IntroductionIn contrast to U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba that virtually all economists agree should be lifted, voices on lifting U.S. economic sanctions against Korea have been rare and weak (Whitty et al., 2006). One reason for the difference is that U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba began on February 3, 1962, when President John F. Kennedy signed into law Presidential Proclamation 3447, but Cuba's hostility toward the United States has not been threatening like Korea's hostility to U.S. allies, which has been violent at times. other reason is that economists have estimated U.S. exports to Cuba to be more than twice the amount of U.S. imports from Cuba when U.S. sanctions against Cuba are lifted (Chang, 2005, p. 30), but no one expects economic benefits to the U.S. to be greater than economic benefits to Korea when U.S. sanctions against Korea are lifted.As Korea's threat to international peace, real or perceived, continues to attract serious attention from the United States and Korea's four neighboring countries, the role of U.S. economic sanctions against Korea is also expected to attract greater attention during the on-again, off-again negotiations. Reviewed first in this paper is the history of U.S. economic sanctions against Korea, this being followed by an analysis of the future of economic sanctions against Korea, based on the hypothesis that the long and sometimes violent history of the relationship between Korea and the U.S. allies makes it difficult for the United States to unilaterally lift its sanctions against Korea without concessions on security issues.The History of U.S. Economic Sanctions against KoreaOn June 28, 1950, only three days after the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States invoked a total embargo on exports to Korea on the basis of the Export Control Act of 1949. This embargo was the beginning of a long series of U.S. economic sanctions against Korea. total embargo was followed by President Truman's Presidential Proclamation 2914 on December 16, 1950, which effectively invoked additional economic sanctions against Korea under thenexisting laws. presidential proclamation was allowed under the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917. A few days later, the U.S. Treasury Department issued Foreign Assets Control Regulations (FACR) to forbid any financial transactions involving, or on behalf of, Korea and China (Rennack, 2003, p. CRS-12).In 1951, the United States passed the Trade Agreement Extension Act that required the suspension of Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status for all munist except Yugoslavia. Korea was denied MFN trade status on September 1, 1951. denial still continues to this date: The United States grants MFN status or better to countries that account for more than 99 percent of global global exports, and thus denial of MFN would clearly be abnormal. Indeed, in 1998, the term 'most-favored-nation,' or MFN, was officially changed to the more appropriate 'normal-trade-relations' or (Preeg, 1999, p. 4). This denial of NTR has effectively banned imports of Korean products to the U.S. market. On August 26, 1955, the U.S. State Department issued its first International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which denied exports and imports of defense articles and defense services, destined for or originating in certain countries: North Korea has been listed as a restricted country from the ITAR's inception (Rennack, 2003, p. 11).On September 4, 1961, the Foreign Assistance Act was passed, authorizing U.S. government foreign aid programs that encompassed a wide range of development assistance, such as economic support funding, numerous multilateral programs, housing and other credit guaranty programs, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, international organizations, debt-for-nature exchanges, international disaster assistance, and more. …
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Jul 15, 2007
S.H Oh + 4
Open Access