Lifting Of Sanctions Research Articles

PROSPECTS OF RUSSIAN-IRANIAN RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

At present, the international situation changes dramatically compared to previous years. The Russian Federation is gradually increasing its influence on the world stage. Many international aspects require the participation of Russia in addressing these issues. Accumulated Russian Federation over the past 16 years, the economic potential allowed it in 2016 to firmly adhere to their political and economic ideals. Especially clearly manifested in the role of Russia in the Middle East. The successful development of Russian-Iranian partnership and participation of the Russian Federation led to an increase in the authority of the Russian war in Syria in the world and the consolidation of Russia in the Middle East. The Islamic Republic of Iran, which is one of the key players in the Middle East after a long life in the conditions of economic sanctions imposed by the Western countries, is back on the international economic and political arena. Cancel Iranian sanctions was made possible by a number of reasons related to the gradual loss of its US influence in the Middle East and the loss of a number of markets for the purchase of energy. That is why the US government has decided on a dialogue with the recent "stronghold of international terrorism," Iran. Also, in many respects the lifting of sanctions was made possible thanks to the work of the current president of Iran H. Khatami, who has more liberal views than their predecessors. Despite the successful development of Russian-Iranian partnership is likely to weaken this cooperation, which subsequently can lead to the breakdown of relationships. Termination of Russia and Iran, the contacts will not only bring multimillion losses of the Russian economy but also weaken the influence of Russia in the Middle East. Thus, this article discusses the prospects of development of Russian-Iranian relations in the near future. Analyzes the reasons for the possible weakening of the Russian-Iranian partnership and ways to overcome the growing contradictions between the states.

Regional Organisations and the Enforcement of Constitutionalism: Reflections on the Implementation of Chapter 8 of the African Charter on Democracy Elections and Governance (ACDEG)

Persistent and widespread coup d’etat in Africa in the 1990s prompted the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to respond with the Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government in 1999 in Algiers3, which was subsequently followed by the 2000 Lome Declaration on the OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCG)4. As a clear shift from the OAU to a new dispensation underpinned by solidarity, democratization, integration peace and development, the OAU transformed into the African Union (AU) in 2000 with a new vision embedded in the Constitutive Act of the Union5. The vision proclaimed in the Act promoted further interrogation of how the AU could provide move away from its focus of an end to colonialism to democratisation and the development of other normative instruments that would ensure democratic consolidation on the continent as underpinned by the Constitutive Act. One of those instruments is the African Charter on Democracy Elections and Governance (ACDEG) 2007, which came into force in February 2012 after ratification by fifteen (15) Member States6. The Charter paid important attention to unconstitutional changes of government in Chapter 8 from Art 23 to 26, outlining the definition of UCG as well as the mandate of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the lifting of sanctions. This paper argues that implementation of the provisions of the Charter has been inconsistent. It rarely defends the rights of the citizens against constitutional abuse by incumbents. The paper further agues that AU’s response to cases of UCG has been rather reactive rather than proactive

The Role of Iran's Future Liquid Natural Gas Supply in the Eu's Energy Security

Global gas demand will surge by around 50% until 2030 and more than 50% of all interregional gas trading will be conducted by LNG carriers. The EU will be the first gas importer by the end of the next decade, while the Union will import around 80% of the gas and LNG it will need during the next decade. In addition, the EU is not interested in supporting the status quo in its gas and LNG policies and decided to decrease its huge dependency on Russian gas. Therefore, diversification of gas and LNG suppliers is at the top of the EU energy agenda.Iran likewise is dissatisfied with its share in the global gas markets and is similarly not interested in supporting the status quo in its gas and LNG policies. For this reason, diversification of LNG suppliers is at the top of Tehran's Energy Outlook and Grand Strategy for the period towards 1404/2025. All the conditions are in place for Iran to assume an important role in the supplying of LNG toward the EU in the near future. However, it depends on changing the development of relations and the lifting of sanctions against Iran. Accordingly, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) has been reached on June 30, 2015 after 22 months intensive negotiations between the EU/E3+3 and Islamic Republic of Iran. If this deal is fully implemented, the JCPOA will result in lifting of all sanctions targeting Tehran's nuclear programme, especially those with regard to energy industries.This article examines the development and current situation of Iran's LNG industry, and looks at its prospects with particular regard to the energy needs of the EU, following the JCPOA.

US Policy in the Middle East: Breakthrough or Breakdown?

By the end of February 2014, US policy in the Middle East faced very serious challenges. Negotiations between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority had reached an impasse, and even the indefatigable efforts of US Secretary of State John Kerry had not succeeded in getting the two sides to sign an agreement or even a framework for an agreement. In the case of Iran, the United States (US) and the other members of the P-5 plus one (UK, France, Russia, China, and Germany) had reached an interim agreement in November 2013, to limit Iran’s production of enriched uranium in return for a partial lifting of sanctions, but major questions remained as negotiations began on a final agreement. These included Iran’s willingness to surrender information about its suspected nuclear weaponization program; whether or not Iran would be allowed to continue to enrich uranium, and if so, how much; and the future of the Arak heavy water plant and the Fordow nuclear facility. In the case of the war in Syria, the US continued to avoid involvement, even as the death toll rose to 150,000. Despite rising calls for US action from the State Department and CIA, President Obama refused to act. His position appeared to be, “I got us out of Iraq, I’m getting us out of Afghanistan, I’m not getting us involved in Syria.”

Promoting Commodity Exports Through Governor-Led Trade Missions: Governors’ Constitutionally Permissible (and WTO Permissible) Role of Exporter-in-Chief

U.S. state governors led over 500 trade missions in the ten years prior to the recent economic downturn. (1) While state budgets are under pressure during the economic downturn, governor-led trade missions continue, albeit at a somewhat reduced rate. In the last seven years, Nebraska Governor Heineman (or other high-level state officials, such as the lieutenant governor or the head of the Nebraska Department of Agriculture) led nine overseas trade missions, including four to Cuba and two to China. (2) The purpose of governor-led trade missions is to expand existing export markets for products from the state or to open new markets. A state's department of economic development and/or the department of agriculture will plan and coordinate the trade missions depending on the types of products likely to find a market in the targeted country. In the case of trade missions focusing on agricultural products, delegations will include producer associations, growers, and corporations representing agricultural interests. Of the nine overseas trade missions led by the Nebraska governor (or other high-level state officials), delegations have varied in size from 10 to over 60 persons. Nebraska agricultural officials coordinate the state's trade missions with the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Foreign Agricultural Service, which has roughly 100 offices in 82 countries throughout the world and provides marketing information on an additional 80 plus countries. Governor-led trade missions are also generally coordinated with the U.S. embassy in the visited country as well. Nebraska is not the only state in the nation's heartland engaged in these types of trade missions. Iowa's Lieutenant Governor Kim Reynolds recently led a delegation to China and had discussions with China's Vice-President Xi. (Interestingly, Iowa Governor Branstad has a nearly 30-year relationship with Vice-President Xi that began when the Vice President was a leading local official in Hebei, China, which established a sister-state relationship with Iowa during Governor Branstad's initial term as Iowa Governor in the mid-1980s). South Dakota Governor Daugaard sponsored a trade mission to China whose timing overlapped in part with the Iowa trade mission, as did a broader U.S. Department of Agriculture trade mission. Minnesota Governor Drayton led a trade mission to China in the last year as well. Nebraska Governor Heineman will be leading another mission to China in July 2012. Countries to be visited on a mission are selected based on a variety of factors. Suggestions from producer groups and USDA marketing information and advice play a key role. Activities of other U.S. states and the high entry fixed costs (3) of exporting to particular markets, including language and cultural barriers or great involvement of the government in the economy of the tbreign country, also play a role in selecting countries to be visited. Countries visited may be large purchasers already, potentially vast future markets, or markets that only recently opened to trade with U.S. entities. Nebraska's experience is informative. One of the nine trade missions was to Japan, the single largest purchaser of U.S. corn, soybeans and wheat. Two more missions were to China and/or Taiwan, which are fast-growing markets for U.S. agricultural products, with China now the leading export market for U.S. soybeans. Four trips were to Cuba, a market that only opened in late 2000 to U.S. agricultural exports, with the lifting of sanctions on food and medical exports to the communist country. Newspapers often report agreements being concluded between state governors and the foreign country at the conclusion of trade missions. What this typically involves is a non-binding memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the governor and representatives of the foreign country or government-run import authority of the foreign country in which the foreign entity signals its good-faith intent to purchase a set amount of agricultural products from state producers. …

Between 'China Threat Theory' and 'Chindia': Chinese Responses to India's Military Modernization

Since India’s nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998 and China’s 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, the two countries have faced the flow and ebb of western sanctions. Under these controls, China and India’s initial development occurred largely within a military supply vacuum that resulted in an early dependence on Russian, and later Israeli cooperation, increasingly supplemented and in some cases replaced by domestic production. In 2000, however, this pattern began to undertake a marked shift. It was during this year that then US President Bill Clinton made the first visit by a sitting US president to the subcontinent since that of Jimmy Carter in 1978. This momentous occasion set analysts talking about the potential lifting of United States sanctions against India. Within a year, and with the lifting of sanctions, the US–India strategic partnership became a reality. In 2001, the United States conducted a large-scale removal of Indian companies from the US Entity List and in 2005 came the announcement of US–India intent to engage in civil nuclear cooperation. This article explores the impact of these two once similar and increasingly divergent military modernization and procurement trajectories. Given that India has become the primary beneficiary of this shift, this article will quantitatively and qualitatively measure changing Chinese perceptions of India’s forces in the wake of sanctions lifting on the part of the West and the military procurement imbalance it left behind.

SADC: Summit Calls for Lifting of Sanctions on Harare

SADC: Summit Calls for Lifting of Sanctions on Harare

Just How Special is “Special”: Britain, Cuba, and US Relations 1958–2008 an Overview

In June 2008, despite intense lobbying from the Bush administration, the Council of Ministers of the European Union lifted the diplomatic sanctions on Havana that it had imposed in 2003 and agreed to resume a “comprehensive political dialogue” with the revolutionary regime. Instrumental in this decision was a change in policy by the UK that had hitherto stood against such a normalisation of relations. The move came as a surprise to many who had anticipated that the British would oppose the lifting of sanctions in deference to their “special relationship” with their transatlantic ally. However, as this overview suggests, the UK decision was not unusual. Even from the earliest days of the revolution, the UK has differed with the US over Cuba. By surveying the five decades of the UK–Cuba relationship since 1959 the article explains how the UK has maintained an ambivalent attitude towards Washington's embargo. While recognising US primacy of interest in Cuba, London has consistently attempted to follow an independent policy that at times has come between the close allies. It concludes that although the UK (along with other European partners and Canada) shares the US goal of seeing the end of Communism on the island, it has ironically helped to thwart this ambition. The history of the relationship provides an example of the limitations of unilateral economic sanctions as policy instruments. The failure of the US embargo to affect the behaviour of the Castro regime should be no surprise when Washington's closest ally has never fully agreed to it.

From Non-Proliferation to Post-Proliferation: Explaining the US–India Nuclear Deal

How can the reversal in American policy toward South Asia from the Clinton administration's strong condemnation of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of May 1998 and the enforcement of American non-proliferation legislation to the lifting of sanctions and the de facto recognition of India and Pakistan as nuclear weapon states be explained? The Indian–American nuclear deal of March 2006/July 2007 is examined here through alternative theoretical perspectives to explain the American reversal. Defensive realism and social constructivism offer the strongest explanations for the shift under the Bush administration. Both can be used to explain a deal that makes major concessions in previous American policy. They also help draw attention to the problems arising from a situation where the future of Indian–American relations will depend not only on Indian but also American actions. The nuclear deal, it is concluded here, could irreparably damage the Non-Proliferation Treaty while increasing the danger of actual use of nuclear weapons in a future Indo-Pakistani war.

Criminalizing Consequences of Sanctions: Embargo Busting and Its Legacy

The upsurge in the use of economic sanctions in the post-Cold War era has prompted much scholarly and policy debate over their effectiveness and humanitarian consequences. Remarkably little attention, however, has been devoted to their criminalizing consequences and legacy for the post-sanctions period. In this article, I develop an analytical framework identifying and categorizing the potential criminalizing effects of sanctions across place (within and around the targeted country) and time (during and after the sanctions period), and apply and evaluate this framework through an in-depth examination of the case of Yugoslavia. For comparative leverage and to assess the applicability of the argument beyond the Yugoslavia case, the analysis is briefly extended to other cases both within and outside the Balkans (Croatia and Iraq). The article suggests that sanctions can unintentionally contribute to the criminalization of the state, economy, and civil society of both the targeted country and its immediate neighbors, fostering a symbiosis between political leaders, organized crime, and transnational smuggling networks. This symbiosis, in turn, can persist beyond the lifting of sanctions, contributing to corruption and crime and undermining the rule of law. The article is one of the first efforts to integrate the study of sanctions and transnational crime, and suggests that the criminalized collateral damage from sanctions and its post-sanctions legacy should be made a more central part of the evaluation of sanctions.

Democracy and Delivery: The Rationalization of Local Government in South Africa

Introduction Following the demise of apartheid and the transition to democracy in 1994, South Africa has sought reintegration into the global economy. Reintegration has followed the ending of years of isolation and the lifting of sanctions imposed by the international community against the apartheid regime. The democratic government also recognized that South Africa’s prospects for economic growth — essential to achieve the government’s objectives of redistribution and poverty elimination — were inexorably linked to the country’s ability to position itself within the global economy (Abedian and Biggs, 1998). When the African National Congress (ANC)-led government first came to power in 1994 the party’s manifesto and the government’s key policy document was the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) (African National Congress, 1994). The RDP sought to address the inequalities of apartheid and accelerate economic growth through government intervention in the economy. Rapid delivery of social goods, education, health care and housing were to be used as the basis to stimulate economic activity and job creation (Munslow and FitzGerald, 1997). By 1996 the RDP, while not abandoned as official government policy, was superceded by the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy as the government’s macro-economic framework. GEAR has been described by Nattrass as a neoclassical economic growth theory, with a Keynsian concern for investor confidence and an active and redistributive role for the state (Nattrass, 1999: 76). The switch from the RDP to GEAR represents a recognition of the inescapable influence of global economic forces as South Africa seeks to attract foreign investment and to promote exports (Pycroft, 1999). To be successful within the global economy, according to GEAR, requires a reduced budget deficit, marketoriented growth, fiscal discipline, labour-market flexibility and reduced government intervention — all of which reduce the government’s ability to influence poverty alleviation and income redistribution (Nattrass, 1999: 76–7). The results of the GEAR strategy to date have not been encouraging. Economic growth rates, job creation and inward investment have all been significantly lower than GEAR

South African Wine Market Survey

This is an update of the article in Number 3 of Volume 4 of the Journal in 1992. The omnipotence of KWV backed by the Afrikaans — led government shielded wine farmers to the extent that they became complacent both before and during the world sanctions. The change of government, downfall of apartheid, and lifting of sanctions all wrought revolutionary changes including a government enquiry into KWV and the wine industry as a whole. Incidentally, export inexperience of many wineries caused errors of judgement in that field. The most widespread was resultant local shortages in spite of previous reassurances to the contrary. The recent worldwide “fruit‐forward” wine style fashion puzzled South African farmers who reacted in various ways and completely out of unison. Nor were they helped by the realisation of the fact that there was widespread vine disease in the country. Nevertheless, exporting volumes quickly surpassed expectation, and consequently the total area under vines began to increase, with many new names entering the industry. The old price control disappeared and market forces began to take control once again. One example of these is the international shortage of red wine, leading to the previously unheard of importation of low priced red wine. Summing up, it is clear that South Africa, the eighth largest of the world's producers, is firmly back in the international wine and spirit market. This is assisted by increasing tourism to the beautiful Cape.

Russian Jewish artists in a century of change, 1890-1990

With the break-up of the Soviet Union, countries and cultures under Soviet control opened up to the West. In the past few years, as information has begun to flow more freely, art historians have found themselves having to re-examine subjects in the light of newly accessible information. Nowhere is this situation more apparent than in the study of Jewish artists in Russia. Until recently, books and catalogues written in the West have concentrated on work done by Russian Jewish artists in exile. Now, for the first time, an international group of scholars has been assembled to address the last hundred years of art produced by Jews living in Russia itself. Under Tsarist rule, Jews were confined to communities within the Pale of Settlement, and those interested in pursuing artistic careers were educated locally or found that opportunities to attend urban academies were severely limited. Nonetheless, a significant Jewish presence existed on the Russian art scene before the Revolution. Having suffered persecution and circumscribed professional opportunities for decades, many Jewish artists welcomed the Revolution and threw themselves into the task of building the new Communist society. With the lifting of sanctions on Jews, many found jobs in the new Soviet bureaucracy of culture or as influential teachers, designers, and photographers. Some, like El Lissitszky, became world-famous members of the Russian avant-garde. With the advent of Stalin, the eternal political game played by Russian governments with ethnic minorities took another diabolical turn. Many Jews who had attained positions of responsibility became victims of Stalin's purges. Some survived, adopting the officially sanctioned Socialist Realist style; others emigrated. Beginning in the Khruschev years, the Russian underground gradually gained momentum. Jewish artists, who played an essential role in keeping unofficial art alive, worked solely for themselves or exhibited in their own apartments. Nonetheless, the political tide turned slowly. Today, the new openness between Russia and the West has made it possible for the work of these individuals to be set against a narrative of tragedy and transcendence stretching back over many years. Given the present state of research, this text purposely proposes more questions than it answers. An historical overview by historian Michael Stanislawski is followed by seven essays by an international roster of art historians who address, in chronological sequence, the difficult, frequently uplifting history of Jewish art in Russia in the modern period. Essays are contributed by Ziva Amishai-Maisels, John E. Bowit, Boris Groys, Victor Misiano, Aleksandra Shatskikh, Michael Stanislawski and Seth L. Wolitz.

Myths on the March: the Kenyan and Zimbabwean liberation struggles in colonial fiction

On 20th October 1952 the Kenyan Government declared a State of Emergency in response to settler calls for action against African Nationalism in general, and the movement known to the settlers as 'Mau Mau' in particular, and in so doing triggered off what is now known as the 'Mau Mau' revolt. Four years later the arrest of Dedan Kimathi marked the effective end of an armed peasant resistance to colonial rule which, if it didn't regain for the peasants the land which was their main object, did hasten a nominal Independence. Just over twenty years after the declaration of the state of emergency in Kenya, on 21st December 1972, the guerrilla attack on Altena Farm in north-eastern Zimbabwe signalled the start of the final and decisive phase of the Zimbabwe war. Seven years later, to the day, the formal agreements marking the end of the war and opening the way to an internationally recognized Independent Zimbabwe were signed at Lancaster House. 'The guerrillas', as Martin and Johnson put it, 'had brought Rhodesia to a point where it needed the end of the war even more than recognition and the lifting of sanctions.' 2 The Zimbabwe war, like the 'Mau Mau' revolt, was aimed by its black fighters at regaining control over their land and their political destiny, and was directed against white settlers. In each case armed resistance to the status quo provoked extremes of repression (often modelled by the Rhodesians on their Kenyan counterparts) on the part of what were, ironically, known as the 'security forces'. In each case the war produced a substantial body of propaganda and myth-making aimed at justifying or disguising both the social, political and economic dispensations which had been the causes of the war, and the measures taken to counter it. And in each case a substantial body of 'popular' fiction, written by settlers and their sympathizers, was an important, perhaps the most important, component of that propaganda.