How Does Israel’s Nuclear Posture Work? The Case of Saddam Hussein, 1978–1991

Abstract

This article explores the role played by Israel’s unique nuclear posture in the Arab-Israeli inter-state conflict over the past five decades since Israel became an undeclared nuclear state. It is the first attempt of its kind to conduct an historical analysis that aims at exploring both the Israeli and the Arab side, as it pertains to the effects of Israel’s nuclear deterrence. It is argued that over the years Israel adopted a multi-layered deterrence model: overt conventional and covert nuclear deterrence. The conventional deterrence was meant to dissuade Arab countries from threatening Israel’s strategic interests, while the nuclear deterrence was meant to forestall threats to the state’s intrinsic interests. The empirical research on Israel’s nuclear deterrence from the perspective of the deterred country – Iraq under Saddam – substantiated this study’s main thesis, namely that Israeli nuclear deterrence played a central role in the decision-making processes of various Arab national leaders, despite the policy of opacity that Israel adopted in the nuclear sphere. The Saddam Hussein documents reveal the “smoking gun” – extensive evidence that the Iraqi leader perceived Israel’s nuclear capability as the greatest obstacle to Iraq and to the other Arab countries interested in continuing the war against Israel.