Impeded by Informality: The War Office, the Admiralty, the Canadian Militia and War Plans to Capture the French Islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, 1898–1903

Abstract

In November 1897, the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) North America and West Indies Station, Vice-Admiral Sir John Fisher, initiated plans to capture the French North American island group of St Pierre and Miquelon, using British garrison troops stationed at Halifax, Nova Scotia, and the Canadian Militia in a supporting role. His staff developed the scheme without consulting the Government of Canada or the War Office, and only brought the Halifax garrison commander into the planning process in October 1898, when the Fashola Crisis was in full swing. The War Office and the government of Canada eventually learned of the plans, which slumped along until 1903, but no one seemed sure who had the authority to deploy the Canadian Militia abroad. The plans were never executed, but the episode reveals a great deal about the dysfunctional state of British strategic planning in the late-Victorian period, especially between the War Office and the Admiralty, and the evolution of the dominion-imperial relations.