There is an error in my 2004 paper “Wealth, Information Acquisition and Portfolio Choice”. This note shows how to correct it by adjusting the hypotheses of the model. Specifically, it assumes that agents learn about the stock’s mean payoff rather than about its realization. All the conclusions of the paper remain valid. There is a mistake in the derivation of agents’ unconditional expected utility in “Wealth, Information Acquisition and Portfolio Choice” (Review of Financial Studies, 17(3) (2004), pages 879-914). Some formulas need to be corrected and some assumptions adjusted, but all the conclusions of the paper remain valid. In particular, it remains the case that wealthier investors collect more information and that, as a result, they hold a larger fraction of their wealth in stocks even though their relative risk aversion is not lower. The unconditional expected utility is approximated using a Taylor series expansion, in which higher order terms are dropped. In fact, these terms cannot be neglected under the payoff structure postulated in the paper. As a result, the demand for information cannot be evaluated for arbitrary preferences. In this note, we offer a solution to the issue, which relies on a slight modification of the stock’s payoff structure and supports all the conclusions of the paper. 1 The problem The expression for the conditional expected utility Ej(U(W2j) | Fj) stated on page 906 is correct. However, equation 12 obtained by taking its unconditional expectation is not. To see why, we rewrite Ej(U(W2j) | Fj) as: Ej(U(W2j) | Fj) = U(W0j) + U (W0j)Ej(∆W | Fj) + 1 2 U (W0j)Ej(∆W 2 | Fj) + o(z), (1)