Tatarstan-an autonomous ethnic republic within the Russian Federation dominated by traditionally Muslim Tatars-was at the forefront of nationalist mobilization in the late 1980s and early 1990s. From 1990 to 1993, against a background of political rivalries in Moscow (first between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, then between Yeltsin and the parliament), the republic's leadership enjoyed virtual independence and consolidated its position vis-a-vis the federal government to win extraordinary concessions in a power-sharing treaty between the republic and Russia's central government. The republic's leadership insisted on being an equal partner with Moscow; retained a substantial share of federal taxes for the local budget; and enacted local laws that sometimes contradicted federal law.1 Tatar ethnicity and (especially) proficiency in the Tatar language were essential for advancing in many types of careers in the republic. Until recently, three-quarters of the Tatarstani legislature's (Gossovet) members were ethnic Tatars, even though Tatars barely constituted a majority of the population. During his tenure, however, Russian President Vladimir Putin slowly eroded Tatarstan's independence. Putin rescinded all Tatarstani laws found to contradict federal law and enforced fiscal discipline, and the Moscow headquarters of the ruling United Russia Party demanded its Tatarstani representatives revise the Gossovet's ethnic composition.2Although the Russian federal leadership's reasons for making these changes are clear, their methods of doing so without encountering substantial resistance from the republic's leadership or the Tatarstani nationalist movement's popular leaders are not. I use the example of Tatarstan to examine the ease with which the cental government regained the ground lost to some ethnic republics during the Gorbachev-Yeltsin conflict and Yeltsin's first term as president. Because Tatar nationalism and Islamic tradition were so instrumental to Tatarstan after 1991, I also examine the history of the Volga republic's Islamic renaissance, and the prospects of politicized Islam.Stage One: A Game of NationalismIn the late 1980s, as the Soviet grip on free speech and political organization loosened, nationalistic Tatarstanis mobilized to improve the status of the republic and their native culture. After Russia declared sovereignty on June 12, 1990, Tatarstan sought to elevate its status from an autonomous region within the Russian Federation to a union republic within the Soviet Union. Tatarstan and other autonomous regions, such as Chechnya, Bashkortostan, and Yakutia, profited greatly from Gorbachev and Yeltsin's 1989-91 rivalry. In the context of this power struggle, Yeltsin suggested in 1990 that the leaders of Tatarstan take as much independence as you can-warning if they seceded, the decision will be final.3 However, even after the Soviet Union's collapse and Gorbachev's fall from power, Yeltsin did not focus on reining in autonmous Russian regions, instead wrestling with the parliament over constitutional powers and economic reforms.Meanwhile, before concluding a power-sharing treaty with Moscow on February 15, 1994, Tatarstan enjoyed virtual independence. The republic's government, under the leadership of the experienced Communist bureaucrat Mintimer Shaymiev, artfully employed this independence to consolidate its position vis-a-vis Moscow.4 Within Tatarstan, President Shaymiev played a subtle game with the popular nationalist movement. Although he used the movement as a bargaining chip in his negotiations with Moscow to win more concessions by presenting himself as a nationalist leader, Shaymiev carefully engaged the movement to avoid the same fate as Communist elites in Chechnya, who were ousted by the nationalist movement. 5 Shaymiev proceeded to subdue and marginalize the nationalist movement, securing his grip on political power. At the same time, the republic's status began to resemble that of a union republic within the former Soviet Union. …
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