uniformity applicable alike to all persons without regard to circumstances or conditions. Equal protection requires that all persons be fairly treated in their relations with the state. But the concept makes allowance for dissimilarity of circumstances in order that legislation may fall with evenhandedness upon all persons. Special burdens and duties may be imposed upon a particular group or class for the benefit of the public as a whole. Arbitrary discrimination alone is prohibited. If control or regulation of a particular group is undertaken, the classification or distinction upon which such legislation is founded must be based upon a real or substantial difference which has pertinence to the legislative objective.8 This is an extremely flexible formula, and a classification's reasonableness is largely dependent upon the peculiar needs, the special difficulties, and the particular requirements of the local situation. Here again the Court must necessarily give great weight to legislative judgment in view of the necessity for familiarity with local conditions. Where the legislature, however, attempts to single out persons because of their particular race, color, or national origin in order to subject them to discriminatory penalties, then a determination of the unreasonableness of these penalties within the purview of the Constitution is not precluded by lack of any special or specific familiarity with local conditions or needs. The Supreme Court of the United States, far removed from the stresses which keep racial animosity alive, is best able to determine whether the state in fact provides equal protection of the laws as required by the Constitution. This was recognized in United States v. Carolene Products Company,9 where Justice Stone stated: There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth ... Nor need we inquire whether similar conditions enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religions. . ., or SSee, e.g., Lowell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U. S. 496 (1939). 6The Fourteenth Amendment reads: No state shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws. 7 See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944); Ex parte Endo, 323 U. S. 283 (1944); United Public Works v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 100 (1947). 8 Examples are legion: Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U. S. 619 (1934); Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527 (1931); Groessart v. Cleary, 335 U. S. 464 (1948); Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553 (1931); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535 (1942). 9304 U. S. 144, note 4 (1938). This content downloaded from 157.55.39.173 on Thu, 19 May 2016 04:54:38 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms THE SUPREME COURT AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS 103 national..., or racial minorities ..., whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. It is sometimes said that there is a presumption of unconstitutionality running against governmental action based upon race or color. This may be an overstatement of fact, but certainly this type of governmental action in terms of motivation, purpose, and effect is now subjected to a more searching scrutiny than is ordinarily the case with other kinds of state activity.'0 Here the Supreme Court now retains for itself the final word as to whether the state has violated constitutional standards of conduct, and therefore functions as the ultimate guardian of civil rights.