Democracy and Delivery: The Rationalization of Local Government in South Africa

Abstract

Introduction Following the demise of apartheid and the transition to democracy in 1994, South Africa has sought reintegration into the global economy. Reintegration has followed the ending of years of isolation and the lifting of sanctions imposed by the international community against the apartheid regime. The democratic government also recognized that South Africa’s prospects for economic growth — essential to achieve the government’s objectives of redistribution and poverty elimination — were inexorably linked to the country’s ability to position itself within the global economy (Abedian and Biggs, 1998). When the African National Congress (ANC)-led government first came to power in 1994 the party’s manifesto and the government’s key policy document was the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) (African National Congress, 1994). The RDP sought to address the inequalities of apartheid and accelerate economic growth through government intervention in the economy. Rapid delivery of social goods, education, health care and housing were to be used as the basis to stimulate economic activity and job creation (Munslow and FitzGerald, 1997). By 1996 the RDP, while not abandoned as official government policy, was superceded by the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy as the government’s macro-economic framework. GEAR has been described by Nattrass as a neoclassical economic growth theory, with a Keynsian concern for investor confidence and an active and redistributive role for the state (Nattrass, 1999: 76). The switch from the RDP to GEAR represents a recognition of the inescapable influence of global economic forces as South Africa seeks to attract foreign investment and to promote exports (Pycroft, 1999). To be successful within the global economy, according to GEAR, requires a reduced budget deficit, marketoriented growth, fiscal discipline, labour-market flexibility and reduced government intervention — all of which reduce the government’s ability to influence poverty alleviation and income redistribution (Nattrass, 1999: 76–7). The results of the GEAR strategy to date have not been encouraging. Economic growth rates, job creation and inward investment have all been significantly lower than GEAR