Supererogation by David Heyd

Abstract

BOOK REVIEWS 485 logic of sensation language differs drastically between first and third persons because I possess in my own case a privileged, arlicul«te acquaintance with my own sensations. But this notion is just what the repudiation of private rule-following makes impossible. My acquaintance with my own sensations becomes articulate (becomes part of a rule-governed system of identification, description, etc.) only in a setting that already involves a complex of learned and instinctive behaviors and practices in which others-and their pains-are intimately implicated. Thus the logic of all sensation language is pushed into a public domain, in which alone the idea of consistent, intelligible practice can gain a footing. But Kripke concludes with an expression of dissatisfaction over Wittgenstein 's handling of the issues. He writes: " Clearly much more needs to be said here: a few sketchy remarks . . . hardly give a complete theory" {p. 145). But what sort of theory is it that Kripke, in the face of Wittgenstein's " sceptical paradoxes and solutions," believes to be both needed and possible'! One sort of theory would be a more complete account of the ways in which sensation language is taught and acquired, a detailing of the place various sorts of sensation language hold in human Jives, a deeper account of the social conventions supported by or required by our talk about sensations, and so on. But what philosophical problems would these explorations into what Wittgenstein called " our natural history " solve'I Or does Kripke aim for a theory in a more ambitious, more traditionally " philosophical " sense-a theory that would overcome the " sceptical paradoxes" and provide a " straight solution " to the problem of other minds'! If so, is such a theory to be more general, anchoring perhaps all our rule-following in something other than human agreement in the use of public criteria'I Would the theory constitute an attempt to restore the rationalism under attack in Wittgenstein's " scepticism'I " JOHN CHURCHILL Hendrix College Conway, .Arkansas Supererogation. By DAVID HEYD. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. Pp. 191. $29.50. This book remedies the lack of proportion between the importance of acts of supererogation in everyday life and the attention they have received from philosophers. Relying heavily on both the Christian origins of the theory of supererogation and on J. 0. Urmson's seminal article "Saints and Heroes" {1958), Heyd shows: (1) how supererogation fits (or does not fit, as the case may be) into the major ethical theories in the 486 BOOK REVIEWS history of philosophy; and (2) how a contemporary philosopher can defend a theory of supererogation. (1) The idea of supererogation was, strictly speaking, alien to the classical ethics of virtue, since arete was not above and beyond the call of duty. Nonetheless, some distinctions between what is strictly required and what is virtuous but partly optional can be found in Aristotle and others. Thus, classical ethics is pre-supererogatory rather than anti-supererogatory . The theological roots of supererogation in Christianity can be traced back to the New Testament and to the Church Fathers, and especially to Saint Thomas Aquinas's treatment of the distinction between precepts (like the ten commandments) and counsels (like perfect chastity ). Opera supererogationis aroused one of the most heated theological disputes in the sixteenth century when Protestants criticized the idea of supererogation, largely because of the Catholic view that supererogatory acts created a surplus of merit that could be tapped in the form of indulgences (even though the Protestants also indirectly held this view by believing that Christ redeemed humanity from sin). Perhaps because of this Protestant background, Kant became the most forceful philosophical anti-supererogatonist. Deontology conquers axiology , so that an act is moral only if it is a duty. Even here, however, Heyd finds Kantian texts that grant the intrinsic value of moral conduct which transcends what is strictly required. The wider definition of " moral " maintained by utilitarians makes it easier for them to explain supererogation than Kant, especially if they are defenders of what Heyd calls "negative utilitarianism." The most successful of all major ethical theories, however, in explaining supererogation is contract theory, since it takes justice (rather than virtue, duty, or utility) as...