Abstract

In my paper, I want to focus not only on the notions of givenness and evidence in Husserl’s phenomenology, but also on phenomenological work “after” Husserl. I will elaborate on how these phenomenological key ideas can methodologically be made fruitful, especially for an investigation into religious phenomena. After giving an outline of Husserl’s notions of (self-)givenness, evidence, and original intuition (I), I want to portray key elements of Steinbock’s discovery of a generative dimension in Husserl’s phenomenology and show how this approach correlates to the field of religious experiences (II). Subsequently, I want to focus on Steinbock’s book Phenomenology of Mysticism: The Verticality of Religious Experience (2007), and elucidate how for Steinbock different historical examples of mystical experiences can serve as leading clues for the revelation of the essential, eidetic structures of “vertical experiences”—or, phenomenologically speaking, the eidos of religious experience, which turns out to be “epiphany” (III). The expression “verticality,” as opposed to “horizontality,” denotes the existential and dynamic dimension of experiences which are oriented toward a new height (religiously or morally) “beyond” ourselves.

Highlights

  • The phenomenological principles of givenness and self-givenness can be made fruitful in particular for a description and investigation of those phenomena which, according to their very nature, resist other theoretical approaches

  • Rather, pushing phenomenology to its limits, the full range of experience shows that there are certain kinds of phenomena of which the genuine mode of givenness cannot be reduced to the way in which objects are presented to a subject

  • 39 PhænEx 13, no. 2 (Winter 2020): 38-51 are characterized by a specific kind of evidence, namely to be “given as not being able to be given” (Steinbock, Generativity 290)

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Summary

Introduction

The phenomenological principles of givenness and self-givenness can be made fruitful in particular for a description and investigation of those phenomena which, according to their very nature, resist other theoretical approaches. Rather, pushing phenomenology to its limits, the full range of experience shows that there are certain kinds of phenomena of which the genuine mode of givenness cannot be reduced to the way in which objects are presented to a subject.

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