In times of budget crises, the judiciary, like any government organization, may be subjected to dramatic reductions in operating budgets. Unlike funding for many other government organizations, however, funding for some court programs, such as defense of indigent criminal defendants, implicates important constitutional obliga tions. For example, a state decision to "defund" its public defender system obviously would create enormous Sixth Amendment difficulties. But what happens if a state defunds part of its public defender system, places selected defendants' trials on hold, is sued by these defendants?and then reinstates funding so as to allow the criminal trials to proceed? The answer, according to a recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, is that the challenge to the defending is moot. In response to a severe economic downturn and rising state government budget deficits, the chief justice of Oregon in early 2003 issued a "Budget Reduction Plan" (BRP). This suspended criminal trials for some misdemeanors and all adult drug possession felonies in Oregon state courts until July 1, 2003, when the next fiscal biennium was to begin. The BRP's practical result was to shut down temporarily both criminal trials and access to public defenders for designated types of defendants from March through June 2003. As soon as Oregon trial judges implemented the BRP, they were subjected to lawsuits from a collection of public defenders, criminal defen dants, and even the Lane County district attorney. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the First and Sixth Amendments, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, and the Oregon State Constitution and Oregon state statutes. After the Oregon State Supreme Court refused to invalidate the BRP, State ex rei Metropolitan Public Defender v. Courtney, 335 Or. 236, 64 P3d 1138 (2003), the plaintiffs brought suit in federal district court. By the time the suit had reached the U.S. District Court, June had passed, the chief justice had lifted the BRP, and funds were being provided for indigent defense. Consequently, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs' lawsuit as moot. Plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In Foster v. Carson, 347 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2003), Judge Graber began by noting that as a matter of jurisdiction, feder al courts cannot hear moot cases, and "if there is no longer a possibility that an appel lant can obtain relief for his claim, the claim is moot." Id. at 745. The plaintiffs had not requested monetary damages, but had sought simply a declaratory judgment invalidating the BRP, as well as attorney fees. Inasmuch as the BRP already had been revoked, declaratory relief was not possible; as Judge Graber noted, "we cannot undo the past," id. at 746, and previous caselaw clearly established that an action for attor ney fees does not revive an otherwise moot action. Plaintiffs asked the court of appeals to invoke the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to the mootness doctrine to reach the merits of the claim.
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