Abstract
The present paper sets out to counter the claim put forward by British philosopher of mind, Robert Kirk, according to which Sartre’s notion of consciousness as for-itself, while offering some valuable insights regarding human existence, nonetheless fails to engage with the problem of how to establish the existence of such conscious beings on philosophical grounds. To the extent that it succeeds in meeting the challenge raised by Kirk’s comment, the reading of Being and Nothingness offered here could be considered as fulfilling a twofold aim. Firstly, it offers an answer to the problem of other minds which is construed on the basis of Sartre’s ontological work, thus contributing to a still open debate in the scholarly literature devoted to Sartre’s thought. Secondly, it illustrates one way in which a specific problem which is amply discussed among contemporary philosophers of mind could be tackled from within a conceptual framework rooted in the continental tradition of philosophy.
Highlights
The problem of other minds or selves has been alive in philosophy at least since the inception of the Cartesian private theatre model of the mind
Philosophical discussion regarding consciousness and mind has proceeded on two parallel fronts, namely, the front of the mainly Anglo-American or analytical philosophy of mind and that of the so-called Continental tradition
It is undeniable that some interesting and fruitful philosophical work has gone into a critical appraisal of the conclusions and conceptual apparatuses adopted by philosophers who are usually placed in the Continental tradition, thereby showing how their works can be relevant to the issues with which mainstream analytical philosophy of mind concerns itself
Summary
The main theme of Kirk’s latest work has been to show the implausibility of the conception of the ‘philosophical’ zombie, that is:. In my view this is so not so much because Sartre fails to establish the existence of a concrete person (e.g., Pierre or Annie) but mainly because if the possibility that the phenomenon of being-looked-at, that is, the radical transformation of the cogito from a being-for-itself to a being-for-others, can be conceived as occurring in the absence of another subjectivity, the cogito by itself playing a central role in the project is not adequate to ground the existence of that subjectivity necessarily and beyond doubt This possibility is what constitutes the failure of Sartre’s position in Ayer’s view: “It may be certain that I have the feeling of being watched, and this may reasonably be taken to involve a belief on my part that other subjects exist. Sartre’s words in this regard are revealing: “In truth the cogito must be our point of departure, but we can say of it ... that it leads us only on condition that we get out of it” (Being and Nothingness 73-74)
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