Justice Stone Research Articles

Chief Justice Stone and the Supreme Court

Chief Justice Stone and the Supreme Court

Chief Justice Stone and the Supreme Court

Chief Justice Stone and the Supreme Court

Constitutional Law in 1943–44

There were no changes in the personnel of the Court during the 1943 term. Disagreement amongst the justices mounted sharply. In seventeen cases, four justices dissented; three dissented in twenty others. Two cases overruled previous decisions of the Court, bringing to twenty-four the total list of reversals since 1937. One of the two recent reversals, that in the very important case holding the insurance business to be interstate commerce, was effected by a minority of the justices, who divided four-to-three.A. Questions of National Power1. The war PowerConstitutionality of Wartime Price Control and Rationing. In a group of cases, the Court came to grips with the constitutionality and construction of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. The most important of these was Yakus v. United States, involving a conviction in a federal district court in Massachusetts for a violation of the maximum prices fixed by the O.P.A. on the sale of wholesale cuts of beef. Yakus refused to obey the price regulation, declined to follow the procedure made available in the statute for protesting against it, and attempted in his criminal trial to challenge the validity of the price regulations and of the statute on which they rested. This he was not permitted to do. Speaking through Chief Justice Stone, the Gourt held the Emergency Price Control Act to be valid, not only in its substantive regulations, but also in the procedures set up for its enforcement. The Court's opinion dealt with four points.

Constitutional Law in 1941–1942: The Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1941

The vacancies on the Supreme Court caused by the retirement of Mr. Justice McReynolds and Chief Justice Hughes were filled by President Roosevelt during the summer of 1941. When the Court convened in October, Mr. Justice Stone, originally appointed by President Coolidge, became Chief Justice. Chief Justice White was the only other associate justice to be promoted to the Chief Justiceship. Senator James F. Byrnes of South Carolina, and Attorney General Robert H. Jackson of New York took their seats as associate justices. Thus seven justices have been placed on the Court by President Roosevelt. Any idea, however, that these Roosevelt appointees conform to any uniform pattern of thought is belied by the fact that in the 75 cases in the 1941 term turning on important questions of either constitutional law or federal statutory construction, there were dissents in 36, and 23 of these dissents were by either three or four justices. No act of Congress has been declared unconstitutional since May, 1936, when the Municipal Bankruptcy Act was held invalid. Since 1937, the Court has overruled 20 previous decisions, mentioning them by name, while it has modified or qualified a number of others.

The Methods of Mr. Justice Stone in Constitutional Cases

The Methods of Mr. Justice Stone in Constitutional Cases

The Sherman Act v. Labor

M R. JUSTICE STONE'S opinion in the Apex case' has not been very instructive. He has made it dear that the Sherman Act was designed to prevent restraints on free competition in national markets, and was not devised to set the federal courts up as policing agencies to prevent those interferences with interstate transportation which local authorities should punish. But he does not say precisely what he means by protection of competition in interstate markets from the restraining activities of labor unions. His attempt to interpret and to reconcile earlier labor decisions of the Court under the Sherman Act, to correlate these with the business decisions and thereby to explain the Court's position in the Apex case is confusing. But lawyers are anxious to understand the Court's attitude toward labor union activities under the act; and this speculation is an endeavor to determine what that position may be. I

Review: Stone's Justices' Manual for 1939

Review: Stone's Justices' Manual for 1939

Review: Stone's Justices' Manual

Review: Stone's Justices' Manual

Mr. Justice Stone and the Constitution

Mr. Justice Stone and the Constitution

Review: Stone's Justices' Manual, 1935

Review: Stone's Justices' Manual, 1935

Review: Stone's Justices' Manual

Review: Stone's Justices' Manual

REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF BOOKS

REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF BOOKS

The Factor Case and Double Criminality in Extradition

The recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Factor v. Laubenheimer and Haggard has broken new ground with reference to the interpretation of the extradition treaties between the United States and Great Britain, and it seems to deserve special consideration as a contribution to the law of extradition. Factor's extradition was requested by Great Britain on a charge of receiving certain sums of money, aggregating £458,500, known to have been fraudulently obtained. On the complaint of a British consul, Factor was taken into custody in Illinois, and a United States Commissioner in Illinois issued a warrant for his commitment pending surrender. On a return to a writ of habeas corpus, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ordered his discharge from custody, but this order was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. Both the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals seem to have regarded extradition as possible only if the offense charged was a crime both by the law of Great Britain and by the law of Illinois; the District Court held that receiving money known to have been fraudulently obtained was not a crime by the law of Illinois, but a majority of the Circuit Court of Appeals, relying chiefly on Kelly v. Griffin, took the contrary view. On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the offense charged was an extraditable crime even if it is not punishable by the law of Illinois, the opinion being written by Justice Stone. Justice Butler was joined in a vigorous dissenting opinion by Justices Brandeis and Roberts.

Review: Stone's Justices Manual

Review: Stone's Justices Manual

Review: Stone's Justices' Manual

Review: Stone's Justices' Manual

Review: Stone's Justices' Manual for 1931

Review: Stone's Justices' Manual for 1931