A Market-Sharing Approach to the World Nuclear Sales Problem

Abstract

The recent decisions by West Germany and France to sell nuclear fuel facilities to Brazil and Pakistan, respectively, mark the first sharp divergence by major industrial nations from long-established U.S. nonproliferation policy. Thus far, the U.S. has been ineffective in seeking to persuade Germany and France not to proceed with them. This indicates a serious weakness in the execution of American nonproliferation policy, which if left uncorrected, could result in the rapid spread of nuclear weapons material and capability around the world. It is clear that complex problems are raised by the concept of market-sharing. A principal advocate, Dr. Lawrence Scheinman from ERDA, says that traditional arguments against market-sharing do not qualify as reasons against the concept. He does identify three basic arguments against market-sharing, which the author discusses in this article, namely: (1) reactor market-sharing is contrary to U.S. anti-cartel policy and in violation of antitrust laws; (2) other nuclear supplier countries would reject a market-sharing arrangement; and (3) the recipient countries of the Third World would view it as a nuclear cartel and refuse to do business with it. The author advocates that at the very least, the U.S. should enter the next round of supplier negotiations preparedmore » to propose multinational arrangements for closing the commercial nuclear fuel cycle and for making all weapons-grade material generated by the fuel cycle unavailable to any nation on a sovereign basis. The U.S. should also make clear that it would view with the gravest concern the continuation of the present export policies of West Germany and France. (MCW)« less