Iraqi Leader Research Articles

Securitization of the 2017 Kurdistan independence referendum

The Kurdish right to self-determination within Iraq has consistently been framed as a security issue by successive Iraqi governments. This paper applies securitization theory to analyze the Iraqi Government’s response to the Kurdistan Region’s unilateral independence referendum held on September 25, 2017. The referendum, which resulted in a strong vote in favor of independence, was viewed as a serious threat to Iraq’s unity by Iraqi Arab political and military forces, as well as Turkmen groups. In response, the Iraqi Government chose to take military action. On October 16, 2017, the Iraqi military, along with Popular Mobilization Forces (PM), launched an attack on Kurdish Peshmerga forces in the disputed territories, taking control of them. While many studies have explored various aspects of the Kurdistan referendum, including its timing, motivations, and consequences, there has been limited focus on how the Iraqi federal government’s securitization of the referendum facilitated military interventions in the contested territories. This article explores how Iraqi leaders’ rhetoric and securitizing language framed the referendum as an existential threat.

“There Should Be No Life”: Environmental Perspectives on Genocide in Northern Iraq

ABSTRACT This article examines the natural environment during the Kurdish genocide in northern Iraq. The genocide killed between 50,000 and 180,000 people and destroyed some 4,500 Kurdish villages from the 1960s to 1980s, reach peak violence during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88). The paper uses American, British, and Iraqi archival documents to analyse how the violence affected the natural landscape and how ecological conditions constrained the violence. Iraqi leaders regarded dams and other modes of environmental engineering as levers to facilitate agricultural modernization and social integration. Protecting and projecting hydraulic power justified greater military exertion. Iraqi leaders, frustrated by the lack of progress in development and hostile to the claims of Kurdish nationalism, resorted to more coercive options to combat guerrillas. But the inadequacies of military exertion prompted the government to redouble efforts to tame unruly nature and those who dwelled in it. This escalation contributed significantly to the lethal violence against rural Kurdish society. At a theoretical level, these findings highlight the troubling ways in which policies aimed to improve environmental conditions fold into campaigns of mass violence. The article also adds to understanding of violence in Iraq, showing how Iraq’s attempts to use environmental engineering for development intersected with security concerns and ethnic marginalization to create more intensive repression.

US Policy in the Persian Gulf in the 1980s

The article deals with the U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf region in the 1980s. During this period, the neoconservatives came to power in the U.S., which was the reason for the tightening of foreign policy. The administrations of J. Carter and R. Reagan began an unprecedented build-up of forces in the region, which was justified, in particular, by the Iran-Iraq war. The fall of the Shah’s regime in Iran after the 1979 revolution forced the U.S. to change allies. The author proves that during the Iran-Iraq war, the U.S. played a double game by supplying weapons to both warring countries. This policy caused a prolongation of the war. Weakening the two most important countries in the region was in line with the U.S. geopolitical objective: during the war, it played the role of “balancer” or “rejoicing third”. However, Washington’s official support for Baghdad led Iraqi leaders to believe that the U.S. would support them in the next aggression

Summaries

Summaries

The Cult of the Persuasive: Why U.S. Security Assistance Fails

Abstract Security assistance is a pillar of U.S. foreign policy and a ubiquitous feature of international relations. The record, however, is mixed at best. Security assistance is hard because recipient leaders are often motivated to implement policies that keep their militaries weak. The central challenge of security assistance, then, is influence. How does the United States aim to influence recipient leaders to improve their militaries, and what drives its approach? Influence in security assistance can be understood as an escalation ladder with four rungs: teaching, persuasion, conditionality, and direct command. Washington increasingly delegates security assistance to the Department of Defense, and the latter to the U.S. Army. U.S. Army advisers tend to rely exclusively on teaching and persuasion, even when recipient leaders routinely ignore their advice. The U.S. Army's preference for persuasion and aversion to conditionality in security assistance can be traced to its bureaucratic interests and to the ideology that it has developed—the cult of the persuasive—to advance those interests. A case study examines the bureaucratic drivers of the U.S. Army's persistent reliance on persuasion to influence Iraqi leaders to reform and strengthen the Iraqi Army. Qualitative analysis leverages over one hundred original interviews, as well as oral histories and recently declassified U.S. Central Command documents. The findings illustrate how the interests and ideologies of the military services tasked with implementing U.S. foreign policy can instead undermine it.

The Perception of Gender Equity: A Case of Iraq

Despite extensive research into women's leadership representation and roles, little is known about the role of women in Iraqi leadership and academics. Most of the literature on academic imperialism and the relegation of women to secondary roles in higher education is authored by Westernershus; thus, it may not accurately depict the level of gender inequality in academia. The aim of the current study is to explore the prospect of career progression for women in Iraq based on the insight presented by both male and female professionals. The study also sought to whether the interaction between lecturers and students was influenced by gender stereotypes and the inclusion of women in departmental administration. Hence, a quantitative research method was used, and data required to sufficiently address the research questions was collected using questionnaires. The sample population constituted of 59 male and female professionals and 114 students of both genders and across departments. The collected data was then analyzed on SPSS version 2.0. The research found that male employees had a better prospect of career progressions than their female counterparts; 57.6% of male professional participants strongly agreed that their prospect of career progression is high, while 50% strongly agreed to this prompt. Moreover, female lecturers reported that female students were freer with them than their male counterparts. Also, females felt less represented in departmental administration than their male counterparts. Although Iraq's academia has come a long way in bridging the gender inequality gaps, more still needs to be done for better female professionals' inclusion in leadership and administrative roles. The current study that future studies should be dedicated to finding the current challenges facing women academics.

‘Backstabbed by a Friend and Saved by an Enemy’: Narratives of War: The Gulf War in Saudi Oral Histories

The Gulf War (1990–1991) had a transformative effect on Saudi Arabia and its society. The war brought major ideological changes and allowed its citizens for the first time to voice critique and concern about economic and social problems. Many studies have highlighted the diverse reactions and dilemmas of Saudi people from the crumbling notion of Arab unity to the emergence of the United States to stop the looming invasion of the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. Although there is a plethora of studies about the Gulf War, none of them has investigated how ordinary Saudi citizens experienced the war with all its implications. The paper describes what narratives were used by interviewees in oral history interviews when talking about the war and its effect on their lives, families, and worldview.

How Does Israel’s Nuclear Posture Work? The Case of Saddam Hussein, 1978–1991

This article explores the role played by Israel’s unique nuclear posture in the Arab-Israeli inter-state conflict over the past five decades since Israel became an undeclared nuclear state. It is the first attempt of its kind to conduct an historical analysis that aims at exploring both the Israeli and the Arab side, as it pertains to the effects of Israel’s nuclear deterrence. It is argued that over the years Israel adopted a multi-layered deterrence model: overt conventional and covert nuclear deterrence. The conventional deterrence was meant to dissuade Arab countries from threatening Israel’s strategic interests, while the nuclear deterrence was meant to forestall threats to the state’s intrinsic interests. The empirical research on Israel’s nuclear deterrence from the perspective of the deterred country – Iraq under Saddam – substantiated this study’s main thesis, namely that Israeli nuclear deterrence played a central role in the decision-making processes of various Arab national leaders, despite the policy of opacity that Israel adopted in the nuclear sphere. The Saddam Hussein documents reveal the “smoking gun” – extensive evidence that the Iraqi leader perceived Israel’s nuclear capability as the greatest obstacle to Iraq and to the other Arab countries interested in continuing the war against Israel.

The problems of 2017 Kurdistan Region independence referendum

This article sheds light on the situation related to 2017 Kurdistan Region independence referendum. Leaning on the primary sources, it is demonstrated that the party officials of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan warned the leadership of the Kurdish Regional Autonomy of Iraq represented by the Kurdistan Democratic Party about the consequences of shortsighted policy. The disputed territories, which are the subject of discussion between the leadership of the Autonomy and Baghdad, were controlled by the troops of the Central Government. The Iraqi leadership has also reduced the funds from the federal budget for supporting the government employees of the Autonomy. It resulted in payment arrears and mass disturbances in the Autonomy. The novelty of this research lies in the fact that this topic has not previously received due attention in the Russian sources. This article is first within the Russian Kurdish Studies to introduce the primary sources in Sorani (Kurdish dialect). It cannot be asserted that these problems have been resolved conclusively; the blame falls on the shortsighted and irrational policy of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, or even personally Masoud Barzani, who was removed from his office as result of the referendum. The representatives of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan denounced the detrimental consequences of holding the referendum in the existing conditions.

A New Structure For Security, Peace, and Cooperation in the Persian Gulf by Seyed Hossein Musavian

Reviewed by: A New Structure For Security, Peace, and Cooperation in the Persian Gulf by Seyed Hossein Musavian Kamal A. Beyoghlow A NEW STRUCTURE FOR SECURITY, PEACE, AND COOPERATION IN THE PERSIAN GULF by Seyed Hossein Musavian., New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2020, 183 pages. Hardback $120.00. Reviewed by: Kamal A. Beyoghlow, PhD, Prof of Int’l Security, The Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University This book is about a paradise lost and wishful thinking. It laments the passing of better relations in the Persian Gulf between Iran and its Arab neighbors, and argues that the time has come to end the current stalemate and eliminate the ongoing suspicion and hostility between the two camps at loggerheads. The central theme of this book is that given shared historical and cultural struggles of Persian Gulf states there is today a unique opportunity to mend fences in light of the growing reproachment and realignments between select Arab Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman with Israel against Iran. According to the author, his book, A New Structure for Security, Peace, and Cooperation in the Persian Gulf, is a blueprint towards building a new security architecture in the Gulf free from outside superpower and Great Powers competition and interference. The book is a determined appeal to Arab Gulf states to help reshape the structure of the Gulf region in Iran’s image and as a result, the book comes across as an idealistic attempt to fix the deep structural policy and strategic differences currently plaguing the Gulf. The author’s vision for a new security architecture is based on the notion that Gulf security challenges, threats, and vulnerabilities can and must be resolved through Gulf institutional mechanisms alone. The underlying assumptions is that there are indeed Gulf solutions to Gulf security problems. As such, the book may be short on realism. The book is divided into five chapters. The first chapter, entitled “Iran’s Relations with its Arab Neighbors” traces the historical relations between the Gulf states and Iran before and after the Iran Revolution of 1979 through four Iranian presidencies of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Mohammad Khatami, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and the current President, Hassan Rouhani. The author, significantly, served as Rafsanjani’s special envoy on Arab Gulf affairs and was tasked with improving relations between Iran [End Page 79] and its immediate Gulf neighbors. This chapter also is a hodgepodge of issues ranging from Iran’s changing domestic dynamics to addressing the historical roots and evolution of Wahabbism in Saudi Arabia to Iranian Shi’a political ideology and, ironically, even to former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s decision to go to war with Iran in 1980 and, finally, to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Moreover it analyzes energy politics and the inherent original schism between Iran and Saudi Arabia over OPEC oil production quotas, and energy policies and strategies. The gist of this chapter is that although relations between Iran and Arab Gulf states tended at times to be difficult and uncertain (e.g., during Ahmadinejad’s presidency), at other times, such relations were less contentious. The author attributed persistent tensions between Arab Gulf States and Revolutionary Iran to Sunni Arab fears of Shi’a hegemony, but more importantly, to a lack of understanding on the part of Arab Gulf states of Iran’s political system of manageable factionalism within its current ruling elite (p. 25). Chapter 2 outlines the grievances of Iran and Arab Gulf states against each other. Chapter 3 focuses on complex regional issues that hamper cooperation and coordination among Gulf states and assesses former President Trump’s tilt towards Israel against Iran and the subsequent Arab Gulf acquiescence to the Trump administration’s maximum pressure on Iran mostly through economic sanctions at the expense of the Palestinian cause. Chapter 4 is a compilation of disputes among the Arab Gulf states themselves and between the latter and Iran. This chapter also addresses many current tensions including the Saudi-UAE-Bahrain alignment against Qatar as well as the Arab Gulf states’ continuing concern over Iran’s strategy of exporting its style of revolutionary theocracy and subversion to its neighboring Sunni...

THE ROLE OF MEDIA IN PEACEBUILDING IN IRAQ AFTER ISIS

The victory over the territorial rule of the so-called Islamic State provides an opportunity for the government of Iraq to restore its state institutions and reassert its authority. Can the Iraqi leadership step beyond cycles of failure in this transition to tackle the systemic issues that sustain state weakness and promote the emergence of groups like ISIS? This paper aims to enlighten the challenges faced by Iraq after ISIS for the restoration of peace between minorities and religious groups, and coexistence after the myth, so that conflicts are going on between minorities and religious groups, particularly in Mosul and other cities under the control of ISIS, the state could not reconcile the displaced people. Correspondingly, this paper intends the focus and role of local, regional, and international media in the process of peacebuilding and coexistence in Iraq after ISIS.

The Position of Jimmy Carter's Administration about Iraq-Iran war in 1980 A Historical and Political Research

Following the demise of the Shah regime, Saddam Hussein capitalized on the deteriorating situation of Iran to attack the country in a bid to achieve a set of goals. He never thought that the war would last eight years. Before Iraq kicked off the conflict, Saddam and other Iraqi leaders had apparently gathered with American officials in Jordan. It is highly likely that Saddam declared war on Iran with the consent of the USA, though both sides categorically have rejected such accusations. Saddam seized the fallout of Iran-US relations to introduce himself as the guard protecting America's interests. Even if the US was not responsible for the ignition of the war, it liked it as Iran at the time had American hostages behind its bars, a crisis which emerged in November 1979. In the meantime, the new Iran emerged to portrait itself as a major foe of the US. Though Jimmy Carter chose neutrality amidst the conflict, it asked for an immediate pause. The equation, however, turned up side down soon after Washington started to assist Iraq. One indication is that, two months before the war started, Baghdad and the US had decided to normalize ties, but announcing it was delayed as the war had been looming in order to avoid miscalculations from other sides.
 Through the war, the US wanted to destroy the infrastructure of both sides in order to cripple them from emerging as two powerful regional states. Through third parties, Washington was selling arms to both sides. The US had even warned Iran of Iraq's military attack plan. The age of Carter's age came to an end shortly after the war began when he lost the elections to Ronald Reagan and that a new administration took office in January 1981.

Cheater's Dilemma: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Path to War

Between the 1991 Gulf War and the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, the Iraqi regime faced a cheater's dilemma: how much should it reveal of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities when each additional revelation made it less likely that the country would be rewarded, while continued denial also prevented the lifting of sanctions. The Iraqi leadership struggled to resolve this dilemma, as elites pursued competing policies and subordinates did not consistently obey Saddam Hussein's orders. These difficulties reflected principal-agent problems that were aggravated by the leadership's initial attempts to deny and cover up Iraq's WMD capabilities. Together, the cheater's dilemma and principal-agent problems explain a range of puzzling Iraqi behaviors that came across as calculated ambiguity to the outside world. These findings offer insights into the incentives and constraints that shape how other authoritarian regimes respond to external pressures to eliminate their WMD, and the extent to which they are willing and able to disclose information about past programs and their past efforts to conceal this information from the outside world.

Iraq, 2003–2011: succeeding to fail

ABSTRACT This study examines the US experience during the Iraq war, from the planning phase that began in 2001 to the withdrawal of US forces in 2011. It reveals a dearth of planning and intelligence leading up to the invasion; reluctance by conventional coalition military forces to conduct reconstruction, political and security capacity-building; and, later, full spectrum counterinsurgency operations. These forces took on some missions traditionally reserved for special operations forces, and they increasingly assumed diplomatic roles as they interfaced with the Iraqi leadership and local kingpins. Although these efforts yielded some impressive organizational learning and limited operational successes, they were hampered by lack of adequate preparation, a poor understanding of the human terrain, shortsighted strategies, and ultimately a dearth of political will to stay the course. The outcome was far from the model Middle East democracy envisioned by the invasion’s architects, and the American experience in Iraq instead became a cautionary tale for military intervention.

Hippocratic Diplomacy

“Hippocratic Diplomacy”—first, do no harm—is not the title of Jeffrey A. Engel’s masterful account of President George H. W. Bush’s conduct of foreign policy, but it could have been. Drawing on his vast knowledge of national security policy, as well as a treasure trove of recently released documents that he and other scholars have plumbed in the United States, Russia, Germany, Hungary, and several other countries, Engel has written the best book about the administration that adroitly oversaw the dissolution of the Soviet Empire, the reunification of Germany, and the thwarting of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s military campaign for regional domination. Bush took office in January 1989, after a political career heavy in domestic politics dating back to his two terms in Congress in the late 1960s, as well as in foreign policy as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, emissary to China, and CIA director. As the two-term vice president to Ronald Reagan from 1981 to 1989, Bush was active in both domains, campaigning extensively for Republican candidates while making more diplomatic trips than any vice president in history. But diplomacy was his first love. To Bush, politics was the price he had to pay to do foreign policy.

IRAQ: YEARS OF POST-SADDAM INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS

Iraqis very important for the world community because of its strategic position at the crossroads between the Persian Gulf, theMideteraneanSeaand theRed Seaalong with huge oil and mineral wealth. Moreover, Iraqi case illustrates all aspects of the US Middle Eastern policy since the end of the Cold War. The article analyses political and economic processes in Iraq after the demise of Saddam Hussain’s regime, evaluates the efficiency of post-war reconstruction of this Arab country in security and economic fields, singles out the reasons behind the civil war between Sunni and Shia followers, explains the paradox of semi-independent status of Iraqi Kurdistan as well as foreign policy of official Baghdad towards important neighbours – Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The rise of Islamic State of Iraq andLevantcapitalizing on sectarian devide and an attempt of Iraqi leadership to neutralize this threat also has become the part of analyzis.

تطبيق النظام الكونفدرالي كحل للقضية الكوردية في كوردستان الجنوبية

During the period leading up to the referendum in southern Kurdistan and after the referendum held many statements by the Iraqi leaders and officials, which implied that the establishment of a confederation may be acceptable to all parties and Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Abadi in response to the possibility of establishing a confederation in Iraq pointed out that this step needs to amend the constitution, that is, he did not reject the subject, but the fact that it can not be applied to amend the Iraqi constitution, on the other hand, media sources indicated that the Iraqi government has expressed preliminary approval to discuss this issue.

Conclusion

Conclusion

The Iraqi Occupation of Kuwait: New Historical Perspectives

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a critical juncture in both countries' histories. With unprecedented access to internal Iraqi documents about the invasion of Kuwait, this article underscores how the Iraqi leadership perceived Kuwait, assesses the Iraqi regime's objectives in Kuwait, and analyzes Kuwaiti resistance to the Iraqi occupation. The article ultimately aims to show that Iraq's policies of violence and dispossession in Kuwait were similar to tactics the Ba'thist regime had used before against internal opponents.

Faisal I of Iraq

Faisal I of Iraq