Israeli-Palestinian Peace Research Articles

A Review on the Evolution of Europe’s Methods to Exert Influence on The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process

This review will assist to understand the evolution of Europe’s methods to exert influence on the Palestinian-Israeli peace process specifically from 1973 to 2015. Moreover, it was also noted that this will be essential in recognizing the evolution of European foreign policies. This study assists to understand the evolution of approaches agreed by the Europe since 1973 until present or 2015. This study focuses on the various approaches of actors from the civil society, private sector involved in the conflict between the Palestine and Israel. Moreover, this study will assist in understanding the evolution of Europe’s methods and policies in the peace process between Israel and Palestine. Subsequently, this study focuses on the significance of non-state actors in the peace process between Palestine and Israel. This study clearly highlights the various strategies adopted by the Europe foreign policies in the conflict between Palestine and Israel. This study also highlights to what extent European foreign policy has assisted in the peace process between Israel and Palestine. This study would be useful to understand the effectiveness of European foreign policies in the peace process.

Israel and Its Messianic Right: Path Dependency and State Authority in International Conflict

Why do states responsible for unleashing violent nonstate actors fail to halt them despite rising costs and, at best, marginal utility? I argue that a historical-institutionalist approach helps scholars understand these dynamics. I present five path-dependent mechanisms—change in the balance of power, spiraling perception of threat, ideological shift among the public, state penetration, and weakening of the principle of state primacy—that diminish the prospects of policy reversals. I then demonstrate the usefulness of path-dependency analysis in the case of Israel’s entanglement with the Jewish messianic Right. Applying the theoretical framework sheds light on the process that brought Israel prohibitive costs—undercutting the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, undermining the state’s international standing, and weakening the state’s authority and democratic nature—and made policy reversal, in line with the state’s national interest and its responsibilities as a member of the international society, highly unlikely.

Does Foreign Aid Accelerate Corruption? The Case of the Palestinian National Authority

This article critically analyses the contribution of foreign aid policy to the spread of political corruption in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. The argument is that the extent of the politicisation of aid and the disparagement of normative behaviour create opportunities to exploit resources and to strengthen political and personal gains of the political elite in the receiving country. Thus when examining the relationship between the extent of the politicisation of the process of assistance and the acceleration of corruption during the rule of Yasser Arafat (1994–2004) the case study shows that political considerations caused the main donors to ignore or disregard corrupt behaviour.

The “Yes, We Can” Slogan Stranded In Obama’s Myriad of Vows

Abstract At the beginning of his presidency in January 2009, President Obama not only made an effort to mobilize the Middle East to support his bid for “change”, but he also mobilized the English language to achieve his purpose; and for the first time, we heard pledges to break the U.S.-Israel “kabuki dance” [i] . With his vows to adopt a different posture, President Obama changed George W. Bush’s tone and rhetoric towards the Muslim world, and promised to commit the United States to bring about an end to the 60-year Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He initially condemned Israeli settlements, the major obstacle to peace for decades now, as “illegal”, and set their “complete freeze” as a prerequisite to resuming peace talks between the Palestinians and the Israelis. It did, after all, seem to the Palestinians too good to be true that the settlements had to stop before the peace process would get back on track. Near the end of Obama’s second term now, Obama’s slogan of “yes, we can” in the Middle East has been stranded in his procrastination whether to confront Israel’s right wing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Consequently, change has become more and more elusive, and the prospects of peace in the region are in shambles. President Obama gradually backed away from his condemnation of Israel’s settlements policy in the Palestinian territories. Obama’s failure to make good on his words with respect to the peace process became gradually clear in his three U.N. General Assembly talks from 2009 to 2011 which this work takes as case studies. The tone and the verbiage of these three speeches revealed that Obama’s 2009 promises of change would most likely fail to materialize, and the initial euphoria of Obama’s vows of resetting the button of the US foreign policy in the Middle East was incrementally dampened with each of Obama’s U.N. General Assembly speeches. In the end, all that changed for the Palestinian-Israeli peace process are the tone and the rhetoric rather than the reality of things on the ground. With at least two bloody wars have been fought in Gaza in October 2012 and July 2014, and when war crimes were committed [1] , the situation has even deteriorated and the prospects of peace have become more and more elusive since Obama took office in January 2009. [1] Israel: In-Depth Look at Gaza School Attacks . Human Rights Watch . 11 September 2014. Three Israeli attacks that damaged Gaza schools housing displaced people caused numerous civilian casualties [i] “ Obama Aping Bush on Mideast peace”, The Opinions, September 7, 2010 .

Compensation to Palestinian Refugees and the Search for Palestinian–Israeli PeaceEdited by Rex Brynen and Roula El-Rifai

<i>Compensation to Palestinian Refugees and the Search for Palestinian–Israeli Peace</i>Edited by Rex Brynen and Roula El-Rifai

Governing the Israeli–Palestinian peace process: The European Union Partnership for Peace

This study applies a governmentality approach to analyse the European Union’s civil society promotion in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian peace process through the EU’s Partnership for Peace instrument. Contrary to a widespread conviction in earlier academic research, it argues that the EU engagement with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has political substance, and the Partnership for Peace provides a good illustration of this. The governmentality perspective highlights the power of the technical in guiding civil society towards particular visions, activities and goals. It brings to light a set of supposedly neutral definitions and technical instruments related to project applications and project selection that sort out, promote and link together civil society action in a way that manages and reinforces the existing dynamics of the peace process. The technical brings with it a particular idea of civil society, which is encouraged to assume functions that focus on the management of the outcomes of the conflict rather than striving for a transformative vision of peace based on political deliberation and fundamental change. The use of the governmentality approach not only aims to provide a better understanding of the nature of the Partnership for Peace programme, but also contributes to debates over the theoretical merits of governmentality by applying the approach to peace and conflict research.

Book Review: Chie Ezaki, Political Process of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations (in Japanese)

Book Review: Chie Ezaki, <i>Political Process of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations</i> (in Japanese)

Goliath: life and loathing in Greater Israel and Shattered Hopes: Obama’s failure to broker Israeli-Palestinian peace

Goliath: life and loathing in Greater Israel and Shattered Hopes: Obama’s failure to broker Israeli-Palestinian peace

The gender–culture double bind in Israeli–Palestinian peace negotiations: A narrative approach

This article investigates structural conditions for women’s inclusion/exclusion in peace negotiations by focusing on the linkage between acts of gender stereotyping and cultural framing. Through a narrative analysis of semi-structured interviews with Israeli negotiators and administrators who participated in official negotiations during the Oslo peace process, I link two recent claims about how gender may affect negotiators’ understandings of strategic exchange: the gendered devaluation effect and the gender–culture double bind hypothesis. Building upon postcolonial feminist critique, I argue that narratives about women and cultural difference (a) demonstrate and engage with Israeli essentialist and Orientalist discourses about Arab culture and masculinity; (b) manifest how ideas about strategic dialogue and negotiations are gendered; and (c) convey how policymakers and negotiators may use cultural claims to rationalize women’s exclusion from diplomatic and strategic dialogue. Furthermore, the study implies that dominant framings of Israeli–Palestinian negotiations as a binary East–West encounter need to be replaced by a more nuanced conceptualization of cultural identity that captures contextual aspects of difference, including the existence of military power and masculine dominance.

International Efforts to Create a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East

The efforts to create a nuclear weapons ― later weapons of mass destruction ― free zone in the Middle East face many difficulties: the Arab–Israeli conflict, the deterioration of the Israeli–Palestinian peace process, the growing number of actors in the peace process, the nuclear program of Iran, the security policy of Israel etc. The aim of this paper is to give an overview of the international (United Nations [UN], European Union [EU]) efforts from the 1960s to the indefinite post- ponement of the Middle East weapons of mass destruction free zone (MEWMDFZ) conference planned for December 2012.

Tony Blair-s Tangled Web: The Quartet Representative and the Peace Process

Tony Blair stepped down as British prime minister in 2007 and immediately assumed the position of representative to the Quartet, the international body overseeing the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Against the background of mounting criticism at home over his role in the 2003 Iraq war, this profile examines the record of Blair-s activities in the Middle East over the past five years. The picture that emerges is one of rapid self-enrichment through murky consultancies and opaque business deals with Middle East dictators, and an official role (formally dedicated to Palestinian state-building) whose main results appear to be a disgruntled Palestinian Authority and the perpetuation of the status quo.

The Obama approach to the Middle East: the end of America's moment?

As Obama begins his second term, this article takes stock of his foreign policy approach towards the Middle East. It lays out four big arguments. First, Obama's foreign policy in the Middle East has demonstrated more continuity with the past than real change. While shifting his approach significantly from Bush's, Obama has adopted a centrist-realist approach towards the region, consistent with the dominant US foreign policy orientation. Second, from Palestinian-Israeli peace to Afghanistan, Obama's conduct testifies to the structural-institutional continuity of US foreign policy. More than in any other region in the world, presidential policy in the Middle East is hampered by institutional, bureaucratic and domestic politics. America's dysfunctional political culture has imposed severe constraints on Obama's ability to pursue an even-handed approach towards the enduring and preeminent Palestine question. Third, despite Obama's lofty rhetoric about a new start in relations between the United States and Muslim countries, the Middle East does not rank very high on his agenda. Putting America's fiscal house in order and renewing its long-term economic strength have been Obama's priorities. From the outset, Obama has been shifting US foreign policy priorities away from the Middle East to the Pacific and Asia where he and his aides believe that America's future lies. Finally, the article argues that the US finds itself in a similar position to that of Great Britain after the Second World War, at the beginning of the end of its hegemonic moment in the Middle East. The end of American hegemony in the region stems from internal and external causes, including an awakened public opinion in the Middle East, the emergence of geostrategic and geo-economic regional powers with assertive foreign policies, America's relative economic decline and the high costs of war, and the shift in US foreign policy priorities to the Asia-Pacific region.

In His Own Words

In His Own Words

The failed Palestinian–Israeli peace process 1993–2011: an Israeli perspective

In memory of Gad Yaakobi This article examines the major developments that have taken place since the signing of the Oslo accords in September 1993. It analyses the major mistakes made along the way by both sides, showing that brinkmanship is a very dangerous policy when one or both sides are willing to pay a high price in blood. Finally, it offers a blueprint for breaking the deadlock roughly based on the Clinton parameters of 2001 and the subsequent Israeli–Palestinian Geneva Accords.

The Collective Memory of a Civil War as Reflected in Edutainment and its Impact on Israeli Youth: A Critical Reading of Consensual Myths

Following the political assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, in 1998 Israel's national theater Habimah produced the play “Civil War.” The play addressed the religious/hawkish-secular/dovish rift in Israel through a critical reading of events from Jewish history and raises the potential of civil war and political violence in Israel over Israeli-Palestinian peace. An empirical study of 107 Israeli students from the 11th grade who viewed the play presents the potential of “Civil War” to influence students and lead them to a critical reading of consensual myths of the Jewish historical/cultural texts and current events.

The De‐Threatenization of the Other: an Israeli and a Palestinian Case of Understanding the Other’s Suffering

As a result of the failure of the Israeli–Palestinian peace process, new initiatives from civil society have emerged. Initiators learned from the shortcomings of the peace process and seek to achieve peace through understanding the suffering of the Other. Such attempts leave an open space for the trauma of the counterpart and engage both sides in deconstructing mutually exclusive identities that represent the Other as an existential threat. They represent a first step for a deep dialogue and have the potential to (de)threatenize the Other. This article examines two such initiatives that are unique in not seeking to explain their own narrative to the Other, but to present the narrative of the Other to their very own community.

Exploration of the Hamas Suicide Attacks

The majority of the Hamas suicide attacks were carried out by young fellows. There were various motivations for the suicide attacks, including four social factors. Firstly, the miserable experiences of the Palestinian people became a hotbed for the suicide attackers. Secondly, the wide public sympathy of suicide attackers among the Palestinian people provided support for Hamas and the suicide attacks. Thirdly, the Palestinians turned to violence as a last resort from the disappointment of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. Finally, the Hamas suicide attacks had many religious factors. The Hamas suicide attack has two effects. One is that it causes the Palestinians and Israelis to fall into a vicious circle of ''violence to violence''; however it also strengthens Hamas's leading position as a resistant organization. Another is that it has caused the martyrdom culture to become popular in Palestine and inspired many Palestinians to join suicide attacks. In conclusion, the roots of the suicide attacks by Hamas and other Palestinian groups are found in Palestinian despair of the status quo and therefore, the Palestine issue

Oslo and Its Aftermath: Lessons Learned from Track Two Diplomacy

Since the collapse of the Oslo peace process and the violence that followed, many scholars have reflected upon the Israeli–Palestinian peace process. Most of this analysis has focused on official negotiations without considering the substantial role that unofficial peace efforts have played in peacebuilding, both prior to and after Oslo. This article, in contrast, seeks to better understand the application of “track two” diplomacy to the Israeli–Palestinian case. It reports on a self‐reflection effort by numerous Israeli–Palestinian peace practitioners to better understand what has worked, what has not, and how new initiatives could be more effectively organized and carried out in the future. The research presented is based on an inventory of seventy‐nine track two projects that occurred between Israelis and Palestinians between 1992 and 2004, personal interviews with many of those who organized and oversaw these projects, and two focus group meetings that brought together a total of forty practitioners.In this article, we seek to better understand two issues: (1) how track two initiatives have changed in scope, organization, and intent; and (2) how track two practitioners have sought to disseminate their work beyond the participants of those initiatives. Our findings present an overall picture of the Israeli–Palestinian second track practice and identify a number of trends and common types of practice.Among the trends we have identified are the following: during the peace process years, more track two initiatives were undertaken with elite/professional participants than with representatives of the grassroots, but in the subsequent decade‐and‐a‐half, Israeli–Palestinian grassroots, track two initiatives gradually replaced senior‐level track two exchanges; most of the grassroots initiatives we studied were relationship focused, whereas those involving elite participants are outcome focused; the track two community subscribes to a set of theoretical propositions about which conditions and contexts facilitate the transmission of track two insights and ideas to the political process, but these propositions have yet to be validated; and track two specialists do little strategic planning about ways to most effectively transfer track two insights and ideas to the political process. Our research also identified four distinct, but not mutually exclusive, approaches to practice: the psychological, the constructivist, the capacity building, and the realistic interest.

Obama, Palestine, and the United Nations

How and why did President Obama betray his own commitments to a just Israeli-Palestinian peace process?

Political geography and grassroots conflict resolution

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict is well known and understood within the intricacies and intractability that it possesses. The political geography of the region known as the Holy Land has been debated by elites since before the establishment of the state of Israel. Demographic realities have altered the geopolitical definitions of what is defined as Israel and Palestine. Currently, there is a fresh push by political elites to achieve new political resolutions that will respect the aspirations of both the Israelis and Palestinians. This process has been bogged down by new demographic realities specifically in the West Bank. An alternative mode of negotiations known as the ‘Minds of Peace’ experiment or MOPE uses a grassroots approach to try the overcome stumbling blocks in the current Israeli–Palestinian peace process. The MOPE experiment provided fresh and valuable perspectives on the conflict. This article discusses reflections of the author on this new and innovative approach to peacemaking.