Theory Of Legal Argumentation Research Articles

The Reasoning of Russian Courts in Cases Connected with the Protection of Religious Feelings

The authors examine how the Russian judiciary devises legal policies when adjudicating cases in which religious beliefs are concerned. First, the authors describe the theoretical framework within which research on this matter can be conducted. This framework can be constructed on the basis of the theory of legal argumentation. Applying this framework to the investigation of the Russian court practice enables the authors to discover important features which are characteristic of legal reasoning in this category of cases. The Constitutional Court of Russia has chosen to abstain from crafting principles of legal policy regarding religious issues; yet, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, by and large, is not followed by the Russian judiciary, and the Supreme Court of Russia has no clear-cut policy in this regard. In such a situation, ordinary judges choose individual strategies which are indispensable as fidelity to the letter of law is inadequate for adjudicating such cases. The case of Pussy Riot and the other cases analyzed in our paper serve as examples of this tendency. The court practice in religious cases can be better explained from this perspective than in light of presumed political influence

Law and Argumentation Theory: Theoretical Approaches to Legal Justification

In the past thirty years study law and argumentation has become an important interdisciplinary discipline. It draws its data, assumptions and methods from legal theory, legal philosophy, logic, argumentation theory, rhetoric, linguistics, literary theory, philosophy, sociology, and artificial intelligence. Scholars from various traditions have attempted to explain structural features of legal decision-making and justification from different points of view. One of the main incentives for the growing interest in legal argumentation has to do with changing views on judicial tasks. In modern legal systems a judge not only applies legal rules but also resolves interpretation problems and justifies his doing so in a reasoned decision. Although it is a part of the Rule of Law that legal decisions must be justified, explicit legal norms for this justification can hardly be found. One of the important problems in the study of legal argumentation is the question which standards of soundness the argumentation should meet. Is it enough that the judge mentions the facts of the case and the legal rules, or does he also have to explain why the legal rules are applicable to the concrete case? How can the interpretation of a legal rule be acceptably justified? What, in the context of legal justification, is the relation between legal rules, legal principles and general moral norms and values? A second important problem is the question how to reconstruct real life argumentation in legal decisions in order to evaluate the justification. For instance when a judge resolves an interpretation problem in deciding a case, he can choose different types of interpretative arguments to justify his decision. Ideally, these arguments are recognizable in the justification of the legal decision. But in practice these arguments are not always presented explicit, clear and well ordered. The critical reader who wants to evaluate the argumentation must therefore solve a number of reconstruction problems in order to evaluate the argumentation. Legal argumentation-theory has a descriptive and a normative dimension. It is descriptive in the sense that it gives a reconstruction that starts from arguments expressed in legal discourse and it is normative because the reconstruction is related to a model of acceptable justification. Given these two dimensions, five research components can be distinguished. The philosophical component attends to the normative foundation of a theory of legal argumentation. A central question is which criteria of rationality should be used in evaluating legal argumentation. In the theoretical component, models for legal argumentation are developed, in which the structure of legal argument and norms and rules for argument-acceptability are formulated. The reconstruction component shows how to reconstruct real life argumentation within the framework of a theoretical model. This reconstruction forms a basis for the evaluation of arguments. The empirical component investigates the construction and evaluation of arguments in actual legal practice. It establishes in which respects legal practice fits in or conflicts with theoretical models and examines how possible discrepancies might be explained. Finally the practical component considers how various results forwarded by the philosophical, theoretical, reconstruction, and the empirical components might be used in legal practice. Practical applications are methods for improving skills in analyzing, evaluating and writing legal argumentation. This chapter describes how researchers deal with these questions depending on their different points of view. Ideas about standards of soundness for legal argumentation and methods for reconstruction, developed by influential authors in the field, will be examined. In the sections 2, 3 and 4 we will discuss the three dominant traditions in legal argumentation-theory: the logical, the rhetorical and the dialogical approach. In section 5 we conclude with some questions for the agenda.

Towards a Typology of Argumentation Based on Legal Principles

In this paper I analyse interpretative argumentation based on legal principles, explore the crite-ria for the assess¬ment of this type of argumentation and relate that to the general theory of law and legal argumentation. Starting from Alexy’s principle theory and its critics I will differenti-ate various forms of argumentation based on legal principles

Formal and Substantial Justification in Legal Decisions: Lasser's Judicial Deliberations - Some Critical Questions from an Argumentative Perspective

Lasser’s study Judicial Deliberations offers an interesting analysis of judicial discourse and legal argumentation. For theorists of legal argumentation Judicial Deliberations is an interesting project, because of its theoretical perspective, its methods and its results. In the past thirty years the study of legal argumentation has increasingly become an important field of interest. In this paper I discuss some of Lasser’s conceptual and empirical contributions to this theory of legal interpretation and argumentation. I will do this by exploring Lasser’s analysis of the difference between interpretative justification in Common Law and Civil Law countries, focusing on the difference between formal and substantial interpretative argumentation in legal decisions. In short, I will discuss Lasser’s lack of conceptualization of the distinction between formal and substantial interpretative argumentation, his methodological choices and the generalization of his empirical findings.

El carácter argumentativo del Derecho: una defensa del post-positivismo de MacCormick

En los escritos de N. MacCormick, existe tanto una teoría del derecho —la denominada teoría institucional— como una teoría de la argumentación jurídica. La atención que MacCormick presta a la justificación de las decisiones jurídicas le hace plantear asuntos que no pueden ser contestados por una teoría positivista del derecho. Esta es, claramente, una de las razones por las cuales este autor defendió abiertamente, en sus últimos trabajos, una teoría post-positivista del derecho. En este ensayo, dicha teoría es comparada con el positivismo contemporáneo, que puede ser ejemplificado por medio de la teoría jurídica de J. Raz. Se concluye, después de un breve análisis de las tesis centrales del positivismo y de algunos argumentos de MacCormick que lo apartan de estas tesis, que el post-positivismo es superior a todas las versiones del positivismo jurídico. En el caso específico de MacCormick, los siguientes argumentos son contribuciones relevantes para el desarrollo de la ciencia del derecho más allá de los límites del positivismo jurídico: 1) la caracterización del derecho como un concepto «argumentativo»; 2) la teoría reflexiva de las fuentes del derecho, adoptada por MacCormick; 3) la concepción kantiana de la justificación jurídica que da fundamento a su teoría de la argumentación jurídica; 4) la tesis del caso especial; 5) la tesis de la pretensión de corrección del derecho y la obligación, que se deriva de ella, de hacer justicia conforme el derecho, y 6) la tarea desempeñada por la eticidad y por la moralidad política en la creación y en la aplicación del derecho.

Legal Argumentation Theory and the Concept of Law

There has been wide recognition over the last three decades that argumentation plays a pivotal role in shaping the law, since practically any stage of what is ordinarily considered the legal domain involves recourse to reasoning.1 Legal scientists put forward interpretive statements: they propose what they see as reasonable interpretations of laws and defend these interpretations with arguments. Both of these tasks require reasoning. Lawyers, when they bring cases to court, must do more or less the same (even if the aims here are more specific and concrete): they interpret general norms and precedents, qualify concrete cases and offer reasons in support of their conclusions. Judges decide cases, an activity which makes it necessary to find and sometimes reconstruct the rule of law, interpret rules and apply them to concrete circumstances, weigh principles, settle conflicts between norms encased in the same legal order, follow precedents, ascertain and qualify facts, determine the most reasonable solution to the case at hand, and put forward justifications for their decisions. All such operations are argumentative. And lastly, in a constitutional democratic state the legislators, too, will tend to offer reasons backing their deliberations, so as to make them more easily acceptable to the people they govern. In doing so even the legislators accept to take part in the game of argumentation.

Finding Analogies between Cases: On Robert Alexy’s Third Basic Operation in the Application of Law

The point of this essay is to discuss in a critical way one of Robert Alexy’s recent developments to his theory of legal argumentation. While in his earlier writings Alexy distinguished only two basic operations in the application of law, subsumption and balancing, he has recently changed this theory to claim that legal analogy, or comparison of cases, also figures as a third basic operation which shares the same general features of the former two. My purpose, therefore, will be to answer whether Alexy is right when he holds that the comparison of cases can stand besides balancing and subsumption as a basic operation in the application of law.

Neil MacCormick's Second Thoughts on Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory. A Defence of the Original View

This paper offers a diachronic reconstruction of MacCormick's theory of law and legal argumentation: In particular, two related points will be highlighted in which the difference between the perspective upheld in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory and the later writings is particularly marked. The first point concerns MacCormick's gradual break with legal positivism, and more specifically the thesis that the implicit pretension to justice of law proves legal positivism false in all its different versions. The second point concerns MacCormick's acceptance of the one-right-answer thesis and the consequent thinning of the differences between MacCormick's theory of legal reasoning and that of Ronald Dworkin and of Robert Alexy. The intent, however, is not only to describe this change in MacCormick's thought, but also to attempt a defence of the original view that we find in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory.

Saadya Gaon and Maimonides on the Logic and Limits of Legal Inference in Context of the Karaite-Rabbanite Controversy

Saadya Gaon (882 – 942), one of the outstanding Rabbis in the period of the Geonim, rejected the legitimacy of legal inference, as part of his polemics with his contemporary Karaite scholars. The paper analyzes Saadya's stance regarding the logical basis of legal inference, and shows that Saadya's distinction between reason and revelation in the domain of legal inference is only in regard to the ‘illah– the factor that connects the case with its law. The rationality of the commandments, on the other hand, is based according to Saadya upon the manfa‘ah– the utility of the commandments, and hence Saadya's religious doctrine turns out to be coherent and consistent. Maimonides (1138–1204), who was one of the most important figures in the Jewish scholarly world in the Middle Ages, adopted the Aristotelian concept of dialectics in order to facilitate his theory of Jewish legal argumentation. Unlike Saadya, Maimonides saw inferences in the realm of the law as legitimate. His position can be considered an inclination towards the Karaite ideology according to which reason must be the ruler in the realm of the law. Nevertheless, Maimonides' stance deviates from that of Karaites in a crucial point: according to Maimonides, only authorized institutions are qualified to use legal inference. Since the Talmud, according to Maimonides, represents the teachings of the rabbinical authorized institutions, its legal instructions must be followed. The article describes Maimonides' position regarding legal and Talmudic inferences, and shows that Maimonides' inclination towards the Karaite theory remains within the limits of the Rabbanite ideology.

Fundamentar y decidir (Sobre la obra homónima de Carsten Bäcker, Begründen und Entscheiden. Kritik und Rekonstruktion der Alexyschen Diskurstheorie des Rechts)

En su reciente obra, Begründen und Entscheiden, plantea Bäcker un sugerente desarrollo de la teoría de la argumentación jurídica formulada por Alexy, mediante su relativización. Tal relativización conlleva, entre otros aspectos, la renuncia a la idea de «la única respuesta correcta», asumiendo en su lugar una idea de corrección relativa en función de las circunstancias concurrentes. Sin embargo, el alto grado de relativismo de este planteamiento acentúa al mismo tiempo su principal debilidad, así como en general, el descuido de las cuestiones evaluativas —frente a las analíticas— en el seno de las teorías de la argumentación. Pues corrección (y en particular, corrección relativa) no significa equivalencia en Derecho: en el marco del discurso jurídico, hay mejores y peores soluciones dentro de lo discursivamente posible. En este último sentido, se esbozan también las posibilidades de una comprensión normativa de la idea de eficiencia.

La unidad de razonamiento práctico en la teoría del discurso jurídico

La principal contribución de la Teoría de la argumentación jurídica de R. Alexy es la «tesis del caso especial» (Sonderfallthese), según la cual, la argumentación jurídica es un caso especial de discurso práctico general. Para determinar el verdadero significado de esta tesis, es decir, para determinar el contenido de las pretensiones de validez (o pretensión de corrección) formuladas en los discursos jurídicos, es necesario precisar el concepto central de la misma —el discurso práctico general— y sus relaciones con otros discursos prácticos específicos —discursos pragmáticos, ético-políticos y morales— distintos del discurso jurídico.

Razones para no creer en la actual Teoría (ilusionista) de la Argumentación

Las teorías dominantes («estándar») sobre la argumentación jurídica pecan no tanto por buena parte de cuanto dicen..., ¡sino sobre todo por lo que no dicen! Son teorizaciones pseudodescriptivas —basadas en unas «intellectualist assumptions»— con respecto a los razonamientos jurídicos. Así ellas conducen a apartar la vista de los decisivos ingredientes de anti-racionalidad, señaladamente las falacias típicas del «Síndrome normativista», con base en los cuales se arman muchos de esos discursos en la práctica. Por lo demás, dichas concepciones fijan la atención simplemente en ciertos aspectos semánticos de la discursividad jurídica, haciendo abstracción de sus dimensiones pragmáticas. La Teoría «estándar» de la Argumentación resulta especialmente apta para ser asumida como ideología profesional («storytelling») de los operadores del Derecho positivo, es la más reciente: sus embellecimientos teoréticos (una «cirugía estética» frente a los razonamientos judiciales normales) y sus cómodos silencios (ante el Síndrome normativista y las consecuencias prácticas) legitiman los modus operandi tradicionales de esos operadores. Lo que aquí está en discusión no es si los juristas argumentan, sino cómo estas argumentaciones son de veras.

Crítica de la crítica crítica: contra Enrique Haba y consortes

Después de señalar los elementos fundamentales de la crítica que Haba dirige a la teoría «estándar» de la argumentación jurídica, el autor entiende que «Haba tiene alguna razón en lo que dice, pero no en cómo lo dice ni tampoco (sobre todo) en la consecuencia que pretende extraer de su crítica: la descalificación radical de la teoría estándar de la argumentación jurídica». Aclara que, en su opinión, esa teoría es susceptible de más de una crítica pero que, en su opinión, Haba «ni siquiera ha planteado sus críticas con el rigor exigible para ser sometidas a una discusión racional», y termina pidiéndole que lo haga.

¿Es realista la teoría de la argumentación jurídica? Acotaciones breves a un debate intenso

Al hilo del debate entre E. Haba y M. Atienza, se trata de resituar y justificar la distinción entre teoría descriptiva y teoría normativa de la argumentación, resaltando la utilidad de elaborar patrones ideales de racionalidad argumentativa con los que medir aproximativamente la racionalidad de las argumentaciones reales. Seguidamente, se mantiene la tesis de que la teoría estándar de la argumentación jurídica no ha rendido muchos instrumentos útiles para el análisis argumentativo de sentencias porque se ha dado la mano con un iusmoralismo cercano a las teorías de la única respuesta correcta y que ve en la argumentación la vía para el descubrimiento de tal respuesta, en lugar de una herramienta para la justificación razonable de elecciones discrecionales bajo condiciones de inevitable incertidumbre.

Whose Experience is the Measure of Justice?

Robert Alexy’s theory of legal argumentation is among the notable contributions made to mainstream jurisprudence in the last three decades. Remaining true to its rational discursive mission, it engages with both analytical positivism and natural law theories. A recent collection of essays edited by George Pavlakos explores Alexy’s theory from a number of philosophical standpoints, revealing its theoretical potential and flaws. By doing so, this volume helps us to gain a better understanding of the implications of Alexy’s theory of legal argumentation, but also to identify new areas of research within the discourse theory of law. Although this collection is concerned with a critical examination of various aspects of Alexy’s work, it nonetheless draws attention to the dual characteristics of positive law, that is, the problematic separation of facts from values, law from morality, legal certainty from justice, which continue to preoccupy legal theory. In what follows I shall attempt to examine the debate between Alexy and the contributors to Pavlakos’s volume in order to gain a deeper understanding of the role of dichotomies in legal theory. Part 1 starts by explaining the theoretical background against which I have read the debate on Alexy’s theory of legal argumentation. I have explored the role of dichotomies in socio-legal research elsewhere. However, in the following pages, I shall use Alan Norrie’s critical examination of antinomies to throw light on some of the shortcomings of Alexy’s theory and also to discuss the concerns of mainstream jurisprudence. In that sense, this essay presents both Norrie’s and Alexy’s works, using the former to critically assess the latter. In Part 2, I briefly sketch the layout of Pavlakos’s collection to provide an overview of the type of questions that are discussed by the various contributors. Parts 3 and 4 bring into focus two issues that loom large in the collection. The first issue is Alexy’s central thesis on law’s claim to correctness, while the second concerns the duality of law exemplified by the attempts of mainstream jurisprudence to cope with the tension between the positivist notion of law and the idea of justice. In Part 5, I conclude the essay by reflecting on some of the implications of Alexy’s thesis.

Balancing as a Guide to Legislative Reasoning

AbstractUp to the present day, the theories of legal reasoning have been concerned with reasoning in the stages of interpretation and adjudication of laws. However, if a fundamental feature of legal reasoning is that it is actually bound by laws, then the theory of legal argumentation should also consider to what extent legislative argumentation is an assumption of rational legal reasoning: if legal reasoning is, as Alexy states, a special case of the general practical discourse, and the speciality of legal reasoning is a consequence of the requirement of being bound by legal laws, then legislative rationality can be considered a premise of the rationality of law interpretation and adjudication.

On MacCormick's Post-Positivism: Comment on Karen Petroski's ‘Is Post-Positivism Possible?’

In the essay entitled “Is Post-Positivism Possible?”, Karen Petroski argues two theses: (1) There are certain institutional conditions in the “modern setting of scholarly activity” that make positivism the inevitable (or nearly inevitable) form of theoretical thinking about the law; and (2) There is nothing in Neil MacCormick’s post-positivism that should lead us to believe that his legal theory is qualitatively different from positivism. In this paper I intend to reply to those two thesis and to explain why I think that MacCormick’s post-positivistic legal theory can easily resist its critics and opens up new directions for legal theoretical inquiry. In my opinion, MacCormick’s institutional theory of is inevitably connected with his theory of legal argumentation, as opposed to the positivistic viewpoint that strictly separates theories of law from theories of adjudication. This connection, it is argued, is very important because it explains why moral and political arguments necessarily play a part in legal discourse.

Insights, Errors and Self‐Misconceptions of the Theory of Principles

AbstractThe theory of principles is multifaceted. Its initial expression contained an important argument against positivist theories of adjudication. As a legal theory, it fails in its effort to claim a structural difference between rules and principles. It also fails as a methodological theory that reduces adjudication to subsumption or balancing. It misunderstands itself when it is conceived as a doctrinal theory especially of fundamental rights. Its most promising aspect could be its contribution to a more comprehensive theory of legal argumentation.

Una teoría de la argumentación jurídico-penal: un primer esbozo sobre el ejemplo del bien jurídico protegido en el art. 318 bis del Código Penal español

El desarrollo de teorías de la argumentación jurídica, en el seno de la teoría general del Derecho, viene ofreciendo interesantes materiales para una racionalización del discurso jurídico. Sin embargo, la complejidad de lo jurídico precisa de mayores márgenes de rendimiento y con ello, probablemente también, de especialización. En las siguientes páginas se ofrece un primer esbozo de una —por el momento, tan sólo— posible teoría de la argumentación jurídico-penal.

Taking Rights less Seriously. A Structural Analysis of Judicial Discretion

. This article investigates the concept and the construction of judicial discretion. The strengths and weaknesses of both Dworkin and Hart are analysed, and in view of these, it is argued that a full picture of judicial discretion is between the two extremes. Thus, a moderate theory of judicial discretion is maintained which is based on achievements by Robert Alexy (2002b). The article develops a balancing model of discretion and relates it to the theory of legal argumentation. The limits of discretion and the relation between structural (strong) and epistemic (weak) discretion are addressed in detail, both with illustrations from the jurisdiction of the German Federal Constitutional Court.