The article analyzes the conditions for a dialogue between Western and post-Soviet philosophy and theory of law on the nature of law (in terms of the first), or understanding of law (in terms of the second), which would create an opportunity for the organic inclusion of the “dispute about the nature of law” elements in the context of the discussion and solving issues relevant to the post-Soviet philosophy of law, including the shift of emphasis from the theoretical to the practical aspect of the problem of the nature of law.
 The research begins with a general description of the peculiarities of the “discourse of legal thinking (understanding of law)” inherent in post-Soviet jurisprudence and the identification of ontological and analytical criteria for classifying the types of understanding of law (natural law, positivist, sociological) as the basis for further convergence of post-Soviet and Western experience of understanding of law.
 Further, the meaning of the concept of validity of law in its social, moral and legal varieties for understanding the nature of law in general and the corresponding types of such understanding are revealed.
 In the final part, attention is drawn to the practical aspects of the study of the nature of law, carried out in the context of “extraordinary cases” existing on the verge of law and un-law. Further analysis reveals the methodological possibilities of comprehending the concept of law through the correlation with the counter-concept of “un-law” using examples: post-Soviet discussions about the relationship between law and statute, legal and non-legal law; Hegel’s concept of right and non-right; contemporary non-positivist approach by Robert Alexy in accordance with the criterion of the “limiting border” of law according to the Radbruch formula.
 The conclusions summarize the provisions on the general and distinctive features of the “discourse of the nature of law” and “discourse of understanding of law”, determine the prospects for their rapprochement.