Lee Teng-hui Research Articles

Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy

Voting for democracy. Learning to vote: The origins of Taiwan's electoral system. Party-state Authoritarianism in the Pre-reform era. Political Reform under Chiang Ching-kuo.The Watershed elections of 1989. The Lee Teng-hui Years (1990-1996). Continuing Challenges to Taiwan's Democracy.

Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratization (review)

??8 China Review International: Vol. 6, No. ?, Spring 1999 John W. Garver. Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratization. Seattle: University ofWashington Press, 1997. xii, 193 pp. Paperback $18.95, isbn 0-295-97617-9. From March 8 to March 25, 1996, the People's Republic of China (PRC) launched missiles directed toward the vicinity of Kaohsiung and Keelung, the two major seaport cities on Taiwan, and conducted a series of extensive live-fire military exercises in the Taiwan Strait. These PRC military actions occurred as Taiwan was engaged in its first-ever direct, popular presidential election. The United States responded to this PRC military intimidation by deploying two aircraft-carrier battle groups in the waters near Taiwan—the largest concentration ofAmerican naval power in East Asia since the Vietnam War. This was the first Sino-U.S. military confrontation since the one involving Vietnam in the late 1960s; faced with superior U.S. forces, the PRC backed down and an international crisis was averted. What led to this PRC saber-rattling? What objectives was the PRC trying to achieve by these threats of force? Why did the United States decide to intervene against these acts of military intimidation? What is the significance of the 1996 crisis and the consequence ofAmerican intervention? How has democratization in Taiwan affected Taiwan-China and Taiwan-U.S. relations? These are among the many issues that John Garver painstakingly examines in Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratization. According to Garver's analysis, two major sets of grievances prompted Beijing to commence large-scale military exercises to intimidate Taiwan (p. 13 ). One was concerned with recent shifts in U.S. policy toward Taiwan: President Bill Clinton's decision in May 1995 to issue a visa permitting Taiwan president Lee Teng-hui to visit his alma mater, Cornell University, was seen by Beijing as a clear and major violation of "explicit commitments" by the United States on the Taiwan question—such as the "One China" policy. The other was concerned with Taiwan's domestic developments and external behavior. The steady process of democratization and the transformation of Taiwan's ruling elite and polity on the one hand and its "pragmatic diplomacy" and growing international status on the other indicated to Beijing that Taiwan was moving closer to independence and further away from unification with the PRC. According to Garber, "The drastic measures of 1996 were, in large part, an© 1999 by University effort to abort this process" (p. 14). ofHawai'i PressRightly or wrongly, PRC leaders at first believed that they could strike a deal with Taiwan's autocratic KMT rulers, Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo, on the matter ofTaiwan's unification with China. Democratic change Reviews 119 in Taiwan thus created a major problem for the PRC—for Beijing could no longer expect to reach a setdement that might totally ignore the wishes of the people ofTaiwan. The death of Chiang Ching-kuo and the political ascendancy of Lee Teng-hui presented new worries for Beijing: although a member of the KMT, Lee is an ethnic Taiwanese and seems to have weaker ties to the mainland than the Chiangs. The PRC leaders were especially incensed by an interview Lee gave in 1994 to a Japanese writer, Ryotaro Shiba, in which Lee (1) stated that Taiwan must belong to the people ofTaiwan, (2) called the KMT regime in Taiwan "an alien regime," and (3) castigated the post-1945 KMT rule in Taiwan as "a period of oppression and darkness for the people ofTaiwan" (p. 24). When Lee used the Old Testament story of Moses leading the Hebrew people out of slavery in Egypt to imply his self-conceived mission for Taiwan, PRC analysts equated Egypt with China and concluded that Lee intended to lead the people ofTaiwan out ofChina (p. 24). Under Lee, Taiwan has also endeavored to reverse its diplomatic isolation by taking a series ofinitiatives to seek greater international recognition. Under the term "pragmatic diplomacy," Taiwan established diplomatic ties with several states that had already recognized the PRC, compelling Beijing to sever relations with them. From 1993 on, Taiwan began knocking on the...

Document 4: President Lee Teng-Hui, “Six-Point Reply,” 8 April 1995

Document 4: President Lee Teng-Hui, “Six-Point Reply,” 8 April 1995

Relations between Taiwan and China after the Missile Crisis: Toward Reconciliation?

C HINA began in 1995 to launch a series of military exercises and missile 6tests against Taiwan when the latter was seeking international recognition of its status as a sovereign and independent country and was all but abandoning the goal of unification with China. China's coercive military actions were terminated after Lee Teng-Hui won the presidential election the following year. Although the crisis in the Strait of Taiwan did not culminate in a military showdown between the two sides, it has heightened concern throughout East Asia that their differences over unification have the potential to deteriorate into war not just between China and Taiwan but also between China and the United States and, consequently, jeopardize regional stability in the near future. Revival of military tension, let alone military conflicts, in the Strait of Taiwan will have greater devastating impact on the entire region now that it is mired in a protracted struggle against the social, political, and economic aftermath of the financial crisis that erupted in July 1997. The prospect for an imminent negotiated settlement between China and Taiwan over unification and, consequently, long-term stability in the Strait of Taiwan is far from assuring. Most Asian specialists and security analysts believe that Taiwan's declaration of, or significant advance towards, independence will surely provoke China to undertake military actions in spite of the costs. According to them, Taiwan's independence aggravates the legitimacy crisis that is currently confronting leaders in Beijing and undermines its national security potentially culminating in the territorial breakup of China. After abandoning the goal of creating an egalitarian social order in accordance with Mao Zedong's vision, the Chinese Communist party's legitimacy to rule is now predicated upon a historical mission to restore China's central position in the world, which only a strong and unified China can achieve, and upon its role as the guardian of China's national sovereignty.' Chinese nationalist sentiments, which leaders in Beijing have stoked up to

Japan's China Policy: Implications for U.S.-Japan Relations

Developments in U.S.-China relations provide frequent fodder for the American media. Sino-Japanese relations, however, though rarely any warmer and certainly no less fragile, attract its attention only occasionally. Given America's tendency to view the world in Washington-centered terms, this oversight is hardly surprising-but it is nonetheless unfortunate. Ties between East Asia's two major powers-one a staunch U.S. ally, the other an uncertain partner not easily termed friend or foe-will do much to define America's future relationship with East Asia. As China emerges on the world stage, the ability of Tokyo and Beijing to manage bilateral ties peacefully will become a challenge of central geopolitical importance. Events over the past few years suggest that the consequences of failing to meet this challenge could be severe. Sino-Japanese relations began a downward spiral in August 1995, when China ignored Japanese protests in conducting its second nuclear test of the year. Tokyo responded to the underground blast by suspending a portion of its development assistance to Beijing. Although the frozen funds represented only a small percentage of Japan's overall aid to China-and were restored less than two years laterthe move represented a striking departure from Tokyo's normally nonconfrontational diplomacy. Officials in Beijing denounced the action, counseling Tokyo to recall the wartime suffering Japan inflicted on the Chinese people. The situation thereafter appeared to go from bad to worse. China's military exercises off the coast of Taiwan shortly before the island's first free presidential elections in March 1996 shocked the Japanese people. The provocative actions generated sympathy in Japan for President Lee Teng-hui of

China's Militarized Interstate Dispute Behaviour 1949–1992: A First Cut at the Data

China's military exercises in the Taiwan Strait in 1995–96 accentuated concerns among states in the Asia-Pacific region about what kind of great power China will become if its economic growth continues at present rates and if its domestic political system does not change appreciably. In most respects many Chinese internal post-mortems on the crisis were quite similar to those in other states: coercive diplomacy led to an increase in voter support for Beijing's nemesis, Lee Teng-hui, and it increased worries among surrounding states about how China might handle bilateral disputes with them; but it also showed just how seriously the Chinese regime takes threats to the related interests of territorial integrity and domestic legitimacy.

Greater China: The Next Superpower? (review)

244 China Review International: Vol. 4, No. 1, Spring 1997©1997 by University ofHawai'i Press David Shambaugh, editor. Greater China: The Next Superpower. Oxford: Clarendon Paperbacks, 1995. ix, 310 pp. "Greater China" is now a common phrase in the press, and increasingly in academic discourse it is used as a new model for post-Cold War global politics. Greater China: The NextSuperpower.—the product ofa China Quarterly conference held in Hong Kong in January 1993—is an interesting book on fhis popular topic. Though there is often disagreement among scholars about the limits of Greater China, most ofthose represented in this volume see it in terms ofthe People's Republic of China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Occasionally Macao, Singapore, and Overseas Chinese communities are also included. Since this conglomeration ofpeople and places bodes to be a major player in world economic, political, and strategic relations, the volume addresses how different groups use and criticize die "Greater China" concept. In "Introduction: The Emergence of'Greater China,'" editor David Shambaugh sets die volume up nicely by providing a concise summary of each of the chapters . He highlights how Greater China is part ofa post-Cold War reconfiguration of International Relations and contains various actors, dimensions, and processes. Most importantiy, he contrasts the problems ofde jure political reunification and the de facto growth of economic and cultural links. Thus, though formal and institutional relations between Taiwan and the PRC remain difficult, the informal integration ofthe two societies marches on. The first chapter, "The Concept of "Greater China": Themes, Variations and Reservations," by Harry Harding is exceUent in explaining the ambiguities of "Greater China." Though fhis term has been used over the past century to define China geographicaUy, the concept regained currency at the end of the 1970s when post-Mao economic reforms opened up China to foreign, usuaUy Hong Kong, investment and trade. This expanded to Taiwan once Taibei loosened travel, trade, and investment restrictions in the mid 1980s. Since dien, cultural and, increasingly, political links have been made. Harding divides die discourse of Greater China into three core concepts: economics , culture, and politics: Economically, Greater China involves the expanding commercial interactions among mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Culturally, it refers to the restoration ofpersonal, scientific, intellectual and artistic contacts among people of Chinese descent around the world. Politically, it refers to the possibility of the re-establishment of a single Chinese state, reuniting a political entity that was disintegrated by more than a century of foreign pressure and civil war. To a degree, the three themes are interrelated: a common cultural identity provides a catalyst for economic ties, and economic interdependence may lay the foundation for political unification, (p. 32) Reviews 245 Some see fhis to be a threat from an expansionist empire rather than an economic opportunity. But Harding states that such alarmist tendencies are overdrawn because they focus only on integrative aspects whUe not recognizing the centrifugal tendencies in Greater China. In some ways this begs the question ofwhether China, let alone Greater China, wül continue to exist at all. To put it another way, does fhe future lie in an increasingly centralized state or will fhe pressures ofmodernization pull China apart. Except for fhe first footnote of fhe volume, in Shambaugh 's article, there is no talk about what would happen ifChina itself falls apart upon the succession to Deng or some other crisis. And what will happen if the regionahsm ofGreater China actuaUy becomes fhe "Lesser China" ofSouthern China, leaving the balance of the mainland behind in its economic and political change? Each offhe foUowing chapters is weU researched and weU written. But most ofthem do not seem able to break free ofthe nation-state concept to look at Greater China as a new phenomenon in world politics. The cover Ulustration— showing a simple coUage ofphotographs ofDeng Xiaoping, Chris Patten, and Lee Teng-hui—speaks to fhe problems faced in die balance offhe book. Greater China is not so much about leaders who represent states but about the anonymous social and economic forces ofthe mUlions ofpeople who are pushing and puUing at the region. Shambaugh recognizes fhis in his introduction: "Ifone looks at Greater China...

Taiwanese Democracy Under Threat: Impact and Limit of Chinese Military Coercion

S INCE 1994, China has launched a series of military exercises to demonOstrate its resolve to safeguard territorial integrity and to intimidate into abandoning any attempts to create either Chinas or China and one Taiwan through its pragmatic diplomacy. After Taiwanese president Lee Tenghui visited his alma mater, Cornell University, in June last year, China took more drastic military actions to indicate to that its toleration of any attempts to split national territory was wearing thin. Failure of military exercises to generate the desired intimidating effect only galvanized China to resort to more reckless military actions, culminating in launching missiles at targets dangerously close to Taiwan's two main key harbors in the north and in the south one week before the Taiwanese voters directly elected a president for the first time in the country's history. Chinese military brinkmanship instantly heightened tensions in the Strait of Taiwan, which caused many countries in the region, including Singapore, South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and Australia, to worry about its war propensity. The military action also prompted the U.S. to deploy two aircraft carrier battle groups in the vicinity of as a precaution against a potential military conflict between and China. What prompted China to resort to military coercion? What objectives did it seek to achieve? To what extent has it achieved its goals? To measure China's success or failure in achieving its goals, one has to ask the following question: To what extent has Chinese military coercion succeeded in influencing Taiwanese public opinion, political parties, and political processes to force that government to abandon or modify its diplomatic efforts to carve out a separate national identity in the international community and to accelerate national unification? Literature on coercive diplomacy has identified the following factors as conducive to a successful application of coercion to achieve political goals: motivation of the disputants, quality of leadership, articulation of precise terms for settlement, generation of a strong sense of urgency in the adversary to comply, international support, and confrontation with the adversary with the specter of unacceptable consequences that will result from further escalation of

Political Developments in the Post-Deng Era and their Impact on China's Relations with Taiwan and Hong Kong

Abstract Indicators suggest that the post-Deng era and the associated leadership succession process have already begun. While the probability of chaos and the splitting up of the country after Deng is not high, control in the ideological arena will likely be tightened. After his electoral victory Lee Teng-hui will initiate measures to improve relations with Beijing and to reduce tension across the Taiwan Strait, leading to direct mail, trade and transport. But Lee will not give up his pragmatic diplomacy which will further provoke Beijing. The Chinese leadership's major difficulty is that it has upped the ante a number of times, and has no results to show to facilitate its climb down the ladder of escalation. With the approach of 1997, the Chinese authorities' influence on Hong Kong has become increasingly significant. The community reluctantly accepts the lack of consultation. About 1.2 million people, however, have the opportunity to emigrate and they adopt a wait-and-see attitude. Meanwhile, economic integration between the territory and southern China has made much progress.

Taiwan’s Lee Teng-hui Complex

Essay| September 01 1996 Taiwan’s Lee Teng-hui Complex Shelley Rigger Shelley Rigger Shelley Rigger is an assistant professor of political science at Davidson College. Her article, “Political Opposition in Taiwan,” will appear in Political Oppositions in Industrializing Asia, edited by Garry Rodan (New York: Routledge, forthcoming). Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Current History (1996) 95 (602): 266–271. https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.1996.95.602.266 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Shelley Rigger; Taiwan’s Lee Teng-hui Complex. Current History 1 September 1996; 95 (602): 266–271. doi: https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.1996.95.602.266 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentCurrent History Search This content is only available via PDF. © 1996 by The Regents of the University of California1996 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Lee Teng-hui Inaugurated President of Taiwan

President Lee. After my inauguration, very soon, probably in July or August, we may need to convene a Political-Economic Conference. This conference will cover such important topics for the next four years. The first one will be our mainland policy. The second one would be the foreign policy for the Republic of China on Taiwan, and lastly, what opinions people have on domestic political reform.

Democracy for the Long Haul

Democracy For The Long Haul Samuel P. Huntington (bio) I was last in Taipei in January 1989, participating in a conference on political change in Taiwan co-sponsored by the Institute of International Relations of National Chengchi University and the Harvard Center for International Affairs. At that time, as a result of the leadership of President Lee Teng-hui, the process of political change was well under way and was becoming a process of democratization. Martial law had been lifted; the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) had been formed; electoral competition was expanding; legislative debates had become vigorous; press censorship was on the way out; social movements and social groups were organizing, demanding, and protesting. The conference itself was also a small part of this process, as the first public meeting in which both Kuomintang (KMT) and DPP officials took part. The changes taking place here in 1989 were, of course, part of the vast third wave of democratization that had begun 15 years earlier in Southern Europe, and then moved on to Latin America and Asia. By 1989 this wave was in full flood, reaching its crest at the end of the year with the collapse of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, which was soon followed by the disintegration of the USSR. These events generated a swelling tide of euphoria. Many believed that a global democratic revolution was under way, that liberal democracy was soon destined to triumph everywhere, that history was [End Page 3] at an end, and that, as Francis Fukuyama put it, we might be approaching “the end point of man’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” 1 Similar euphoric expectations had appeared at the end of this century’s other major conflicts. The First World War was thought to be the “war to end all wars” and the war to make the world safe for democracy. The Second World War, Franklin Roosevelt said, would lead to a new security system that would “end the system of unilateral action, the exclusive alliances, the balances of power, and all the other expedients that have been tried for centuries—and have always failed.” Instead, we would have “a universal organization” of “peace-loving Nations” and the beginnings of a “permanent structure of peace.” 2 The First World War, however, generated communism, fascism, and the reversal of the century-old first wave of democratization. The Second World War produced a Cold War that was truly global. Now, six years after the collapse of European communism, our euphoric moment has passed, and we too have become sadder but wiser. A single dominating ideological conflict has given way to a multiplicity of ethnic conflicts, the stability of a bipolar world to the confusion and instability of a multipolar and multicivilizational world, and the potential horror of global nuclear war to the daily horror of ethnic cleansing. The word “genocide” has been heard far more often in the past five years than it was in any half-decade during the Cold War. In this sobering world, we need to have a sober view of the prospects for democracy and to recognize the possibility that this great third wave of democratization, having brought democracy to some 40 countries, may be losing its outward dynamic and moving from a phase of expansion to one of consolidation. Among scholars of democratization, a major debate goes on concerning the issue of crafting versus preconditions. Some argue that movement toward democracy depends on the existence within society of particular social, economic, or cultural preconditions, although there is much disagreement over what those preconditions are. A different school of thought sees democratization as primarily the product of political leaders who have the will and the skill to bring it about. Clearly, however, both preconditions and crafting have roles to play, and certain preconditions can facilitate democratic crafting. These include a relatively high level of economic development and the prevalence of what can be termed Western culture and values, including Western Christianity. At present, virtually all of the non-oil-producing high-income or upper-middle-income countries, with the exception of Singapore, are demo-cratic...

The Power Structure in Taiwan's Political Economy

The year 1995 was a critical one in Taiwan's political history. It commemorated the centennial of the Manchu Dynasty's cessation of the island to Japan under the Shimonoseki Treaty of 1895 and marked the 50th anniversary of the Kuomintang's (KMT) one-party rule. The year also set the stage for the first direct popular election of Taiwan's president in the spring of 1996. There is no doubt that Taiwan today is fundamentally different from its colonial and authoritarian past. It is a new Taiwan, a dynamic powerhouse and a competitive political democracy. The economic miracle has been widely recognized around the world, but in the last several years under Lee Teng-hui, Taiwan has also emerged dramatically as a dynamic working democracy. Gone are the days of political repression and secret police control. More than 70 political parties have officially registered since martial law was lifted in 1987. Press controls were relaxed in the same year, and the mass media has become one of the most energetic and dynamic in the world. The path to political liberalization and democratization in Taiwan, however, has by no means been smooth. In the political arena, reform had to wait decades for the power grip and conservative heritage of the KMT to erode and change; the strengths of social protest and political opposition also took a long time to nurture and grow; the socioeconomic foundation as a prerequisite to democratization took an even longer time to build. While the essential elements of democratic institution are now very much in place, the very forces that the KMT had skillfully used to support its authoritarian rule and that later corroded its Leninist one-party control, thus

Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea

1994 witnessed interesting developments in cooperation and confidence building dialogue amongst the States of the Asia Pacific region, and in the South China Sea region in particular. On 25 November 1994 in Bogor, Indonesia, the leaders of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Council's (APEC) member States committed to link their economies together through the future creation of the largest free trade zone in the world. Previously, 18 foreign ministers met in July, at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Bangkok, to discuss the post Cold War situation in Southeast Asia. Much of the discussion focused on the role that confidence building activities could play in facilitating transparency in the face of the increasing armaments build up in the region. One of the longest standing confidence building activities in the region are the informal meetings of the project on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea (MPC). 1 Since 1990 this project has continued to develop avenues for cooperative activities and to foster dialogue amongst the littoral States of the South China Sea region. New challenges were presented in 1995 for the MPC project. China's announcement that she would endeavour to settle disputes in the South China Sea through accepted norms of international law and the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea was welcomed by Southeast Asia's leaders. In orde to take advantage of this favourable climate, the MPC convened the First Meeting of the Technical Working Group on legal Matters in the South China Sea in Jakarta, in July. The meeting represents a significant step for the project as previously it was felt a legal debate may degenerate into participants merely restating rhetorical and entrenched positions. The large, and increasing, volume of naval traffic in and around Spratly Islands coupled with the concern that misinterpretation of another's actions could lead to conflict, resulted in the signing of multiple ‘code of conduct’ agreements between claimants. Vietnam and the Philippines as well as China and the Philippines agreed to cooperate in this regard. During 1995 China continued to be the main source of concern for the countries of the region. Her occupation of Mischief Reef at the end of 1994 and rising tensions between the mainland and Taiwan over President Lee Teng-Hui's visit to the US in June, culminating in missile tests off Taiwan, renewed questions over China's intentions in the region.

Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea

1994 witnessed interesting developments in cooperation and confidence building dialogue amongst the States of the Asia Pacific region, and in the South China Sea region in particular. On 25 November 1994 in Bogor, Indonesia, the leaders of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Council's (APEC) member States committed to link their economies together through the future creation of the largest free trade zone in the world. Previously, 18 foreign ministers met in July, at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Bangkok, to discuss the post Cold War situation in Southeast Asia. Much of the discussion focused on the role that confidence building activities could play in facilitating transparency in the face of the increasing armaments build up in the region. One of the longest standing confidence building activities in the region are the informal meetings of the project on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea (MPC).1 Since 1990 this project has continued to develop avenues for cooperative activities and to foster dialogue amongst the littoral States of the South China Sea region. New challenges were presented in 1995 for the MPC project. China's announcement that she would endeavour to settle disputes in the South China Sea through accepted norms of international law and the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea was welcomed by Southeast Asia's leaders. In orde to take advantage of this favourable climate, the MPC convened the First Meeting of the Technical Working Group on legal Matters in the South China Sea in Jakarta, in July. The meeting represents a significant step for the project as previously it was felt a legal debate may degenerate into participants merely restating rhetorical and entrenched positions. The large, and increasing, volume of naval traffic in and around Spratly Islands coupled with the concern that misinterpretation of another's actions could lead to conflict, resulted in the signing of multiple ‘code of conduct’ agreements between claimants. Vietnam and the Philippines as well as China and the Philippines agreed to cooperate in this regard. During 1995 China continued to be the main source of concern for the countries of the region. Her occupation of Mischief Reef at the end of 1994 and rising tensions between the mainland and Taiwan over President Lee Teng-Hui's visit to the US in June, culminating in missile tests off Taiwan, renewed questions over China's intentions in the region.

Taiwan in 1995: Electoral Politics and Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan went through a year of political turbulence in 1995. Across the Taiwan Strait, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) GeneralSecretary Jiang Zemin's eight-point policy proposal in January for peaceful reunification generated a sense of optimism for improved Taiwan-mainland relations. But this had subsided in July when the Beijing authorities launched the first of four military exercises aimed at intimidating Taiwan after President Lee Teng-hui visited the United States. By year's end, the cross-strait relationship had suffered serious political setbacks, as Beijing's bellicose rumblings damaged the atmosphere of reconciliation that had developed since 1987 through trade, investment, tourism, and semi-official contacts. Not since the early 1960s has the People's Republic of China (PRC) displayed such military belligerence toward its Taiwanese compatriots. As Beijing authorities poise themselves for continued military intimidation, at least through Taiwan's first popular presidential election in March 1996, security in the Taiwan Strait could get worse before it gets better. On the domestic front, partisan politics perforated this young democracy; the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) was saddled with internal dissension over the nomination of candidates for president and vice-president. Three leading figures left the KMT to run against the party ticket of incumbent President Lee Teng-hui and Premier Lien Chan. The departures of KMT Vice-Chairman Lin Yang-kang and former Premier Hau Pei-ts'un further split the party. This political dissension had the immediate effect of diluting the KMT vote in the December election for the Legislative Yuan and benefiting the New Party, whose leaders had left the KMT in 1993. The outcome of the parliamentary election, as well as the political dynamics of the upcoming presiden-

The Political Economy of Taiwan´s Relations with Southeast Asia: The “Southward Policy”

When President Lee Teng-hui and Premier Lien Chan visited Southeast Asia in early 1994, Taiwan's Southward began to be known world-wide. Superficially, this policy is aimed at strengthening Taiwan's economic relations with Southeast Asian countries, but in reality the ROC Government intends to expand Taiwan-Southeast Asian economic linkages in exchange for Tai wan's political participation in regional organizations and activities. Yet, while Southeast Asian countries welcome Taiwan's economic resources (capital and technology], they hesitate to upgrade their political relations with Taiwan owing to their deference to China. This article suggests that while Taiwan exerts efforts at streng thening its relations with Southeast Asia, it should also promote practical relations with mainland China. In addition, the South ward should be seen as a long-term objective instead of a short-term programme.

An interview with President Lee Teng-hui of the Republic of China on Taiwan

An interview with President Lee Teng-hui of the Republic of China on Taiwan

Education and National Development: The Case of Taiwan

Taiwan's economic success has attracted worldwide attention. Although government declared the Taiwan to be theory and model for developing countries and was quick to promote it internationally (Lee Teng-hui 1988, 8), some scholars clearly pointed out that experience of Taiwan could not be a model, since it possessed unique historical, geographic, and political characteristics that no other country could imitate (Evans and Pang 1988, 19; Amsden 1988, 172). Of many reasons cited for Taiwan experience, some emphasized strategy, such as land reform and phasic development (Ranis 1979; Amsden 1988; Tsai 1989); others gave credit to role of government (Evans and Pang 1989). Still others focused on historical and cultural factors such as Confucian philosophy (Berger 1984; Hwang 1986). Education was another factor often cited. This fact was not only affirmed by educators but by many economists from point of view of human capital theory, citing education's cont...

Models of DEMOCRATS in Island China/Mainland relations

Abstract Six models of DEMOCRATS (in capital letters) were introduced in this paper: democrat (in italics); “democrat” (in quotation marks); democrat→ “democrat;” democrat→ “democrat”→ democrat; “democrat”→ democrat; and “democrat”→ democrat→ “democrat.” This paper then attempts to explicate which model(s) of DEMOCRATS do Presidents Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui belong to. It was found that Chiang could be regarded as a “democrat,” and Lee, both “democrat” “and democrat”→ democrat. Both of them have to make sure that democratization in Island China can assure its survival as well as create an impact on Mainland China.