In contrast to the extensive literature on the determinants of campaign spending and its effect on candidates’ electoral performance, comparatively less literature exists on the legal and sanctioning characteristics of political finance systems. Though some contributions have analyzed and compared the institutional designs of these financing systems, limited literature has empirically examined infractions and sanctions of electoral laws, categorized as either a crime or a misdemeanor, by the candidates. Limited knowledge exists about the political and sociodemographic profile of candidates who commit such offenses or misdemeanors, a gap this study addresses by empirically analyzing electoral law infractions. Using the case of Chile and an unpublished database of infractions of 38,246 candidates in the local elections of 2008, 2012, and 2016, as well as the legislative elections of 2009, 2013, and 2017, we present four conclusions. First, only about one-fifth of candidates commit such infractions. Second, such infractions are more common during first-tier elections, especially in deputy and senatorial elections. Third, the candidates most likely to commit such infractions are independent candidates who compete in regions remote from large urban centers, especially in rural areas. Fourth, the rise in infractions is linked to a new law that more strictly regulates candidates’ campaign spending. The study enhances our understanding of the efficacy of political finance systems and the enforcement of electoral sanctions.
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