Abstract

The purpose of this study is to posit and test whether the presence and structure of national legislatures can account for the varying degree of corporate transparency displayed by firms operating in emerging economies. We conducted tests using a sample of 226,088 firm-level observations spanning 67 countries over the period 1990–2014. Firms located in political regimes that lack national legislatures display a lower level of transparency than those in regimes with semi-competitive legislative elections, and these in turn display lower transparency than firms located in countries with competitive elections.

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.