Abstract
This paper presents a spatial version of the iterated battle of the sexes game in which every one individual plays with his nearest partners and imitates the optimal strategy of his nearest mate neighbors. It is concluded that the spatial structure enables the emergence of clusters of coincident choices, leading to the mean payoff per encounter to values that are accessible only in the cooperative two-person game scenario, which constitutes a notable case of self-organization.
Published Version
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