Abstract
AbstractThis chapter examines the theoretical principles that underpin conventional deterrence and its evolution in practice over the past century. It disaggregates conventional deterrence approaches into four strategic categories based on their geographic scope and the nature of the threats they employ, and focuses in particular on strategies of punishment through resistance to an invader on the battlefield. It concludes with an assessment of the strengths and limitations of conventional and nuclear deterrence, and a set of summary principles for conventional deterrence strategy makers.
Highlights
Other chapters in this volume discuss the nature and dynamics of deterrence in general, but four key points about it are worth reiterating before we delve into conventional deterrence in particular
Brute force can be an effective way to deal with security threats, especially when the enemy is weak or vulnerable, coercion is usually more attractive if it can be achieved, when successful deterrence means a war will not have to be fought
The development and proliferation of reliable precision-guided munitions (PGMs) enabled states with advanced air forces to inflict high levels of damage against enemy military and infrastructure targets without placing their own armies at risk, while stealth aircraft and modern long-range missiles limited the ability of air defences to protect against such attacks
Summary
In the world of national security, the term tends to be most readily associated with nuclear threats, but even in the nuclear age most military deterrence revolves around conventional capabilities. We practice and study deterrence in a wide variety of contexts ranging from nuclear crises to crime prevention, but here the focus is on deterring interstate and similar aggression: starting wars, launching other sorts of military attacks, and expanding or escalating armed conflicts.. We practice and study deterrence in a wide variety of contexts ranging from nuclear crises to crime prevention, but here the focus is on deterring interstate and similar aggression: starting wars, launching other sorts of military attacks, and expanding or escalating armed conflicts.3 Other chapters in this volume discuss the nature and dynamics of deterrence in general, but four key points about it are worth reiterating before we delve into conventional deterrence in particular. The long and lengthening tradition of non-use has made nuclear weapons recede into the background of many of the deterrent relationships is which they do play a role.
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