Reviewed by: Turkey’s State Crisis: Institutions, Reform, and Conflict by Bülent Aras Michael B. Bishku Turkey’s State Crisis: Institutions, Reform, and Conflict. By Bülent Aras. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2022. ISBN: 9780815637349. 146. In the United States, many people are tired of the polarization and divisiveness in politics that has become the norm in recent years. Yet, despite four years’ experience (2017–2021) with a president possessing autocratic tendencies, and continued partisanship in Congress, even over supposedly non-partisan issues, the strength of American institutions has generally prevented the worst results, even though there is still need for reform as is the case with every country in the world. Turkey, as Bülent Aras expounds upon, is in dire need of political reform as its institutions are ill-suited to efficiently handle the country’s pressing problems, while facilitating the increasingly autocratic behavior of its president (and former prime minister) Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. He is the leader of the Islamist Justice and Development (AK) Party, which, in the last few years, has been in an electoral alliance with the Nationalist Action Party, and has had dissension by leading figures within its ranks leading to defections. At the same time, the opposition has been divided. Many who have vigorously opposed Erdoğan’s policies or have written unfavorable reports about the activities of his administration, especially since the failed coup of July 2016, have been labeled unpatriotic at best and a threat to the security of the state at worst, facing loss of jobs and/or prison, or having to seek exile. That is to say that the state has employed either co-optation or coercion, rather than accommodation in the domestic arena, while foreign policy has become a battleground for domestic schisms and an area where there is a lack of long-term planning, leading to inconsistent short-term fixes or blunders. After identifying the problems with the state and institutions, including in internal conflict resolution and in addressing foreign policy and security issues, Aras offers recommendations for reform. He begins the initial chapter by stating that “Turkey has faced recurrent political crises since early Turkish modernization,” (p. 6) which one assumes means since the reign of Ottoman Sultan Selim III, but then proceeds to almost focus on [End Page 97] the rule of Erdoğan exclusively and the AK Party, especially during the last decade. These crises have involved the “conflict between the center and periphery,” manifesting itself as a “never-ending power game between the military-judiciary bureaucracy and the political elite.” (p. 8) As for the time period since the Second World War, Aras asserts that the “quality of Turkish democracy has been dubious at best.” (pp. 6–7) The AK Party promised further democracy and liberalization, but especially since the adoption of the presidential system following the failed coup of 2016, instead has brought “authoritarianism, centralization of state power, and the rebuke of no majoritarian interests.” (p. 7) According to Aras, the new system minimizes “checks and balances” as the office of the president has “overwhelming control over” the three branches of government and turned parliament into a “virtual nonplayer.” Aras contrasts this time with the AK Party’s early years in power when Turkey began membership talks with the European Union, giving the National Security Council (MGK), which had been dominated by the military, more influence from civilians, and allowing for more open debate on the Kurdish, Cypriot, and Armenian issues. Thus, the AK Party, in Aras’ words, “seemed to have normalized the perennial question of the compatibility of Islam and democracy.” (p. 9) While this was certainly true among segments of Turkish society and the impression of Western leaders, at least in public, there were secularists and nationalists who were still quite distrustful of the AK Party’s intentions, but this political opposition was fragmented. Meanwhile, the AK Party was assisted by the Gülen movement as both feared the power of the military and judiciary, the former of which they proceeded to weaken through trials and the latter through a referendum. This alliance began breaking down first with differences over the Mavi Marmara incident in May...
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Jan 1, 2023
Hussein Idrisov + 2
Open Access
