Nuclear Weapons Materials Research Articles

Prohibiting nuclear weapons: initiatives towards global nuclear disarmament

The world now stands at a precarious nuclear fork in the road with the following characteristics: the Nuclear Left Path is characterized by continued vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons with the danger being that any nation (or terrorist group) that wants such weapons, and can afford them, will eventually secure them; the Nuclear Right Path prohibits all nuclear weapons and leads ideally to global nuclear disarmament where the threat of nuclear war is minimized. The article is concerned with several initiatives that could be taken in order to follow the Nuclear Right Path and perhaps achieve global nuclear disarmament. The Nuclear Right Path requires a commitment of leadership from the US to vigorously promote new initiatives that seek to reduce, and perhaps totally eliminate, all nuclear weapons from Earth. These include, but are not limited, to the following: multilateral, phased reductions in strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems; complete cessation of all flight tests of long-range missiles; a global nuclear warhead dismantlement plan with effective economic incentives; a firm commitment from all nations to stop producing missile materials for nuclear weapons. Besides Russia, the key nation in future negotiations to reduce nuclear weapon arsenals is China which faces unique challenges in providing for its burgeoning population and who stands today at the threshold of economic superpower status.

1073. JMTR用高性能燃料要素の設計

For test and research reactors, the core conversion to low-enriched uranium fuel is required from the viewpoint of non-proliferation of nuclear weapon material. Improvements of core performance are also required in order to respond to recent advanced utilization needs. In order to meet both requirements, a high-performance fuel element of high uranium density with Cd wires as burnable absorbers was adopted for JMTR core conversion to low-enriched uranium fuel.From the result of examination of an adaptability of a few group constants generated by a conventional transport-theory calculation with an isotropic scattering approximation to a few group diffusion-theory core calculation for design of the JMTR high-performance fuel element, it was clear that the depletion of Cd wires was not able to be predicted accurately using group constants generated by the conventional method. Therefore, a new generation method of a few group constants in consideration of an incident neutron spectrum at Cd wire was developed. As the result, the most suitable high-performance fuel element for JMTR was designed successfully, and that allowed extension of operation duration without refueling to almost twice as long and offer of irradiation field with constant neutron flux.

Plutonium - Burn It or Bury It?: Using the Richardson Model, and Its Non-Linear Extensions, as a "Decision Tool" in Helping to Choose Between the Use and Disposal of Surplus Nuclear Weapons Materials

Public consideration of nuclear-security matters, such as what to do with surplus fissionable materials from retired nuclear weapons, is often overwhelmed by the pro- or anti-nuclear energy biases of the discussants. Clearly a ground for such discussion is required which is explicitly independent of such biases. The Richardson Model and its linear and non-linear extensions link the onset of war to the "interactions" between the participants in the international system. These "interactions" include competitions for resources as well as military and economic components. The disposal of surplus nuclear weapons materials contributes to both the resource and the military aspects of these "interactions". Hence the proper disposal method might be linked to international security: the best option is that which maximizes the stability of the system, as determined by a Richardsonian model. Several simple models are developed and investigated in this paper. Admittedly, these models do not do full justice to the complexities of the real world problem.. But they do allow simple answers which should provide clues to the eventual development of more realistic models as well as some possibly unbiased insights into how to deal with the real problem. The simple models of this paper indicate that it may be better to "burn" rather than "bury" the fission components of surplus nuclear weapons.

Can nuclear weapons be abolished?

One of the greatest threats to virtually all human rights is a global or regional nuclear war. For so long as nuclear weapons exist, there is a risk that they may be used. If nuclear war is to be avoided, therefore, nuclear weapons must be abolished. The abolition of nuclear weapons by international treaty is topical because for the first time the issue is on the political agenda. This article discusses the political and security issues which affect future decisions on nuclear weapons. Particular attention is given to the spread of nuclear weapons to countries which do not now have them, often said to be today's main nuclear threat to global security, and the difficulty of negotiating a treaty banning the future production of fissile nuclear materials for nuclear weapons. Finally, the problem of getting rid of the last few nuclear weapons is examined.

Material Matters

The following article is based on a talk for Symposium X presented by Wolfgang Stoll, Chief Scientific Advisor and Consultant in Siemens, Germany, at the 1996 MRS Fall Meeting.Since 1941 when Glenn Seaborg first isolated plutonium in milligram quantities, the total amount converted through neutron capture in U-238 has increased worldwide to about 1,200 tons and continues to grow about 70 tons/year. What was fissioned in situ in operating nuclear power stations is roughly equivalent to 5 billion tons of black coal, while the fission energy contained in those 1,200 tons unloaded in spent fuel is equivalent to another 2 billion tons of coal. About 260 of these 1,200 tons are ready to release their energy in about 4 kg-portions each in microseconds which is equivalent to 10,000 tons of coal. Most people believe this release of energy poses a major threat of the worldwide arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The about 20-fold overkill stored in worldwide WMD is considered superfluous after the crumbling of the Soviet Union. Options are sought to dispose of this surplus in a safe, speedy, and controllable manner. While for highly enriched uranium (HEU) (the other nuclear weapons material) dilution into low-enriched uranium and utilization in current light water reactors (LWR) poses market adaptation problems only, and while the worldwide consensus on the elimination of chemical and biological WMD is still in an initial phase, the decision of both the United States (US) and the former Soviet Union (FSU) to remove most of the plutonium out of weapons looks as if it was a firm political decision.

The proliferation risks of plutonium mines

A number of observers have recently pointed to the risk that spent fuel repositories could eventually become relatively low‐cost sources of fissile material for nuclear weapons—that is, “plutonium mines.” However, the range of conditions under which repository mining will look attractive compared to other means of acquiring plutonium is extremely narrow. At a minimum, mining significant quantities of plutonium will take several months and will be readily detectable if reasonable safeguards are applied at the repository sites. In any case, if spent fuel is not put into a repository, and is instead left in retrievable storage and eventually reprocessed, with the plutonium and other actinides in the spent fuel separated and transmuted, that course will itself generate significant risks of plutonium diversion or theft.

Nuclear weapons‐free zones

In April 1996, the latest agreement on establishing weapons‐free zones, the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (or the Treaty of Pelindaba), was signed in Cairo by more than 40 African nations. By this treaty, African nations pledge not to build, test, bury, or stockpile nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons material. A Washington Post article claimed the treaty was “... a culmination of work which began as a response to French nuclear tests in the Sahara desert in the 1960s ...,” thus typifying how long these weapons‐free zones take to evolve.

Location of neutron sources using moderator-free directional thermal neutron detectors

The use of neutron detectors designed to record only those thermalized neutrons coming from a highly specific direction can provide enhanced capability for applications such as locating nuclear weapons material or monitoring storage vaults containing special nuclear materials. Such a detection system should be as free of moderator as possible to assure effective directionality. We provide evidence from computer modeling and experimental tests that this technique allows the identification and localization of neutron sources at greater distances and narrower angular resolution than would be possible with conventional moderating neutron detectors.

PRIVATIZING GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS A SYSTEMS APPROACH

AbstractThe Hanford Area is a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) reservation in Southeastern Washington, where the primary mission for nearly fifty years was production of nuclear weapons materials. It is now the nation's largest superfund site and its sole mission is environmental remediation of the mixed wastes generated during plutonium production. A large fraction of these wastes are stored in 177 underground tanks and are the subject of the DOE's Tank Waste Remediation System (TWRS) Program. Since its inception the TWRS Program has been managed by a Maintenance and Operations (M&O) contractor.The DOE is now considering the privatization of a portion of this program and has recently issued a Request for Proposals (RFP) seeking new, qualified, private vendors. Successful bidders will be expected to build waste processing facilities with their own financial resources and to recover their costs by charging fixed prices for the various products delivered to the DOE. Because the TWRS Program is such a large, complex, and expensive undertaking, the privatization initiative will be conducted in two phases: a small proof‐of‐concept phase, followed by full‐scale production. A primary objective of the proof‐of‐concept phase is to test this new contracting approach by determining the interest of private companies and demonstrating their technical capabilities.The key to a successful demonstration is establishing the right set of requirements to be satisfied by the private vendors. These requirements must be consistent with the existing requirements set developed over the past three years by the M&O contractor. This paper presents the results of a systems engineering effort that was conducted in support of the RFP preparation and had to be coordinated with an ongoing program. Much of the effort was focused on the specification of new proof‐of‐concept requirements that are directly traceable to corresponding requirements in the M&O's RDD‐100® database. A new functions and requirements database was created for this first privatization phase using CORE®, a systems engineering support tool, produced by Vitech Corporation.

Nonproliferation Boom Gives A Lift to the National Labs

This article describes the research programs of the national laboratories in developing satellites for detection of nuclear weapons material production. The present designs detect thermal emissions from reactors and electromagnetic radiation from nuclear explosions. Future designs hope to detect the vegetation kill zones around waste holding tanks associated with uranium and plutonium processing.

Bush proposes Mideast arms control plan

In a commencement address to graduates of the U.S. Air Force Academy last week, President Bush unveiled a bare outline of arms-control initiatives to rid the Middle East of weapons of mass destruction and of destabilizing quantities of conventional arms. His proposals, still sketchy, are intended to halt the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the missiles that can deliver them, and to stem the buildup of conventional weapons in that powder-keg region. As President Bush explains, his proposal features supplier guidelines on conventional arms exports; barriers to exports that contribute to weapons of mass destruction; a freeze now, and later a ban, on surface-to-surface missiles in the region; and a ban on production of nuclear weapons material. Bush's initiatives apply to all states of the Middle East. He calls on them to commit to signing a global chemical weapons treaty, and to begin now to implement appropriate provisions of the draft ...

Savannah River Parkway

Officially it's called the Savannah River Plant, or SRP. Many call it the bomb factory. It is located 15 miles east of Augusta, Ga, where I live and work. Most people know little of what occurs there every day, despite the fact that SRP is responsible for the manufacture of virtually all the nuclear weapons materials in our country. Covering more than 600 square miles of land, the facility is tremendous. I drive through SRP occasionally, usually on my way to the beach. Highway 125 takes you through the heart of the complex for 20 miles. The early sun beams brightly through the windshield, promising a day of the childhood frolicking, corebody warming, and spiritual nourishment that occur only with ocean sounds. Yet, for 20 minutes, silent nuclear sounds eclipse the sun, waiting for an exit reprieve. The signs, buildings, roads, and security personnel offer small reality reminders, standing in

Converting the SLOWPOKE reactor to low-enrichment uranium fuel

SLOWPOKE-2 is a 20 kW pool-type research reactor, producing a thermal neutron flux of 1012 n·cm−2·s−1 at five sample sites in the beryllium reflector. Because of its inherent safety, it is the only reactor in the world licensed for unattended operation. The present core contains approximately 900 g highly-enriched uranium (93 wt.% U-235 in U), which could be viewed as a potential source of nuclear weapons material. To overcome proliferation concerns, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) has developed a low enrichment fuel containing less than 20 wt.% U-235 in U. The first low enrichment uranium core will be installed in a new SLOWPOKE-2 reactor at the Royal Military College, Kingston, Ontario.

Economic analysis of a magnetic fusion production reactor

The magnetic fusion reactor for the production of nuclear weapon materials, based on a tandem mirror design, is estimated to have a capital cost of $1.5 billion and to produce 10 kg of tritium/year for $22,000/g or 940 kg/year of plutonium in the plutonium mode for $250/g plus heavy metal processing. A tokamak-based design is estimated to cost $1.5 billion and to produce 10 kg of tritium/year for $29 thousand/g. For comparison, a commercially sized tandern mirror fusion breeder selling excess electricity and fissile material to commercial markets is estimated to cost $3.6 billion and to produce tritium for $2.6 thousand/g and plutonium for $34/g plus heavy metal processing.

Uranium Power and Horizontal Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Only a few nonnuclear weapons states with uranium-fueled power plants have kept the weapons option open, and none has evidenced activities intended for diverting fissionable material from its civilian system. Analysis of alternative strategies shows that acquisition of nuclear weapons material would probably depend on military production facilities rather than diversion. Horizontal proliferation is primarily a political issue and is related only marginally to uranium power development. Restrictions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act on the supply of equipment and fuel by the United States appear to have induced, in some nonnuclear weapons states, the building of small-scale facilities that can be modified for production of weapons material. More attention should be given to the international political, economic, and military factors that persuade such states to abjure nuclear weapons.

A Market-Sharing Approach to the World Nuclear Sales Problem

The recent decisions by West Germany and France to sell nuclear fuel facilities to Brazil and Pakistan, respectively, mark the first sharp divergence by major industrial nations from long-established U.S. nonproliferation policy. Thus far, the U.S. has been ineffective in seeking to persuade Germany and France not to proceed with them. This indicates a serious weakness in the execution of American nonproliferation policy, which if left uncorrected, could result in the rapid spread of nuclear weapons material and capability around the world. It is clear that complex problems are raised by the concept of market-sharing. A principal advocate, Dr. Lawrence Scheinman from ERDA, says that traditional arguments against market-sharing do not qualify as reasons against the concept. He does identify three basic arguments against market-sharing, which the author discusses in this article, namely: (1) reactor market-sharing is contrary to U.S. anti-cartel policy and in violation of antitrust laws; (2) other nuclear supplier countries would reject a market-sharing arrangement; and (3) the recipient countries of the Third World would view it as a nuclear cartel and refuse to do business with it. The author advocates that at the very least, the U.S. should enter the next round of supplier negotiations preparedmore » to propose multinational arrangements for closing the commercial nuclear fuel cycle and for making all weapons-grade material generated by the fuel cycle unavailable to any nation on a sovereign basis. The U.S. should also make clear that it would view with the gravest concern the continuation of the present export policies of West Germany and France. (MCW)« less

Environmental Aspects of Fusion Reactors

With the continued depletion of fossil and uranium resources in the coming decades, the U.S. will be forced to look more toward renewable energy resources (e.g., wind, tidal, geothermal, and solar power) and toward such longer-term and nondepletable energy resources as fissile fast breeder reactors and fusion power. Several reference reactor designs have been completed for full-scale fusion power reactors that indicate that the environmental impacts from construction, operation, and eventual decommissioning of fusion reactors will be quite small. The principal environmental impact from fusion reactor operation will be from thermal discharges. Some of the safety and environmental characteristics that make fusion reactors appear attractive include an effectively infinite fuel supply at low cost, inherent incapability for a “nuclear explosion” or a “nuclear runaway,” the absence of fission products, the flexibility of selecting low neutron-cross-section structural materials so that emergency core cooling for a loss-of-coolant or other accident will not be necessary, and the absence of special nuclear materials such as 235U or 239Pu, so that diversion of nuclear weapons materials will not be possible and nuclear blackmail will not be a serious concern.