Logische Untersuchungen Research Articles

The phenomenological movement in Swedish philosophy

In my demarcation of "phenomenology", I have chosen a strategy equivalent to the one used by Herbert Spiegelberg in his standard work about the phenomenological movement. In his characterization of phenomenology he takes as his point of departure the phenomenology inaugurated by Husserl in his Logische Untersuchungen in 1900-1901 and continued and modified since then. According to this understanding, phenomenology is not restricted to Husserl himself, or even more narrowly, to some part of his philosophical development. In other words, phenomenology is not understood as a dead philosophy which nowadays can only be the topic of exegetic studies. Phenomenology is a living philosophy and this is also the main reason for calling it a movement. Spiegelberg motivates the term in the following manner:

Chance and the Text of Experience: Freud, Nietzsche, and Shakespeare's Hamlet (review)

136Philosophy and Literature is how to persuade that Ingarden and some others are right. Ifthe accumulated experiences of ages are anything to go by, humanity will go on alternately enjoying art in its own perverse ways, or destroying it when its mood changes— caring not a bit for the broad Ingardenian theses, never mind their subdeties and distinctions. The present selection consists ofeight papers and a monumentalbibliography of works by and on Ingarden, which takes up over a quarter of the book. McCormick endeavors to convince us that he has put together a balanced representation ofIngarden's crucial works, but he has simply gathered scattered papers that have become available in translation since 1961. In addition to the one already cited, these include: "On Philosophical Aesthetics," "Phenomenological Aesthetics: An Attemptat Defining Its Range," "A Marginal Commentary on Aristotie's Poetics," "Psychologism and Psychology in Literary Scholarship," "Artistic and Aesthetic Value," "Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object," and "The Physicalistic Theory of Language and the Work of Literature." Nor has McCormick paid much attention to the detail of editorial responsibilities . The paper on psychologism is preceded by the translator's (John Fizer's) useful introduction, but such material should either have been incorporated into the editor's general introduction or each paper given a similar separate introduction for consistency's sake. Moreover, in this book obviously aimed at readers with no German, Fizer is allowed to quote in German some crucial sentences from Ingarden's The Literary Work of Art, which he refers to as Das Literarische Kunstwerk and claims, against McCormick's testimony to the contrary, that it is not yet available in English. Ingarden's own texts have not been checked for similar inconsistencies and Husserl's work is sometimes referred to as Logische Untersuchungen, sometimes as Logical Investigations. The dust jacket correcdy informs that Ingarden died in 1970, but Fizer is allowed to say he died a year earlier, while the Congress Catalog rubric gives his date of birth as 1983 and implies, perhaps not surprisingly, that he is still alive. Curiously, the book is published in a series devoted to "Austrian intellectual history." LondonAdam Czerniawski Chance and the Text of Experience: Freud, Nietzsche, and Shakespeare's Hamlet, by William Beatty Warner; 308 pp. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986, $29.95. Iffinding the rightjacket photo is a matter ofchance, this author was certainly Reviews137 lucky. The cover shows Nietzsche and Paul Rèe drawing a small cart; in the driver's seat, holding a whip and smiling like the Mona Lisa, is Lou Salomé. Chance brought them together, chance provided the props and, if one were writing about those photographed, the intersection of their chances with one's own would be a chance too good to miss—a chance that would not only compel interpretation but would also offer the writer some purchase, some mastery over the labyrinths of those texts, those lives. Warner's book explores what is at stake for the subject who accommodates the threats and opportunities chance brings its way. At the same time, Warner also offers a program for biographical criticism. By studying the archive of a life and thought in the making, he aims to recuperate the role chance plays in the production of texts. This archive or "life-writing" is often directed to or against another person in a dialogue that is only pardy under conscious control and, for Freud in the 1890s, that other was Wilhelm Fliess. Warner's account of the role chance plays in Freud's life and thought in the 1890s begins with an explication of the interplay between memory and fantasy in psychic life and moves on to a detailed reading of Freud's "non-vixit" dream. Where Freud relates the dream to a single primal scene of rivalry, Warner's analysis is more concerned with the mechanisms that allow Freud to settle on such a singular reading. Other scenes compete with the one Freud privileges, but Freud feels interpellated by a linguistic coincidence and his response to this chance guides his interpretation in a self-serving way. It protects the self who interprets from its dissolution in interpretation; it turns Fliess into the defeated rival Freud...

The Phenomenology of Forgetting

Edmund Husserl's early and explicit turn towards an egological phenomenology of intentional constitution clouded the waters of the promising phenomenological movement even before it entered the mainstream of philosophical research. A method that Heidegger and others had thought philosophically neutral, especially as it was expressed in the first edition of the Logische Untersuchungen,' all to soon came to reflect a philosophical commitment to a subject of conscious constitutive activity, Husserl's now infamous transcendental ego.' More than one thinker has cut his wisdom teeth convincingly criticizing this move.3 But if such critiques are largely negative - and surely Husserl's critics have mostly failed to match the positive originality and penetration of the analyses he continued to conduct under the aegis of phenomenology - a lacuna is opened up within phenomenology, threatening the continuity and integration of the field. In the search for a positive counterthrust to idealism, phenomenologists have often looked elsewhere, to existentialism, Marxism, and psychoanalytic theory and even to a logical pragmatics, to supply the corrective to what has seemed to be Husserl's

Markers on the Road to the Conception of the Phenomenological Movement: Appendix to Spiegelberg's Paper

In so-called pencil of Ideen III, written in November/ December i91i, Husserl contrasts phenomenology with Brentano's psychology as die neue (Husserliana V, p. 59). Dr. Reinhold Smid of University of Utrecht has discovered that, in vita appended to her dissertation of i9gi, Hedwig Conrad-Martius refers to die durch Husserls 'Logische Untersuchungen' inaugurierte phdnomenologische Bewegung innerhalb der Philosophie. ConradMartius received degree in i91i, but dissertation was not published until I9I3; vita seems to-have been written in July or August i91i. So both her phrases and Husserl's probably reflect a spoken use of this expression which might have developed during summer term of i9i1 among Husserl's students belonging to G6ttinger Philosophische Gesellschaft. Conrad-Martius led Society at that time because Theodor Conrad, although participating in discussions, lacked time for handling this job. Conrad's use of this phrase in title of an unpublished manuscript on the beginnings of phenomenological movement, written in I954 (see E. Ave-Lallemant, Die Nachldsse der Mfinchener Phdnomenologen, I975, p. i66), could go back to his presence in Society in summer of i9iz. Jean Hering, who had studied with Husserl since i909, was to lead Society in following winter semester of i9Iz/I3. Though Hering's first use of phrase cannot be traced back beyond i9zi, work in which it occurs derives from a text written in early I9I4, conception of which presumably goes back to summer semester of i9iz. Hering's role in coining phrase is also intimated by Edith Stein's anecdotal account.

Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit (review)

494 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY heavdy upon the spoken word. There is a distinctionbetween what one would say and what is true. For example, whde it may be true that the Dean has a wart on his nose, it would be improper for the untenured instructorto say this at a faculty meeting. What we should or should not say is a better guide to the proprieties implied in certain speech and social contexts than ii is to what is true. Graham applies these general criticisms to the ways that Austin approaches particular philosophical topics. For example, he argues against Austin that one cannot refute skepticism of the senses merely by pointing out that the way we ordinarily speak of our perceptual experiences conHtcts with that of the sense-datum theorist (p. 183). Instead, one must examine in detail the skeptic's arguments to determine where they go wrong. Again, the problem of other minds arises "'from the consequences of a particular philosophical picture of the nature of human beings, viz. that deriving from Descartes. But the way to settle the problem is to show what is wrong with that phdosophical picture, not to refer to existing linguistic idiom" (p. 136). Not only does Graham develop a general line of criticism of Austin as an ordinary-language philosopher, on each topic that he discusses he takes up in detail the particulars of various issues and develops his own account of them. For example, he tries to save the theory of performatives against Austin's own criticisms by interpreting them as a type of self-verifying statement (Chapter 3). He provides his own account of illocutionary force (Chapter 4). He argues for a capacity concept of knowledge against Austin's performative account (Chapter 5). He provides an alternative interpretation of the nature of ability (Chapter 8). Throughout, Graham writes clearly, forcefully, and accurately . I recommend this book to those who want a reliable account of Austin's philosophy in particular and a critical grasp of ordinary-language philosophy in general. The only important fault in Graham's account is that it insufficiently appreciates the fact that Austin stimulated a great deal of interesting and fruitful discussion about most of the issues that he tackled. Even if his own views cannot stand up to criticism, his errors were of that interesting kind that are a mark of philosophical importance. CHARLES LANDESMAN Hunter College, CUNY Martin Heidegger, Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit. Edited by Waiter Biemel. Volume 21 of Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976. Pp. 415. Although not as well organized and clear as Die Grundprobleme der Phiinomenologie (the first published volume of Heidegger' s Gesamtausgabe),these lectures (given at the Universityof Marburg in the winter semester, 1925-26) are nevertheless important not only for understanding the development of Heidegger's thinking, but also for gaining insight into the philosophical squabbles of early twentieth-centuryphilosophy, squabbles which Heidegger viewed as indicative of modem man's lack of understanding of the philosophical issue: the question of Being. It is difficult to review these lectures, because they attempt too much. Besides an introduction, there are three major divis)ons: "A. Preliminary observation: The present situation of philosophical togic. Psychologism and the question of truth." "'B. First major part. The problem of truth in the decisive beginningof phdosophical [philosophierenden]logic and the roots of traditional logic." "C. Second major part. The radicalized question: What is truth? Repetition of the analysis of falsehood from its temporality." Division A is a lengthy treatment of Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen as an attempt to overcome the "psychologism" so important in logical theory in the early twentieth century. But Heldegger is also critical of Husserl's failure to ask penetrating questions about Husserl's notion that truth is the "'identity" between meaning and what is "given'~'in intuition. Division B involves the analysis of Aristotle's theory of the proposition as the ground of truth. Heidegger shows that the proposition is itself founded m a more primordial form of activity of Dasein, in which Dasein revealsthe thing about which a proposition can then be formulated. A major problem for the Aristotelean concept of truth, namely, the possibilityof falsehood...

REVIEWS

Book reviewed in this article Logical Investigations. By Edmund Husserl. Translated from the second German edition of Logische Untersuchungen by J. N. Findlay. Vols. 1, 2. Fallacies. By C. L. Hamblin. The Brain‐Mind Identity Theory. Edited by C. V. Borst. Respect for Persons. By R. S. Downie and Elizabeth Telfer. The Sovereignty of Good. By Iris Murdoch. What is Redaction Criticism? By Norman Perrin. In Search of the Historical Jesus. Edited by Harvey K. McArthur. New Testament Issues. Edited by Richard Batey. The Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth. By Willi Marxsen. Translated by Margaret Kohl. Catholic Theories of Biblical Inspiration since 1810. By James T. Burtchaell. Encyclopaedia of Biblical Theology. Edited by J. B. Bauer. Translated by J. Blenkins New Liturgical Feasts in Later Medieval England. By R. W. Pfaff. The Yale Edition of the Complete Works of St. Thomas More: Volume 5: Responsio ad Lutherum, Part I: Latin and English Texts; Part II: Introduction, Commentary, Index. Edited by John M. Headley. The New Cambridge Modern History. Volume VI. The Rise of Great Britain and Russia 1688–1725. Edited by J. S. Bromley. Philosopher King. The Humanist Pope, Benedict XIV. By Renée Haynes. Irish Anglicanism 1869–1969. Edited by Michael Hurley, S. J. Classical Islam, A History 600–1258. By G. E. VON Grunebaum. Translated from the German by Katherine Watson.