Liberal Democratic Values Research Articles

Advancing Australia through soft power: virtue & virtuosity

ABSTRACT Migration is an important soft power effect in Australia. Many migrants are attracted to Australia today because of the opportunity it would provide for a better life. Australia’s political values, rule-of-law and economic and social conditions are among the attractions. Virtue as reposed in adherence to liberal values and virtuosity in crafting messages, cultural objects, events, programmes and laws are viewed as key soft power predicates. Yet there are instances where members of diasporic groups choose to support values of authoritarian countries of origin within the liberal Australian polity that are antithetical to Australian liberal democratic values. This soft power oration-based article addresses the seeming paradox of migrants presumably attracted by liberal values and benefits supporting values that are in sharp contrast. It suggests that research is required to understand diasporic communities relations with their states-of-origin, legitimate right and need to evolve to be Australians who are proud of their cultures-of-origin and how the Australian story could be better told in order that the virtues of liberalism become more evident to all migrants resident in Australia.

Why Do Chinese Democrats Tend to Be More Nationalistic? Explaining Popular Nationalism in Urban China

ABSTRACT Popular nationalism remains strong in China. What drives this strong nationalistic sentiment? This is the key question this study attempts to answer. The authors are particularly interested in the connection between domestic politics and outward nationalist feelings among Chinese urban residents, specifically the relationship between democratic orientation and regime support on the one hand and nationalist feelings on the other. Descriptive findings from random survey data on Chinese urban residents in 34 Chinese cities reveal that democracy-oriented Chinese urbanites tend to show stronger nationalistic feelings. A large volume of literature on the relationship between democratic value and nationalistic sentiments, however, generally suggests that people with more liberal democratic values tend to be less nationalistic. How should one, then, reconcile and explain this seemingly contradictory relationship in China? Upon further research, the study finds that system support is a confounding factor affecting Chinese urban residents’ nationalistic sentiments. People with more nationalistic feelings tend to be those who show less support for the current system in China. Popular political discontent with the Chinese domestic system may very well have a spill-over effect on Chinese people’s nationalist feelings toward the outside world.

Religion, Education, Security

On first glance the politicization and securitization of religion may seem remote from education. A second look reveals widespread international initiatives aimed at the uses of education precisely for political and security purposes, notably in the countering of terrorism, violent extremism and ideologies opposed to liberal democratic values. This editorial presents a critical framing on how scholars from a range of interrelated disciplines analyze the interface of religion, education and security. The purpose of this Special Issue is thus critically to engage scholars across religious studies and theology, politics and international relations, security and intelligence studies, to explore through empirical evidence and reasoned argument the role here for religion in education. The volume aims to make some ground-breaking cross-disciplinary theoretical advances and methodological innovations not simply to further debate but to provide the tools for asking new questions and opening new pathways and frameworks for exploring the critical interface of religion, education and security.

Security in the balance: How Britain tried to keep its Iraq War secrets

State secrecy is incompatible with the values of liberal democracy if there is no publicly reasonable justification for the concealment. So how can a liberal democracy continue to keep state secrets amidst suspicion that no such justification exists or that, worse, those secrets contain evidence of wrongdoing? This article maps and critiques the justificatory strategies that were used by the British state to refuse to disclose secret material related to the 2003 Iraq War, despite widespread accusations of hidden deception and illegality. Through an analysis of the legal discourse that underpins freedom of information (FOI) and disclosure protocols, the article shows how the law regulates disclosure through a metaphorical ‘balance’ of public interests. This balance, however, is no balance at all. It is profoundly one-sided because security only features on one side. The law explicitly recognizes that disclosure can create insecurity for public interests, but lacks any recognition of the opposite: the insecurity of secrecy. Rather than security trumping liberal values, this law allows enduring secrecy to be framed, paradoxically, as a means to secure liberal democratic accountability. The significance of this claim is far-reaching as FOI laws in many other countries employ a similar harm-based, one-sided justificatory strategy.

Is it really about values? Civic nationalism and migrant integration

ABSTRACT Migrant integration is a pressing policy concern, and the perception that newcomers are not integrating has led to a growing backlash against migration. One outcome is ‘civic integration’ policies, according to which the most important mechanisms of integration are language training, employment counselling, and especially the inculcation of liberal-democratic values. Few authors, however, have addressed the fact that these policies are essentially civic nationalist ideology applied to migrants, and represent the most recent chapter in a long-standing debate over the relationship between majorities and minorities that focused on intra-state nationalist conflict during the 1990s. Civic integration policies reflect the self-representation of majorities, and are both politically and ontologically problematic. First, in many cases they seem best understood as a kind of symbolic politics that is more about who gets in than how they are integrated. Second, civic nationalism is based on a theory of nations and nationalism that treats these as solely ideological phenomena, and ignores the social bases of integration. ‘Shared values’ are a product of that process, not a mechanism for its achievement.

Liberalism beyond toleration: Religious exemptions, civility and the ideological other

I address the long-standing problem of toleration in diverse liberal societies in light of the progress of same-sex marriage and continued vehement opposition to it from a significant portion of the population. I advance a view that contrasts with recent discussions by Teresa Bejan, Mere Civility, and especially Cecile Laborde, Liberalism’s Religion. Laborde emphasizes the importance of state sovereignty in fixing the boundaries of church and state, emphasizing the priority of public authority and constitutional supremacy. I argue that emphasis on priority needs to be complemented by a recognition of the importance of forms of reconciliation that go beyond ‘mere civility’. Reflections on toleration in the liberal and democratic traditions – including in the canonical discussions of Locke, Rousseau, Smith and Tocqueville, and in more recent political science – have recognized that the health of liberal democracy benefits enormously from the educative and morally formative resources furnished by religious communities. We must hope and plan for the reconciliation of the values of liberal democracy and the teachings of the major religions in society. In that context, a great source of present difficulty is the political polarization that infects and inflects religious differences. For that reason, I applaud aspects of Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Masterpiece Cakeshop. Kennedy insists on the equal dignity of gay and lesbian couples, but also requires that the complaints of religious wedding vendors should be listened to respectfully. While progressives constantly urge that we do more to include the other – typically meaning refugees, migrants, racial, sexual minorities and so on – one great challenge in conditions of hyper polarization is to include the ideological other.

The role of ‘uncivil’ society in transitional justice: evidence from Bougainville and Timor-Leste

ABSTRACTTransitional justice (TJ) scholarship and practice often pins much hope on civil society. It generally assumes that civil society organisations demonstrate ‘civility’, have broad-based memberships, support liberal democratic values and promote TJ approaches based on liberal-legal justice strategies. Yet there is nothing inherently virtuous about civil society and in conflict-affected societies it often lacks these desired properties; it can be underdeveloped, unruly and disruptive. So, what role do, and should, ‘uncivil’ society groups play in TJ processes? To answer this question this article uses comparative case studies of the role of uncivil society groups in Bougainville and Timor-Leste. These cases exhibit similar broad cultural, socio-political and socio-economic characteristics. In both cases uncivil society groups are organised around societal divisions, attempt to operate as alternatives to the state, oppose liberal democracy and liberal-legal TJ processes and engage in unruly behaviour, including violence and criminality. These uncivil society groups are not regarded as internationally legitimate, but they nevertheless have strong local legitimacy, particularly when the state is absent or weak. Consequently, this article concludes that in conflict-affected societies it is necessary to engage with groups regarded as both civil and uncivil to promote locally legitimate and effective TJ, and peace more broadly.

Artificial or Human: A New Era of Counterterrorism Intelligence?

A new revolution has begun in counterterrorism—the Artificial Intelligence (AI) revolution. The AI revolution has had a significant impact on many areas of security and intelligence. The use of AI and big data in general, and in the field of intelligence and counterterrorism in particular, has led to intense debates between supporters of the continuation and expansion of the use of this technology and those who oppose it. The traditional delicate balance between effectiveness in the fight against terrorism and the liberal democratic values ​​of society becomes even more crucial when counterterrorism engages in AI and big data technology.

The nonprofit arts organization concept and its transformation in Korea

ABSTRACTAfter the Korean War, both the autocratic and later democratic South Korean governments actively fostered the development of Korea’s arts sector, in part by emulating the organizational and legal structures of U.S. nonprofits. Yet, in this policy transfer, Korea has taken a different path, notably rearticulating the U.S.-style hands-off facilitation model to reflect and accommodate Korean political, institutional, and cultural exigencies. We analyze the effects of the resulting cultural policy on Korean public arts institutions, using documentary evidence and narratives from our case studies of two national arts organizations restructured by the government: The National Theater Company of Korea and the Seoul Arts Center. We employ the concept of cultural statism, conditioned by "culture as glorification," resource dependence, and path dependence, to understand the development of Korea’s public arts sector. Specifically, we consider: the government’s desire to use the arts to enhance its image on an international stage shaped by western liberal democratic values; arts leaders’ desire for reliable support (resource dependence); and the tendancy of Koreans to want to be associated with the stability and prestige of the government (path dependence).

Religiosity, Integration and Sport: Muslim Women Playing Australian Rules Football

ABSTRACTThis article explores the phenomenon of practising Muslim women playing Australian Rules football (Aussie Rules). While Western liberal-democratic governments have considered Islamic religiosity to be contrary to Western liberal-democratic values and therefore detrimental to integration, scholars and governments alike have regarded sport as a major tool for enhancing social cohesion and increasing social capital for ethnic minorities and marginalised groups. In-depth interviews with thirteen members of the Auburn Giants women’s football team demonstrate the limits of conceptualising sport participation in binarised terms of “integration” or “exclusion”, with findings providing nuanced insights into how Muslim women perceive the relationship between religion and playing competitive sport. The women interviewed saw no compromise between their religious adherence and their sporting commitments and ambitions to play competitive Aussie Rules. While religion was found to guide participants’ morals and behaviour, it did not feature as a significant factor in their decision-making to play Aussie Rules. Through discussions about playing the game, sports uniforms and family perceptions, participant responses show that Islamic religiosity comes in different shapes and forms. This research advances the interdisciplinary study of sport, religion and culture by deepening understandings of the relationship between gender, Islamic religiosity and sport participation.

Normativität und Wissenschaft in Zeiten von Populismus

The rise of populist parties throughout Europe is fostering the debate on normativism in science. Klaus von Beyme – one of Germany’s leading political scientists of the Second Generation after World War II – is an early sceptic of normative thinking in the field of political science. He campaigns for a neoinstitutionalist perspective which combines historical insights and empirical findings to describe and explain political phenomenons. Not only in the times of bloc confrontation before 1990 but also in the current debate on populism, Beyme’s hesitation against normative thinking is sharply criticised as a lack of normative comittment to the fundamental values of liberal democracy. Following the concept of Intellectual History, this paper analyses Beymes scientific writings against the backdrop of biographical and historical contextes. Further, the paper shows how methodological and epistemological assumptions can shape the production of knowledge in scientific discourses.

Press Freedom in Contemporary Japan ed. by Jeff Kingston

Reviewed by: Press Freedom in Contemporary Japan ed. by Jeff Kingston Tracy Dahlby (bio) Press Freedom in Contemporary Japan. Edited by Jeff Kingston. Routledge, London, 2017. xiv, 322 pages. $160.00, cloth; $54.95, paper; $54.95, E-book. Donald Trump loves to pound away at the press, as he has amply demonstrated by tweet-storming his contempt for the "fake news" media. But when it comes to actually curbing press freedoms, Trump is no match for Abe Shinzō. Neither the U.S. president nor his supporters in Congress have dared, at least to date, to suggest laying a finger on the First Amendment or [End Page 134] to stop the mainstream media from lacerating Trump with one unflattering scoop after another. The Japanese prime minister is the real infighter. He has acted, far more pointedly, to cow Japan's press and quash the nuisance it presents to his ambitious political agenda. Abe's war on the media is the subject of this timely and engrossing book, and the dangers it poses for Japan's democracy animate many of its 21 essays. Authors assert that since taking office for a second time in 2012 (after his first term ended in 2007), Abe and his political allies have been busy: they've proposed constitutional limits on free speech, leveraged the nation's broadcast code to throw TV news units off balance, toughened state secrecy laws to penalize journalists, and helped sideline critical voices. While Abe has worked coercive charm on financially pressed newspaper moguls, simpatico right-wing bloggers have menaced reporters and scholars alike. Harrying the press, as Jeff Kingston points out, isn't "unprecedented, or indeed unique to Japan" (p. 2). Yet various contributors make the case that Abe has audaciously tightened the screws. And that is precisely why Japan's example is important for the rest of us to consider. With liberal democracies under siege across the planet, and the currency of "alternative facts" on a roll, the erosion of a free press carries risks for all. As Yale historian Timothy Snyder pithily observes in his 2017 book, On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century: "To abandon facts is to abandon freedom."1 The Abe that Kingston and his authors portray fits the zeitgeist to a tee. Scion of a heavyweight political family, Abe finessed his rise on promises of "normalizing" Japan, which means ditching a post–World War II system that critics argue locks Japan into an uneasy dependency on the United States as its geopolitical go-between and protector. It also means seeking a freer hand in military affairs by dumping the antiwar provisions in Article 9 of the constitution U.S. occupiers imposed on Japan in 1946. And under Abe's stewardship, it has meant a stepped-up campaign to whitewash the country's record of wartime atrocities in favor of make-believe versions of history. It is worth noting, as Kingston and others do, that most Japanese citizens shy away from supporting Abe's play on the constitution and, by extension, his view that it contains Western values incompatible with Japan's traditional identity. Thus, at its core, as a number of authors argue, Abe's media assault is really part of a broader culture war pitting liberal democratic values against an illiberal agenda. To win out, Senshu University professor of media law and journalism Kenta Yamada contends, "Abe's government is trying to prioritize the national interest over individual freedom and rights, a [End Page 135] revanchist agenda out of synch with twenty-first century democratic values and norms in Japan. Suppressing and intimidating the press is a means to stifle the necessary debate and scrutiny [Abe's] agenda deserves" (p. 130). Right-tilting news media have been only too happy to oblige. In 1990s Japan, such players "started to escalate the rhetoric … in attacking what they saw as biased, left-leaning media," writes Sophia University political scientist Koichi Nakano (p. 34). Their campaign, says Nakano, rallied conservative intellectuals, pundits, and rising neonationalist politicians, including Abe Shinzō, to protest purported liberal bias and an anti-Japanese, self-hating take on modern history. Riding such ideas to his second term two decades later, Abe...

ФЕНОМЕН «СУЧАСНИЙ ПОПУЛІЗМ» У КОНТЕКСТІ РИЗИКІВ І ВИКЛИКІВ ЛІБЕРАЛЬНИХ ДЕМОКРАТІЙ ХХІ СТОЛІТТЯ

In the article attempts of description and analyze of research studies are undertaken, which are recognized in the modern scientific world as «strong points» in the study of the phenomenon of populism, in particular - G. Ionesk, E. Gellner, D. Bell, M. Kenovan, P. Tagart, E. Laclau, I. Me, I. Sorel et other, and the latest Western and domestic theoretical constructs, which lead to the knowledge and the nature and essence of the phenomenon of «modern populism», namely - Z. Bauman, W. Beck, F. Venturi, A. Grimimal-Buss, K. Davyst, J. Judis, R. Itwell, J.-V. Muller, T. Snyder, etc.; T. Andrushchenko, V. Bebyk, S. Datsyuk, I. Kiananka, G. Kuts, O. Lisnichuk, L. Matlai, I. Pobochi, T. Pryadko, T. Rad, O. Yarosha and others. It is determined that the overwhelming majority of modern researchers express a consolidated position on the complexity of definition («populism is the phenomenon dispersed, i.e. it is a component of many political phenomena, embodied in various ideological forms and political strategies») and a huge variety of manifestation of modern populism D. Trump (USA), Brexit (UK), Yellow Vest Movement (France), Five Star Movement (Italy), Podemos (Spain), G. Wilders (Netherlands), V. Orban (Hungary), R. Erdogan (Turkey), etc. Attention is drawn to the fact that the «global success of populists» in the 21st century creates a real threat to liberal-democratic values - individual freedom, pluralism, free speech, free elections, etc. The key factors that provoked «the outburst of populism» are characterized, in particular, the dominance of the contemporary voter in the socio-political moods of feelings of «disappointment», «confusion», «uncertainty» and others. The author attempts to find effective strategies for counteracting «aggressive populism» in the context of the mediation of contemporary political processes, in particular, the formation of critical thinking and media literacy of the modern voter. It is stated that the «wave» of populism also seized the political space of modern Ukraine, in which the mediation of political processes created a new format of communication between voters and politicians, which, in fact, attested to the results of recent presidential and parliamentary election campaigns.

«ВИБУХ ПОПУЛІЗМУ» У ХХІ СТОЛІТТІ: ДОСЛІДНИЦЬКІ ІНТЕНЦІЇ ЩОДО ВИЗНАЧЕННЯ «УНІВЕРСАЛЬНИХ» ХАРАКТЕРИСТИК

Спираючись на новітні західні та вітчизняні теоретичні конструкції автор статті пропонує власну дефініцію «сучасного популізму» – як політичного поліваріативного феномену, який в залежності від унікальної комбінації специфічних рис, може виступати в якості ідеології, методу політичної боротьби, суспільно-політичного руху, маніпулятивної технології, стилю політичної поведінки тощо. В ракурсі визначеної дослідницької позиції автор робить спробу визначити «універсальні» характеристики феномену «сучасний популізм» – «акумуляція незадоволення», «гра на емоціях», «народовладдя», «політика симулякрів», «національна автентичність», а також охарактеризувати специфічні рис «сучасного українського популізму». Акцентовано увагу на тому, що «сучасний популізм» становить реальну загрозу для загальновизнаної ліберально-демократичної світоглядної позиції сучасної цивілізації, відтак, автор статті спрямовує дослідниці інтенції на пошук ефективних стратегій протидії даному феномену.

Інформаційний вплив на дітей в умовах гібридної війни на Донбасі.

The article deals with the informational influence on children and young people in conditions of hybrid war in the uncontrolled territory of Ukraine in the separate regions of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. The purpose of this article is to analyze the main forms and methods of informational impact on children in the ORDLO and the possible consequences of such influence. For the study used messages in the media, regulatory legal acts of self-proclaimed republics, materials of Internet resources, indicating the facts of the dangerous information impact on children.The content of the textbook on history used in schools and higher educational institutions in ORDLO, the state of teaching the history of the native land and the Ukrainian language is analyzed. The system of militarypatriotic education of children and youth is explored, aimed at preserving Soviet stereotypes from the inhabitants of the Donbas, nostalgia for the USSR, and forming a sense of belonging to Russian civilization.It is proved that students at ORDLO carry out enormous informational influence in order to integrate the younger generation into the Russian civilization. Instead, hostility toward Ukrainians and the rejection of Western liberal-democratic values are being cultivated.Thus, there is a violation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989 in the ORDLO.

The End of China’s Reform Era

The End of China’s Reform Era Carl Minzner (bio) keywords China, Xi Jinping, Governance, Political Reform [End Page 83] executive summary This essay examines recent developments suggesting that China’s post-1978 reform era has ended and assesses the economic, ideological, and political implications. main argument The late 1970s saw Chinese leaders steer their country out of the chaos and stagnation of the Maoist era, launching the policies of “reform and opening up.” In subsequent decades, domestic Chinese politics were marked by three core factors: (1) rapid economic growth, (2) ideological openness, and (3) relative political stability as the result of partially institutionalized norms, such as those governing the retirement and succession of top Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders. However, all of these factors are ending. Foreign media coverage has focused on recent elite political developments, such as the CCP’s proclamation of a “new era” under Xi Jinping and the removal of constitutional term limits on his role as president. But these developments are the culmination of much deeper shifts dating back to the early 2000s—with even older roots. Recent events merely illustrate how these trends have steadily deepened over the last two years. policy implications • In the short term, policymakers should expect China to evolve in the direction of a harsher and more personalized authoritarian system. • In the medium to long term, China will likely experience a revival of the sources of domestic political instability that marked the pre-1978 era—elite political turmoil, escalating social conflict, and rising ethno-nationalist sentiment directed at minorities and foreigners alike. • Beijing’s interest in increasing its economic and diplomatic influence overseas will continue unabated, with Chinese-language media and ethnic Chinese communities outside China as the first targets. Foreign firms and entities operating within China should also expect an increasingly unfavorable ideological and political climate. • Democratic countries should respond to Chinese pressure by reaffirming their liberal democratic values rather than giving into the nativist sentiment currently sweeping many Western nations. [End Page 84] In the late 1970s, China’s rulers steered the country out of the political turmoil and economic stagnation of the Maoist era, launching the policies of “reform and opening up” (gaige kaifang). During the decades-long reform era that followed, domestic politics were marked by three core factors: (1) rapid economic growth, (2) ideological openness, and (3) relative political stability as the result of partially institutionalized norms, such as those governing the retirement and succession of top Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders. All of these conditions are ending. Foreign media coverage of China has focused on recent elite political developments, such as the CCP’s proclamation in fall 2017 that the nation has entered a “new era” (xin shidai) under Xi Jinping, the removal of constitutional term limits on his role as president in spring 2018, and other indications that China is steadily evolving in the direction of an extended period of one-man rule. But these developments are merely the culmination of a much deeper set of changes that extend back to the early 2000s, with roots that go back even further. Political, economic, and ideological developments over the past two years merely illustrate how these trends are steadily deepening. This essay examines these trends. Drawing from my recent book, the first section sketches out how the core political, economic, and ideological characteristics that had marked the reform era have eroded.1 The second section explores developments since 2016. The third section outlines the implications of these trends. the end of china’s reform era Economics Rapid growth has been the beating heart of China’s renaissance. First-time visitors inevitably remark on the efficient high-speed rail network, the unending proliferation of Starbucks coffeehouses, and the ever-expanding number of newly opened shopping centers (and online apps) offering the latest in consumer products. All are the products of China’s astounding reform-era economic boom. Starting in 1978, the nation averaged 10% GDP growth annually for three decades, one of the highest rates in world history. The results have been spectacular. In the late 1970s, China was poorer than Afghanistan, India, and Zaire. By 2016, not only [End Page 85] had the...

Narrative and elucidating the concept of democracy: the case of Myanmar’s activists and democratic leaders

ABSTRACTNarrative analysis has been widely employed in the social sciences. Yet there has been no systematic application of narrative theory to the study of how the word “democracy” is given meaning by political actors. Using the empirical example of the Burmese democracy movement in the lead up to the historic 2015 election victory of the National League for Democracy, this article argues that narrative analysis can contribute in unique ways to the interpretive task of “elucidating” the concept of democracy. Tracing plot and character construction within activist and aid worker stories about democracy in Myanmar, this study reveals three prominent and diverging narratives of democracy within and around the movement; a liberal narrative, centring on liberal democratic institutions and values, a benevolence narrative, focussing on the value of moral leadership and selflessness, and an equality narrative, highlighting the importance of cultural reform towards greater relational equality. Attention to these narratives has implications for donor “democracy promotion” strategies raising new questions about the role of formal institutions of democracy, the perceived source of “solutions”, and the impact on internal struggles within democracy movements.

Popular conceptions of democracy and democratic satisfaction in China

Evaluating attitudes to democracy in an authoritarian political system is complex. Several surveys suggest that the majority of Chinese people feel satisfied with the level of democracy in China. In explaining this intellectual puzzle, this study addresses how different understandings of democracy influence satisfaction with the state of democracy. This study also investigates the relationships between liberal democratic values and popular conceptions of democracy, and between liberal democratic values and satisfaction with democracy. The results show that Chinese citizens who view elections and political rights as essential to democracy are dissatisfied with the current state of democracy. People who hold liberal democratic values are also dissatisfied with the current state of democracy. In other words, popular conceptions of democracy make a difference in the people’s satisfaction with the democratic level in China. With a rise in the population adhering to procedural conceptions of democracy, satisfaction with the level of democracy in China may decline in the future.

The Theological Foundation of Democracy According to Ratzinger

When the Cold War was ended in 1989, Francis Fukuyama wrote, three years later, his very well-known book proposing a quite original thesis. He argues that the end of fascism and of communism means the triumph of Eastern liberalism in history. Following a Hegelian perspective, Fukuyama said contrary to Marx that communism, like the other previous economic-political systems that are not liberal, has been only a step to achieve a liberal society. So it happened in Russia and in Eastern Europe, and so it seems to be happening with the progressive opening of the market in China. Today, more than twenty years after Fukuyama wrote, it is time to ask whether secular liberal Western societies still appear to the eyes of humankind to provide the best option. In fact, with the economic crises in Europe, with the austerity imposed on many people and affecting deeply the lives of at least one generation, are liberal societies at risk? Does the growth of the Islamic state after the Arab Spring question the foundation of democratic principles? Considering also Russia and the geo-political problems in Ukraine, can we say that the East has become or is in the process of becoming really democratic? Is the growing popularity of political parties opposed to the European Union, and often embracing anti-democratic ideologies, compatible with Fukuyama’s thesis? It is true, we must say that the American philosopher whom I mentioned assumed that, even if liberal economic-political systems were the best option, their triumph was not automatic and necessary in the long-term. However, Francis Fukuyama recently wrote a new book in which he analyzes a kind of contemporary democratic recession in the first decade of the twenty-first century, a recession that he sees as having delayed the democratic triumph all over the world and over history he announced in the nineties. For me, it is quite interesting to notice how Joseph Ratzinger shares, even if from a different perspective, the concerns of Fukuyama. The German theologian, who became the Pope during a time of political and economic crises, experienced the dictatorship of Nazism and was a protagonist of the Second Vatican Council, in which the Catholic Church accepted positively the principles of democratic society. While, in the past, the relationship between the Church and the “so-called” democrats was characterized especially by confrontation, it seems to me that today, Christianity encourages and is best able to preserve democratic principles. Furthermore, the originality of Ratzinger’s theology consists not only in reconciling the main liberal democratic values with Catholic thought but especially in showing that the condition of the possibility of democracy resides in such Christian theology: democratic values are intelligible and grounded within such theology.

Is There Such Thing as ‘Populist Constitutionalism’? The Case of Hungary

The paper deals with recent deviations from the shared values of constitutionalism towards a kind of ‘populist, illiberal constitutionalism’ introduced by Hungary’s new constitution in 2011. The populism of FIDESZ was directed against all elites, including the ones that designed the 1989 constitutional system (in which FIDESZ also participated), claiming that it was time for a new revolution. This is why PM Viktor Orban characterized the results of the 2010 elections as a ‘revolution of the ballot boxes’. His intention with this revolution was to eliminate all checks and balances, and even the parliamentary rotation of governing parties. His vision for a new constitutional order—one in which his political party occupies the centre stage of Hungarian political life and puts an end to debates over values—has now been entrenched in the new constitution. The paper argues that this current Hungarian constitutional system was made possible by FIDESZ’ anti-pluralist nationalist populism, but is not necessarily based on a true commitment to expressing the will of the people via ‘illiberal constitutionalism’. The populist government rather misuses the country’s lack of constitutional culture. Adherence to constitutional patriotism would mean that FIDESZ would have to endorse what John Rawls once called ‘constitutional essentials’. The core of this kind of constitutional patriotism is a constitutional culture centred on universalist liberal democratic norms and values. Instead, the current Hungarian constitutional system is confronted with unconstitutional patriotism, a kind of nationalism that violates constitutional essentials in the name of ‘national constitutional identity’.