The Problem of Mind and Other Minds in William James’s Pragmatism

Abstract

The chapter explicates William James’s pragmatist conception of the human mind and his way of approaching the problem of other minds. James’s pragmatism is usually classified among empiricist and associationist philosophies of mind, but as is shown, it can also be understood according to its Kantian features. In James’s view, the mind is really an active and a purpose-oriented organizing principle which structures our lifeworld. The main difference between James’s pragmatism and Kant’s transcendental philosophy is that James does not make any explicit distinction between psychological and philosophical inquiries into the mind; he based his philosophy of mind on the same introspective methods that he used in his psychological studies. The chapter shows that despite this difference there are interesting connections between the pragmatist and the transcendentalist traditions. The latter part of the chapter questions the recurrent accusation that James’s philosophy is individualistic and even leads to solipsism. It is highly questionable, whether James’s philosophy of mind really reduces the other person to something in my experience. James’s position can be properly understood only if the problem of other minds is not merely understood as metaphysical or epistemological, but also, or even primarily, as an ethical question. Despite this, one can find certain egocentric traits in James’s philosophy. These traits stem from the fact that James’s notion of the ethical attitude is based on the requirement that the self must take responsibility for the other in order to correct its “instinctive blindness” to the other’s goals and projects.