Kantian Texts Research Articles

The idea of God as a condition for the reason functionning in Kant's transcendental Theology

According to I. Kant, reflecting on reality, the mind inevitably comes to the idea of an entity possessing the highest perfection and absolutely necessary by its nature. The idea of God as the supreme being is considered by transcendental theology as a hypothesis of pure reason, without which its practical application is impossible. The author of the article explores why and how the concept of God plays a coordinating role in the work of speculative reason. In this regard, the structure and tasks of Kant's transcendental theology are discussed, its problematic nature as a form of cognition, the prerequisites for the emergence of the idea of God in pure reason, the possibility of proving His existence solely based on a priori concepts, the problem of excluding empirical definitions from the idea of God. The idea of God is analyzed in the light of the natural tasks of the mind formulated by Kant, as a necessary condition for the possibility of achieving them. The study is based on the analysis of Kantian texts. These are mainly the works "The only possible basis for proving the existence of God" (1763), the First and Second criticisms, manuscripts from 1778-1780 (the so-called materials for the "Critique of Pure Reason"), Lectures on Rational Theology of the winter semester of 1783/84, etc. As a result of the research, it is shown that the idea of God acts as an unprovable position, which, nevertheless, the mind must accept, since this is necessary for the completeness of its application. The author explains the organizing role of the concept of God by its a priori "genetic" connection with such categories of pure reason as reality and necessity. The concept of God is "involved" in the work of these categories and is simultaneously shaped by their application. It allows, ultimately, to think about the order and expediency of reality and satisfies the requirement of reason to be economical with respect to the number of explanatory principles. The author's special contribution to the research of the topic is to demonstrate the specifics of the transcendental approach to the stated problem. It is shown that the unprovability of the existence of God is a necessary element of transcendental theology. The very idea of the supreme essence appears in it as a limit, indicating the limit of the possibilities of the mind. In this regard, it is productive, as it allows us to idealize, model consciousness and construct a different type of rationality within the boundaries of our understanding of our own mind.

Three Kantian Routes to the Synthetic A Priori

Abstract Kant influentially distinguished analytic from synthetic a priori propositions, and he took certain propositions in the latter category to be of immense philosophical importance. His distinction between the analytic and the synthetic has been accepted by many and attacked by others; but despite its importance, a number of discussions of it since at least W. V. Quine’s have paid insufficient attention to some of the passages in which Kant draws the distinction. This paper seeks to clarify what appear to be three distinct conceptions of the analytic (and implicitly of the synthetic) that are presented in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and in some other Kantian texts. The conceptions are important in themselves, and their differences are significant even if they are extensionally equivalent. The paper is also aimed at showing how the proposed understanding of these conceptions—and especially the one that has received insufficient attention from philosophers—may bear on how we should conceive the synthetic a priori, in and beyond Kant’s own writings.

The Reception and the Fear of Kant in the Late Eighteenth Century

Through a wide range of sources, this study reveals the non-philosophical spread of the ideas of Immanuel Kant in the Slovak regions of Hungary. The flow of philosophical ideas can be demonstrated not only in the works of the Hungarian followers of Kant, but also in censorship sources documenting the import of Kantian texts in the 1790s. The critical debates in correspondences and published texts reveal anti-Kantian argumentations. Information about the advertisements of Kant’s works and subscriptions to them also help form an idea about their popularity. Research on private albums reveals how the philosophical legacy circulated, despite bans and repressions, in non-public communication networks and how its social area extended beyond the sphere of philosophy and education.

Kant's Nonideal Theory of Politics by Dilek Huseyinzadegan

Reviewed by: Kant's Nonideal Theory of Politics by Dilek Huseyinzadegan Omar Dahbour Dilek Huseyinzadegan. Kant's Nonideal Theory of Politics. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2019. Pp. xii + 204. Paperback, $34.95. In this work the author attempts two, rather different, tasks in rethinking the nature of Kant's contributions to political philosophy. First, she argues that Kant's political writings depart methodologically from his critical writings on epistemology and morality. This is the significance of her use of the term 'nonideal theory' to designate the distinctive methodology that is supposedly operative in later Kantian texts such as part 1 of the Metaphysics of Morals, and especially the essays on enlightenment, world history, and war and peace. Second, she maintains that Kant's distinctive contributions to political philosophy derive not from entailments of his moral philosophy, but from specific theses he advocates concerning the nature of legitimate government, historical progress, and international relations. The author's primary claim concerning Kant's method for thinking about political life is that it is distinct from the ideal theory used in his three critiques on epistemology, morality, and aesthetics. While the Metaphysics of Morals contains an "ideal" conception of peace (7), the nonideal theory contained in the other essays provides a guide to the "pursuit of peace" (11). On her view, Kant derives his ideal theory from "formal" notions of personhood and rights (7). But Kant was interested in more than simply working out the conceptual implications of his basic notion of moral rightness. While the central concept of Kant's moral theory is right (Recht), the corresponding concept in his political theory is "purposiveness" (Zweckmässigkeit). The latter is taken to be a "regulative principle of teleology" that justifies the existence of certain values (e.g. "perpetual peace") and institutions (e.g. a federation of states) based on the purposiveness of (human) nature leading toward these ends (10). Kant regarded political norms to be goals that are realizable through a historical process. As the author writes, this is not provable as such, but is a "useful assumption" (31). Clearly, Kant's philosophy of history plays a central role here. It is, as the author admits, a hypothetical reconstruction of world history—even, as she provocatively refers to it, a "historical novel" (27, 51)! Yet, on her account, it shows the importance of narrative in justifying, for instance, the cosmopolitan ideas that Kant espoused (42, 50). At this point, some concerns about this approach emerge. First, Kant's contribution to the philosophy of history is not, despite the author's claims, unprecedented. What is interesting in Kant's case is the particular story he told; but then the importance of Kant's input is not methodological (i.e. with respect to methodology in the philosophy of history, to which Kant contributes nothing unique), but substantive. Second, does Kant's approach truly address what the author refers to as the "feasibility concern" regarding his substantive political proposals (115)? If Kant's teleological reconstruction of human history were based on a thick, empirical account (as, for instance, Hegel's was), maybe so. But Kant's "hypothetical" history is nothing of the sort. The answers here lie not in the methodological originality of Kant's approach, but in the substantive value of the particular norms and institutions that he advocated. Above all, the idea of a cosmopolitan world order has been extremely influential. This order is, on the author's account, a possible, pragmatic result of various historical tendencies—including Kant's notion of "unsocial sociability"—rather than a simple product of postulated moral ideals. Peace, in other words, is a political goal, rather than a moral goal, and is to be achieved not on the basis (only) of moral incentives, but also of the practical incentive of peoples' need for accommodation with one another (102–3). This practical incentive gives rise to the three political proposals that Kant advocates: republican government, a federation of states, and a right of hospitality (117). The combined effect of the enactment of these proposals was to be the condition of "perpetual peace" that Kant envisaged as the necessary end of world history (13). There are, however, some reasons...

Análisis de la Carta de la ONU a la luz de los postulados del texto “Zum ewigen Frieden” de Immanuel Kant. El objetivo de la paz y el mecanismo de la guerra

En el presente ensayo se procede a realizar un análisis de la Carta de las NacionesUnidas, específicamente en relación con el objetivo de mantener la paz y, cómo este mismo documento regula los conflictos que pueden poner en riesgo tal objetivo. El análisis propuesto intentará fusionar las ideas emanadas del texto político de Kant, el cual establece pautas de cómo debe ser un tratado dirigido al establecimiento de la paz perpetua. En la primera sección se analiza el Capítulo I: Propósitos y principios en concordancia con el Capítulo VI: Arreglo pacífico de controversias y con las medidas que se separan del concepto propio de la paz, las cuales se encuentran en el Capítulo VII: Acción en caso de amenazas a la paz, quebrantamientos de la paz o actos de agresión. En la segunda sección se describe el texto kantiano Zum ewigen Frieden y, a la vez, se analizan los artículos del modelo de tratado que se establece. En la última sección se realiza un análisis correlacional entre la Carta de la Naciones Unidas y el modelo kantiano determinando la existencia de una antinomia normativa que implica la imposibilidad material en el cumplimiento del objetivo de mantener la paz.

Kant e la Rivoluzione Francese: liberali e/o reazionari fra passione e storia

L’articolo nasce dal tentativo di trovare una connessione all’interno di parte della filosofia kantiana fra i tre termini di “passione”, “storia” e “Rivoluzione” (soprattutto francese). La sua intenzione fondamentale è quella di rispondere alle seguenti domande: che ruolo hanno le passioni nel sorgere della storia? E quale significato ha rappresentato la Rivoluzione Francese nel corso delle vicende umane? La ricerca si è occupata principalmente del commento di alcune delle nove tesi del testo kantiano Idea di una storia universale dal punto di vista cosmopolitico ma si è basata anche su altri testi del filosofo di Könisberg, quali Il conflitto delle Facoltà ed i Principi metafisici della dottrina del diritto. Essa si è articolata intorno ai seguenti punti: il ruolo della socievole insocievolezza nel far nascere la società e dunque la storia, il ruolo del popolo nel determinare la storia, la posizione kantiana a favore e poi contro la Rivoluzione Francese. Cercando di determinare se si possa mantenere una linea di sostanziale continuità, nonostante le differenze, nel pensiero kantiano sulla Rivoluzione Francese espresso nei testi sopracitati, l’articolo s’interroga anche sul rapporto fra procedere della ragione nella ricerca della conoscenza e della crescita morale, e filosofia della storia (ragionando particolarmente sul confronto fra l’idea di “fine” della storia e l’uso della ragione, un confronto mediato dal concetto di “organizzazione”).

A pergunta fundamental de Leibniz na base do ideal transcendental da Cŕitica da Razão Pura

We seek to present the importance of Leibniz's theses on Kant's philosophy by examining how the two philosophers reflect on the demonstration of God's existence. To do so, we return in general lines to the Leibnizian arguments of his Principles of Nature and Grace (1714) to demonstrate the existence of God. Next, we recall how a similar argument can be found in pre-critical Kantian texts such as the Nova Dilucidatio (1755) and The Only Possible Argument for a Demonstration of the Existence of God (1762). Subsequently, we present (also in broad outline) some of the main reasons listed by the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) that seem to have convinced Kant to abandon the previous certainty about the effective validity of the pre-Critical argumentation (Leibnizian in some way). Finally, we note the permanence of this argument in the section of the Critique of Pure Reason – dedicated to the exposition of the genesis of the so-called transcendental ideal of pure reason.

Об огне. Магистерская диссертация

The text of Kant’s first dissertation is a translation from Latin from an academic publication of a collection of Kant’s works: Kant, I. Meditationum quarundam de igne succincta delineatio... In: Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, ed., 1910. Kants Gesammelte Schriften. 1. Abhandling: Werke. Band I: Vorkritische Schriften I, 1747-1756. Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1910, pp. 369-384. The publication is available at https://korpora.zim.uni-duisburg- essen.de/kant/aa01/ [Accessed 10 March 2019]. Pagination and illustrations are from the same publication, the page numbers are in square brackets at the beginning of the page. Page footnotes, if indicated, draw on the commentaries of Lewis White Beck, the translator of the dissertation into English from the following edition: Kant, I., 2012. Natur­al Science, edited by E. Watkins, translated by L. W. Beck, J. B. Edwards, O. Reinhardt, M. Schönfeld and E. Watkins. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 713-714. It was important for the translator to follow the course of Kant’s thought and as far as possible preserve his style, including recurring words. Natural science terminology keeps as close as possible to the dissertation text, so instead of the term “gas”, which Kant does not use, the translator resorts to a loan-translation “elastic liquid,” harking back to the Russian term упругая жидкость (elastic liquid) which was proposed by Mikhail V. Lomonosov but did not catch on. For the same reason the translator uses the loan translation “moment” instead of the more common “motive force”. “Gradus”, however, is always translated as “degree” for the sake of uniformity. All the translator’s additions to the Kantian text are within square brackets. When the meaning of a word is translated in a form that departs from the original meaning due to context the Latin original is attached within round brackets in the grammatical form used by Kant. To facilitate understanding, long compound sentences of the Kantian text are sometimes broken up into several simple sentences. The structure of the text and title page format have been preserved. The translator would like to express sincere gratitude to Alexei N. Krouglov and Svyatopolk N. Yeschenko for their valuable advice, remarks and help and support in preparing this publication.

Acción recíproca y unidad necesaria de la experiencia. Sobre la interpretación de E. Watkins del modelo causal kantiano

En este trabajo analizo algunos aspectos de la interpretación del modelo causal kantiano que E. Watkins presenta en su libro Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality. Según el autor, sólo su interpretación permite volver inteligibles las relaciones de acción recíproca que Kant presenta en la tercera analogía de la experiencia.Contra esta posición, intento demostrar, por un lado, que la tercera analogía podría resultar inteligible de acuerdo con el modelo causal “evento-evento”, que Watkins critica, y que, por otro lado, el modelo propuesto por este autor podría volver ininteligible, o al menos oscurecer, el sentido de la segunda analogía de la experiencia

Koskenniemi's Images of the International Lawyer

AbstractIn this article I excavate and critique two dominant images of the international lawyer that emerge from the oeuvre of Martti Koskenniemi. In doing so, I hope to briefly shake the faith critical international legal thought so often invests in the potential of the subject. The first image is of the critical subject that emerges from From Apology to Utopia. She also happens to be a projection of the critic, governed by both elitism and unhappiness, for whom freedom is always both a constant and overarching possibility, and yet always embodied in a fleeting moment. By way of critique, I question whether this critic(al subject) may not unwittingly embed the very aspects of liberal legal and political thought that she seeks to challenge. The second image is of the professional lawyer, left on the shores of pragmatism. She emerges from my reading of Koskenniemi's The Gentle Civilizer, the 2005 Epilogue and his Kantian texts. She is constructed as Koskenniemi's critique is domesticated, taking a last, and perhaps futile, refuge in an ethics that is needed to buttress an identity which can aid international law's moral regeneration. Koskenniemi's writings urge today's international lawyers to put their sense of identity into question; this article asks which identities (and their possibilities) he embeds as he does so.

Freedom of the Press: a Kantian Approach

This paper presents an interpretation of the Kantian concepts of public and private use of reason in relation to the topic of the legitimacy of freedom of the press. In this case, I intend not only an interpretation of the Kantian texts but also an update of Kantian philosophy in a sense that tries to recontextualize some arguments and concepts for thinking about the modern question of freedom of the press in democratic societies.

Equidade na Doutrina do Direito de Kant: um direito que, não sendo um direito, enfraquece a “tese da independência”

O presente trabalho tem por objetivo abordar criticamente a chamada “tese da independência” (Unabhängigkeitsthese) entre Direito e Ética a partir do texto kantiano sobre a equidade em sua Doutrina do Direito. Para essa abordagem crítica, procurou-se demonstrar um enfraquecimento da “tese da independência” segundo conceitos endógenos à obra de Kant, a partir do que convencionamos tratar-se de uma abertura oblíqua da sua lei jurídica à ética. A fim de o demonstrar, usamos um caminho metodológico analítico dividido em três momentos: (i) a análise do conceito de direito em Kant; (ii) uma abordagem explicativa da “tese da independência”; e (iii) uma abordagem crítica da “tese da independência”.

Michael Wolff über Kant als Logiker. Eine Stellungnahme zu Wolffs Metakritik

In an earlier article (see J Gen Philos Sci (2009) 40: 357–372) I have discussed the arguments brought forward by Michael Wolff against the interpretation given in the commentary by Ebert and Nortmann on Aristotle’s syllogistic theory (Aristoteles Analytica Priora Buch I, ubersetzt und erlautert von Theodor Ebert und Ulrich Nortmann. Berlin 2007) and against the critique of Kant’s adaption of the syllogistic logic. I have dealt with Wolff’s arguments concerning (Ebert/Nortmann’s interpretation of) Aristotle in the paper mentioned and with his attempts to defend his critique in this subsequent article (part 1; see J Gen Phils Sci (2010) 41: 215–231). Part 2 (the paper below) is concerned with Wolff’s renewed attempts to defend Kant as a logician. In particular I point out that if, as Wolff claims, the nota notae relation in Kant is restricted to subordinated concepts, then it can hardly serve as a principle for syllogistic logic, as Kant claims. Against Wolff’s attempts to defend Kant’s claim that o-propositions are simpliciter convertible, I point out two arguments: (1) Even if Kant, following the Vernunftlehre by Meier, has assumed that an o-proposition can be turned into an i-proposition, this conversion is useless for the reduction to first figure syllogisms since we are no longer dealing with three syllogistic terms but with four. (2) It is quite unlikely that Kant has a conversion of this type in mind since the texts of his students always talk of the group of either the particular propositions or else of the negative propositions. Given Kant’s mistakes concerning the convertibility simpliciter of o-propositions, it is no wonder that he overlooks the special status of the moods Baroco and Bocardo. Wolff’s attempts to provide Kant with what he claims are direct proofs for these moods can be shown to rely on a reductio ad impossibile. Kant mistook what are parts of the proofs for the validity of moods in figures two to four as parts of these moods themselves. Wolff—who tries to defend Kant on this point—is forced to an artificial and unconvincing reading of the Kantian texts.

Sharing the Secret: Between Law and Fiction (Literature and Politics in the Thought of Jacques Derrida)

To understand Derrida’s conception of the relationship between literature and politics, one needs to begin with his reflection on the connection between the production of meaning in language, on the one hand, and the demarcation of borders in socio-political space, on the other. For Derrida, literature is a specific kind of writing that, by intensifying the limits of meaning, suspends or de-stabilizes the socio-political borders erected by all institutional normativity. This article reflects on the mutual entanglement, thus emphasized by Derrida, between a certain idea of “literature” and a certain idea of “democracy.” What is at stake here is the possibility of configuring the political community by other means. This possibility implies the challenge of re-thinking the exercise of freedom and the affirmation of an unrestricted universality, no longer in the transparency of a fully-accountable subject or in the space of intelligibility of discursive rationality, as we are used to thinking about them. But rather, it is a freedom associated with an irreducible opacity of the subject, and a universality associated with an instance of excess (the “secret’), which dislocates the structure of discursive meaning. By pointing out suggestive points of convergence between several late Kantian texts and some works by Derrida on the apophatic writing of medieval mysticism, the article attempts to show how Derrida’s meditation on the political function of literature prompts us to question and de-stabilize the opposition between “Enlightenment” and “mysticism”, and a series of dichotomies tied the latter that have become dogmatic in our understanding of politics.

Téléologie juridique et téléologie historique chez Kant

This essay shows that according to Kant the philosophy of history is a division of physical teleology, which only meaning is to be a confirmation of the moral (juridical) teleology which grounds and seeks in the physical world a natural grounding for the standpoint of ends (peace) which nature itself is always powerless to bring about. The teleology of freedom seeks in the teleology of nature grounds for hope and its actual achievement, yet without ever filling the void of the separation that prohibits all natural accomplishment of right. That explains the effects of rupture one can find in the Kantian texts, and which are only a problem for the continuist reading which is here refused. Finally, it is shown that genuine historical events consist rather in that which within history cannot knowingly be deduced from history, because they precisely escape from the natural world that is their invariable context.

Kant's Perpetual Peace and Its Hidden Sources: A Textual Approach

The problem of Kantâ‐™s sources in Perpetual Peace has never before been dealt with in a systematic fashion. As some commentators have already noticed, Kant seldom quotes his sources in Perpetual Peace and in quite a number of other works. The purpose of the present research note is to analyze the Kantian text and to find philological traces of the various authors that we believe have been important to Kantâ‐™s work in the field of political philosophy. With this in mind, a methodology has been elaborated which includes three aspects: a textual and comparative analysis, a consistency analysis and a contextual analysis. These three approaches combined should allow us to systematically shed light on the key role played by Emer de Vattelâ‐™s famous book The Law of Nations (1758) and, more unexpectedly, by the Federalist Papers, in particular articles No. 10, 14 and 51 written by Madison.

The Transcendental Deduction of the Categorial Imperative in Fichte’s System of Ethics

In Fichte's System of Ethics find a double deduction of categorial imperative. first one, in §1-3, is for philosopher, based on essence of I. second one appears in §9-13 and 16, where Fichte shows how I-self rises genetically to moral conscience. In this essay I will concentrate on explicating first of these deductions. Kant In first three paragraphs of System of Ethics (1798), Fichte proceeds to lay out bases of his ethics by philosophically deducing tile law or principle of morality. With this deduction, he promises us the most perfect insight into morality of our being, because it makes comprehensible so-called categorical imperative. latter no longer appears to be sort of hidden property (qualitas occulta). . . . Thanks to this derivation, that dark region of sundry, irrational enthusiasm [Schwarmerei], which has opened itself in connection with categorical imperative (e.g., notion that moral law is inspired by deity), is securely annihilated.1 With this deduction it appears that moral law comes from transcendental I. Was this something that remained unclear in Kantian text? It is well known that Kant placed freedom first in cosmological area, in third of antinomies of Critique of Pure Reason (1781), understanding it as a real force or an unconditional cause of phenomena, as the power of beginning a state spontaneously.2 But as such transcendental freedom stems from experience, and therefore it cannot be asserted objectively. practical concept of freedom is nevertheless based on me transcendental idea of it, and denial of transcendental freedom involves elimination of all practical freedom. But this transcendental freedom cannot be refuted either, since theoretical knowledge does not reach totality or unconditional, and is even less capable of explaining experience of duty and of imputability of acts. possibility of such freedom remains open therefore, and that is enough for Kant in this first critical approach to topic, since in The Canon of Pure Reason3 he affirms that practical freedom consists only of independence in regard to sensuous present impulses, and this be proved through experience,4 because we have power to overcome impressions on our faculty of sensuous desire, by calling up representations of what, in a more indirect manner, is useful or injurious.5 This closeness between profitable and moral thing, which still existed in Canon of Critique of Pure Reason, is dismantled in first two chapters of Fundamental Principles of Metaphysic of Morals (1785) and distinguished as two different imperatives: hypothetical and categorical. Only latter is moral law, and free action, according to this new formulation of moral law, has to be not only as duty requires, but also carried out because duty requires it. Consequently, moral freedom entails pure motivations that stop being accessible to experience, provided only that this tells us that have not found some secret impulse of self-love, but not that it does not exist.6 In this case, how can demonstrate reality of practical freedom in every rational being and base validity of moral law on it? This is not possible theoretically (KrV), nor by appealing to experience nor by resorting to an intellectual intuition, so question remains in truth unanswered in third chapter of Fundamental Principles of Metaphysic of Morals. Then, in Critique of Practical Reason (1788), Kant inverts terms: It is moral law, as a fact of practical reason well-established in itself, which assures us reality of moral freedom7 (already identified with transcendental freedom of third antinomy),8 since only for a free being is consciousness of his duty possible and only actions of such a free being can be imputed to him. …

Critique de la faculte de juger de la musique

Kant's Critique of Judgement on Music. It is well known that Kant, in his Critique of Judgement, utters an explicit and repeated negative judgement on music. There is no doubt that such a condemnation is Kant's basic attitude, and that most difficulties of his position actually concern the range of such a negative statement, as well as the way to justify it. Much less attention, however, has been given to hesitations and nuances so thoroughly that this argumentation seem to put several basic categories of Kantian theory to the test, in which lies the great importance of Kantian text for musical aesthetics. In fact, Kant seems to accomplish a sort of an eulogy of music which wouldn't pronounce itself, hidden as it is under axiological hierarchies and moral suspicions, as in a negative picture. Taking account of this complexity should allow a subtler approach of that decisive historical break between AufklA¤rung's generation and German thought of the XIXth century, either in its romantic, Hegelian, or Schopenhauerian trends. Moreover, one could say that the Critique of Judgement introduces several themes that since then have always been at the center of musical theory's concern.

Kant's Political Philosophy (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 265 an absolute guarantee of truth. The theory of possibility fails as a replacement for the axiom because it does not fit well into Hume's epistemology: it is not empirical. Kreimendahl turns his attention to Hume's "fork" (relations of ideas and matters of fact), and finds its sources in Leibniz and the theological debates of Tillotson, who was particularly concerned with the question of the certainty of theological judgments . Kreimendahl asks how mathematical ideas, which are not based on previous impressions, can be reconciled with Hume's empiricism, and how it is possible for Hume to distinguish a priori between relations of ideas and matters of fact without violating his empiricism. He concludes that Hume's inconsistency reflects the different and disparate sources he drew upon. To show once again that Hume was inconsistent is to batter down an already open door. Kreimendahl's contribution is to show that this inconsistency has its roots in Hume's rationalism. The most interesting part of the book, to my mind, is Kreimendahrs historical detective work. Kreimendahl overstates, however, the influence some writers had on Hume. To show that Abb~ Pluche and Tillotson held views parallel to those held by Hume is not to show that they influenced him. It is by no means unheard of for two philosophers to come to similar conclusions quite independently. HAMILTON BECK Oklahoma State University Howard L. Williams. Kant's Political Philosophy. New York: St Martin's Press, 1983. Pp. xii + 29u. $3o.oo. In the past fifteen years, a number of books have been published on Kant's politica! philosophy: Murphy (197o), Saage (1973) , Saner 0973), Shell 098o), Riley (a983), and the text of some lectures by Arendt (1981). Howard Williams correctly notes, however, that none of them has succeeded either in showing "how Kant's views on politics square with the major tenets of his critical philosophy" or in establishing Kant as "a political philosopher of the first rank" (vii). In my judgment, Williams's book also leaves those tasks unaccomplished. Nevertheless, it makes a significant contribution to the literature on the topic and compares well with any of the books listed above. It is inappropriate of Williams to advertise his book as showing how Kant's political thought relates to the critical philosophy as a whole, for almost any of the books mentioned above does a better job of that. Williams's book is deliberately written in a "simple" and "modest" fashion, assuming little knowledge of Kant or of political philosophy (vii). This may account in part for the impression of philosophical naivet6 the book often gives. But the objective of showing how Kant's political thought arises out of his critical philosophy is hindered by the author's apparent lack of much knowledge of Kantian metaphysics and by his superficial treatment of Kantian moral philosophy. The book's strengths lie elsewhere, in Williams's thorough knowledge of the Kantian texts on political philosophy, and in his good judgment about the strengths and weaknesses of the ideas expressed there. Williams also refers regularly 266 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY and helpfully to other major political philosophers (such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau , Hegel, occasionally also Plato and Aristotle, Burke, and T. H. Green) and illuminates Kant's views by comparison with theirs. Williams begins with a comprehensive, well-written chapter on Kant's philosophy of history which provides the perspective from which he views Kant's political thought. The second chapter on Kant's moral philosophy and the relation of morals to politics is less strong. The next three chapters expound some of the main themes in the First Part of the Rechtslehre: Kant's conception of justice (Chapter 3); his theory of property (Chapter 4); and three other themes in the theory of Privatrecht--punishment , contract, and marriage (Chapter 5)Williams claims that his discussion of Kant's distinction between noumenal and empirical concepts of property "deals neatly with a seemingly intractable difficulty in liberal property theory" (viii). He also claims that "Kant expresses some surprising views on the role of women" (ix). These advertisements, however, appear only to set the reader up for disappointment. The difficulty in liberal...

Supererogation by David Heyd

BOOK REVIEWS 485 logic of sensation language differs drastically between first and third persons because I possess in my own case a privileged, arlicul«te acquaintance with my own sensations. But this notion is just what the repudiation of private rule-following makes impossible. My acquaintance with my own sensations becomes articulate (becomes part of a rule-governed system of identification, description, etc.) only in a setting that already involves a complex of learned and instinctive behaviors and practices in which others-and their pains-are intimately implicated. Thus the logic of all sensation language is pushed into a public domain, in which alone the idea of consistent, intelligible practice can gain a footing. But Kripke concludes with an expression of dissatisfaction over Wittgenstein 's handling of the issues. He writes: " Clearly much more needs to be said here: a few sketchy remarks . . . hardly give a complete theory" {p. 145). But what sort of theory is it that Kripke, in the face of Wittgenstein's " sceptical paradoxes and solutions," believes to be both needed and possible'! One sort of theory would be a more complete account of the ways in which sensation language is taught and acquired, a detailing of the place various sorts of sensation language hold in human Jives, a deeper account of the social conventions supported by or required by our talk about sensations, and so on. But what philosophical problems would these explorations into what Wittgenstein called " our natural history " solve'I Or does Kripke aim for a theory in a more ambitious, more traditionally " philosophical " sense-a theory that would overcome the " sceptical paradoxes" and provide a " straight solution " to the problem of other minds'! If so, is such a theory to be more general, anchoring perhaps all our rule-following in something other than human agreement in the use of public criteria'I Would the theory constitute an attempt to restore the rationalism under attack in Wittgenstein's " scepticism'I " JOHN CHURCHILL Hendrix College Conway, .Arkansas Supererogation. By DAVID HEYD. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. Pp. 191. $29.50. This book remedies the lack of proportion between the importance of acts of supererogation in everyday life and the attention they have received from philosophers. Relying heavily on both the Christian origins of the theory of supererogation and on J. 0. Urmson's seminal article "Saints and Heroes" {1958), Heyd shows: (1) how supererogation fits (or does not fit, as the case may be) into the major ethical theories in the 486 BOOK REVIEWS history of philosophy; and (2) how a contemporary philosopher can defend a theory of supererogation. (1) The idea of supererogation was, strictly speaking, alien to the classical ethics of virtue, since arete was not above and beyond the call of duty. Nonetheless, some distinctions between what is strictly required and what is virtuous but partly optional can be found in Aristotle and others. Thus, classical ethics is pre-supererogatory rather than anti-supererogatory . The theological roots of supererogation in Christianity can be traced back to the New Testament and to the Church Fathers, and especially to Saint Thomas Aquinas's treatment of the distinction between precepts (like the ten commandments) and counsels (like perfect chastity ). Opera supererogationis aroused one of the most heated theological disputes in the sixteenth century when Protestants criticized the idea of supererogation, largely because of the Catholic view that supererogatory acts created a surplus of merit that could be tapped in the form of indulgences (even though the Protestants also indirectly held this view by believing that Christ redeemed humanity from sin). Perhaps because of this Protestant background, Kant became the most forceful philosophical anti-supererogatonist. Deontology conquers axiology , so that an act is moral only if it is a duty. Even here, however, Heyd finds Kantian texts that grant the intrinsic value of moral conduct which transcends what is strictly required. The wider definition of " moral " maintained by utilitarians makes it easier for them to explain supererogation than Kant, especially if they are defenders of what Heyd calls "negative utilitarianism." The most successful of all major ethical theories, however, in explaining supererogation is contract theory, since it takes justice (rather than virtue, duty, or utility) as...