Israeli-Palestinian Peace Research Articles

A2. Middle East Quartet, Statement Urging the Resumption of Israeli-Palestinian Peace Talks, New York, 23 September 2011.

"A2. Middle East Quartet, Statement Urging the Resumption of Israeli-Palestinian Peace Talks, New York, 23 September 2011.." Journal of Palestine Studies, 41(2), pp. 204–205

Post-Oslo peace initiatives and the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations

The author’s argument is that the efforts made by the Obama administration to realize Palestinian-Israeli reconciliation will, like all “peace” initiatives before them, ultimately exacerbate direct and structural violence between the two parties. He makes this argument in four stages. First, he explains his Foucault-inspired discourse analysis. Second, he describes and historicizes the discourse of Palestinian-Israeli relations. More specifically, he identifies the three persistent practices, three silences and three rules of formation that constitute the discourse. Third, he demonstrates how all post-Oslo peace initiatives, the Roadmap and the Geneva Accord for example, were articulations of, and rearticulated, this discourse and consequently (re-)produced Palestinian- Israeli violence. Fourth and finally, he argues that if the Obama administration is to realize Palestinian-Israeli peace, it must violate the determinant rule of the discourse and talk about Israel’s ethnic cleansing of Palestine.

Resettling the West Bank Settlers

In countering view that Israeli- Palestinian conflict is intractable, Israeli writer Amos Oz has famously described it as one over estate.1 Surely he was applying a clever riff on basic concept of territory - on which so much of geopolitics rests. And in part there is simple question of urban sprawl, where homes in settlements cost one third or even one quarter of what an equivalent- sized house or apartment would run in Israel's urban centres.2 But it is also broader and deeper. In invoking importance ofhow public space is conceived, real estate metaphor fills in an important part of story between reaching an agreement at bargaining table and eventually having to ratify it at home. This becomes clear as we consider long history of breakdowns in Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. Part of explanation is failure of each side to let go of maximalist positions out of fear of alienating segments of their domestic support base. In case of Israel, government's inability to deal effectively with Jewish settlements in West Bank is among thorniest problems.3The Israeli government has no choice but to account for demands of settler population. They number in hundreds of thousands; have sympathizers among broader population, including state leaders; and themselves occupy decision-making positions in civil service and Israeli armed forces.4 Without understanding dynamics of settler identity, observers cannot provide workable ideas for inching Israelis and Palestinians toward a final agreement.Thinking about how collective identity influences view of public space, this article starts from assumption that, while it is certainly not inevitable, a two-state solution is most likely arrangement on which both sides will reach agreement.5 It follows that to make way for a likely Palestinian state in West Bank, Israeli government will have to move tens of thousands of settlers across green line into Israel.6 Though there are 500,000 settlers in West Bank (including 200,000 who reside in and around east Jerusalem), conventional wisdom - based on past negotiations and on Israeli red lines regarding largest settlements - suggests that only about 70,000 settlers will be made to move in event of a final agreement,7 though some recommendations argue for a range of 100,000 to 120, ooo.8 The remaining settlement blocs will likely be annexed to Israel in return for negotiated land swaps.9But Israel's last foray into relocating a settler population still haunts country. Prior to 2005 Gaza withdrawal, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon told an Israeli parliamentary committee that the fate of Netzarim [a small settlement in Gaza Strip] is fate of Tel Aviv.10 In event, 8000 Gaza settlers felt abandoned to subpar housing options and lacklustre employment opportunities inside Israel.With lingering ill-will from Gaza evacuation, it can be assumed that in event of a large-scale disengagement, Israeli government will present West Bank settlers with strong economic incentive packages. But in context of a peace agreement, and to allow for Israel's successful implementation of it, government will have to get maximum buy-in from settlers in what wul no doubt be a politically, socially, and emotionally painful process of relocation. After cheque is cashed, settlers will have to feel that they can live meaningful lives on other side of green line, lives that connect with their well-entrenched identities as frontier Zionists. Without such guarantees, government will simply be unable to generate enough legitimacy from this crucial sector of population.Focusing on identity as a key factor in dealing with settlers suggests recasting of territorial attachment. If stuff of identity is as symbolic and imaginary as it is physical and concrete, there is room for Israeli government to highlight new symbols and images with which settlers can connect. …

Reflections on the Meaning of Palestine

This essay addresses the Palestine question within a European context. After reflecting on why Palestine has been widely embraced as a "universal cause," the author explores its relationship to the "Jewish question" in the changed context following World War II: Whereas prior to the war it was the Jews who were perceived as a threat to European civilization, today it is the Muslim immigrants who have the scapegoat role. Also discussed are philosemitism (and its manifestations in the West) and anti-Semitism (as it relates to the Arab world), and how these phenomena have been impacted by the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The essay concludes with "utopian musings" on possibilities for a future Palestinian-Israeli peace.

Gender and “Peace Work”: An Unofficial History of Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations

Unlike earlier attempts to theorize Israeli women's peace activism in civil society, this article examines the involvement of women in backstage roles of formal negotiations during the Oslo Process. On the basis of a qualitative analysis of the organizational structure and gender division of labor in Israeli negotiating bodies, I find that women were placed as midlevel negotiators and professional and legal advisors, and also served as spokeswomen and secretaries. This pattern of participation reveals 1) that the “security logic,” developed by Israeli negotiators led to, and reinforced, a structured gendered division of labor, providing a rational justification for gender inequality; 2) that the ability to control administrative capacities and women workers generated symbolic masculine power and assisted in maintaining asymmetries between Israeli and Palestinian delegations; 3) and that midlevel Israeli negotiators' narratives reveal the extent to which conceptual confusion and self-contradictory approaches toward the Oslo Accords reinforced women's overall invisibility. I conclude that patterns of rigid gender roles in official negotiating structures not only minimize women's meaningful inclusion in peace negotiations but also affect the production of public historical narratives about gender, peace, and war.

Entertainment‐education: dilemmas of Israeli creators of theatre about the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in promoting peace

Israeli–Palestinian peace is promoted through political and diplomatic channels, as well as indirect channels such as conferences, lectures, meetings, workshops and political journalism. However, there is less awareness of the extensive artistic activity in Israel surrounding peace and its implications for society, or of the uniqueness of the theatrical medium as a public medium that allows its viewers and participants to clarify their conflicts and positions related to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. As part of a large and comprehensive study of plays about the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (which included mapping out and analyzing the themes of 37 plays about the Israeli–Palestinian conflict between 2005–2007, and checking the impact of some of the plays on teenage audiences), this study focused on Israeli theater creators who deal with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The goal was to specify the models, issues and strategies the creators used in plays about the conflict in order to influence viewers’ positions. This article represents the findings of the analysis of 26 in‐depth interviews with various creators (playwrights, directors and actors), who intended their plays to be seen by adult and high school audiences. The findings discuss the ideological, ethical and pedagogical dilemmas as well as the strategies they used to build texts meant to influence their viewers, and which distinguish dramatic works that educate for peace.

The Palestine Papers: Chronicling the U.S. Abandonment of the Road Map

On 23 January 2011, as U.S. efforts to revive Israeli-Palestinian peace talks floundered, the Qatar-based al-Jazeera satellite TV channel and Britain's Guardian newspaper released a set of documents, written mostly by Palestinian officials (the “Palestine Papers”), claimed to be “the confidential record of ten years of efforts to seek a peace agreement with Israel.” The more than 1,600 pages of documents dating from September 1999 to September 2010 came mostly from the PLO Negotiation Affairs Department (PLONAD) and its successor body, the Negotiations Support Unit (NSU) headed by chief negotiator Saeb Erakat, and included memos, emails, maps, minutes of private meetings, accounts of high-level exchanges, strategy papers, and Power Point presentations. The papers were leaked (apparently by several PLONAD/NSU staff) to al-Jazeera. Timed with the release, al-Jazeera launched a series (1/23-26) of hour-long programs to discuss the contents of the leaked material thematically: Jerusalem, settlements, and borders; refugees and right of return; PA security coordination with Israel; and the negotiations process.

Symposium: Israeli-Palestinian Peace: What Is the U.S. National Security Interest? How Can It Be Achieved?

Symposium: Israeli-Palestinian Peace: What Is the U.S. National Security Interest? How Can It Be Achieved?

Negotiating Arab-Israeli peace: patterns, problems, possibilities

List of Maps Preface to the Second Edition List of Abbreviations Introduction. Historical Patterns: Bad Habits Are Hard to Break Part 1. The Arab-Israeli Peace Process: Beginnings 1. Hot Wars and a Cold Peace: The Camp David Accords, 1977-1979 2. Mission Impossible: The 1983 Israel-Lebanon Agreement 3. Premature Peacemaking: The 1987 Hussein-Peres London Document Part 2. The Arab-Israeli Peace Process: Madrid and After 4. Setting the Peace Table: The Madrid Conference and Washington Talks, 1991-1993 5. Out of the Shadows and into the Light: The Jordanian-Israeli Peace Process, 1991-1994 6. Falling Short of the Heights: Israel and Syria, 1991-2000 Part 3. The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: Oslo 1993 and Beyond 7. Breakthrough: Israelis, Palestinians, and the Oslo Peace Process 8. Breaking Down: Israelis, Palestinians, and the Collapse of Oslo 9. Broken beyond Repair? Camp David II and the Second Intifada Conclusion. Peace as a Process Epilogue. Rebuilding amid the Rubble Appendix A. Timeline Appendix B. Documents Online Notes Bibliography Index

The One-State Solution and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Palestinian Challenges and Prospects

As the Israeli-Palestinian peace process continues to stalemate, voices calling for an inclusive single state in Israel/Palestine as an alternative to the two-state solution have grown louder. This article reviews the Palestinian debate around the one-state solution and analyzes the challenges its advocates face in generating political support, central among which is the difficulty of redefining the Palestinian cause in terms of a struggle for equal political rights within a single polity rather than in terms of a struggle for a separate state.

The One-State Solution: An Alternative Vision for Israeli-Palestinian Peace

This essay examines the one-state alternative to the commonly accepted two-state solution, which has been the basis of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process since 1993. It reviews the prospects for success of the two-state solution and sets out the arguments for and against such a settlement. The history and interpretation of the one-state alternative, whether binational or secular democratic, are explored, and the future chances of its success assessed. The author finds that to date no "road map" exists for how to implement the one-state solution, without which it is likely to remain an idealistic dream.

Hard-Won Tips for Twenty-First Century Activists

In more than forty years of writing, activism, and fundraising for the issues I care about, I’ve learned a thing or two—or five—about what works and what doesn’t:“There is no end to how much you can accomplish if you don’t care who gets the credit.” I don’t know who coined that maxim, but I’ve quoted it for decades because it’s true. Many people have a dual motivation for their activism—the upfront goal of advancing a cause and making the world a better place, and the hidden goal of aggrandizing or promoting themselves. Maimonides said the highest form of tzedakah (charity) is anonymous giving. I think the best test of a pure commitment to social justice is one’s willingness to do the work with zero expectation of honor or recognition. Sign your writing, by all means. Own your ideas (and failures). Accept kudos and plaques when earned. But don’t slap your brand on everything. When there’s a photo op, don’t stick yourself in front. Let your colleagues push you forward. Let your works sing your praise.It’s important to sign online petitions and lend your name to ads sponsored by progressive groups. But those are acts, not activism. How do you tell the difference? Acts are easy. (You can’t just click “send” and imagine you’ve changed the world.) Activism is hard. Activism takes hours, days, nights of dogged effort. Activists don’t just sign a petition; they organize hundreds of thousands of other people to sign it. Better yet, they organize dozens of folks to show up, sheaves of signatures in hand, at the office of the person with the power to effect change. And if that person doesn’t respond appropriately, they make his or her life uncomfortable until the desired result is achieved.Maybe I’m too cynical (or tired or old), but I no longer believe in the efficacy of street demonstrations. I say this as someone who marched against the Vietnam War, for civil rights, women’s rights, and reproductive freedom. In 2003, my husband and I traipsed down Broadway with two grandchildren and about a million other people to protest the invasion of Iraq. In 2004, another million of us congregated on the mall in Washington, D.C., to protest the curtailment of abortion rights. Neither effort had the slightest effect on Bush administration policy or the Supreme Court. And neither event registered on the public consciousness beyond one news cycle. Yes, street demos bring us together and make us feel good. And yes, the Tea Party started with disruptive loudmouths and staged media events. But if the debacle of November 2 taught us anything, it’s that systemic change ultimately happens through electoral politics. To pile up votes for our side, you have to craft a clear message, recruit winnable candidates (or run yourself), and get down in the trenches to influence local and national campaigns.The political is personal. To change minds, raise money, or goad someone into action—whether your issue is racial or ethnic harmony, Israeli-Palestinian peace, immigration, or tax policy—it’s not enough to send out a group email. You need to individualize the message, get on the phone, host a parlor party, send authoritative information to buttress your position, link interested people to relevant resources. The first rule of organizing is “out of sight, out of mind,” so whatever you do, remember to follow up. And don’t assume someone’s a lost cause until they say the word “no.”Fundraising basics: Focus on an aspect of your issue that directly connects with someone’s passions. Ask for a slightly larger donation than you think the person is capable of giving. (They can always say no, but they may be flattered that you think they’re successful enough to afford that amount.) Don’t do the “pitch” until after the main event (luncheon speaker, film screening, or plenary session). People need to feel spiritually invested in your issue or group before they’ll invest financially. Don’t over-sell. Be concise. If possible, be funny. Humor softens the transaction. Don’t disappear after you’ve got the money. Stay in touch.

Canadian Civil-Military Relations

Every war is rich in unique episodes. Each is an uncharted sea, full of reefs.-Clausewitz, On War1This study looks at civil-military relations in Canada and the use of military power for political purposes. Through an examination of the 2005 Canadian decision to deploy forces to Kandahar and the debates about potential deployments elsewhere, the following pages highlight the gap between the ambitions of Canadian international policy and the reality of limited military capacity. The study makes the case that the absence of strategy and strategic dialogue are at the heart of the problem of civil-military relations in Canada. It calls for a new model of civil-military relations, bunt upon a sustained dialogue between civilians and soldiers that rests ultimately on a more realistic assessment of the military means available to attain policy ends.DECISION-MAKING ANDTHE DEPLOYMENT TO KANDAHARSoon after appointing General Rick Hillier as chief of the defence staff, Prime Minister Paul Martin summoned him to discuss the government's priorities for international engagement and the potential deployment of the Canadian forces. After acknowledging his qualified support for Canada's ongoing involvement in Afghanistan, the prime minister spoke of three other priorities for Canadian international policy and sought Hillier's assurances that Canada's participation in the Afghan mission did preclude our capacity to deploy elsewhere. Martin wanted a commitment from Hillier that Canada would have the military capacity to contribute to an international peacekeeping effort to prevent the slaughter in Darfur. Martin also believed that Canada, as the hemisphere's largest francophone nation, should shoulder special responsibilities in Haiti, and he raised the possibility that Canada would play a military role if there was ever an Israeli-Palestinian peace pact.2 In Martin's view, it was important that the mission in Afghanistan not crowd out other international deployments that his government might choose to undertake. Martin had, after all, appointed Hillier a few days earlier because he had noted the general's view that the Canadian forces had to be capable of responding quickly to new demands.Martin was particularly interested in Darfur, as his memoirs make clear, suggesting that it presented a perfect opportunity for Canada to play a leadership role in keeping with [the] broader philosophy of our foreign policy. The importance of Darfur, together with Martin's sense of lost opportunity, can be seen in the chapter tellingly entitled Into Africa. Exercising leadership abroad was certainly a priority for the prime minister. I believe that we will have the greatest impact on the direction of world events, he writes in Hell or High Water, if we select an objective carefully and choose those opportunities where we can play a leadership role. In addition to offering the potential for international leadership, Martin saw Darfur as a place where Canada could pursue, in his words, its own perspective in international affairs, independent of the United States, which he judged to be largely indifferent to African issues. In Martin's thinking, Canadian leadership in Darfur, including participation in a humanitarian intervention with military means, matched the ideal he envisaged for the country in global affairs. In The Unexpected War, Stein and Lang insist that Martin's interest in Darfur also reflected strong support within the Liberal caucus to do something about the crisis unfolding there, a view bolstered by public opinion, which appeared to favour a potential Darfur mission over continued involvement in Afghanistan.3According to Martin, Hillier assured him that he understood the government's priorities and that whatever the next stage might be in our Afghanistan mission, it would not preclude our capacity to deploy elsewhere. Stein and Lang confirm Martin's account of his discussion with Hillier, but they offer a few additional and, one might add, dramatic details of the conversation between the two men. …

Myths, Illusions and Peace (review)

Reviewed by: Myths, Illusions and Peace David Tal Myths, Illusions and Peace, by Dennis Ross and David Makovsky. London: Viking, 2009. 366 pp. $27.95. This book is an attack on U.S. Middle Eastern policy, mainly during the administration of George W. Bush, with suggestions for a remedy. The authors have a wealth of experience in Middle Eastern affairs. Makovsky covered the region for many years as journalist, while Ross was a White House official dealing with the Middle East from the days of George H. W. Bush, and was deeply involved in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process under President Bill Clinton. At the time the book went to print, Ross had been appointed as Special Adviser to Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton for the Persian Gulf, a brief that includes Iran and southern Asia. The book's main thesis is that U.S. Middle Eastern policy has been influenced by two schools of thought, realist and idealist, with the latter represented mainly by the neoconservatives who were dominant during the tenure of George W. Bush. Both schools base their attitudes to the Middle East on myths that, according to the authors, have hampered America's Middle Eastern policy. Makovsky and Ross seek to debunk these myths and to offer a path toward a more effective Middle Eastern policy for the United States. One of the myths conceived by the realists was of "linkage." They argue that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and once it is resolved, peace will prevail in the Middle East. Ross and Makovsky do not deny that the Israeli-Arab conflict in general and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular have a substantial impact on the Arab and Islamic countries. They emphasize, however, that peace must be also pursued for the sake of the people who are trapped amid the bloodshed, and it would be illusionary to assume that resolving one specific conflict would end all wars and hostilities in the Middle East. Wars have erupted throughout the region regardless of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and will continue to do so even if it is solved. Makovsky and Ross then challenge the neoconservative argument that since the Arab states "categorically reject Israel," "peace is not possible as a result" (p. 91). They treat this as another myth. Egypt and Jordan signed peace [End Page 154] agreements with Israel that have endured through rough periods like the wars in Lebanon, the First and Second Intifadas, and the occasions when Israel took harsh measures against the Palestinians. States like Morocco and some of the Gulf states have also maintained more or less tacit relations with Israel over many years. While the neoconservatives were aware of this, they believed that real peace would come only when the Arabs accepted Israel's moral right to exist—which they are far from doing at the present time. This cannot be the criterion, Makovsky and Ross maintain. The next myth evolved over "themes of engagement versus non-engagement and regime change versus the change of regime behavior" (p. 9), with Iran as the prime test-case. Ross and Makovsky reject the realists' approach of an engagement that might involve compliance with nuclear Iran, as well as the neocons' idealistic approach that advocates regime change in Iran because it is impossible either to talk with the Iranians or to deter them. The authors suggest that the United States should aim to influence Iran not by changing the regime, but by changing the behavior of Iran's leaders. That could be done by identifying Iran's vulnerabilities and seeking "to play upon them" (p. 205). At the same time, suggest Ross and Makovsky, the administration should "engage without conditions" (p. 225), that is, initiate talks with the Iranian regime without setting conditions to those talks. Meantime the economic measures would signal to the Iranians that the stick was still hanging over their heads. While advocating engagement with states like Iran, Makosvky and Ross reject the realists' advocacy of engagement with non-state entities such as Hamas and Hezbollah. These non-state entities, they argue, are much less susceptible to external pressure because they lack...

The barriers approach to the Palestinian-Israeli peace process

Social conflict is constantly changing in scope, dynamics and pattern. Clashes between nation-states become obsolete while internal rifts within sovereign entities escalate rapidly to local and regional strife. The changing nature of disputes around the world stimulates new emphases and foci in conflict research. One of the novel shifts of interests is why conflicts endure and linger, or what prevents antagonists from terminating their contention even if they are both better off without it. The paper introduces the barriers approach to conflict resolution by grappling with the question of what the impediments to conflict termination are. The perspective is investigated in the context of one of the most protracted and deep-rooted conflicts in the world today: the Palestinian-Israeli, which despite occasional breakthroughs remains substantially entangled in the woes of hostility, violence and despair. Key words: Conflict theory, conflict resolution, barriers approach.

Comments on “Confronting water in the Israeli–Palestinian peace agreement” by David Brooks and Julie Trottier [Journal of Hydrology 382/1–4, pp. 103–114

These comments deal only with the Brooks–Trottier proposals for the formulation of an Israel–Palestine peace agreement on water. It is felt that their proposal of breaking with conventional approaches in the allocation of water in the frame work of the Israel–Palestine peace agreement with specific volumes or percentages of the shared water resources going to Party A and to Party B will be unacceptable to the parties and will prevent the parties to the agreement from knowing at the signing of the peace agreement how much their water resources have been increased and or how much their resources will be reduced. Such matters are vital to each partner and must be settled at the political level. Their proposal to choose an ongoing management process that will empower an untried and almost independent Bilateral Water Commission to allocate and reallocate water between the partners over time will be unworkable and lead to endless disputes disagreements and appeals which could deadlock the process. These issues should be settled at the political level as part of the final status peace agreement.

Balancing, Bonding, and Balking: The European Union, the United States, and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process

The increasing resources, albeit largely financial, that the European Union has committed to the Israeli-Palestinian relationship has led to increasing calls for the EU to take a greater political role in the peace process. In this essay the potential role of the EU in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is examined in relation to that of the United States. For the EU to play a more influential role in the peace process, neither a pure balancing nor a pure bonding strategy is likely to work. Instead, the most promising strategy for the EU would be a bonding strategy combined with a threat to balk, to simply withhold support from US initiatives if Europe's views are not taken into account.

Confronting water in an Israeli–Palestinian peace agreement: Response to the comments of Hillel Shuval

Confronting water in an Israeli–Palestinian peace agreement: Response to the comments of Hillel Shuval

The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace (review)

Reviewed by: The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace Robert O. Freedman The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace, by Aaron David Miller. New York: Bantam, 2008. 398 pp. $26.00. For those of us teaching courses on U.S. policy in the Middle East, and on the Arab-Israeli conflict, The Much Too Promised Land by Aaron Miller is a very welcome addition to the literature. Miller, who served in a number of U.S. Government positions dealing with the Middle East, including as deputy to U.S. Middle East envoy Dennis Ross, presents an "insider's view" of what works—and what doesn't—in U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. Spicing up his narrative, Miller frequently cites the rather earthy language used by both U.S. officials and foreign leaders, as they discuss Middle Eastern personalities, such as the comments of the late King Hussein of Jordan who characterized Yasser Arafat in the following way: "That little shit. He hasn't a clue what he is doing" (p. 55). Similarly, Miller's portrayal of the eating habits of Israeli negotiators is absolutely hilarious (p. 50). Miller gives the reader a real feel for how Middle Eastern diplomacy actually works, including how divisions among U.S. policy-makers hampers U.S. policy in the region. [End Page 173] The book is divided into three sections. The first is an introduction to the dynamics of Middle East peacemaking and the challenges which even a superpower like the United States faces in trying to enforce its will. This section also includes an entire chapter devoted to the impact of U.S. domestic politics and the strengths and weaknesses of the so-called "Israel Lobby." The second part of the book presents case studies of successful U.S. policymakers: Henry Kissinger in negotiating the Sinai I (1974) and Sinai II (1975) agreements between Israel and Egypt, and the Golan Heights Agreement (1974) between Israel and Syria; Jimmy Carter, who worked out a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt (1979); and James Baker, who successfully convened the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991 after the First Gulf War. The final section of the book deals with U.S. President Bill Clinton, who failed in his efforts to achieve peace between Israel and both Syria and the Palestinians, and President George W. Bush who, according to Miller, did not try very hard to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. In the first section of the book, Miller presents a number of lessons for U.S. policy-makers as they deal with the nations of the Middle East. Perhaps the most pithy are as follows: In negotiations, to be effective, you need to believe that things can change but have extraordinary patience if they don't. (p. 26) You need to be tough but empathetic, firm but practical. And above all, you need to be ready to endure the endless maneuvering and machinations of Arabs and Israelis for whom the conflict has sadly become a way of life. (pp. 26–27) Smaller nations will do just about anything to survive, and are not inclined to listen or even trust advice offered by a distant power whose political and physical survival is not at stake. The ghosts of the past, made real by history's fears and traumas, speak louder than the untested promise of a brighter future offered up by American diplomats. (p. 37) Americans who recognize the galactic gap between a secure and confident America and the insecure world of Israelis and Arabs fare best of all. (p. 41) This conviction (of Yitzhak Rabin), that however well intentioned, the Americans were naive and didn't understand the Arabs, was shared by almost every Israeli with whom we worked. (p. 42) In his chapter on the Israel Lobby, Miller shows how a combination of common values and common enemies has forged a close U.S.-Israeli alliance. He also cites the influence of pro-Israeli Jews in the Democratic Party, and pro-Israeli Evangelical Christians in the Republican Party to show the broad bipartisan support for Israel in the U.S...

Israeli identity formation and the Arab—Israeli conflict in election platforms, 1969—2006

This study focuses on the relationship between national identity and intractable conflict. Abdelal’s definition of collective identity that refers to the level of agreement regarding the purposes, practices, relational comparisons with other entities, and narratives that define collective identity was adapted to national identity during intractable conflict and was later applied to Israel’s national identity. A review of the Israeli 1969—2006 election platforms shows that in the 1980s and 1990s significant changes occurred in Israel’s national identity. The most significant changes included: changes regarding the territorial purpose of Israeli identity; changes in practices on who may become an Israeli citizen; changes of perception of the relationship between Israel and the Arabs; and a growing Israeli acceptance of Palestinian identity. Since 2000, following the failure of the Israeli—Palestinian peace process, some components of Israeli national identity have reverted to their original form. The study indicates that the Arab—Israeli conflict triggered changes in Israel’s national identity, but the conflict also seemed affected by changes in that identity. The article connects the changes in Israeli national identity to specific mechanisms and conditions of conflict resolution and reconciliation.