultimately, this investigation contributes to a broader understanding of Maimonides’ philosophical outlook and the challenges posed by different translations of his seminal work. The different ways of reading Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed is the subject of a very important and impassioned debate which has been raging from the time of the Guide’s publication until today.1 Was Maimonides a naturalist thinker who believed that religion is only needed for social and pedagogical reasons, and who based all his metaphysical opinions on philosophical argumentation? Was he a true believer who affirmed the main monotheistic and biblical positions such as creation,2 and argued for these positions against the philosophers, especially Aristotle?3 Or, perhaps he was a skeptic who doubted the possibility of humans having access to irrefutable truth?4 In seeking to answer these questions, the debate concerning the Guide condenses its focus to two major questions: 1. Is it justified for the philosophical interpreter to assume that Maimonides’ philosophical opinion is actually radical, i.e., naturalist, despite Maimonides’ explicit rejection of naturalism in the Guide (for example II:29)? 2. Does Maimonides think that humans can reach an unassailable knowledge of the secrets of religion and nature?
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